UK case law

Alison Pinnock v The Independent Office for Police Conduct

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2572 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely on 9 October 2026 ROBERT PALMER KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court: Introduction

1. The Claimant, Ms Alison Pinnock, challenges the decision dated 27 February 2025 of the Defendant, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (“ the IOPC ”), not to uphold her appeal against the outcome of her complaints about various officers of the Metropolitan Police Service (“ the MPS ”).

2. The IOPC is the continuation of the former Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was established by section 9(1) of the Police Reform Act 2002 (“ ”). It became known as the IOPC pursuant to an amendment to the 2002 Act section 9(1) made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017 with effect from 8 January 2018.

3. The essential basis of the Claimant’s appeal was that her complaints of harassment by the MPS had not been properly investigated. The investigation had centred on a complaint she had made in respect of an occasion in September 2015 when she was arrested in Walsall on suspicion of robbery by officers from the West Midlands Police (“ the WMP ”) at the request of the MPS, and then charged with battery (an offence of which she was later acquitted). Her central complaint is that the investigation of that complaint failed to take into account the fact that she had also complained of earlier events in which she felt she had been harassed by the MPS. In particular, she had complained about events which are said to have occurred at the London offices of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (“ the NMC ”) in 2013 to 2014. She viewed her arrest in September 2015 as being the continuation of a course of conduct by the MPS which she believed was aimed at disrupting her work as an advocate or “McKenzie friend” for a variety of individuals (including but not limited to the NMC). The MPS had rejected her complaint, finding that her September 2015 arrest had been wholly justified, but had failed to address the complaint concerning her treatment at the NMC. Her appeal to the IOPC against the MPS’s decision was not upheld.

4. The Claimant now seeks an order quashing the IOPC’s decision and requiring her complaint to be re-investigated encompassing all the complaints she has made about harassment by MPS officers. She further seeks an order that those events should be investigated alongside her complaint of harassment against officers the WMP on the occasion of her arrest in September 2015, which, by a separate decision dated 31 January 2025, the IOPC had already ordered should be further investigated and reconsidered.

5. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on 20 October 2025 by Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, limited to three of the Claimant’s six grounds. Permission was refused on three other grounds. On 27 January 2026, a renewed application for permission in respect of those remaining grounds was refused by Rory Dunlop KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court.

6. The Claimant represented herself at the substantive hearing on 2 July 2026, while Mr Danny Simpson, in-house solicitor for the IOPC, represented the Defendant. I allowed Mr Simpson to submit further written submissions on the applicable statutory regime by 6 July 2026. It had also become apparent at the hearing that the Claimant wished to make more extensive submissions in reply to Mr Simpson’s submissions than time would allow. I permitted the Claimant to make further written submissions in reply, which were duly filed and served on 10 July 2026. I am grateful to her and to Mr Simpson for their respective written and oral submissions. The factual background

7. The background to the Claimant’s complaints against the MPS and WMP officers extends back over a decade. It is necessary to set it out in some detail in order to understand the basis of the Claimant’s case. (1) The September 2015 arrest

8. On 2 August 2015, a motor insurance investigator named Mr Reynolds attended the front counter at Brixton police station, where he made a complaint against the Claimant to the MPS.

9. Mr Reynolds gave the following account. He stated that he had been asked to attend the Claimant’s home address to obtain a statement from her regarding a car accident for which an insurance claim had been made. An appointment had been arranged to which she had agreed. On arrival, he had introduced himself but from the start the Claimant had been rude and uncooperative. She refused either to provide a statement or to provide any driving documentation. Mr Reynolds asked if he could take photographs of her car, but she had responded that he could not. Eventually he had left. He went downstairs back to his car and returned some of his files there. He took a file over to the Claimant’s damaged car that he was investigating, a Vauxhall Zafira. He was jotting down the damage only, not taking photographs. However, the Claimant had then come downstairs and got very angry with him: she thought he was taking photographs, but in fact he was just writing notes. She rejected his denial that he was taking photographs. She got verbally aggressive and grabbed the file that Mr Reynolds had in his right hand. She then grabbed his left shoulder, span him around and pushed him to his right hand side, causing him to fall on the ground. He had grazed his right elbow and knuckles. The file ripped: he was left with a small corner but the Claimant had the substantive part. The Claimant got into her vehicle with the file, and drove away leaving Mr Reynolds in shock.

10. No witness statement was taken from Mr Reynolds at this time, as there was only one officer on the desk at the front counter. However, the officer recorded the essentials of Mr Reynolds’ account on the Crime Report Information System (“CRIS”) within 30 minutes of his attendance at the station. On the evening of the same day, the appointed Officer in Charge (“OIC”) of the investigation, DC Rudd, telephoned Mr Reynolds at home and took a full account over the telephone, which he also recorded on the CRIS. Mr Reynolds volunteered that he was an ex-police officer, and suggested completing his own MG11. (He subsequently did so, on 6 August 2015.) He told the OIC that he would like action to be taken against the Claimant, but agreed that the situation should be kept in proportion and said that he would happily agree with an out of court disposal if it were appropriate.

11. Having taken that account, DC Rudd telephoned the Claimant on the same evening to ask her to attend the police station voluntarily for an interview under caution (without being arrested). He recorded on the CRIS that the Claimant was confrontational and rude in response. She denied that any assault had occurred and said that CCTV would prove her innocence. She then told DC Rudd that if he wanted to speak to her he would have to arrest her. DC Rudd recorded: “I have advised her bluntly that this is what will likely happen.” He noted that it was apparent that the Claimant had no interest in cooperating with the investigation, and that her confrontational approach left him with no other option than to arrest her when he had the key evidence at his disposal. DC Rudd later formally recorded these exchanges in a witness statement dated 14 August 2015.

12. On 14 August 2015, police obtained CCTV of the alleged incident. An officer recorded that it showed that the offence had occurred. DC Rudd noted that it appeared that the Claimant spent her time between London and Birmingham, usually being in London at the weekend. He recorded that arrest enquiries would be made the following week.

13. On 21 August 2015, officers attended the Claimant’s London address in order to arrest her. Her lodger stated that she was in Birmingham but that she would pass on the police officers’ phone number to her. She duly did so, and the Claimant called the police later that day. DC Rudd explained the reason for the visit. The Claimant stated that she was up in Birmingham visiting a sick family member and was prepared to give details of her location there. She said she was willing to cooperate but that she was not willing to come voluntarily to a police station. She said she would rather be arrested. She said that the reason for this was that she had been harassed by the MPS in the past, and so wanted the matter to be fully on record. DC Rudd explained that the transparency of the process would not be affected either way by arrest or voluntary attendance, but noted that the Claimant appeared adamant that she would not attend for interview voluntarily. Given that this was a “low level assault”, and that the Claimant had said that she was tending to a very ill family member, DC Rudd noted that he did not propose to contact WMP and ask for their assistance: she would be arrested on her return to London.

14. On 6 September 2015, an officer made a further attempt to arrest her at her London address. A resident in the block reported that she had not seen the Claimant in a while and thought that she was still “up north” but did not know where. The officer called the Claimant again, without answer. Later that day, an officer completed the paperwork necessary to circulate the Claimant’s details for arrest anywhere, but it was not authorised at that stage as no Inspector was available.

15. On 7 September 2015, the Claimant attended Kennington police station on an unrelated matter (she had been the victim of a theft). As her details had not been circulated at that stage, her attendance did not lead to her arrest in connection with the alleged incident concerning Mr Reynolds.

16. On 8 September 2015, circulation of the Claimant’s details as a person wanted for arrest was authorised by an Inspector. It is to be inferred that they were circulated at some point on or after this date.

17. On 22 September 2015, WMP officers attended the address linked to the Claimant’s family in Walsall, where they arrested the Claimant. She made no reply to caution. She was booked in at Bloxwich police station. DC Rudd then travelled from Brixton to interview her. DC Rudd’s notes on the CRIS record as follows: i) Although not present at the time, DC Rudd understood that following her arrest and initial risk assessment, the Claimant had been seen by the custody nurse and declared fit for detention and interview. (This is also reflected by the custody record.) ii) The Claimant told DC Rudd that she had informed the custody officer that she was very tired and suffered from PTSD. iii) The Claimant initially declined to have her fingerprints taken: she had politely and articulately told DC Rudd that she did not recognise the law allowing the police to take her fingerprints. Although she did not want to cause problems, she could not voluntarily offer them. Nor would she be signing any documents in custody. iv) The Claimant complained about her arrest: she had apparently been under the impression that the matter would not be dealt with during ongoing care for her grandfather. DC Rudd had no idea where the Claimant had gained that impression given that she had been told on more than one occasion that she would be arrested if she was unwilling to participate in a voluntary interview. Nonetheless, he formed the impression that she was intelligent, articulate, and willing to discuss the matter. v) The Claimant and her solicitor were given full disclosure of the evidence, including the CCTV footage, following which the Claimant was interviewed. The details of the allegation made against her by Mr Reynolds were explained to her. The Claimant responded that she did not have the capacity to articulate her position, and that she suffered from PTSD which made her “foggy” and which affected her memory. She said that the PTSD was sometimes “triggered” by something. She added that she had been harassed by the police in the past and she felt that this incident (and interview) was “subject to those events and the corresponding effect of [the police] harassing [her].” vi) The Claimant was asked whether she was saying that she could not remember the incident in question. She replied that that was not what she had said, but that she could not go further into it. She then said that she had not had any disclosure about the incident previously, but now that she had seen the CCTV she understood what was alleged. Following a further consultation with her solicitor, she was asked if she wished to add anything further. She said that she did not “feel able to perform properly” and had trouble remembering. She said that she was “very tired” due to being up in the night as her grandfather was terminally ill. She added that this was “compounded” by having had to wait in custody, although she understood that the officer had had to come from London. She explained that her detention in custody had, essentially, exacerbated her lack of ability to perform in the interview. vii) The Claimant then went on to say that there had been a previous interaction with the police at the NMC’s London offices where two officers had “pulled” her out of the building causing her injury. She added that she did “advocacy” work that was subject to “apparent problems” and these were “harassing and stressing her out.” She said that she could not go any further into what she meant by this. [She does not appear to have been taken by interviewing officers at this time as raising a complaint within the meaning of the 2002 Act ; certainly, no action to record such a complaint was taken at this time by any officer.] viii) Further questions challenging her apparent unwillingness to provide her own account of the incident did not progress matters. She remained silent in response to questions putting the detail of Mr Reynolds’ account to her. She denied being guilty of robbery (on suspicion of which she had been arrested, given the allegation included elements both of battery and of theft of Mr Reynolds documents), but provided no further details of the incident nor any commentary on the CCTV footage. ix) Following the interview, the Claimant was charged with battery (a charge of robbery, requiring trial on indictment, unsurprisingly being thought to be disproportionate). She was released on bail. x) In his notes on the CRIS explaining the charging decision, DC Rudd recorded his view that the Claimant had provided no account in her defence. The mitigation she had provided, including her allegation that her arrest was linked to general harassment against her by the police, had not been adequately explained. He observed that “the matter of harassment is a side issue not relevant to this case and is unlikely to provide any kind of mitigation at all.”

18. On 21 October 2015, the Claimant appeared at South London Magistrates Court and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge against her. A summary trial was set down for 9 March 2016. On the day of that trial, an ambulance was called to the court after the Claimant was taken ill. It transpired that she had suffered as stroke. The matter was adjourned to 13 July 2016, when the charge is recorded as having been dismissed.

19. In the meantime, the Claimant did not at this stage pursue a complaint about her treatment either on her arrest or in relation to matters which pre-dated that arrest. She told me in her oral submissions that at the time, she had nonetheless expected that the police would contact her and progress a complaint given her allegation of harassment during the interview, but that had not happened. She told me that she was still waiting for contact from the MPS even after she had suffered a stroke at the summary trial. (2) The Claimant’s first appeal to the IOPC

20. On 14 August 2019, over three years after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against her, the Claimant made a telephone call to the MPS to make what she has referred to as “continued and new complaints relating to the ‘conduct’ of police officers associated with my arrest on 22 September 2015”. She contended that her arrest was unlawful and unreasonable in the circumstances. She further complained that the decision of the Police and the CPS to progress the case to trial was also unlawful, disproportionate and had culminated in her being injured as she had had a stroke on the day of the scheduled trial on 9 March 2016.

21. On 22 August 2019, the MPS responded to say that the complaint was out of time, as it was made more than 12 months since the incident complained of. They required the Claimant to show why the investigation of her complaint should not be discontinued, by 13 September 2019.

22. On 13 September 2019, the Claimant emailed the police with the requested information. However, on 3 October 2019, the MPS replied that she had not responded in time and that the Chief Inspector had decided to discontinue the investigation of her complaint and take no further action. This was subsequently referred to as “ the disapplication decision ”.

23. On 9 October 2019, the Claimant appealed to the “DPS Appeals Unit” of the MPS, on the grounds that there had been an error, in that she had sent the requested information by 13 September 2019.

24. On 11 October 2019, the MPS responded to the effect that due to the nature of her original complaint, the matter must be dealt with by the IOPC. Her appeal had accordingly been passed to the IOPC.

25. On 14 October 2019, the IOPC contacted the Claimant to tell her that they would investigate the matter.

26. On 11 November 2019, the IOPC sent a final decision to the Claimant, by which it decided not to uphold her appeal. It had not disclosed the fruits of its investigation to the Claimant before doing so, or sought her comments upon any material provided by the MPS.

27. In February 2020, the Claimant sought judicial review of the IOPC’s decision, and was granted permission on the single ground of procedural unfairness on 27 October 2020. The IOPC subsequently consented to the quashing of the decision of 11 November 2019, and to re-make its decision following consideration of further representations by the Claimant. This led to the information which the police had provided to the IOPC being disclosed to the Claimant on 15 March 2021.

28. The Claimant provided her representations on that material on 11 April 2021.

29. By a fresh decision dated 20 September 2021 (“ the disapplication appeal decision ”), the IOPC upheld the Claimant’s appeal against the disapplication decision. Although the complaint had not been made within 12 months of the incident, the decision-maker considered that she had provided enough information about her medical condition and her caring responsibilities for her grandfather to establish that she could not have made the complaint sooner. Further: i) The decision-maker noted that within her representations dated 12 April 2021, the Claimant had explained that her complaint was a “continuation” of the complaint that she had made in custody which had been logged in the crime report [on the CRIS]. She had stated: “I did complain at the time of my arrest on 22 September 2015, while being held in custody, during the Police Interview; and before and beyond my arrest. A Metropolitan Police officer had travelled from London to interview me. The IOPC bundle makes clear that the interviewing officer had no doubt that he had received a complaint about harassment from me, where the arrest and other elements formed harassment as I had intimated/expressed. My complaints were unlawfully dismissed as a ‘side issue’.” ii) The decision-maker noted that it had been recorded on the CRIS that the Claimant felt harassed by police in the past and felt that her arrest was linked to general harassment against her by the police. The decision-maker concluded that, whilst it was noted that the Claimant had provided insufficient information to support her concerns raised during the interview, it did not appear that they had been properly explored to ascertain if she wished to make a formal complaint at the time. Nor was it clear how it had been, or could have been, concluded that the concerns raised during the interview did not amount to a complaint. If further clarity was needed, this should have been explored through a complaint handling process, outside of the investigation.

30. The appeal was therefore upheld, and the MPS was directed “to complete a local resolution or investigation into [the Claimant’s] complaint in line with Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act.”

31. I note that although the Claimant’s written representations of 11 April 2021 made no express reference to the alleged NMC incident in 2013 or 2014, the decision-maker for the disapplication appeal picked up on the Claimant’s oblique reference to it: the complaint of harassment made during the interview of 22 September 2015 was said by her to have been based on her arrest “and other elements”, which had been treated as a “side issue”. (3) The MPS investigation

32. On 29 October 2021, the MPS investigator charged with complying with the IOPC’s decision dated 20 September 2021 sought to agree with the Claimant the matters which would be the subject of the new investigation, by identifying various heads of complaint. On 3 November 2021, the Claimant responded, redrafting some of the heads of complaint and adding others.

33. On 4 November 2021, the investigator responded. i) She identified ten matters which would be the subject of her investigation. They largely concerned the decision to arrest the Claimant, the conduct of the investigation, and the effect that the arrest and subsequent charges had had on her. They included as the third head of complaint: “You feel that you have been harassed by the MPS as you were arrested and from the discussions that were had with the OIC prior to the arrest.” This formulation reflected her original drafting of 29 October 2021, thus rejecting the amendments that the Claimant had made to it. ii) The investigator also set out five complaints about her treatment by the WMP while in custody, which she explained would have to be raised directly the WMP. iii) The investigator set out a list of matters that she considered were outside the scope of the complaint and of the IOPC’s direction. These largely concerned complaints about matters which had led to the MPS’s original decision that the Claimant’s complaint had been out of time. It was said that a new complaint would need to be raised if the Claimant wished those matters to be investigated.

34. By return of email, the Claimant maintained her view that the heads of complaint should be more extensive than those which the investigator had identified.

35. On 11 February 2022, the investigating officer sent the Claimant a new list of 11 heads of complaint which would be investigated. She confirmed that five other matters would need to be dealt with by the WMP, and listed fourteen other issues raised by the Claimant which she considered to be out of scope. Of the heads of complaint to be considered, the third had now been amended to reflect the Claimant’s own drafting: “You feel that you were harassed by the Metropolitan Police and Police at Bloxwich Police Station (in connection with the instructions given by the Metropolitan Police/OIC) due to you being arrested and incident(s) that had occurred prior to the arrest ” (underlining added). Again, there was no express reference there to the allegations relating to the NMC, but the Claimant contends that those matters were implicitly referred to by inclusion of the words “incident(s) that had occurred prior to the arrest”. (4) The complaint against the West Midlands Police

36. Meanwhile, on 23 November 2011, following the above exchange with the MPS investigator, the Claimant made a complaint to the West Midlands Police. This complaint concerned her treatment while in custody on 22 September 2015 at Bloxwich police station. It included allegations that she had not been able to call her son or grandfather in custody, that a male had attempted to inject her with insulin for no medical reason, that she had not been provided with an appropriate adult while in custody, that damage had been caused to her jacket, and that her fingerprints had been taken without her consent as a result of her having been “unlawfully arrested”.

37. On 3 May 2022, the WMP decided to take no further action on the complaint: it had been investigated and found to be without foundation. The Claimant had been permitted a phone call to her mother, had not received medical treatment, had had a full risk assessment leading to the conclusion that no appropriate adult was needed, had not suffered any damage to her coat, and had been required to give her fingerprints in accordance with PACE. She was offered the opportunity to apply for a review by the IOPC. (5) The MPS’s first decision to dismiss the Claimant’s complaints

38. On 16 May 2022, the MPS dismissed the Claimant’s complaints. In very broad summary, it was considered that the police (and DC Rudd in particular) had acted appropriately in investigating the criminal allegation that had been made by Mr Reynolds. Further, DC Rudd had offered the Claimant a voluntary interview which would have avoided the need for any arrest and custody, but the Claimant had declined to attend. She had made clear that she would have to be arrested if the police wished to interview her about the allegation. DC Rudd had sought to accommodate her availability but after making attempts to arrest her at home in London, was required to progress the investigation. This had resulted in the decision to ask the WMP to arrest her in Walsall. There had been no failure to act impartially. The arrest had been lawful. So far as the third head of complaint about harassment was concerned, the MPS found that the Claimant’s arrest had not been an act of harassment. Both the arrest and subsequent custody at Bloxwich Police Station had been conducted with lawful authority. There was, however, no reference to the suggestion made in the IOPC’s first appeal decision that there ought to have been further investigation of the allegation made by the Claimant when in custody of a previous history of harassment at the NMC.

39. On 13 June 2022, the Claimant appealed to the IOPC in respect of both the MPS and WMP’s decisions to dismiss her complaints. (6) The Claimant’s appeal to the IOPC in respect of the WMP complaint

40. On 30 January 2023, the IOPC upheld the Claimant’s appeal against the WMP’s decision on some but not all grounds: it identified a procedural flaw in that the WMP had not consulted the Claimant before making its decision. The Claimant sought judicial review of that decision on the grounds that it did not go far enough: the IOPC had failed to consider her complaint that the WMP had unlawfully arrested her and that WMP officers had harassed her whilst in custody, and should not simply have remitted the matter to the WMP on the grounds of a procedural flaw. In a response to her Letter Before Claim, the IOPC offered to consent to judgment on that basis, and to make a fresh decision. A consent order was made on 21 July 2023.

41. Reconsideration of that matter was delayed at the Claimant’s request, while she pursued a damages claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 . That claim was ultimately dismissed on 12 November 2024.

42. By a decision dated 31 January 2025, the IOPC upheld her appeal in relation to the WMP’s decision, in that the WMP had failed to contact the Claimant to discuss her complaint with her. This was a procedural flaw, as it was contrary to the requirements of paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and IOPC statutory guidance. In particular, the WMP had altered the wording of her complaints for “better reading”, but should not have done so without discussion. Moreover, in addition, the WMP did not appear to have considered the Claimant’s allegation in relation to being harassed by officers at Bloxwich Police Station, or her allegation that her arrest had been unnecessary and unlawful. This may have been the result of confusion between the MPS and WMP and a lack of understanding of her allegation, it was suggested. However, it was considered that this could have been clarified had the WMP contacted the Claimant with regard to the allegations. The allegation needed to be addressed by the WMP, notwithstanding that she had been arrested on behalf of the MPS. The allegations should now be the subject of a reasonable and proportionate investigation which included obtaining the Claimant’s account and revisiting their analysis. (7) The decision under challenge: the IOPC’s second decision in respect of the MPS complaint

43. On 27 February 2025, the IOPC decided not to uphold the Claimant’s appeal of 13 June 2022 against the outcome of her complaint to the MPS. This is the decision now under challenge in the present judicial review claim.

44. The decision-maker examined the MPS’s conclusions in respect of each of the eleven complaints it had considered in turn. The decision took into account not only the Claimant’s original grounds of appeal, but also some further written representations she had made on 24 January 2025 and 21 February 2025 following further document disclosure.

45. The IOPC found, again in broad summary, that there had been reasonable and proportionate grounds for the Claimant’s arrest, as the police had been required to obtain her account of the incident of which Mr Reynolds had complained. Numerous opportunities had been given for the Claimant to attend voluntarily to be interviewed, but those had been declined. The option of arrest was all that remained. DC Rudd had not made any decision as to the Claimant’s guilt in advance of the interview, but had followed reasonable lines of enquiry to establish what if any offences had been committed. Prompt investigation was required, and could not await her return to London at a time of her choosing. The Claimant had been aware of the nature of the allegation, and had the opportunity to review the CCTV footage of it by way of disclosure before the interview. The fact that she had not been arrested at Kennington police station when she attended there on an unrelated matter did not show that her later arrest was a form of harassment. Nor was the decision to refer the matter to the CPS for a charging decision unreasonable or a form of harassment, notwithstanding that the court might ultimately have taken a different view of what the CCTV evidence showed. There was insufficient evidence to show that the criminal investigation had caused the Claimant’s stroke. There was no evidence to show any inaccuracy in DC Rudd’s record that he considered her to have been “aggressive and rude” when he first contacted her. Any disclosure of her arrest following a future DBS check would be lawful.

46. So far as the Claimant’s third head complaint was concerned (i.e. that relating to past harassment as alleged in her police interview), the IOPC noted that the Claimant had raised in her appeal form an issue of “Whether certain behaviours/actions or omissions on the part of the police amounted to harassment”. The decision-maker again found that the Claimant’s arrest on 22 September 2015 and telephone contact leading to it had directly related to the ongoing investigation of the matters complained of by Mr Reynolds on 2 August 2015, and did not appear to be excessive or of a harassing nature. The decision-maker continued as follows (underlining added): “In your interview, following your arrest, you state that you had been harassed by the police in the past and that you felt this incident was ‘subject to those events and the corresponding effect of harassing (you)’. The CRIS report entry following your interview states that there was a previous interaction with the police at the Nursing and Midwifery Council where two officers pulled you out of the building causing you injury. However, this did not form part of your complaint allegation and has not been addressed by the IO. As a result, it cannot be addressed as part of this appeal. Should you wish to have this addressed, you would need to raise this with the police direct. The CRIS report contains an entry following your interview, in which it is recorded that during your interview you stated that ‘the harassment was stressing [you] out’. This comment followed questions from the officers in relation to whether you could remember the incident and could remember what had happened on 02 August 2015. It is clear that you were represented by a solicitor during your interview, and it is my understanding that no representations were made by your solicitor with regard to the officers’ behaviour being harassing during your interview. The appeal is not upheld in relation to this aspect.” (8) The present judicial review proceedings

47. On 15 May 2025, the Claimant filed the present judicial review claim in respect of that decision. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on the papers on three of her grounds only.

48. Permission was again refused in respect of the remaining grounds at an oral renewal hearing. At that hearing, directions were given in respect of disclosure of MPS material. They included a direction in respect of the Claimant’s allegation that she had been removed by police officers from the NMC on an unspecified date. On 28 January 2026, the IOPC therefore enquired of the MPS as to whether they had any record of this incident. On 19 February 2026, the MPS responded as follows: “The MPS has conducted a search covering the period from 2001 to January 2016 and found no crime reports indicating that Ms Pinnock was forcibly removed from the Nursing & Midwifery Council. Upon undertaking various different searches against several variations of Ms Pinnock’s full name and date of birth, the MPS has located four computer aided dispatch logs (“CADs”) dated 19th January 2014, 20th January 2014, 11th December 2013 and 26th November 2013 linking Ms Pinnock to the Nursing & Midwifery Council at 61 Aldwych, WC2. There are however no reports available detailing the outcome. Due to the passage of time, the CADs are no longer fully accessible, and the remarks cannot be viewed.”

49. The IOPC has since made clear to the Claimant in correspondence dated 8 May 2026 that, if the Claimant gave consent for it to do so, it would ask the MPS to record the complaint concerning the NMC for separate investigation. It has been said that that offer remains open. The statutory framework

50. Part 2 of the 2002 Act makes provision relating to complaints against the police. After making provision under section 9 for the continued existence of the IOPC, it sets out in section 10(1) the general functions of its Director General. Those functions include to secure the maintenance by (among others) the IOPC itself and chief officers of suitable arrangements with respect to the handling of complaints within the meaning of section 12.

51. Section 12(1) (so far as material, and as it applied at the time of the complaints in the present case) provides that Part 2 of the 2002 Act applies where a complaint about the conduct of a person serving with the police is made (whether in writing or otherwise) by (among others) a member of the public who claims to be the person in relation to whom the conduct took place.

52. Section 10(4) provides that it shall be the duty of the Director General to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred on him by Part 2 in the manner that he considers best calculated for the purpose of securing the proper carrying out of the Director General’s functions under section 10(1).

53. Section 22 empowers the Director General to issue guidance to chief officers and others serving with the police concerning the exercise of performance by them of any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed by or under Part 2, including those relating to the handling of complaints. Such statutory guidance was issued by the former IPCC in 2015 (and adopted by the IOPC); the IOPC issued updated guidance in 2020.

54. Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act makes provision for the handling of complaints and the carrying out of investigations. T he duty to record police complaints is contained in paragraph 2 of Schedule 3. It is the responsibility of Chief Officers of a police force, referred to as the “appropriate authority”, to record complaints against their own officers. Accordingly, complaints against different police forces may be investigated separately (as they were in the present case, by the respective Professional Standards Departments of the MPS and WMP).

55. Schedule 3 was amended with effect from 1 February 2020, with the result that complaints made to a particular police force before that date (as was the position in relation to the MPS complaint in the present case recorded in 2019) and complaints made after that date (as was the position in respect of the WMP complaint recorded in 2022) were subject to different regimes. The rules applying to the MPS complaint

56. At the material time, it was the duty of a Chief Officer to record any complaint made to him where he has determined he is the appropriate authority in relation to that complaint: paragraph 2(6) of Schedule 3.

57. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 provided that the appropriate authority should determine whether the complaint was suitable for being subjected to “local resolution”. If not, it should make arrangements to be investigated by the authority on its own behalf.

58. At this time, paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 provided for the “disapplication” of the requirements of the Schedule in certain circumstances. (Paragraph 7 was later repealed by the Policing and Crime Act 2017 with effect from 1 February 2020.) i) Paragraph 7(1) provided that if, in a case to which paragraph 6 applied, the appropriate authority considered (a) that it should handle the complaint otherwise than in accordance with the Schedule or should take no action in relation to it, and (b) that the complaint falls within a description of complaints specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of paragraph 7, then it may handle the complaint in whatever manner (if any) the authority thinks fit. ii) The relevant regulations were the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. Regulation 5(2)(a) specified complaints where the appropriate authority considered that “more than 12 months have elapsed between the incident, or the latest incident, giving rise to the complaint and the making of the complaint and either that no good reason for the delay has been shown or that injustice would be likely to be caused by the delay.” iii) Where an appropriate authority decided to handle the complaint in a way permitted by regulation 7(1) (including by taking no action in respect of it), paragraph 7(2) required the appropriate authority to notify the complainant of its decision. iv) Paragraph 7(8) then provided a complainant with a right of appeal to the IOPC against such a decision.

59. If and when it was determined that there should be an investigation, paragraph 16 of Schedule 3 applied, requiring an investigating officer to be appointed. Upon completion of their investigation, the investigating officer was required to submit a report to the appropriate authority under paragraph 22(2). The appropriate authority would then make its final determination under paragraph 24, and (pursuant to paragraph 24(7)) notify the complainant of the findings of the report, the determination the authority has made, and set out the complainant’s right of appeal under paragraph 25.

60. The version of paragraph 25 which was in force in respect of the MPS complaint provided for a right of appeal to the IOPC. Although this version was amended with effect from 1 February 2020 to provide for a right of “review”, the transitional provisions introducing this change did not apply where a complaint had come to the attention of the appropriate authority before that date: see regulation 3(1) of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 10 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020 No. 5).

61. Pursuant to paragraph 25, the Claimant had a right of appeal to the IOPC (a) on the grounds that she had not been provided with adequate information about the findings of the investigation or about any determination it made, (b) against the findings of the investigation and (c) against any determination of the appropriate authority relating to the taking (or not taking) of action in respect of any matters dealt with in the report on the investigation.

62. On such an appeal, the IOPC was required by paragraph 25(5) to determine (a) whether the complainant had been provided with adequate information, (b) whether the findings of the investigation needed to be reconsidered, and (c) whether the appropriate authority’s determinations are such that the IOPC considered to be appropriate.

63. Paragraph 25(8) provided that if on an appeal under paragraph 25, the IOPC determined that the findings of the investigation needed to be reconsidered, it shall either (a) review those findings without an immediate further investigation; or (b) direct that the complaint be re-investigated.

64. Mr Simpson accepts on behalf of the IOPC that on such an appeal the IOPC will decide (among other things): i) if the investigation dealt with all the complaints; ii) if the investigation was carried out in a proportionate manner and if enough evidence was gathered; and iii) if the right decisions have been made about whether or not the complaint(s) that have been investigated should be upheld (and if so what action taken). The regime applying to the WMP complaint

65. The statutory requirements for recording and handling complaints (as amended from 1 February 2020) provide that a complaint must be recorded if at any time the complainant indicates a wish for it to be recorded (paragraph 2(6A)(a)), and must be handled under Schedule 3 if (among other criteria) it alleges conduct by a person serving with the police that might amount to an offence or justify disciplinary proceedings (paragraph 2(6B)).

66. Paragraph 6(2A) of Schedule 3 provided that complaints must then be handled in such reasonable and proportionate manner as the appropriate authority determines. That may include either by making arrangements for the complaint to be investigated by the authority (as it must if at any time it appears that there is an indication that a person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings, or that there may have been an infringement of a person’s rights under Article 2 or 3 ECHR), or by notifying the complainant that no further action is to be taken in relation to the complaint: paragraphs 6(2B)-(2C). The appropriate authority determined in the present case that the complaints should be handled otherwise than by investigation and no further action taken.

67. Under this regime, the Claimant then had a right to apply to the IOPC for a “review” of the outcome of the complaint: paragraph 6A(2) of Schedule 3. On such a review, the IOPC was required to determine whether the outcome was a reasonable and proportionate outcome: paragraph 6A(4). If not, it may determine that it is necessary for the complaint to be investigated: paragraph 6A(5). The IOPC is further required to give notification of the outcome of the review and of its reasons for the determination to the complainant and the appropriate authority: paragraph 6A(9). The Claimant’s grounds for judicial review and submissions

68. The grounds upon which the Claimant has permission to apply for judicial review are her Grounds 1, 4 and 6.

69. Ground 1 is that the IOPC accepted that the Investigating Officer had failed to take explicit account of the Claimant’s own submitted evidence, but continued nonetheless to conduct its own “desktop investigation” of the Claimant’s complaint instead of remitting the matter back to be properly investigated by the MPS. Had it wished to investigate the matter for itself, it should have given the Claimant notice of that intention so that she could make representations directly to the IOPC accordingly. By proceeding directly to its own desktop investigation, it failed to understand that the Claimant’s complaint regarding events at the NMC was essential to her complaint of harassment taken as a whole.

70. In her oral submissions, the Claimant made clear to me that she did not accept that the police were bound to act upon or investigate the complaint made by Mr Reynolds. She told me that she felt that he had been “sent to criminalise” her, working on behalf of the police to stop her continuing with the advocacy work that she conducted (at the NMC and elsewhere) to support others “as a McKenzie friend”. She could not say whether DC Rudd was part of this coordinated harassment, but said that this is what should have been investigated. She accepted that the interview record was accurate, but contended that the arrest and subsequent prosecution was a relentless campaign that was not warranted, but had in effect been confected in order to harass her. All of this, she submitted, should have been properly investigated by the MPS, and could not adequately be dealt with on the basis of the IOPC’s “desktop investigation” in the absence of proper investigation by the MPS.

71. The Claimant’s complaint in her Grounds 4 and 6, which substantially overlap, is, in summary, that her complaint of harassment at the NMC has not been investigated properly: i) In the decision under challenge, the IOPC had declined to address her complaint relating to the NMC on the basis that it had not been part of her original complaint and had therefore not been addressed by the Investigating Officer. She submits that it had in fact been part and parcel of her original complaint of continuous and connected harassment. The fact that it should have been investigated as part of her complaint had already been recognised by the IOPC in the disapplication appeal decision. The failure to require a proper investigation of this aspect of the complaint was a clear error of law; it was not open to the IOPC now to conclude that a fresh complaint should be submitted. ii) She alleged that the email exchange of October to November 2021 between her and the investigating officer seeking to identify the heads of complaint which would be considered showed that the officer was once again trying to stop her from raising her complaints about the NMC incident. She had initially been reassured when the wording of her third head of complaint was restored to her desired wording on 22 February 2022: following this, she was expecting to be asked for more detail concerning events at the NMC. Instead, the MPS’s ultimate decision had looked at the events concerning her September 2015 arrest in isolation. After the IOPC had directed the MPS to investigate the earlier NMC incidents, there should have been an investigation into those matters. Since the MPS had failed to investigate them, the IOPC itself should have picked up on what she had said in her 2015 interview about the NMC events and determined whether that amounted to a complaint. The IOPC had lost itself in the chronology and failed to remember what they had told the MPS to investigate. iii) Had the earlier matters been investigated, that would have provided important context for the complaints she had made about the circumstances of her arrest in September 2015 and treatment while in custody. It could also have established that there had been a “course of conduct” amounting to harassment within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 . iv) Relief could not be withheld under section 31 (2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 , given the absence of investigation of this complaint.

72. I should also record further aspects of the Claimant’s submissions which, as I explain below, will not be considered further: i) First, in her submissions before me, the Claimant elaborated further on what she said had been a course of harassment conducted by the police against her. These included details of incidents which had not previously been raised in these proceedings. They included some very serious allegations, which the Claimant also accepted had not been the subject of a previous complaint. Despite the seriousness of the allegations, they are not relevant to the claim for judicial review in respect of the IOPC’s handling of the appeal relating to the complaints that had in fact been made to the MPS. I therefore do not refer to them further; it remains open to the Claimant to raise them with the police directly. ii) Second, the Claimant also gave me further details of what she said had occurred in 2013 or 2014 at the NMC. Again, these were details which had not previously been provided, and I do not regard them as relevant to the core of her complaint that, having raised the complaint of harassment, the matter should have been looked into further and investigated. iii) Third, it is to be recalled that permission to apply for judicial review was refused (both on the papers and on renewal) in respect of the Claimant’s Grounds 2, 3 and 5. Those grounds respectively related to: a) the alleged withholding of evidence relating to the Claimant’s attendance at Kennington police station on an unrelated matter, when she says she was told there was no warrant for her arrest; b) the breach of an alleged agreement that she would not be arrested while she was caring for her grandfather; and c) the claim that she had been arrested on suspicion of attempted robbery. I record these matters because, despite the fact that permission had been refused in respect of these matters, the Claimant’s written and oral submissions strayed into them. Again, I do not consider those matters further as, absent permission, they are not before me for determination and are unarguable in any event. The Defendant’s submissions

73. As to Ground 1, Mr Simpson submitted that it was not unlawful or unfair for the IOPC to review certain material which had not been considered by the MPS to decide if it had any impact on the determinations it had to make on the appeal: it lawfully concluded that it did not. It was not ultra vires for it to do so: paragraph 25(8) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act expressly gave the IOPC a power to consider such material for itself. To do so was in accordance with the IOPC’s duties under section 10 of the 2002 Act . The material concerned related to the first appeal to the IOPC regarding the original disapplication decision. None of it was original evidential material; nor did it contain any relevant information which had not been considered or which could have affected the appropriate authority’s decisions or the appeal.

74. As to Grounds 4 and 6, the IOPC’s case, in summary, is that it did not make findings or direct an investigation of the alleged prior incidents because they were not heads of complaint that the MPS had investigated. The NMC incident was not a matter that the IOPC had by its decision of 20 September 2021 required the MPS to investigate. It only required the MPS to seek clarity about the complaints that the Claimant wished to make. Clarity was indeed subsequently obtained in the heads of complaint as set out by the investigating officer on 20 February 2022, but none of those complaints included reference to the NMC; in the third head of complaint, the reference to “previous incidents” was plainly included to explain the context for the Claimant’s belief that her arrest on 22 September 2015 amounted to harassment by police officers and not as a free-standing complaint in its own right. The IOPC had no power to uphold an appeal under paragraph 25 of Schedule 3 on the grounds that the Claimant now wished to include different or additional heads of complaint. If the Claimant now makes a new and discrete formal complaint alleging misconduct by MPS officers using and/or contriving incidents at the Nursing and Midwifery Council and elsewhere to disrupt her providing services as a McKenzie friend, such a complaint must first be separately recorded, and then handled reasonably and proportionally. It remains open to her to bring such a complaint (the time limits formerly contained in paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 and regulation 5 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 having been repealed and revoked respectively).

75. Mr Simpson submits that in any event, the allegation relating to previous incidents was investigated reasonably and proportionately by analysing whether the evidence supported that the officers’ treatment of her in relation to Mr Reynolds’ crime report amounted to harassment. The Claimant’s allegation of harassment by officers in connection with her arrest was not upheld by the IOPC because the evidence did not support it; it could not therefore have been part of a course of harassment. It could not then have been reasonable and proportionate to investigate whether unspecified previous incidents amounted to harassment. Discussion

76. There are two main themes to the Claimant’s submissions. The first concerns the lawfulness of the IOPC’s conclusions in respect of the Claimant’s arrest in September 2015 on the basis of what is described as a “desktop investigation” (Ground 1). The second concerns the IOPC’s rejection of the Claimant’s appeal in respect of the MPS’s failure to investigate the NMC allegations (Grounds 4 and 6). (1) Ground 1: the IOPC’s conclusions in respect of the September 2015 arrest

77. Paragraphs 25(5)(b) and 25(8)(a) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act imposed a duty on the IOPC to consider whether the findings of the investigation needed to be reconsidered, and if so, a power to review those findings without an immediate further investigation: it was not required to direct that the complaint be re-investigated. As Mr Simpson submitted, the only potential flaw identified by the IOPC in respect of the Claimant’s complaint in respect of the arrest on 22 September 2015 was a failure to have regard to documentary material related to the first appeal to the IOPC regarding the original “disapplication decision”: in the decision of 27 February 2025, the IOPC commented that those documents should have been considered within the complaint investigation given that the Claimant had submitted them for review as part of the MPS’s investigation. It is clear, however, that the IOPC reviewed them as part of the appeal process and concluded that they made no difference to the outcome, and did not require the complaint to be re-investigated.

78. In light of the IOPC’s approach in that regard, and in view of the way in which the Claimant has advanced her first ground, I have reviewed the material in question carefully. I accept that none of it contained any new information which could arguably have affected this aspect of the MPS’s decision: it was principally concerned with the appropriateness or otherwise of the initial decision to disapply the Schedule 3 procedure on the grounds that the complaint had not been raised within 12 months of the incident complained of. That was all water under the bridge by the time of the decision of 27 February 2025. It did also refer to the substance of the Claimant’s complaints about her arrest on 22 September 2015, but where it did so it did not materially add to that which had already been considered by the MPS in the decision of 16 May 2022, being the decision under appeal. There was therefore nothing unlawful – whether by reason of irrationality or otherwise – in the IOPC’s decision not to uphold the appeal in this respect. Nor was there any procedural unfairness in the fact that the IOPC took account of this material in this way: it was all material which the Claimant had herself submitted, and to the extent that she wished to comment upon it as part of her appeal submissions, she had the full opportunity to do so.

79. On the basis of that material, the IOPC was in my judgment manifestly entitled to arrive at the conclusion in its decision of 27 February 2025 that the MPS had been right to find that the Claimant’s specific allegations about the conduct and motivation of MPS officers (and DC Rudd in particular) in seeking her arrest on 22 September 2015 were unjustified, and to decline to uphold the Claimant’s appeal in relation to those events. (I leave aside the conduct of the WMP while the Claimant was in custody at Bloxwich police station: this is a matter which the IOPC has directed should be further investigated. I need not say anything further about it.)

80. Strikingly, in her submissions to me the Claimant refused to accept that the MPS was justified even in seeking her arrest to interview her about the allegations made by Mr Reynolds. That is a hopeless contention. On any view, when Mr Reynolds attended the police station and made an accusation of battery against her, the MPS was bound to investigate the matter. Initial attempts to do so had – with Mr Reynolds’ full encouragement – been low key and proportionate: it was initially hoped that an informal resolution might be reached. DC Rudd made efforts to persuade the Claimant to attend for a voluntary interview (known internally as a “caution +3” to mean an interview under caution but not under arrest). The Claimant was clear that she would not do so, meaning that the police could not ask her for her account of events without arresting her. There is no feasible basis upon which either the MPS or the IOPC could or should have determined that the decision to arrest her was an act of harassment.

81. Once arrested, the allegations were properly put to the Claimant, but she declined to explain her own conduct or comment on the CCTV footage of the incident that was shown to her. As the Claimant fully accepted, the interview was properly recorded in the notes. There can be little criticism of the decision to charge her in such circumstances: there was a clear allegation of battery against her supported by CCTV evidence which the police judged was consistent with the complaint, and (at least at that stage) no answer to it had been provided by the Claimant despite the opportunity.

82. Pressed to explain how any of this action could have been motivated by a desire to harass her in order to dissuade her from carrying out her “advocacy work”, the Claimant suggested that Mr Reynolds could have been a police “plant” (noting that he had volunteered that he was a former police officer when offering to provide a witness statement in support of his complaint). This was despite the fact that she acknowledged that, as Mr Reynolds had reported to police, he had originally attended her property in order to carry out a genuine motor insurance investigation into a claim which had been made. She also agreed that she had subsequently refused to allow him to take photos of the vehicle in question, and that she had gone outside to confront him when she believed that he was in fact taking photographs. While she denied that this had led to her assaulting him (and was subsequently acquitted of having done so), none of this is remotely consistent with her suggestion of Mr Reynolds being a police “plant”. The suggestion is simply fanciful. The submission that the IOPC erred in failing to remit any of this back to the MPS for further investigation is in my judgment hopeless. (2) Grounds 4 and 6: The failure to investigate the NMC complaint

83. By contrast to the hopelessness of the above submissions, insofar as the Claimant’s grounds are directed to the failure to investigate the NMC complaint, they are in my judgment well founded.

84. First, the record of her interview on 22 September 2015 does clearly show that the Claimant alleged that she had previously been harassed by police officers at the NMC. DC Rudd was no doubt entirely justified (for the reasons I have already given) in treating that as irrelevant to the question of the Claimant’s guilt or innocence of the matters of which Mr Reynolds had complained on 2 August 2015: to that extent (and to that extent only), it was certainly a “side issue”. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept that there is any plausible basis upon which it could be said that the results of the investigation of the NMC complaint could shed light on the circumstances of the 2015 arrest or the Claimant’s complaint about it.

85. Notwithstanding that, it was still on its own terms a serious allegation to have made. The IOPC found in the disapplication appeal decision of 20 September 2021 that “it is not clear how it is, or could be, concluded that the concerns raised through your interview do not amount to a complaint.” It is true, as Mr Simpson points out, that the decision-maker went on to observe that if further clarity was necessary, this should have been explored through a complaint handling process outside of the investigation. However, her primary conclusion was that a complaint had in fact been made by the Claimant about past harassment at the NMC. (It is to be borne in mind that according to the terms of section 12 of the 2002 Act , such a complaint does not need to be in writing.) The existence of that complaint did not depend on the further link that the Claimant had made between the past claimed harassment and the circumstances of her arrest on that day: the MPS and IOPC were fully entitled to regard that claim as wholly unsupported. Nonetheless, the IOPC had in effect decided in the disapplication appeal decision that the complaint of past harassment had been made as part and parcel of her complaints about her arrest in 2015, and that the complaints should not have been treated as being out of time when the Claimant revived them on 14 August 2019; further, it had directed that there be an investigation.

86. There followed a process by which the MPS investigating officer understandably sought to clarify the Claimant’s heads of complaint. I reject the Claimant’s suggestion that the investigating officer’s attempts to identify the relevant heads of complaint was in any way aimed at deliberately excluding the NMC matter, or was in itself an act of harassment. The Claimant insisted upon the inclusion of reference to past incidents in the third complaint, and that was accepted. Even then, the Claimant had not included express reference to the events at the NMC of which she had complained in 2015. This was an error on her part: she could and should have made clear the precise incidents upon which she was relying. However, in my judgment that did not relieve the MPS of the obligation to ascertain what incidents the Claimant was referring to in her generalised reference to past incidents, in light of the terms of the IOPC’s disapplication appeal decision, which had directed the MPS to investigate the matters relating to complaint of harassment by MPS officers at the NMC as part and parcel of its investigation of the complaints raised by the Claimant in 2015.

87. It is common ground that the MPS did not investigate those matters before arriving at its decision of May 2022. Upon the Claimant’s appeal to the IOPC in respect of that failure, the IOPC concluded in its decision of 27 February 2025 that this matter “did not form part of your complaint allegation” and as a result could not be addressed as part of the appeal. In my judgment, that conclusion is irreconcilable with the IOPC’s earlier disapplication appeal decision, which had held that it could not be explained why this matter had not been treated as a complaint.

88. Contrary to Mr Simpson’s submission, it is no answer to say that this matter had fallen away simply because the MPS and IOPC had (quite properly) concluded that the arrest on 22 September 2015 was not in itself an act of harassment, but had been fully justified. While that conclusion may have undermined the Claimant’s suggestion that the MPS had embarked upon a “course of conduct” within the meaning of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 , that fact cannot of itself have absolved the MPS from addressing an allegation of harassment by officers at the NMC, once that matter had been raised with them. There was no reason to take the Claimant’s complaint as somehow being limited to one of harassment within the meaning of that Act : such a course of conduct does not need to be established for the purposes of a complaint under the 2002 Act . For example, a complaint of “harassment” may in substance relate to conduct which falls within the meaning of section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 , in that it is one of unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic such as race, which had the purpose or effect of violating the complainant’s dignity. Or a complainant may use the word “harassment” in the context of a complaint without seeking to refer to any statutory definition of that term, but nonetheless in an effort to communicate the nature of a police officer’s alleged conduct as being objectionable. If the Claimant remained aggrieved by her treatment at the NMC, she was entitled to have the complaint relating to her treatment considered independently of whether her principal complaint as to the circumstances of her arrest in September 2015 was justified.

89. The IOPC therefore erred in law in treating consideration of the NMC complaint as falling outside the terms of the appeal. She had in fact raised a complaint about it to the MPS, and was entitled to have her appeal about the MPS’s failure to address that complaint considered by the IOPC.

90. I have considered (as I am required to do) whether relief should nonetheless be withheld pursuant to section 31 (2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 : that provision requires that the High Court must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review “if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.”

91. I remind myself of recent Court of Appeal authority which has considered the application of that provision, helpfully summarised by Singh LJ in R (Hippolyte) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1493 at paras 69-74. Applying those dicta, I find that it is impossible to say in the present case that it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred: i) The conduct complained of in the present case is the IOPC’s failure to consider this part of the Claimant’s appeal. Had the IOPC considered it, it could only have found that the MPS had failed to consider this aspect of the Claimant’s complaint, and have upheld the complaint to that extent. The IOPC would then have had to consider whether it was in a position to determine the complaint itself or to direct the MPS to investigate it. Either outcome is, in itself, one which is substantially different to the actual outcome, which was to dismiss the appeal altogether and not to consider the complaint. ii) It is not for me to go on to consider the likely outcome of any future consideration of the complaint (even if it were to be determined by the IOPC itself, which in itself appears unlikely absent any prior investigation). To do so would be to transgress into the “forbidden territory” of a merits consideration of the underlying complaint. As was said by Lewis LJ in R (Bradbury) v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority [2025] EWCA Civ 489 ; [2025] 4 WLR 58 at para 71, “I t is not for the court to try and predict what the public authority might have done if it had not made the error. If the court cannot tell how the decision-maker would have approached matters, or what decision it would have reached, if it had not made the error in question, the requirements of section 31 (2A) are unlikely to be satisfied.” iii) It is true that, pursuant to an order for specific disclosure in the current proceedings, the IOPC made enquiries in 2026 as to the extent of the crime reports which the MPS possessed which indicated that the Claimant had been forcibly removed from the NMC, and that the MPS retrieved little of value beyond four computer aided dispatch logs dating from between November 2013 and January 2014 “linking” the Claimant to the NMC premises. It may be that any subsequent investigation will unearth little more. However, a response to a targeted application for specific disclosure in judicial review proceedings is no substitute for an investigation of the MPS’s own devising, not least in circumstances where such an investigation might be expected to seek more specific evidence from the Claimant herself. Even if it were permissible to enquire as to the likely outcome of such an investigation, it remains impossible to do so. Disposal

92. In the circumstances, I will quash the decision of 27 February 2025 inasmuch as the IOPC found that it had no power to investigate the Claimant’s complaint of harassment at the NMC as it had not been raised as part of the complaint to the MPS. The complaint had in fact been made, as the IOPC had found in its earlier decision on the disapplication appeal. The IOPC must reconsider the Claimant’s appeal to that extent.

93. The IOPC’s conclusions in respect of the complaint insofar as it directly related to the September 2015 arrest remain unaffected. Whatever the outcome of any further investigation of the NMC complaint, it is incapable of affecting the decision to arrest the Claimant in order to further the investigation into the crime report which had been made by Mr Reynolds.