UK case law
Apricot Umbrella Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC
[2026] UKFTT TC 1254 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026
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Full judgment
Introduction
1. This appeal concerns VAT assessments totalling £405,422.00 issued to Apricot Umbrella Limited under s 73 Value Added Tax Act 1994 in respect of accounting periods from 08/20 to 10/22. The assessments comprise output tax assessments of £136,330.00 and disallowance of input tax of £269,092.00.
2. HMRC applies to strike out the appeal pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“Rule 8(3)(c)”) on the ground that the Appellant's case has no reasonable prospect of success. HMRC contends that, despite repeated requests for information and repeated directions of the Tribunal, the Appellant has failed to identify a coherent factual and legal basis upon which the assessments can be challenged.
3. The Appellant opposes the application. It submits that, although its description of the business and the transactions in question has evolved during the course of the proceedings and earlier information provided to HMRC and the Tribunal has been acknowledged to be inaccurate, there remains a substantive dispute as to the nature of the supplies made by the Appellant, the VAT treatment of those supplies and the extent of its entitlement to recover input tax. The issue before us is not whether the assessments are ultimately correct, but whether HMRC has established that the appeal is one which has no realistic prospect of succeeding and is therefore liable to be struck out under Rule 8(3)(c). Background
4. The Appellant is a company incorporated on 16 June 2014. Its statutory accounts for the year ended 30 June 2021, signed by Mr B D Ash, described its principal activity as "temporary employment agency activities". Mr Darren Harding was appointed a director on 1 April 2022 and is the sole director.
5. On 16 July 2021, HMRC opened a VAT enquiry into the Appellant's VAT returns for periods from 07/20 to 04/21.
6. On 19 August 2021, HMRC requested information and documentation concerning the Appellant's business activities.
7. On 4 October 2021, HMRC issued a notice under paragraph 1 of Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008 requiring the Appellant to provide information and documents including details of its business activities, clients, offshore arrangements, accounting systems, sales and purchases, bank statements and contracts.
8. On 13 October 2021, the Appellant's then advisers, ETC Tax, sought clarification of the purpose of HMRC's enquiries.
9. On 3 November 2021, ETC Tax purported to appeal against the Schedule 36 notice on the basis that the information requested was said not to be reasonably required unless HMRC first identified the purpose of its check.
10. On 4 November 2021, HMRC explained that it had opened a VAT enquiry to check the Appellant's VAT position for periods from 07/20 to 04/21 and considered the requested material necessary for that purpose.
11. On 17 November 2021, ETC Tax responded substantively to HMRC's enquiries. ETC Tax stated that the Appellant was "an umbrella company, providing payroll umbrella service to contractors". It stated that the Appellant generated business through agencies, recommendations and marketing, that it had an agreement with Adye Limited in Cyprus and that all employees were remunerated through PAYE. Accounting records, bank statements, VAT records and ledger material were also supplied.
12. HMRC replied on 21 December 2021, indicating that it would continue its review of the information provided.
13. On 21 February 2022, HMRC requested additional information consisting of a copy of the agreement with Adye Limited, invoices supporting the twelve highest-value sales identified in the material previously supplied and an explanation of ledger entries coded "T9". HMRC considered that it did not receive the requested information and, on 25 March 2022, issued a further Schedule 36 notice requiring production of those items by 24 April 2022.
14. On 27 July 2022, HMRC rejected an appeal against the Schedule 36 notice and concluded that the information sought was reasonable and proportionate for the purpose of checking the Appellant's VAT position.
15. On 26 September 2022, HMRC issued a penalty notice imposing daily penalties of £10 per day for continuing non-compliance with the information notice.
16. On 15 December 2022, HMRC wrote to the Appellant explaining the conclusions it had reached following the enquiry. HMRC stated that copies of sales invoices and purchase invoices remained outstanding and that it was therefore unable to verify either the Appellant's sales treatment or its claims to deduct input tax. HMRC explained that it had, in consequence, treated all sales on which VAT had not been charged as taxable supplies and disallowed all input tax claimed. It enclosed calculations showing proposed output tax adjustments of £136,330 and proposed input tax disallowances of £269,092.
17. On 28 February 2023, HMRC issued assessments under s73 VATA 1994 in the total sum of £405,422. The assessments comprised output tax assessments of £136,330 and input tax disallowances of £269,092.
18. By letter dated 21 March 2023, the Appellant appealed against the assessments. The appeal was expressed in very general terms. The Appellant asserted that no taxable turnover had been omitted from its VAT returns, complained that HMRC had not explained how the assessments had been calculated and reserved the right to provide further particulars once HMRC had explained its position.
19. HMRC issued a view of the matter letter on 27 April 2023 maintaining the assessments. The appeal was subsequently notified to the Tribunal.
20. On 11 September 2023, HMRC applied for further and better particulars of the grounds of appeal.
21. The proceedings were thereafter characterised by repeated difficulties in compliance with Tribunal directions and correspondence. Following failures by the Appellant to engage with Tribunal communications, on 16 August 2024 Judge Perez issued an unless order. When the Appellant failed to comply, the appeal was struck out. The Appellant subsequently applied for reinstatement.
22. By a decision dated 14 August 2025, Judge Bailey reinstated the appeal. In doing so, she observed that the application for reinstatement was finely balanced. HMRC did not oppose reinstatement. Judge Bailey directed HMRC to provide a detailed explanation of the basis of the assessments and directed the Appellant thereafter to file fully particularised grounds of appeal.
23. In compliance with those directions HMRC served a statement dated 11 September 2025 setting out the basis of the assessments. HMRC explained that the assessments had been raised because sales invoices and purchase invoices requested during the enquiry had not been provided and HMRC had consequently been unable to verify the VAT returns.
24. On 9 October 2025, the Appellant served further grounds of appeal. Those grounds stated that the Appellant was an umbrella company, its employees supplied medical services, many of its customers were situated overseas and supplies made to those customers fell outside the UK VAT charge.
25. HMRC considered those grounds inadequate and on 17 October 2025 applied to strike out the appeal.
26. On 3 November 2025, the Appellant provided further particulars. In that correspondence the Appellant described itself as an umbrella company supplying medical staff and consultants through agencies. It relied upon ss7 A and 9 VATA 1994 and asserted that a substantial proportion of the disputed sales related to overseas business recipients. A sample invoice and a sample consultancy agreement were provided.
27. On 20 November 2025, HMRC informed the Tribunal that, as an alternative to immediate strike out, the Tribunal could direct production of the outstanding invoices and strike out the appeal in default of compliance. HMRC nevertheless maintained that the Appellant had not identified its case with sufficient clarity.
28. On 8 January 2026, HMRC provided a detailed analysis of the material subsequently submitted by the Appellant. HMRC explained that approximately 15,691 pages had been received but that 45% related to periods outside the assessment periods and a further 52% related to invoices already bearing VAT. HMRC identified only 435 invoices potentially relevant to the disputed output tax assessments and concluded that the available material did not establish the nature of the services supplied or the VAT status and location of the recipients.
29. On 16 February 2026, HMRC provided a parallel analysis of the input tax material. HMRC categorised the disputed invoices and identified a number of concerns, including invoices bearing no VAT, invoices lacking any discernible business purpose, invoices apparently relating to third parties, potentially personal expenditure and legal costs which HMRC considered unrelated to the Appellant's business.
30. On 10 March 2026, representations were made on behalf of the Appellant in response to HMRC's strike-out application. HMRC responded by email dated 16 March 2026 seeking clarification and requesting invoice schedules which it understood had been referred to in the Appellant's representations.
31. On 23 March 2026, Mr Andrew Thornhill KC wrote on behalf of the Appellant providing a further explanation of the Appellant's position. In that email he stated that "the facts are different from those previously understood" and that "Apricot's business is not supplying medical services". He explained that the Appellant's business involved the provision of payment services whereby agencies paid funds to the Appellant and the Appellant processed those funds. The email acknowledged that information previously supplied was inaccurate or incomplete. It further stated that it now appeared that some part of HMRC's input tax adjustments was properly due. Mr Thornhill indicated that a fuller explanation of the Appellant's position and further supporting material would follow in a subsequent communication. No such comprehensive further explanation was subsequently provided. The Parties’ submissions HMRC’s submissions
32. HMRC’s submissions are summarised as follows. HMRC's primary case is that the appeal should be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) because it disclosed no reasonable prospect of success. Notwithstanding repeated requests for clarification, extensive correspondence and numerous opportunities afforded by both HMRC and the Tribunal, the Appellant had failed to articulate a coherent and settled factual case capable of determination. The appeal had been commenced on the basis of bare assertions that the assessments were wrong. Although further particulars had subsequently been provided, those particulars had not resulted in the identification of the Appellant’s case but rather in a succession of inconsistent and mutually incompatible explanations of the Appellant's business activities.
33. The Tribunal's focus should not be upon whether further documentation or witness evidence might emerge at some future date but upon the case presently advanced. The Appellant continued to be unable to identify clearly the supplies said to fall outside the scope of VAT, the factual basis upon which such supplies were said to qualify for that treatment, the recipients of those supplies or the extent to which the assessments were challenged. The Tribunal should not permit a taxpayer to continue proceedings in the hope that a possible case might subsequently emerge.
34. A central feature of HMRC's submissions concerned the changing descriptions of the Appellant's business. Reliance was placed upon the fact that different explanations had been advanced at different stages of the appeal. The Appellant had described itself as acting in a fiduciary capacity for a Cypriot company, subsequently as an umbrella company supplying medical professionals and consultants and most recently as providing payment-processing services. These were fundamentally different factual explanations carrying materially different VAT consequences. The significance of the March 2026 correspondence lay not merely in the existence of inconsistency but in Mr Thornhill KC's express acknowledgement that information previously supplied to HMRC and the Tribunal had been inaccurate. The March 2026 correspondence amounted to a concession that the factual basis previously advanced could not be relied upon.
35. The Appellant's difficulties extended beyond the description of the business itself. The schedules and analyses relied upon by the Appellant had also changed over time, with material previously relied upon subsequently accepted to be inaccurate or incomplete. The Tribunal was left without a settled account of the transactions said to be in issue or the VAT treatment said to apply to those transactions. Even after the March 2026 correspondence, no coherent replacement case had been provided despite indications that further information would be forthcoming.
36. The extensive volume of material provided by the Appellant did not cure these difficulties. Approximately 16,000 pages of documentation had been reviewed. The issue was not the quantity of documentation but the absence of a coherent explanation linking the documents to a properly articulated case. It was not for HMRC, or for the Tribunal, to investigate the material in order to discover a potentially arguable appeal. The burden rested upon the Appellant to identify the transactions relied upon, the relevance of the documentation and the basis upon which the assessments were said to be excessive.
37. In relation to the output tax assessments, it remained impossible to ascertain precisely which supplies were said to have been made, to whom they had been made and why the place of supply provisions were said to apply. In relation to the input tax assessments, the Appellant had failed to identify with sufficient clarity what part of the £269,092 disallowance remained in dispute and upon what evidential basis recovery was claimed. Following Mr Thornhill's statement that some part of the input tax disallowance appeared to be properly due, even at this stage the Appellant had not identified which elements of the disallowance were accepted and which remained contested.
38. HMRC relied upon Fairford Group plc v HMRC [2014] UKUT 0329 (TCC) (“ Fairford ”) , First De Sales Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0396 (TCC) (“ First De Sales ”) and FS Commercial Ltd v HMRC [2026] EWCA Civ 29 (“ FS Commercial ”) . Those authorities demonstrate that a party must identify a properly arguable case and that the Tribunal is not required to speculate as to what a taxpayer's case might be or reconstruct it from large quantities of unstructured material. Particular reliance was placed upon FS Commercial for the proposition that the Tribunal is not obliged to investigate whether an appeal exists where the taxpayer has failed to identify it and upon First De Sales as illustrating circumstances in which strike out is appropriate where the taxpayer has failed to establish a viable basis for challenging the assessments. The common theme emerging from the authorities was that a taxpayer must identify a coherent factual and legal case and that the Appellant had failed to do so.
39. Although HMRC's written application had been made pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c), Ms Parlour confirmed during oral submissions that HMRC also relied upon Rules 8(3)(a) and (b). She submitted that the procedural history of the appeal, the repeated changes of position and the acknowledged inaccuracies in the Appellant's previous explanations reinforced HMRC's contention that strike out was justified. In the alternative, if the appeal were not struck out, HMRC sought an unless order requiring the Appellant to provide a final and definitive statement of its case within 28 days. Appellant’s submissions
40. The Appellant’s submissions are summarised as follows. The application fell to be determined by reference to Rule 8(3)(c) and HMRC had failed to establish that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. The focus should be upon whether the appeal was realistically capable of succeeding rather than upon criticisms of the procedural history of the appeal. Many of HMRC's complaints related to conduct, disclosure and case management rather than the merits of the VAT issues raised by the appeal. The Appellant objected to HMRC's attempt to expand the application to rely upon Rules 8(3)(a) and (b), particularly where the application had been made under Rule 8(3)(c).
41. In any event, the Appellant rejected HMRC's reliance upon Rules 8(3)(a) and (b). Whilst there had been disputes concerning the adequacy and accuracy of information provided during the course of the proceedings, there had been no material failure to co-operate with the Tribunal. The Appellant had sought to engage with the proceedings, had provided substantial documentation and had co-operated in preparing the hearing bundle. The fact that HMRC considered the information supplied to be inadequate did not amount to a failure to co-operate. The Appellant had also been without professional representation for part of the proceedings and its conduct should be viewed in that context.
42. The appeal raised two distinct disputes: HMRC's assessment of output tax on supplies which the Appellant contended were not taxable in the United Kingdom and HMRC's disallowance of input tax amounting to £269,092. The assessments had been raised because HMRC considered that insufficient records had been provided to verify the VAT returns. The appeal therefore turns upon the nature of the transactions, the identity and location of the recipients of supplies and the Appellant's entitlement to deduct input tax. Those issues required findings of fact and could not properly be resolved on a strike-out application. HMRC's criticisms went to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence rather than demonstrating that the appeal was incapable of succeeding.
43. Although mistakes had occurred during the course of the proceedings, those mistakes did not render the appeal hopeless. The description of the business as involving the supply of medical professionals was accepted to have been erroneous and the statutory references contained in the October 2025 grounds were also accepted to have been incorrect. Those errors did not alter the substance of the appeal, namely that a significant proportion of the supplies were made to customers outside the United Kingdom and consequently fell outside the charge to UK VAT.
44. The documentary material already provided demonstrated a strong rather than merely arguable basis for that case. Particular reliance was placed upon the invoice and contractual documentation relating to GEA Dutch Holding BV. The invoice identified an overseas business customer with a Dutch VAT registration number and was supported by contractual documentation describing the services supplied. That material was said to demonstrate, on its face, at least one supply to an overseas business recipient falling outside the scope of UK VAT and to show that the appeal could not properly be characterised as fanciful or devoid of merit.
45. This was not a case in which no evidence had been produced. HMRC's complaint was that the evidence supplied was insufficient or unpersuasive. That criticism went to evidential weight rather than to the existence of an arguable appeal. The central questions remained what supplies had been made, to whom they had been made and what VAT treatment properly applied to those supplies. Those were matters requiring factual determination at a substantive hearing.
46. In relation to input tax, HMRC's position that all input tax should be disallowed was unsustainable. Many of the invoices related to expenditure which was plainly incurred for business purposes, including professional and accountancy fees. Even if HMRC were ultimately correct that some invoices were defective or insufficiently evidenced, it could not realistically be contended that no part of the disputed input tax was recoverable. Questions concerning the sufficiency of particular invoices and the extent of any allowable deduction were matters for determination at a substantive hearing.
47. The Tribunal was not confined to the material available to HMRC when the assessments were raised. Further evidence could be obtained and adduced before the substantive hearing, including witness evidence from individuals involved in the transactions and, where necessary, recipients of the supplies. HMRC's criticisms went to the sufficiency of the current evidence rather than demonstrating that the appeal was incapable of succeeding.
48. Reliance was placed upon Fairford for the principle that strike out is a draconian remedy which should be exercised with caution and that a distinction must be drawn between a weak case and a case with no reasonable prospect of success. HMRC's criticisms were directed principally to the strength of the evidence and the consistency of the Appellant's explanations rather than demonstrating that the appeal was legally or factually incapable of succeeding. First De Sales was distinguishable because it concerned a tax avoidance arrangement which failed as a matter of law, whereas the present appeal depended upon disputed questions of fact. Reliance was also placed upon Mandarin Consulting Ltd v HMRC [2021] UKUT 0292 (TCC) (“Mandarin”), R (on the application of Hotelbeds UK Ltd) v R & C Commrs [2025] EWHC 2312(Admin) (“ Hotelbeds ”) and HMRC's guidance (HMRC Internal Manual VIT31200) concerning alternative evidence as demonstrating that entitlement to deduct input tax may, in appropriate circumstances, be established by evidence other than a fully compliant VAT invoice.
49. HMRC appeared to know a considerable amount about the Appellant's business and activities. HMRC had publicly listed the Appellant as a tax avoidance scheme, had conducted a lengthy enquiry and had involved Counter-Avoidance officers in that enquiry. It was therefore inconsistent to suggest that HMRC knew enough about the business to raise assessments whilst simultaneously maintaining that it was unable to identify the nature of the Appellant's case sufficiently to serve a statement of case.
50. Strike out was a draconian remedy which should be reserved for truly hopeless cases. The appeal raised genuine disputes concerning both the output tax and input tax assessments and those disputes should be resolved through the ordinary litigation process. The appropriate course was for the application to be dismissed, for HMRC to serve a statement of case and for the appeal to proceed to the exchange of evidence and a substantive hearing. The Appellant also opposed the making of any further unless order. Discussion The basis of HMRC's application
51. Before considering the merits of the application it is necessary to identify the basis upon which the application has been made.
52. HMRC's application dated 17 October 2025 sought an order striking out the appeal. The application was expressly made pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) on the ground that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. That was the basis upon which the application was advanced in the application notice and the accompanying materials and was the basis upon which the Appellant prepared and served its response.
53. In its skeleton argument and oral submissions HMRC also relied upon Rules 8(3)(a) and 8(3)(b). During the hearing Ms Parlour confirmed that HMRC sought to rely upon all three provisions and submitted that the procedural history of the appeal, the changing descriptions of the Appellant's business and the acknowledged inaccuracies in information previously supplied to HMRC and the Tribunal reinforced HMRC's contention that the appeal should be struck out.
54. We do not accept that an application brought under Rule 8(3)(c) can effectively be converted into an application under Rules 8(3)(a) and 8(3)(b) by way of a skeleton argument and oral submissions alone. The grounds upon which a strike out application is advanced are matters of substance rather than form. Different provisions of Rule 8(3) engage different considerations and require a respondent to address different issues. Procedural fairness therefore requires clarity as to the basis upon which relief is sought.
55. If HMRC wished to pursue additional grounds of strike out under Rules 8(3)(a) and 8(3)(b), the proper course was to make an application to amend its existing application or to make a further application identifying those grounds expressly. No such application was made. Whilst the matters relied upon by HMRC may form part of the factual background against which the Rule 8(3)(c) application falls to be determined, they do not constitute freestanding grounds of application before us.
56. We therefore determine the application solely by reference to Rule 8(3)(c). Nothing in this decision should be taken as expressing any view on whether strike out might have been justified under Rules 8(3)(a) or (b). The applicable principles under Rule 8(3)(c)
57. The principles applicable to Rule 8(3)(c) are well established.
58. In Fairford Group plc v HMRC [2014] UKUT 0329 (TCC) (“ Fairford ”), the Upper Tribunal held that the Rule 8(3)(c) test is materially the same as the summary judgment test under CPR Part 24. The question is whether the appeal has a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. The Tribunal must avoid conducting a mini-trial and should not ordinarily resolve disputed questions of fact or credibility on a strike out application.
59. First De Sales Ltd v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0396 (TCC) (“ First De Sales ”) demonstrates that strike out may be appropriate where the appellant's case, properly analysed, has no realistic prospect of success. In FS Commercial Ltd v HMRC [2026] EWCA Civ 29 (“ FS Commercial ”), the Court of Appeal emphasised that it is for a party to identify the case it seeks to advance. Neither HMRC nor the Tribunal is required to construct a case from extensive documentation or speculate as to what arguments might be available.
60. The Appellant relied upon Mandarin Consulting Ltd v HMRC [2021] UKUT 292 (TCC) (“ Mandarin ”), Hotelbeds UK Ltd v HMRC [2025] EWHC 2312 (Admin) (“ Hotelbeds ”) and HMRC's published guidance concerning alternative evidence for input tax claims. Those authorities are concerned with the substantive determination of input tax claims. Whether they ultimately assist the Appellant is not a matter that can be determined on this application.
61. The Tribunal's task is not to determine the appeal. The question is whether, viewed realistically and on the basis of the case now advanced, the appeal is bound to fail. Has the Appellant identified a case?
62. HMRC's principal submission was that, despite repeated opportunities, the Appellant had failed to identify a coherent case capable of determination by the Tribunal.
63. HMRC is entitled to criticise the manner in which the Appellant's case has been advanced. The Appellant has given materially different accounts of its business during the course of the enquiry and appeal. The position was summarised by Mr Andrew Thornhill KC in his email of 23 March 2026: “On 10 March the Tribunal was emailed with my representations on behalf of Apricot Umbrella Ltd (“Apricot”) as to why its VAT appeal should not be struck out. I did so after taking instructions but it now appears that the facts are different. Apricot has not carried on business for several years and the relevant information was gathered from persons who were not employed by Apricot when it was carrying on business . As a result, it was inaccurate. I can only apologize for the fact that the Tribunal has been misinformed and not supplied with relevant information.”
64. That passage supports HMRC's submission that the factual basis of the Appellant's case has changed significantly. It also raises obvious concerns regarding the reliability of information previously provided to HMRC and the Tribunal.
65. However, it does not follow that the Appellant has failed to identify any case at all. The question under Rule 8(3)(c) is not whether the Appellant has advanced its case consistently or persuasively. The question is whether there is an identifiable case capable of succeeding.
66. In relation to output tax, the Appellant contends that HMRC was wrong to treat all supplies on which VAT had not been charged as taxable supplies made in the United Kingdom because at least some supplies were made to overseas business customers.
67. In relation to input tax, the Appellant contends that HMRC was wrong to disallow recovery of the entirety of the disputed input tax.
68. Those contentions may ultimately succeed or fail. They are nonetheless capable of being understood and answered. HMRC's own detailed analyses of the output tax and input tax material demonstrate that HMRC is able to identify and respond to the issues in dispute, notwithstanding HMRC's submission that the Appellant's evidence is inadequate.
69. We accept the principle stated in FS Commercial . This is not a case in which HMRC or the Tribunal is being required to construct a case for the Appellant from unstructured material. The Appellant's case may be inadequately particularised and inconsistently advanced, but the substance of the challenge to the assessments can be identified.
70. We therefore reject HMRC's submission that the Appellant has failed to identify a case. The real issue is whether the case now advanced is so weak, inconsistent or unsupported that it has no realistic prospect of success. We address that issue below. The significance of the March 2026 email
71. HMRC placed particular reliance upon the email sent by Mr Thornhill KC on 23 March 2026.
72. The significance of that email should not be understated. It contains an express acknowledgement that information previously supplied to HMRC and the Tribunal was inaccurate and reveals a material change in the Appellant's understanding of its own business activities.
73. The email substantially strengthens HMRC's criticisms of the Appellant's case and may have important consequences at the substantive hearing. It raises obvious questions regarding reliability, credibility and the weight to be attached to the Appellant's evidence.
74. However, the email does not amount to a concession that the assessments are correct. Nor does it amount to an abandonment of the appeal.
75. Its significance lies in the evidential difficulties it creates for the Appellant, not in demonstrating that the appeal is necessarily doomed to fail. Do the inconsistencies mean that the appeal has no realistic prospect of success?
76. We accept HMRC's submission that the inconsistencies in the Appellant's position are serious.
77. The Appellant has provided materially different accounts of its business activities at different stages of the proceedings and has acknowledged that some previous explanations were wrong. Those matters are likely to present significant difficulties at the substantive hearing.
78. However, inconsistencies do not automatically justify strike out. Their significance depends upon the extent to which they affect the evidence as a whole and whether the Appellant can provide a satisfactory explanation for them.
79. Those are matters which ordinarily require findings of fact following consideration of the evidence.
80. HMRC's submissions are strongest as a criticism of the reliability of the Appellant's evidence. They are less persuasive as demonstrating that the appeal is bound to fail regardless of what evidence may ultimately be accepted.
81. We therefore regard the inconsistencies as highly relevant to the eventual determination of the appeal, but not as sufficient to justify strike out under Rule 8(3)(c). The output tax appeal
82. The burden of demonstrating that the output tax assessments are excessive rests upon the Appellant.
83. The Appellant faces obvious difficulties. It has changed its account of the nature of its business and will be required to establish the factual basis for the VAT treatment now contended for.
84. Nevertheless, the challenge to the output tax assessments cannot presently be characterised as fanciful.
85. The Appellant relies upon documentary material which it says evidences supplies to overseas business recipients, including material relating to GEA Dutch Holding BV. HMRC disputes the significance and reliability of that material.
86. That dispute cannot properly be resolved on a strike out application. It requires findings concerning the nature of the supplies made, the identity and location of recipients and the evidential significance of the documents relied upon.
87. We are therefore not satisfied that HMRC has established that the output tax appeal has no realistic prospect of success. The input tax appeal
88. Similar considerations apply to the disallowance of input tax.
89. The Appellant's current position lacks precision. It is apparent from the March 2026 correspondence that it no longer maintains that every aspect of HMRC's disallowance is incorrect.
90. However, HMRC's application requires us to conclude that the Appellant has no realistic prospect of establishing entitlement to recover any part of the disputed input tax.
91. We are not persuaded that such a conclusion is justified on the material before us.
92. The Appellant relies upon invoices and other documentation which it says support recovery of at least part of the disputed amount. HMRC says the material is inadequate. That is an evidential dispute which can only properly be resolved after consideration of the evidence as a whole.
93. The authorities relied upon by the Appellant, including Mandarin and Hotelbeds , may ultimately prove to be of limited assistance. Equally, it cannot presently be said that they are incapable of supporting any part of the Appellant's case.
94. We therefore conclude that HMRC has not established that the challenge to the input tax disallowance has no realistic prospect of success. Conclusion
95. HMRC's criticisms are serious and largely justified. The Appellant's case has shifted significantly during the course of these proceedings and previous explanations have been acknowledged to be inaccurate. The Appellant faces substantial evidential difficulties and may ultimately fail to discharge the burden resting upon it.
96. However, Rule 8(3)(c) is concerned with whether an appeal is realistically capable of succeeding, not with whether it is likely to succeed.
97. The appeal raises disputed questions concerning the nature of the supplies made, the identity and location of customers and the extent of any entitlement to recover input tax. Resolution of those issues requires findings of fact and an assessment of the evidence.
98. Applying the principles in Fairford , we are not satisfied that the appeal has no realistic prospect of success.
99. HMRC alternatively sought a further unless order. We do not consider such an order necessary. Directions are attached to this decision and we are satisfied that the future conduct of the appeal can appropriately be managed through those directions.
100. HMRC's application is refused. Right to apply for permission to appeal
101. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 28 August 2026