UK case law
Atanas DJUMALIEV v Mohammed Rashid MURADI
[2026] EWHC KB 2748 · High Court (King's Bench Division) · 2026
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Full judgment
Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC (Deputy Judge of the High Court):: A. Introduction
1. In what he accepts was a moment of stupidity, a driver testing the acceleration of a powerful Range Rover deliberately applies maximum acceleration and reaches 51mph on a central London street subject to a 20mph limit. Ahead of him, another driver is turning right from a minor road. That driver looks left before setting off, but his view is significantly restricted and he cannot see the Range Rover. He does not look left again and conducts his manoeuvre without stopping or pausing. The vehicles collide. The Range Rover mounts the footway and strikes two pedestrians, causing serious injuries. The driver of the Range Rover admits negligence. But what of the other driver? Did he discharge his duty to exercise reasonable care? If not, how should the Court assess the respective responsibility for the collision and its consequences?
2. These are the questions arising in this case. Matters of quantum have been agreed by the parties subject to my findings. For the reasons that follow, on the particular facts and evidence before me, I conclude that the driver emerging from the minor road was also negligent in a way that was causative of the collision and its aftermath. I apportion responsibility 75% to the driver of the speeding Range Rover and 25% to the driver emerging from the minor road.
3. This judgment is structured as follows: Introduction [1] to [3] Factual Background [4] to [44] Legal Principles [45] to [69] Discussion and Conclusions [70] to [139] - Mr Muradi’s negligence [70] to [78] - Was Mr Djumaliev negligent? [79] to [120] - What apportionment is appropriate? [121] to [139] Conclusion [140] to [141] Appendix: Image of locus Page 50 B. Factual Background The locus
4. The accident with which I am concerned occurred in Knightsbridge, London, at the T-junction where Hans Place meets the north side of Pont Street. Pont Street, the major road, runs broadly east to west. At the junction it has one eastbound and one westbound lane, separated by a filter lane. Hans Place approaches from the north, and drivers emerging from it are subject to give way markings.
5. Marked parking bays lie on both sides of Pont Street, to the east and west of the junction. The filter lane permits westbound traffic to turn right into Hans Place and, a little further east, eastbound traffic to turn right into Cadogan Square. The eastbound lane of Pont Street leads to a traffic light controlled junction with Sloane Street.
6. To assist the reader visualise the locus, the Appendix to this judgment reproduces the labelled image which appeared as Figure 3 in Mr Clarke’s report. It shows the road layout and the positions of the relevant cameras.
7. Hans Place and Pont Street, like all the roads shown in the Appendix, were subject to a 20mph speed limit. Two 20mph roundels painted onto the road surface, and a school warning sign, were displayed to westbound traffic at the Sloane Street end of Pont Street, just after the traffic lights. Uncontroversial facts
8. There is no dispute that the accident occurred some four years ago, between 18:50 and 19:00 on 10 October 2022. At that time it was dark, albeit not pitch black. The street lights along Pont Street (including on its south side, opposite the Hans Place junction) were illuminated. The road was dry.
9. Prior to the accident, the eastbound traffic along Pont Street was relatively busy. A queue was forming at the red traffic lights with Sloane Street; it had reached back to a point to the east of the first junction with Cadogan Square. There were around 13 cars either stopped or coming to a stop. There were no vehicles in the westbound lane for a significant period prior to the material events.
10. There were two parked vehicles in the marked bays on the north side of Pont Street immediately to the east of the junction with Hans Place. A grey Audi was parked in the bay closest to Hans Place. There was then an empty bay, and finally a white Tesla in the next bay along.
11. The two vehicles that collided in the accident were a white BMW i8 (LD64 YUC) driven by Mr Djumaliev, the Claimant, and a black Range Rover (LD22 EZC) driven by Mr Muradi, the Defendant. Mr Djumaliev was driving south on Hans Place, and was in the course of turning right onto Pont Street. Mr Muradi had turned right onto Pont Street from Sloane Street, after the traffic lights had turned green for him. He was then travelling in the westbound carriageway, intending to carry on past Hans Place.
12. Three other vehicles are relevant, all travelling eastbound along Pont Street, and heading towards the end of the queue forming at the traffic lights with Sloane Street. There was a Nissan Micra, followed by a London taxi and then a coach being driven by Mr Padala. The evidence Video footage
13. The Court was provided with footage from several fixed CCTV cameras and from the forward and side/rear-facing cameras on Mr Padala’s coach. The camera positions are marked in the Appendix and I shall refer to the cameras by the numbers used in that image. I have watched the footage repeatedly. It is objective evidence of considerable importance and forms the basis of much of the expert analysis. Its material features are as follows: (1) Camera 6 (forward-facing coach dashcam): As the coach travels eastbound on Pont Street the illuminated street lights and extent of the darkness can clearly be seen. The coach follows a London taxi towards and over a zebra crossing. A cyclist emerges from a side-road and parks up on the south side of Pont Street. As the coach proceeds towards Hans Place, one of the soon-to-be injured pedestrians can be seen at the rear of her car, parked on the south side of Pont Street (the right-hand side of the coach). Other pedestrians are also visible. At this point, the westbound lane of Pont Street is empty except for the bright lights of the Range Rover in the distance. These then approach rapidly towards the coach from Sloane Street (of course the coach is moving towards the Range Rover too in this footage). Meanwhile as the coach approaches Hans Place, Mr Djumaliev’s BMW can be seen stopped at the junction. It starts moving as the taxi reaches it, slowly at first, and then accelerates into the path of the rapidly approaching Range Rover. The position of two relevant parked cars (Audi and Tesla) can then be seen on the left (the north side of Pont Street, to the east of Hans Place). (2) Camera 7 (side/rear-facing coach camera) : This mirrored footage shows the Range Rover mounting the footway after the collision and striking the pedestrians. The BMW is then entirely within the westbound lane and pointing west. (3) Camera 1 (Pont Street pointing west, close to Sloane Street) : The footage shows the two 20mph roundels, the school warning sign and the queue of eastbound traffic. The westbound lane is empty until the Range Rover appears and accelerates through the scene. It is well past Pavilion Road before another vehicle appears behind it. The BMW can be seen entering the Range Rover’s path, and the Range Rover deviating to the left shortly before impact. (4) Camera 2 (further along Pont Street pointing west) : This shows the BMW approaching Hans Place, stopping and then moving into the Range Rover’s path. (5) Camera 3 (Pont Street pointing east, corner of Cadogan Square) : This shows pedestrians near the footway, the eastbound queue and the Range Rover accelerating west along Pont Street. (6) Camera 4 (north on Cadogan Square pointing west) and Camera 5 (south on Cadogan Square) : These show the aftermath of the collision between the vehicles. One of the pedestrians can be seen at the rear of her car in the upper part of the image. There are approximately five pedestrians on or near the footway at this point. The Range Rover mounts the footway, strikes the pedestrians and continues along the footway before returning to the carriageway. Lay evidence
14. I heard live evidence from Mr Djumaliev and Mr Muradi. In assessing their evidence, I have borne in mind that memory is fallible and may be affected by reconstruction, later information and conscious or unconscious bias. An error (or a falsehood) on one matter does not necessarily render the remainder of a witness’s evidence unreliable (or untruthful). When fact finding the Court need not labour to fit every piece of the jigsaw together in order to see the emerging picture: see Pomphrey v Secretary of State for Health & North Bristol NHS Trust [2019] Med LR 424 at §§31–33. Mr Djumaliev
15. Mr Djumaliev’s evidence was that he was familiar with the junction, which formed part of his usual journey home, and knew that both roads were subject to a 20mph limit. He said that traffic in the eastbound lane was heavy, as was usual at that time on a weekday.
16. He said before reaching the give way lines, he could see “far to [his] left” and that it was “clear that there was no traffic approaching from that direction”. He then continued in his statement as follows: “The view to my left was impeded to some extent because of parked cars in the parking bays and, increasingly, due to the accumulation of cars before the traffic lights at the crossroad. I concluded that traffic lights at the crossing of Pont Street and Sloane Street must be red, causing this traffic pattern. I stopped briefly to allow a black taxi to pass from my right, following which there was a significant gap before the next vehicle, a coach. Just before the taxi passed in front of me, I had another peek to my left, seeing no cars. It appeared safe for me to pull out (including from my view left as I approached the give way lines). As I pulled out, I did not see any vehicle approaching from my left. Had I seen any vehicle approaching I would not have pulled out or I would have stopped.”
17. In cross-examination Mr Djumaliev was asked questions about this statement and the evidence he gave during the criminal trial. He had told the jury that before pulling out of Hans Place he had looked to his left twice, once on his approach to the junction, and once at the junction before he started to move. He did not dispute the experts’ evidence that when stopped at the junction his view was limited to 32 metres. He suggested, however, that he gained a better view further along the westbound lane of Pont Street when he was approaching the junction. He said he could see through the gaps between the cars in the line of traffic that had built up.
18. When stationary at the junction, Mr Djumaliev said that he checked his surroundings. He accepted that he had concluded that the traffic lights with the junction of Sloane Street must be red, but he denied that he had therefore only focused on traffic coming from his right. He said he looked to his left just before the taxi came past him and then pulled out, undertaking the right-hand turn as a single movement without stopping. He said he started moving out of Hans Place slowly, and before the taxi in the eastbound lane had travelled past him. Then, as soon as it was gone, he accelerated. He was very clear that after he started moving, he did not look again to his left.
19. When he was asked why he did not take steps to improve his view to his left, for example, by ‘creeping and peeping’, Mr Djumaliev told me it was a question of risk factors. He said when pulling out, he saw the coach coming and was concerned about whether it was going to slow down. He described it as a “split second fear of the coach”. In answer to Mr Woodhouse KC, for the Defendant, he told me: “At that point of time being in a relatively low-rise car, and having a two-storey coach coming towards you at 20 miles per hour I felt that the chances of [the coach] not stopping are much higher risks for me than actually [a] car coming [in] the other direction. There is no way to make a right turn [from] Hans Place into Pont Street without taking a risk and without relying on one of the drivers either from the westbound lane, or the eastbound lane, making way for you.”
20. Mr Djumaliev’s statement then dealt with what happened next: “As I pulled out and [began] turning right, crossing the lane dividing line, I heard very loud, squeaky brakes. The sound was initially some distance away but approaching very fast. I realised that there was a vehicle out of my sight that was braking to avoid impact. As I had crossed into the west-bound lane, I decided that it [was] safest to complete my turn, as I would be moving away from the vehicle’s path rather than stopping right in the middle. Unfortunately, I could not avoid the impact and, in a short instance later, I felt a very hard hit to the front [left] of my car and I saw a Range Rover, travelling at very high speed, pass by me.” The statement stated “right”, but Mr Djumaliev corrected this during the course of his evidence.
21. He was questioned about this. He confirmed that the first time he was aware of Mr Muradi’s presence was when he heard the sound of braking. He thought this was about half way through his manoeuvre. He told me there was “no time to look left or right” but he could visualise where the sound was coming from. He said there was “no need to look” at where the sound was coming from. He had time to decide what he was going to do, and he decided to continue to make the right-hand turn to try to move out of the way. Mr Muradi
22. Mr Muradi’s evidence was that his cousin runs a private chauffeur business and on 10 October 2022 he was helping by driving a client around central London in the business’ Range Rover. In his statement Mr Muradi said that he had “never driven a high-powered car” before. Mr O’Sullivan KC, for the Claimant, asked him about the car he owned and drove at the time of the accident (an S-Class Mercedes 350 diesel). Mr Muradi did not accept it was “powerful”. It was put to him that the experts had agreed that the Mercedes and Range Rover had similar performance; he maintained the Range Rover was more powerful.
23. Mr Muradi said he was familiar with driving in central London and drove around Pont Street a couple of times a week. He had collected the client in the afternoon and had driven him around London to do some shopping; some of the time involved waiting. He confirmed his driving had been “normal” and he had not needed to “floor” the accelerator. At the time of the accident, Mr Muradi was driving to Beauchamp Place to get some food.
24. Mr Muradi told me that he was driving south on Sloane Street and stopped (as the first car) at the red traffic lights at the junction with Pont Street. Once they turned green, he turned right onto Pont Street and drove in a westerly direction. In his statement he said: “8. There was a clear stretch of road ahead of me. I had not driven a new Range Rover before and put my foot down to test its acceleration. In hindsight, I shouldn’t have done so as the high rate of acceleration caught me out.”
25. Mr Muradi confirmed his evidence in the criminal proceedings, namely that he wanted to “test” the car, “just to see how powerful it [was]”. He told me that he wanted to see how fast the car would go, albeit not its top speed. He accepted that as he was completing the right-hand turn he started to accelerate and when the car was straight “I just put my foot down” and “floored the throttle”. When asked why he did it, he said “I just wanted to try it” and that “I don’t know what came to my mind at that moment”.
26. Mr Muradi confirmed he was aware the road was subject to a 20mph speed limit, that he agreed with that limit, and that he did not find it annoying or irritating. He agreed the limit was designed to give drivers greater time to observe and react to what was going on, that it allows vehicles to be brought to a stop sooner and over a shorter distance, and that it reduces the severity of any collision that does occur, including with vulnerable road users. He further agreed that the streetscape on Pont Street with side roads, parked vehicles and potential emerging vehicles and pedestrians were reasons why the 20mph speed limit was in place.
27. Mr Muradi admitted to knowing that accelerating as he did would take him over the speed limit and said it was “stupid”. He accepted the expert analysis that he was travelling 25mph at the start of Pont Street, 33mph at the roundels, and that he reached a maximum speed of 51mph. He was pressed in evidence about the speed he appreciated doing at the time. He said he did not look at the speedometer but knew he was speeding. He accepted the Range Rover was picking up speed “aggressively” and said that “I felt it was fast”. Ultimately he accepted that he knew at the time he was driving “a lot” over the speed limit: over 40mph, but not that he had exceeded 50mph.
28. Mr Muradi was taken to his police interview. He accepted he had lied to the police in this initial account, given eight days after the incident. He had told the police that he had been driving “normally” at around 22-23mph and had challenged them when they put to him that he had been travelling fast, saying he did not know why he braked. He told me he lied because he was scared of the consequences for himself, knowing that he had been driving fast and over the speed limit. He also accepted that he had not told the police why he had braked, because to do so would have meant admitting that he was going well over the speed limit.
29. Mr Muradi was asked about his statement that his acceleration caught him out. He accepted that he knew that when he floored the throttle, the car would start to accelerate very hard.
30. Mr Muradi then described the accident in his statement as follows: “9. I was accelerating for a few seconds then I applied the brakes. The car was very powerful, and I was surprised at how fast it went. As part of my criminal trial, I was told my speed got up to 51mph.
10. As I was slowing down a BMW i8 registration number LD64 YUC driven by the Claimant, Mr Djumaliev pulled out of Hans Place turning right into my lane of traffic on Pont Street.
11. The BMW suddenly appeared from my right. Everything happened very quickly.
12. I braked harshly and turned slightly to the left to try to avoid hitting the BMW but couldn’t avoid a collision. The BMW hit the front driver’s side of my car. I then lost control, hit a post and collided with two pedestrians on the pavement.”
31. In cross-examination, Mr Muradi said he braked before he could see the BMW in order to slow back down to the speed limit. He was asked why he did not brake harder. It was put to him that the expert evidence showed the Range Rover’s speed reduced only from 51mph to 48mph and was still travelling at that latter speed some 22 metres after light braking began. He maintained he pressed the brake three, four or five times and said that had the BMW not emerged he planned to get the Range Rover down to 20mph.
32. When he saw the BMW, Mr Muradi said he steered “slightly” to the left and applied emergency braking. He said he “maybe” realised he was going “way over” the speed limit at this point.
33. In respect of this accident, Mr Muradi pleaded guilty to two counts of causing serious injury by careless driving, contrary to section 2 C of the Road Traffic Act 1988 . He was, however, acquitted, following a trial at Isleworth Crown Court in September 2025, of the alternative counts of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 A of the 1988 Act . On 10 December 2025 he was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment suspended for 15 months, with an unpaid work requirement and ancillary orders including disqualification.
34. By order of Master Gidden dated 14 October 2024, the evidence from the criminal proceedings was admissible in the trial before me as evidence of the truth of its contents, with the weight to be attached to it being a matter for me as the trial judge. By a further consent order approved by Master Gidden and dated 10 February 2026, the parties were granted permission to rely on the documents used in the criminal trial without serving hearsay notices. Mr Padala
35. Mr Padala’s witness statement to the police was unchallenged at the criminal trial. Mr Padala described driving a coach from Southampton to London. He was driving eastbound on Pont Street approaching the junction with Hans Place. He saw a white BMW pull out of Hans Place ahead of him, crossing his lane in order to turn right. He said the BMW was some distance ahead and he did not consider this action as “pulling out on me” due to its distance away and the speed of the general traffic. He said the BMW carried on with its manoeuvre, moving into the oncoming lane, when a dark Range Rover came “charging” down the westbound carriageway, going so fast that the driver did not have any reaction time to avoid the BMW. He estimated that a second or so before the collision, the Range Rover swerved slightly away from the BMW, but was going so fast it was unable to stop and collided with it, and then went onto the pavement, still at high speed, and appeared to hit two people. Expert evidence
36. The Court was provided with assistance from two experts in accident reconstruction: Mr Ross Clarke for the Claimant and Mr Paul Fidler for the Defendant. Each prepared a report. They subsequently met before trial to discuss areas of agreement and disagreement. Their joint statement records that there were no material points of disagreement between them. Nonetheless, both were called to give evidence and were cross-examined. Both gave their evidence in a helpful and straightforward way and as the Court would expect of professional expert witnesses.
37. In Taylor v Raspin [2022] EWCA Civ 1613 ; [2023] RTR 19, at §35, William Davis LJ endorsed the observation of Coulson J in Stewart v Glaze [2009] EWHC 704 (QB) that: “…it is the primary factual evidence which is of the greatest importance in a case of this kind. The expert evidence comprises a useful way in which that factual evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from it, can be tested. It is, however, very important to ensure that the expert evidence is not elevated into a fixed framework or formula, against which the defendant's actions are then to be rigidly judged with a mathematical precision.”
38. In Stark v Lyddon [2019] EWHC 2076 (QB) ; [2020] RTR 5, at §20, Master Davison made a similar point. He noted that counsel had accepted, “and from time to time demonstrated”, that “in cases such as these, it is easy to descend to a level of detail as to speeds, timings, sightlines etc, that over-complicates and clouds the issues”.
39. I have kept the guidance in Stewart v Glaze in mind when considering this case. The need for caution applies with particular force to counterfactual reconstructions in which a single parameter is changed. Both experts acknowledged that changing one parameter can have knock-on effects elsewhere in the mechanics of the accident. For example, Mr Clarke told me in his evidence: “…hopefully the calculations assist with understanding what the effect is of changing a single variable, but there might then be other knock-on effects.”
40. Mr Fidler agreed noting that “you change… one parameter and everything else changes”. For example, changing the approach speed of the Range Rover would put the vehicle in a different position on the road at the different points on the timeline to the collision. Those consequential changes could affect other matters, such as when it became visible to the BMW, the time available to the BMW to undertake its manoeuvre, and even the nature of any collision. A change to one parameter may therefore necessarily require additional circumstances of the accident to be altered. For this reason, Mr Fidler explained that counterfactuals were usually most helpful when considered from the point at which a hazard became one that required an emergency response (usually the point at which the other party to the accident entered the relevant party’s line of sight).
41. In the present case, the synchronised video footage, along with detailed measurements of the locus, has enabled the experts to reach broad agreement on where each vehicle was, and its approximate speed, at various points on the timeline to this collision. The resulting analysis was not materially disputed by Mr Djumaliev or Mr Muradi in their evidence. I found that part of the expert evidence of particular assistance. Nonetheless, I remind myself that I should avoid the trap of engaging in an exercise of mathematical precision (the experts emphasised that there was a range of tolerance with their calculations). The experts’ analysis does not displace the Court’s own evaluation of what reasonable care required, and whether that was discharged.
42. Working from the joint statement, and the agreement obtained in cross-examination, the experts were at one on the following matters : Mr O’Sullivan prepared a table of key timings, distances, speeds and sightlines, based on the joint statement and Mr Clarke’s report, which he put to Mr Fidler for agreement during his cross-examination. The Approach of Mr Muradi’s Range Rover (1) As Mr Muradi turned into Pont Street, his earliest known speed was about 25mph. That was at a point around 110 metres from the collision point. (2) Mr Muradi accelerated “hard” along Pont Street. The acceleration was consistent with maximum pedal application. (3) By the time he reached the 20mph roundels, around 105 metres from the collision point, Mr Muradi had reached a speed of approximately 33mph. (4) Mr Muradi reached a peak speed of about 51mph when he was around 60 metres and 2.80 seconds from the collision point. (5) Mr Muradi then eased off the accelerator and, when around 48 metres (2.30 seconds) from the collision point, started applying light braking, illuminating the Range Rover’s brake lights. Mr Muradi did not have a sightline to the emerging BMW at this time, and therefore this initial braking could not have been in response to detecting the BMW. (6) Mr Muradi’s sightline to the emerging BMW developed at about 1.3 to 1.4 seconds prior to the collision, whilst he was travelling at 48mph and was about 26 metres from the collision point. (7) Mr Muradi began increasing his braking to emergency deceleration shortly before tyre marks that were left on the road. The tyre marks start at 11.4 metres before the point of contact. The tyre marks show two deviations: the first was caused by Mr Muradi steering to the left (at approximately 0.28 seconds prior to the collision), and the second was caused by the impact with the BMW. Both deviations contributed to Mr Muradi’s post-impact path onto the footway and towards the pedestrians. (8) The collision in isolation was insufficient to cause Mr Muradi to leave the carriageway. The Approach of Mr Djumaliev’s BMW (9) Mr Djumaliev approached the junction at around 13mph and slowed to a stop with initial deceleration of 3m/s 2 (with the deceleration reducing as he approached the give way line). This fell within the range of typical deceleration for a planned stop during everyday driving, albeit at the higher end of the range. (10) Mr Djumaliev’s BMW came to a stop at the junction approximately 6.85 seconds before the collision. It was stationary until 5.30 seconds before the collision. When stopped, the front end of the BMW was about 0.3 metres behind the start of the give way lines and about 1 metre back from the furthest edge of the give way lines. (11) In that position, Mr Djumaliev’s view towards approaching westbound traffic was limited to about 32 metres due to the parked Audi in the bay on the north side of Pont Street, to his left. Had the front of the BMW been stopped level with the far edge of the give way lines, this view would have improved to 39 metres. (12) Mr Djumaliev set off from the junction, turning right, around 5.30 seconds before the moment of collision. He was in continuous motion from that point until the point of impact. Initially he only crept forwards due to two slowly passing eastbound vehicles (a Nissan Micra and London taxi). Once these passed, he increased his acceleration (at approximately 2.80 seconds before the collision), reaching a peak of 3m/s 2 , and a speed of 13mph. In the final second before the collision the speed of 13mph was maintained at a constant level. Mr Djumaliev’s acceleration was not close to the maximum acceleration for the BMW (which, at very low speeds, was likely closer to 9m/s 2 ). (13) Typical levels of acceleration used by drivers vary somewhat for each specific junction but are generally between 1 to 2.5 m/s 2 . (14) Mr Djumaliev’s BMW crossed the give way lines at about 2.44 seconds prior to the collision. At this point Mr Muradi was around 50 metres away. Mr Djumaliev had no available view of the Range Rover. (15) A sightline to the Range Rover developed at about 1.2 seconds prior to the collision, at which point Mr Muradi was travelling at around 48mph and was about 23 metres away from the collision point. Mr Djumaliev continued and the BMW crossed into the filter lane at around 1.16 seconds prior to the collision and into the westbound lane at 0.68 seconds prior to the collision. Mr Djumaliev’s Opportunity to Avoid the Collision (16) Had Mr Djumaliev set off at a lower speed and been prepared to stop or pause once he obtained a greater sightline towards the approaching westbound traffic (e.g. whilst crossing the filter lane) then he could have seen the approaching Range Rover and braked before encroaching into the westbound lane, avoiding the collision. (17) Had Mr Muradi been travelling at the speed limit of 20mph when the BMW set off from the junction, the Range Rover would have arrived at the point of collision about 7 seconds later than it did. That additional time would have been sufficient for Mr Djumaliev to have fully manoeuvred into the westbound lane and he would only have needed to continue to accelerate by 0.1m/s 2 to reach 20mph. (18) Had Mr Muradi been travelling at 20mph when the BMW crossed the give way lines, Mr Djumaliev would only have needed to accelerate at about 0.2m/s 2 to have reached 20mph. (19) Had Mr Muradi been travelling at 20mph when Mr Djumaliev gained an available sightline to the Range Rover, he would only have needed to accelerate at about 0.7m/s 2 to have reached 20mph. (20) Had a hypothetical vehicle travelling at 20mph been positioned just beyond the line of sight for Mr Djumaliev as he was stationary at the junction, it would have reached a point of conflict with the BMW’s intended path in about 3.1 seconds. To join the westbound lane ahead of that vehicle, Mr Djumaliev would have needed to accelerate at an average acceleration of 2.7m/s 2 and reach 20mph. That might have avoided physical contact, but would have left the vehicles virtually bumper to bumper. (21) Given that Mr Djumaliev took over 5 seconds from setting off to reach the point of collision, he did not have a sufficient line of sight to ensure he would not cause conflict with a hypothetical westbound vehicle travelling at 20mph if it was just out of sight when he set off. He could not accelerate to the required average of 2.7m/s 2 to ensure no conflict because of the need to allow the taxi in the eastbound lane to move past him. Mr Muradi’s Opportunity to Avoid the Collision (22) Had Mr Muradi been travelling at 20mph at the point at which he developed a sightline to the BMW, he could have brought the Range Rover to a stop well before reaching the point of collision; indeed, he could have done so if he had been travelling at up to about 38mph . Mr Clarke confirmed that this agreement included giving allowance for perception response time (see below). (23) Further, as the Range Rover would only have needed to slow to the speed of the BMW or lower in order to accommodate it (assuming the BMW did not speed up any further), had Mr Muradi been travelling at 20mph, or indeed up to 35mph, at the point the sightline to the BMW developed, he could have slowed using normal deceleration for planned stops and avoided a collision.
43. In their oral evidence, the experts added the following material points: (1) Mr Clarke told me that after Mr Muradi began braking, he did not release the brake. At the initial rate of deceleration, reducing the Range Rover’s speed from 51mph to 20mph would have taken about 9 seconds over 146 metres (Mr Clarke, adopting -1.5m/s 2 ) or 14 seconds over 219 metres (Mr Fidler, adopting -1.0m/s 2 ). (2) Mr Clarke calculated that, because Mr Muradi was already braking when the BMW became visible, his perception-response time (“PRT”) and brake build-up time The time it takes between identifying a potential hazard, deciding what action to take and applying the necessary input to the vehicle. was about 0.76 seconds. The figure of 38mph at paragraph 42(22) assumes that prompt response. With a median response time of a little over a second The time it takes to increase braking from the existing level to full emergency braking. , the maximum speed from which the vehicle could have stopped before the collision point would reduce to 25mph. Mr Fidler did not dispute that analysis. Unlike many accidents, Mr Muradi already had his foot on the brake and was applying some braking pressure when his sight line to the emerging vehicle developed. That reduced the PRT as compared with a situation where it was necessary for Mr Muradi to move his foot to the brake pedal and then depress it. A median response time more accurately reflects a driver who was not already braking. (3) Before reaching the junction, Mr Djumaliev had only a fleeting sightline, lasting less than a second, between two parked vehicles. From his stopped position, the Audi limited his view to 32 metres. As he moved off behind the taxi, his view initially worsened because the rear of the taxi became the pivot point. (4) Mr Clarke was asked about the counterfactual of an imaginary vehicle travelling at 20mph just beyond Mr Djumaliev’s line of sight at the junction. Such a vehicle would have needed around 3.1 seconds to reach the point of collision. Mr Clarke was asked whether it followed that Mr Djumaliev would have needed to complete his turn and accelerate to 20mph within that time period. Mr Clarke agreed in broad terms, but explained the situation was more complicated because as Mr Djumaliev accelerated away from the junction, the separation distance would have increased, thereby giving additional time and distance for the vehicles to reach the same speed. Ignoring that complication, Mr Clarke explained an acceleration of around 2.7m/s 2 would have been required to avoid a collision, but that would leave the vehicles almost bumper to bumper with no significant separation distance. A higher level of acceleration would be required for a greater separation distance. Mr Djumaliev’s average acceleration was lower than this figure because he was only creeping forward whilst vehicles travelling eastbound were clearing his path. Mr Clarke was asked questions about the level of acceleration required to get in front of the imaginary vehicle taking account of the time he spent creeping waiting for the taxi to clear his path. Mr Clarke pointed out the difficulty with that analysis was that the imaginary vehicle would move during the creep time, and would no longer be out of sight; indeed, it would almost be at the point of the collision. (5) Mr Fidler did not disagree mathematically with Mr Clarke’s assessment of this hypothetical, however he maintained it would be necessary for Mr Muradi to bring his vehicle to a stop because the assumption should be that Mr Djumaliev would have responded in the same way, and would therefore have come to a stop as he did in the westbound carriageway. In cross-examination he accepted, though, that if the BMW did continue to accelerate, even less response would be required by the Range Rover and, at lower speeds, there might have been no response required at all. Mr Fidler agreed that if Mr Muradi had been driving and entered Pont Street at 20mph, or even 25mph and continued down that road at anywhere between 20-35mph there would probably not have been a collision. (6) As Mr Djumaliev passed the rear of the taxi, his view opened along the westbound lane towards the traffic lights. Mr Clarke explained that had he looked left, he could have seen the Range Rover and been able to stop before entering the westbound lane. (7) Mr Fidler agreed with Mr Clarke that at the end of the BMW’s motion, just before the point of impact, its brake lights were illuminated and the vehicle appeared to brake. (8) The contact between the vehicles was glancing. The Range Rover’s speed at impact was approximately 35mph on Mr Clarke’s estimate and 39.5mph on Mr Fidler’s. It lost little speed in the collision. Mr Fidler estimated its speed on striking the pedestrians at approximately 29.5–35mph. As recorded in his joint report with Ms Rachel Wray (the police forensic collision investigator), had the Range Rover been travelling at 20mph, it would not have mounted the footway and struck the pedestrians. (9) Mr Fidler explained that the various counterfactuals that had been agreed (see paragraph 42(17) to (21) above) were not the only possible scenarios and depended on the point from which the sequence was modelled.
44. In a supplemental joint statement dated 6 October 2026, the experts agreed that the Range Rover (kerb mass 2,429kg, 345bhp, 0-60mph in 5.7 to 6.5 seconds) and a Mercedes S-Class 350d of the type Mr Muradi described (kerb mass 2,020 to 2,090kg, 281 or 308bhp, 0-60mph in 5.2 to 6.2 seconds) were “similar” in their levels of performance. C. Legal Principles Duty of care of drivers
45. The legal principles for me to apply in this case are well established, and counsel did not dispute them. Every driver owes other road users a duty to take reasonable care: to exercise the care and skill to be expected of a reasonably competent and prudent driver in all the circumstances. The standard is objective and does not vary with the experience or abilities of the individual driver: see Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 . It is for the Court to decide what the reasonably competent and prudent driver would have done.
46. That duty is owed by the driver on the major road as well as by the driver emerging from the minor road. A driver with priority is entitled to take account of the fact that emerging traffic must give way. Priority does not, however, relieve him of his own obligation to drive with reasonable care having regard to the road conditions ahead. A driver may take account of the conduct ordinarily to be expected of other road users, but may not disregard the commonplace possibility that they will act carelessly. He is not bound to anticipate folly in all its forms. The well-known statement of Lord Uthwatt in London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155 at 173 remains the touchstone. The passage was cited in argument in Scott v Gavigan [2016] EWCA Civ 544 (see §13), and Master Davison set it out in Stark v Lyddon at §24: “I … dissent from the view expressed by the Master of the Rolls that drivers “are entitled to drive on the assumption that other users of the road, whether drivers or pedestrians, will behave with reasonable care.” It is common experience that many do not. A driver is not, of course, bound to anticipate folly in all its forms, but he is not, in my opinion, entitled to put out of consideration the teachings of experience as to the form those follies commonly take.” The Highway Code
47. Under section 38(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 , a failure to observe a provision of the Highway Code does not of itself render a person liable to criminal proceedings of any kind. In civil proceedings, however, any party may rely on such a failure as tending to establish or negative liability. The Code is therefore relevant evidence of the standard of the reasonably careful driver. That said, as Burnett J put it in Jones v Lawton [2013] EWHC 4108 (QB) at §42, “it is a mistake to read the Highway Code like a statute”. Where a rule uses “MUST” or “MUST NOT”, it reflects a legal requirement imposed elsewhere. Rules expressed as “should” are advisory, but they are a reliable guide to what prudence requires.
48. The following rules bear on Mr Djumaliev's manoeuvre: (1) Rule 170 provides that drivers should “[t]ake extra care at junctions”, and that they should “look all around before emerging. Do not cross or join a road until there is a gap large enough for you to do so safely.” (2) Rule 172 provides that a driver “MUST give way to traffic on the main road when emerging from a junction with broken white lines across the road.” (3) Rule 180, under the heading “Turning right”, provides: “Wait until there is a safe gap between you and any oncoming vehicle. … Take great care when turning into a main road; you will need to watch for traffic in both directions and wait for a safe gap.”
49. Mr Woodhouse submitted that the obligation to give way under Rule 172 applies whether the driver on the major road is driving well or carelessly. I accept that submission. I also accept that a gap which would leave vehicles virtually bumper to bumper is not a “safe gap” within Rule 180. Those propositions do not, however, make the emerging driver an insurer against every form of conduct on the main road. The question remains whether he exercised the care of a reasonably competent and prudent driver in the relevant circumstances.
50. The following rules bear on Mr Muradi's driving: (1) Rule 124 provides that a driver “MUST NOT exceed the maximum speed limits for the road”. (2) Rule 125 explains that the limit is an absolute maximum and not a target, and that inappropriate speed increases both the chance of a collision and its severity. It also directs drivers to reduce speed where they share the road with pedestrians and cyclists, and when driving at night when it is more difficult to see other road users. (3) Rule 126 requires a driver to travel at a speed that allows him to stop well within the distance he can see to be clear. Apportionment: the 1945 and 1978 Acts
51. Mr Muradi admits that he was negligent. If I find that Mr Djumaliev was also negligent and that his negligence was causative, apportionment arises in two statutory contexts.
52. The first is contributory negligence. Under section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 , where a person suffers damage partly as a result of his own fault and partly as a result of the fault of another, his damages are to be reduced “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage”. That provision applies to Mr Djumaliev’s claim and to Mr Muradi’s counterclaim, each of which is for damage to the claiming party’s own vehicle and related losses. A claimant will be held contributorily negligent only if he did not act with reasonable care in the circumstances and that “fault” had a causative effect on the damage: see Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404 ; [2010] PIQR P8 at §44, per Aikens LJ, cited in Scott v Gavigan at §30.
53. The second is contribution. Mr Muradi seeks contribution towards the sums paid in respect of the claims of the two pedestrians who were ultimately hit by the Range Rover. Under section 2(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 , the contribution recoverable is “such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question”. The relevant damage for that purpose is the injury to the pedestrians.
54. Although the two Acts serve different purposes, the Court applies the same approach under each. It evaluates both the relative blameworthiness (or culpability) of each party’s conduct and its relative causative potency: see Brian Warwicker Partnership plc v HOK International Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 962 ; [2006] PNLR 5 at §37. The twofold approach derives from Lord Reid’s dictum in Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467 at 490D-E: “There are two elements in an assessment of liability, causation and blameworthiness.” Burnett J cited that passage in Jones v Lawton at §43, and Master Davison applied the same approach in Hernandez v Acar [2019] EWHC 72 (QB) at §43 and in Stark v Lyddon at §27.
55. The relevant damage differs under the two Acts. The 1945 Act concerns losses flowing from damage to the vehicles; the 1978 Act concerns the pedestrians’ injuries after the Range Rover left the carriageway. Different apportionments might therefore be possible in principle because the causative potency of each driver’s fault (and perhaps also their culpability) may differ in relation to those different consequences.
56. When I raised the matter with counsel, I was told that their collective researches had not identified an authority where different apportionments had been conducted as between two motorists in respect of their losses inter se and in relation to the consequences of their collision for third parties.
57. However, in this case the parties have agreed that I should treat the collision and its aftermath as a single incident so that any apportionment I make governs its consequences, including the claims of both pedestrians. I was informed that the parties’ solicitors had reached a written agreement not to join Mr Djumaliev to the claims of the pedestrians on the basis that if Mr Djumaliev is held x% liable for the collision in these proceedings, he will be liable to pay that proportion of the pedestrians’ damages and costs by way of contribution. For these reasons nothing turns on the issues raised by Mr O’Sullivan concerning whether a claim for contribution under the 1978 Act was adequately pleaded. Previous cases
58. Decisions concerning whether a particular piece of driving fell below the required standard and was negligent, or how the apportionment exercise should be conducted, are deeply fact sensitive. The Court of Appeal made this point in Farley v Buckley [2007] EWCA Civ 403 at §11. In Jones v Lawton, Burnett J observed, at §43, that previous cases “illustrate the differences in apportionment which can flow from fine distinctions in the circumstances of an accident”. Similarly, Master Davison in Stark v Lyddon described apportionment as “an exercise which is exquisitely fact-sensitive”, in which “previous decisions are of limited assistance” (see §27).
59. I must decide this case on its own particular facts and not by attempting to identify and replicate the result in the most factually similar previous case. Counsel before me readily accepted that previous case decisions are a guide or illustrations of how other courts have approached particular facts rather than “authorities” in the strict sense.
60. Counsel nonetheless took me to a number of decisions, mostly concerning collisions between a vehicle emerging from a minor road and a vehicle on the major road. In light of what I have said, I summarise them briefly. I confine myself to the features of each on which counsel relied.
61. Farley v Buckley . A car turned right across the front of a refuse wagon and collided with a scooter overtaking the wagon at about 30mph on or over the centre line. The trial judge found the rider’s speed “reckless” and the car driver free of negligence, although he had emerged in one continuous movement at about 5-8mph rather than nose-poking. The Court of Appeal held that she was entitled to do so: it was not foreseeable that a motorcycle would overtake in the reckless manner found, and on those facts the difference between continuous movement and nose-poking was “extremely slight” (§10). Maurice Kay LJ stressed, however, that a driver who fails to nose-poke will not in all cases avoid a finding of negligence (§11), and Pill LJ emphasised that “[g]reat care is required” of a driver turning right and that the case is not authority that emerging at 5 to 8mph is generally acceptable (§§14 and 16). Mr O’Sullivan relied on Farley as a caution against converting a theoretically safer manoeuvre, identified with hindsight, into the standard of reasonable care. Mr Woodhouse pointed out that nose-poking there would have done nothing to improve the driver’s view, that the car had moved only about five feet beyond the wagon at impact, and that it was travelling at roughly half Mr Djumaliev’s speed.
62. Heaton v Herzog [2008] EWCA Civ 1636 . A driver turned right out of a side road into the path of a motorcyclist travelling from the driver’s right “far too fast”, possibly at 47mph in a 30mph limit. Parked cars restricted her view to about 54.5 metres and the motorcycle would not have been visible until it pulled out to pass the parked cars about 60 metres away from the junction. The car driver looked right before moving off, but not again. Reversing the judge’s finding that the rider was wholly to blame, Sir William Aldous held that a driver turning right from a side road into a major road “is under a duty to take extreme care before doing so and when doing so”, the more so where she knew that vehicles travelled too fast on the road and her line of sight was restricted (§12). Although it was reasonable for her to look and decide to move off, “she had a continuing duty to look to her right, particularly as her line of sight was restricted” (§14). She was held 25% to blame (§16). Mr Woodhouse relied on the case as showing that the emerging driver’s duty is owed to drivers travelling well in excess of the limit. Mr O’Sullivan pointed out that the sightline, although restricted, was considerably longer than Mr Djumaliev’s, and that the excess speed was less marked.
63. Jones v Lawton . A driver turned right from a minor road across two lanes of slow-moving traffic on an A-road. The traffic on the A-road stopped to let him out. As the driver emerged, he collided with a motorcyclist on the A-road, passing the outside of the queue at about 30mph in a 30mph limit. Burnett J held that the driver should have edged forward past the stationary vehicle “to alert any approaching cyclist or motorcyclist to his presence, and to give himself the best chance to see an approaching motorcycle” (§40). The rider was also at fault, because he was going “far too fast” in those conditions; he should have been riding at a speed which would have enabled him to slow or stop should a vehicle emerge (§42). Blameworthiness had “an element of broad symmetry”, but causative potency tilted “the balance decisively” in the rider’s favour, because the car crossing his path created the hazard and because motorcyclists are vulnerable road users (§44). Liability was apportioned two-thirds to one-third in favour of the motorcyclist (§45). Mr Woodhouse relied on the first of those causative factors and on §40. Mr O’Sullivan submitted that the case was of limited assistance because the apportionment reflected the rider’s vulnerability.
64. Scott v Gavigan concerned a pedestrian. An intoxicated claimant ran into the path of a moped some 10 metres beyond an informal crossing. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that he was wholly to blame because his conduct was not reasonably foreseeable. Christopher Clarke LJ contrasted his “egregious folly” with commonplace events “as when cars or motorcycles emerge from side roads” (§16), and said that the question was “whether what happened was the sort of thing that, in the applicable circumstances, this defendant, acting reasonably, ought to have foreseen” (§17). Mr O’Sullivan relied on the case as a relatively recent statement of what a driver should foresee. Mr Woodhouse accepted that a motorist need not anticipate every form of folly, but submitted that the case was of little help on its facts.
65. Hernandez v Acar. Parked cars limited a driver’s view at the give way lines to 21-23 metres. He edged out only to the point where he could see about 40 metres (on his own account, at most about 45 metres), and pulled into the path of a motorcyclist travelling at around 45-50mph in a 30mph limit. Master Davison held that this was not sufficient (§40). “[R]oad users must always be aware of the fact that other road users may exceed the speed limit or act foolishly or dangerously. The view up the main road which the defendant actually achieved did not sufficiently allow for that possibility” (§42). The Master placed “a little more of the blame” on the rider, but causative potency, partly because of the rider’s vulnerability, tilted the balance back, and liability was apportioned 60/40 in the rider’s favour (§§43-44). Mr Woodhouse submitted that this was the case closest on its facts, pointing to the comparable disparity between actual and safe speeds, and to the fact that the driver there had achieved a view of up to about 40 or 45 metres, further than Mr Djumaliev could see. Mr O’Sullivan relied on Master Davison’s own explanation in Stark (at §28) of why Hernandez was different: the rider there had exceeded the actual limit by “a factor of 50%”, was on an unfamiliar machine, and his speed was “inadvertent”.
66. Stark v Lyddon. The defendant turned right out of a car park across the path of the claimant's motorcycle. She did not stop at the give way lines. She looked right once, from a position where a hedge and billboard limited her view to about 75 metres, and did not look again; with her bumper on the lines she could have seen 130 metres. The claimant was travelling at about 70mph before braking, “more than double the speed limit”, and was riding “for the thrill of it”; he was, in effect, “racing” (§§13 and 19). Master Davison tested the adequacy of the defendant’s view by the time it gave her: a vehicle at the limit would have reached her in 4.86 seconds, and one exceeding it by a third (which was commonplace) in 3.7 seconds, so that “she was cutting things fine” (§17). He rejected the submission that the claimant’s speed was so egregious that it could not reasonably have been anticipated. The defendant had not looked properly, and, had she done so, she would have seen him: “It is no answer to the breach of duty so demonstrated to say that the claimant, by reason of his excessive speed, fell outside its scope” (§26).
67. The claimant bore “a much heavier share of the blameworthiness” (§28). Master Davison considered that the causative disparity between a car and a motorcycle diminishes in line with the motorcyclist’s excess speed. He concluded that, where the speed was “(a) over double the limit, (b) grossly excessive for the circumstances and (c) calculated”, “the most important consideration is not causative potency but blameworthiness” (§29). Liability was apportioned 70/30 in the defendant’s favour: the speeding motorcyclist bore 70% and the emerging driver 30% (§30). Mr Woodhouse relied on §26; in his words, “[t]he bad driver is owed exactly the same duty of care as the good driver”. He submitted that Mr Muradi’s driving was not as egregious as the claimant’s riding in Stark . Mr O’Sullivan relied on §§28-29, submitting that each of the three features identified at §29 is present here: two and a half times the limit, a grossly excessive speed in the circumstances, and a deliberate decision to “test” the car.
68. Taylor v Raspin. A car turned right out of a minor road, where a bend limited the view to the left to about 80 metres, and collided with a powerful motorcycle travelling from that direction “in the low 50s” in a 30mph limit. The judge held that the driver should have looked left a second time as she emerged, and reduced the rider’s damages by 45%; there was no appeal against that apportionment. Dismissing the driver’s appeal, William Davis LJ said (§24): “It is axiomatic that a driver emerging from a minor road onto a major road owes a continuing duty to vehicles on the major road. How that duty is to be fulfilled will depend upon the particular circumstances. … the notion that it was unforeseeable that a vehicle would be exceeding the speed limit to a significant degree on the major road is not sustainable.” The driver’s slow speed had “increased the need to check for a second time that it was safe to continue into the far carriageway” (§24). Her duty was not to keep the major road clear, but “not to drive onto the carriageway along which the motorcycle was travelling and into the path of the motorcycle” (§25), and the judge had imposed no general duty to look twice (§27). Mr Woodhouse relied on §§16 and 24. Mr O’Sullivan contrasted a straightforward suburban turn, with no competing demands and an 80-metre sightline, with the present case, in which the driver on the major road was travelling at two and a half times the limit on a congested urban street. Drawing the threads together
69. The following propositions emerge from these authorities and from the Highway Code: (1) A driver emerging from a minor road owes a continuing duty to give way to traffic on the major road. The reasonable care required in discharging that duty may demand great care, before and during the manoeuvre, particularly where the driver’s view is restricted ( Heaton at §§12 and 14; Taylor at §24; Stark at §26). (2) What that duty requires in practice depends on the circumstances: Taylor at §24. Where the view is obstructed, the driver may be required to edge forward, both to obtain a view and to make his presence known ( Jones at §40; Hernandez at §40). The court must not, however, convert a counsel of perfection, identified with hindsight, into a legal duty ( Farley at §§10-11; Taylor at §27). (3) An emerging driver must allow for the commonplace possibility that traffic on the major road will exceed the speed limit, even to a significant degree. He is not, however, bound to anticipate folly in all its forms ( Taylor at §24; Hernandez at §42; Scott at §§16-17). Even grossly excessive speed might not excuse an emerging driver’s failure to look properly if he would have seen the other vehicle had he done so ( Stark at §26). (4) The driver on the major road owes his own duty of care. That includes a duty to keep to a speed that is within the limit and safe for the conditions. His priority does not entitle him to drive at whatever speed he chooses. (5) Apportionment requires an assessment of both the culpability and the causative potency of each party’s fault ( Brian Warwicker Partnership at §37; see e.g. Jones at §43; Stark at §27). (6) The decided cases are deeply fact sensitive and serve as a guide and no more. D. Discussion and Conclusions Mr Muradi’s negligence
70. Mr Muradi admits that his driving was negligent. The concession is plainly correct, and his negligence was causative.
71. The evidence shows, and I accept, that after turning onto Pont Street, Mr Muradi accelerated the Range Rover hard, consistent with maximum acceleration, from an earliest known speed of around 25mph up to a maximum of 51mph. This was well in excess of the speed limit of 20mph. He did not dispute achieving that peak speed.
72. Mr Muradi initially gave the police an untruthful account of his speed: paragraph 28 above. I have not treated that lie as establishing that his evidence on every disputed matter was unreliable. Having heard him, however, I formed the clear impression that he tended to give answers which he perceived would lessen his responsibility for the accident. He did not give a straightforward account of why he accelerated or of his purpose in applying the brakes before the BMW became visible. I have therefore tested his evidence carefully against the CCTV footage and the expert evidence.
73. It is clear from Mr Muradi’s evidence that, when he floored the throttle, he knew that the Range Rover would accelerate hard. I do not accept his original suggestion that the acceleration “caught him out”. His very purpose was to test how quickly the vehicle would acquire speed, and he accepted in cross-examination that he knew maximum application of the accelerator would produce very hard acceleration.
74. Mr Muradi accepted that he was consciously aware of the rapid acceleration and knew that he was travelling “a lot” over the speed limit. Although he had not looked at the speedometer, he ultimately accepted that he knew he was travelling at more than 40mph, twice the limit.
75. I do not accept that Mr Muradi initially braked in order to reduce his speed down to 20mph. I consider that this is an ex post facto explanation he has given having seen the CCTV footage showing his brake light illuminated before his sightline to the BMW developed. The agreed expert assessment is that after achieving a peak speed of 51mph, Mr Muradi eased off the accelerator and applied light braking, reducing his speed by approximately 3mph over a distance of around 22 metres. Light braking of this nature is not consistent with the actions of a driver realising they are driving significantly over the speed limit and attempting to bring the vehicle’s speed back down to a lawful level. Had that been the intention, I am in no doubt that Mr Muradi would have braked more strongly reflecting the considerable extent to which the speed limit was being infringed. The experts calculated that at the rate of deceleration employed, reducing his speed to 20mph would have taken between 9 and 14 seconds and between 146 and 219 metres (depending on the precise rate of deceleration). Such periods of time, and distances, are not consistent with a driver wishing to bring a vehicle back to a lawful speed. I therefore reject Mr Muradi’s explanation for braking before the sightline developed.
76. As a result of the speed he generated, it was impossible for Mr Muradi to stop in time when a sightline developed to the emerging BMW of Mr Djumaliev. That sightline developed around 26 metres before the point of collision when the Range Rover was still travelling at around 48mph. Despite prompt emergency braking, the Range Rover was still travelling at between about 35mph (Mr Clarke) and 39.5mph (Mr Fidler) when it struck the BMW.
77. I accept the experts’ assessment that, had Mr Muradi been travelling within the speed limit when his sightline to the BMW developed, he could have brought the Range Rover to a stop well before the point of collision. On the experts’ analysis he could have done so even at speeds above the limit: up to about 38mph assuming the prompt response he in fact made, although with a median PRT that figure might fall to about 25mph (see paragraph 43(2) above). In any event his negligence was clearly causative of the collision and its aftermath.
78. The remaining question on liability is whether Mr Djumaliev was also negligent in a way that caused or contributed to the collision and the events that followed. Was Mr Djumaliev negligent? The allegations of negligence
79. The allegations of negligence were narrowed by Mr Woodhouse in his closing submissions to six specific criticisms: (1) Mr Djumaliev failed to recognise that the parked Audi severely limited his view to the left. (2) He pulled out immediately behind the taxi, which reduced that view further. (3) He pulled out without being satisfied that it was safe to do so in relation to the coach. (4) He did not adopt a speed, whether by “creeping and peeping” or edging forward, that would let him identify hazards in the westbound lane and stop before entering it. (5) He did not look left as he crossed behind the taxi. (6) He did not look left as he crossed the filter lane.
80. When considering whether Mr Djumaliev was negligent in these ways, I accept Mr O’Sullivan’s submission that I should not reason backwards from the grave consequences of this accident to a conclusion that Mr Djumaliev’s turn must have been negligent. Instead, I must assess his driving objectively as it would have appeared at the time, without hindsight.
81. In general, I found Mr Djumaliev to be a straightforward witness. Mr Woodhouse submitted that he was unimpressive, unwilling to make obvious concessions and dismissive of any suggestion that he could have avoided the accident. There was, at times, a tendency to argue in support of his position, although I appreciate that this may have been due in part to the way questions were posed, and to the fact that he had already given evidence in the criminal proceedings and had clearly spent some time with the expert materials. He did make important concessions, notably that he did not look left after he began to move (see paragraph 106 below). Where his account conflicted with the objective evidence, as it did on the view he claimed to have had on his approach (see paragraphs 82 to 90 below), I have preferred the objective evidence. Mr Djumaliev’s view on approach to the junction
82. To make his right-hand turn, Mr Djumaliev had to cross the eastbound lane and the central filter lane of Pont Street. As he approached the junction, the eastbound traffic was forming a queue towards the Sloane Street lights. The end of the queue of around 13 cars was a little to the east of the junction. There were also parked vehicles in marked bays immediately to the left of the junction. Mr Djumaliev’s vehicle was a low car. His evidence at the criminal trial was that visibility from its side windows was “very limited”.
83. I accept the expert evidence that Mr Djumaliev is likely to have approached the junction at around 13mph with an initial deceleration of about 3 m/s 2 . That is consistent with the CCTV evidence.
84. Mr Djumaliev maintained that when approaching the junction he could see “far to [his] left” and was satisfied that there were no cars travelling west on Pont Street. I do not accept his evidence to that effect. In my judgment his opportunity to observe was too short and amounted to no more than a glimpse of a limited view of the westbound carriageway. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.
85. First, until the BMW passed the building on the corner of Hans Place, it is clear that Mr Djumaliev could not see west onto Pont Street at all. At one point during his cross-examination, Mr Djumaliev seemed to suggest to the contrary saying he had lived in the area for many years. Familiarity with the area could not improve the physical sightline. Even allowing for the fact that English is not Mr Djumaliev’s first language, his answer suggests that he relied in part on what he expected to find at the junction rather than on what he could see.
86. Next, once the BMW had cleared the building line, Mr Djumaliev’s view to the left was generally blocked by the parked cars and by the eastbound queue. As Mr Clarke and Mr Fidler both accepted, while the BMW was approaching the junction there was “a small sightline between two of the parked vehicles”, one which “would have disappeared once he got close to the give way line” (per Mr Clarke). Mr Fidler’s evidence in the criminal proceedings was similar: there was “a sliver of view between the parked vehicles but only for a fraction of a second”. In his closing submissions, Mr Woodhouse referred to Mr Fidler’s exhibit PF1 which printed each frame of the footage from camera 2 and which shows the sliver of a view that is referred to. Mr Woodhouse used the frame numbers to estimate that the passenger window of the BMW offered a view of the westbound lane between about frames 3595 and 3610 (namely, 15 frames at 20 frames per second, or about 0.75 seconds). That analysis seems to me to be broadly sound and consistent with Mr Clarke’s timing table of the BMW’s approach. It can be seen in those frames that the end of the queue of the eastbound traffic was beyond the gap between the two parked cars allowing a view of a segment of the westbound carriageway. However, it was not a view down towards the lights or for any significant distance.
87. Mr Djumaliev said that he could see the westbound lane through gaps between the eastbound cars. I do not accept that evidence. He said the same thing orally in his evidence to the criminal court and was picked up on the fact that he had not included any such detail in his prior statement. He could not explain that omission. More importantly, the footage from camera 2 (and the frames in exhibit PF1) demonstrate that the angles concerned would not have allowed Mr Djumaliev to obtain any form of reliable view between the queuing vehicles.
88. I also place reliance on Mr Djumaliev having explained that, because of the shape of his car, “looking to the left actually requires stopping”. That would suggest that he could not have taken a meaningful look to his left through his passenger window while moving towards the junction.
89. I therefore find that Mr Djumaliev’s view of the westbound lane on his approach was fleeting and lasted less than a second. He obtained it while the BMW was moving and while he was bringing the car to a stop. It showed only a limited part of the westbound lane and did not extend significantly towards the traffic lights. A reasonable driver could not rely on that glimpse when deciding whether it was safe to turn right.
90. The fact that the Range Rover was then some distance to the east does not assist Mr Djumaliev. A momentary view of an empty section of road could not tell him what traffic might reach the junction after he had stopped, waited and begun his turn. Mr Djumaliev’s conclusion about the Sloane Street lights
91. Mr Djumaliev explained that due to the accumulation of cars travelling eastbound, he concluded that the Sloane Street lights “must be red”. He gave the same explanation at the criminal trial. He accepted that this was one factor in his decision to proceed, while denying that it was the main reason for it. That inference provided no support for the conclusion that it was safe to proceed. A queue of eastbound traffic at the lights says nothing about whether vehicles have turned, or are about to turn, into the westbound lane from Sloane Street (which Mr Muradi ultimately did) or whether vehicles might emerge into that westbound carriageway from the other side roads between Sloane Street and Hans Place.
92. I find that Mr Djumaliev put at least some weight on an assumption about the lights that cannot be supported, and that this assumption shaped the little attention he then gave to his left (see further below). The view at the junction and the decision to pull out
93. The experts are agreed, and I accept, that Mr Djumaliev stopped his BMW about 0.3 metres behind the closest edge of the give way lines, and about a metre from their furthest edge. At this point there is agreement that his view of westbound traffic was limited to about 32 metres because of the parked Audi to his left, which formed the pivot point of Mr Djumaliev’s sightline. Mr Djumaliev did not dispute this was so. At the criminal trial he told the jury that he “obviously did not have the visibility all the way down the road”. In his report, Mr Clarke described the remainder of Mr Djumaliev’s view as being “fully obscured by various vehicles”. Mr Fidler referred to him being able to see only a wedge or slice of the road directly ahead.
94. Mr Djumaliev was stationary for somewhat over a second . During this time, he said he looked to the left just before the taxi came past him. At the criminal trial he accepted that to pull out without having looked would be dangerous. I accept his evidence that he looked to his left before setting off on the right hand turn, but that view only afforded him knowledge that nothing was travelling westbound in the 32 metres prior to the junction. He then started moving forward slowly before the taxi had cleared the path in front of him in order to utilise the gap in the eastbound traffic between the taxi and the coach. He accelerated once the taxi had passed in a continuous right hand turn until the collision, which occurred approximately 5.3 seconds after he started moving. As he accepted in evidence, he did not look to his left after starting to move. About 1.1 seconds (Mr Fidler) and 1.55 seconds (Mr Clarke).
95. I find that Mr Djumaliev’s view at the junction was not adequate. More precisely, it was not adequate to justify committing to a single, continuous manoeuvre across the eastbound lane and the filter lane and into the westbound lane, without any further observation to the left.
96. Acting reasonably, Mr Djumaliev had to allow for the possibility that there would be traffic out of his sightline travelling westbound. He also had to allow for the possibility that such traffic would be travelling at, or significantly above, the speed limit.
97. Reference was made to the hypothetical example of a vehicle just out of his sightline and travelling at 20mph. On the experts’ agreed analysis it would reach a point of conflict with the BMW’s intended path in about 3.1 seconds (paragraph 42(20) above). A faster vehicle would close the gap sooner. The manoeuvre Mr Djumaliev engaged in (slowed as it was by the need to allow the taxi to pass in front of him) took some 5.3 seconds.
98. In his submissions, Mr O’Sullivan referred to Mr Clarke’s oral evidence that a hypothetical vehicle travelling lawfully at 20mph, just outside the 32-metre sightline when the BMW began to creep, would have passed the junction before the BMW entered the westbound lane, so that the BMW would have joined behind it. Mr Fidler agreed with that evidence.
99. I do not accept that this demonstrates that a 32-metre view was adequate for Mr Djumaliev’s manoeuvre. The analysis depends on one hypothetical vehicle, at one precise position, travelling at exactly the speed limit. A driver in Mr Djumaliev’s position, stationary at the junction, could not know whether there was only a single vehicle just beyond his view travelling at 20mph. The vehicle might have been a little further back out of view, it might have been travelling at a different speed, or other vehicles might have been following it. He was required to allow for the possibility that more than one vehicle was approaching and that the westbound traffic might be travelling at, or significantly above, the speed limit.
100. I do not consider that Mr Djumaliev exercised reasonable care at this junction when pulling out with only 32 metres of sight in a single manoeuvre, and without refreshing his observation to the left during the manoeuvre. His actions were inconsistent with Rules 170, 172 and 180 of the Highway Code, which require an emerging driver to give way and to wait for a gap large enough to cross or join the road safely.
101. The experts are agreed that Mr Djumaliev could have improved his sightline to 39 metres had he stopped a little further forward, with the front of the BMW level with the furthest edge of the give way markings. However, I still do not consider that this view would have been sufficient to undertake the manoeuvre he did, without further attention to the left. A continuous turn rather than ‘creeping and peeping’
102. Exercising reasonable care in all the circumstances did not require Mr Djumaliev to stay where he was indefinitely. Whilst I accept Mr O’Sullivan’s submission that the physical possibility of making an interim stop is not the legal test, having carefully considered the evidence about this particular junction and the conditions pertaining at the time, I consider that exercising reasonable care required a driver in Mr Djumaliev’s position to undertake what is sometimes described as “creeping and peeping”, or at least to move cautiously to a position to get a better view to the left. In other words, after ensuring that it was safe to enter the eastbound lane, Mr Djumaliev should have edged forward slowly, initially into the eastbound lane and then to the filter lane, looking to the left as the view opened up. At the same time he should not have neglected possible traffic coming from the right, and have remained ready to stop if necessary. That was, in my judgment, the way to discharge the duty to take reasonable care in these circumstances. I do not consider that this conclusion relies on hindsight, or creates an impossible standard by reference to the competing demands on Mr Djumaliev’s attention. Ultimately it was Mr Djumaliev’s choice when to start his manoeuvre and waiting for a safe gap knowing that he had to creep and peep was a prerequisite. Mr Djumaliev accepted during his cross-examination that if a driver giving way cannot see sufficiently into the westbound lane, he should pull forward to a point where he can see before making the turn. He also accepted that he did not “creep and peep” when he could have done so.
103. In my judgment, the gap between the taxi and the coach was too confined to permit the cautious manoeuvre which the restricted sightline required. I take account of Mr Padala’s evidence that he did not regard the BMW as having “pulled out on” him, and of the fact that the coach would shortly have had to slow for the traffic ahead. The material point, however, is that Mr Djumaliev himself was sufficiently concerned about the coach to experience what he described as a “split second fear” that it might not slow. His attention was consequently directed to clearing the eastbound lane. A gap which required him to proceed continuously and to concentrate on the coach did not afford a safe opportunity to edge forward, obtain a view to the left and remain ready to stop.
104. In my judgment, the decision not to wait for a gap which would have allowed creeping and peeping (or at least to pause and look left when the view opened up) and instead required him to make the right-hand turn in one continuous motion was a negligent one.
105. I am fortified in this conclusion by Mr Djumaliev’s own evidence. He told me that there was “no way” to make a right turn from the junction without taking a risk. He thereby accepted that he took a risk when making the turn. I do not accept that this was inevitable. It was his obligation to give way to traffic on the main road. That obligation is a continuous one. Exercising reasonable care, he could have waited for a safe gap in the eastbound traffic and then moved forward by edging forward, improving his view to the left, keeping a careful look out and being ready to stop. Failing to look to the left after setting off
106. Mr Djumaliev's evidence was clear that after he set off and started moving, he did not look left again. During his cross-examination he confirmed that “Once I started moving I took no steps to improve my vision to the left”; later he confirmed “After I started moving I did not look [to] my left”. I accept his evidence to that effect. It matches the objective evidence visible in the dashcam footage from the coach that the BMW was in continuous motion, and accelerated as it moved into Pont Street.
107. The failure to refresh his view to the left was, in my judgment, a negligent failure. Mr Djumaliev owed a continuing duty to give way to traffic established in the westbound lane of Pont Street. As I have explained, his view when moving off was insufficient and he ought to have refreshed it. There was an opportunity as he moved further forward towards the filter lane, and the taxi moved away, to see down into the westbound lane. Mr Djumaliev himself accepted that if he had pulled forward into the filter lane he “may have had a better view”. That is clearly right and supported by the expert evidence. Mr Clarke explained in his evidence that, if Mr Djumaliev had paused in the filter lane, his view would have extended beyond the taxi and down the westbound carriageway of Pont Street. Mr Fidler’s modelling also showed that from the filter lane the view to the left would have been extensive and the BMW would not then have been obstructing eastbound traffic. Figure 22 at §9.20 of Mr Fidler’s report [TB/215] shows the view that Mr Djumaliev could have obtained by looking left when in the filter lane. Contrast this with the view at Figure 19 (whilst stationary at the junction) [TB/213] and Figure 21 (having started to emerge behind the taxi) [TB/214].
108. In my judgment the failure to look left at that point was a real missed opportunity to avoid the accident. Given his restricted view to the left when setting off, the continuing duty to give way required Mr Djumaliev to look again in that direction as his manoeuvre proceeded and the view opened up. Mr Djumaliev’s explanations
109. Mr Djumaliev gave three explanations for not looking left. I have considered each with care.
110. The first was the design of his car. He said that because of the shape of the BMW, “looking to the left actually requires stopping”. He made a similar point at the criminal trial saying that “the car is such that the visibility from the side windows is very limited”. This explanation does not assist him. A driver who knows that his vehicle gives poor visibility to the side must compensate by stopping, or edging forward, to a point where he can see. He cannot treat the limitation as a reason for not looking left after setting off.
111. The second explanation was the coach approaching from his right. He said that he was watching to see whether the coach would slow down, and that he regarded a two-storey coach coming towards his low car as a greater risk than a car coming from the other direction. He accepted that when he decided the coach might not stop, he continued his turn “because I wanted to complete it before the coach approaches me”. I accept that he faced competing demands on his attention, and I give real weight to Mr O’Sullivan's submission that this was not a straightforward manoeuvre. I also note that the coach would have needed to slow and come to a stop in any event, because of the stationary traffic to the east of the junction. That does not, however, alter my conclusion at paragraph 103 above: the gap Mr Djumaliev chose required him to clear the eastbound lane in front of an approaching coach, and was too tight to allow him to edge forward and look left before doing so.
112. The Highway Code required Mr Djumaliev to watch for traffic in both directions and wait for a safe gap (Rule 180). If he could not complete his turn safely in front of the coach without giving up all observation to his left, the gap was not a safe one. I note Mr O’Sullivan’s submission that the central area was not a protected refuge, and that stopping there might have left part of the BMW in the eastbound lane. That, however, merely required Mr Djumaliev to ensure it was safe to enter the eastbound lane knowing he would be undertaking a creep and peep manoeuvre, or at least that he would have to stop again to look left as his view opened up. Mr O’Sullivan further submitted that the filter lane was in use soon after the accident: the CCTV shows the next westbound car after the Range Rover indicating right and turning into Hans Place. However, again that merely demonstrated that a driver pausing there would need to keep watch for such traffic. It is not a reason for not looking left at all, and Mr Fidler’s modelling showed that from the filter lane the BMW would not have been obstructing eastbound traffic (paragraph 107 above).
113. I find that, having concluded that the Sloane Street lights were red, Mr Djumaliev concentrated on traffic approaching from his right and gave no further effective attention to westbound traffic.
114. The third explanation was that he heard loud braking during the manoeuvre and decided it was safer to complete the turn than to stop. Whatever the merits of that split-second decision, it does not answer the criticism. The failure to look left began when the BMW set off, before any braking could be heard. By the time Mr Djumaliev was reacting to the sound of brakes, the opportunity to prevent the conflict by proper observation had largely passed. Mr Muradi’s high speed
115. As I have found, Mr Muradi was travelling westbound at high speed (a peak of 51mph in a 20mph limit). He was outside the line of sight of Mr Djumaliev when the BMW set off from the junction. Nonetheless, it is commonplace that some road users exceed speed limits or otherwise drive carelessly. I do not consider in all the circumstances that Mr Muradi’s speed relieved Mr Djumaliev of his own duty to exercise reasonable care. Had Mr Djumaliev done so, and looked left as his view opened up from the filter lane, he would have seen the Range Rover and could have stopped before entering the westbound lane, as the experts agree. Conclusion on breach of duty
116. I therefore find that Mr Djumaliev failed to exercise reasonable care in the following connected respects: (1) He relied in part on a fleeting and inadequate glimpse of the westbound lane obtained on his approach, together with an unsafe inference drawn from the state of the traffic lights. (2) His 32-metre view from the give way lines was insufficient to justify a continuous manoeuvre into the westbound lane without further observation to his left. (3) He did not improve his view to the left by edging forward, looking to his left, and remaining ready to stop as he did so. Nor did he at least pause as his view opened up to the left before he entered the westbound carriageway. (4) He began to move before the taxi had cleared his path and selected a gap before the coach which demanded his attention to the right and constrained his ability to proceed cautiously. (5) He did not look left again as his view opened towards the filter lane, although he could then have seen the Range Rover and stopped before entering the westbound lane.
117. These failures, which correspond to the narrowed case advanced by Mr Woodhouse, breached Mr Djumaliev’s continuing duty to give way and the requirements of Rules 170, 172 and 180 of the Highway Code.
118. I reach this conclusion without relying on hindsight. It depends on his failure to take ordinary precautions against the foreseeable presence of westbound traffic that he could not see.
119. I am satisfied that the negligence was causative of the collision and the aftermath. Had Mr Djumaliev exercised the reasonable care that I have found wanting, the collision would not have occurred. Mr Djumaliev would have moved off when safe to do so (given the eastbound traffic) and would have edged forward slowly, refreshing his view to the left to obtain a better view of the westbound traffic. He would either have delayed setting off until after the coach, at which point the Range Rover would have driven past, or he would have driven at a speed enabling him to stop before encroaching into the westbound lane once his sightline to the left improved, at which point he would have seen the rapidly approaching Range Rover. This is consistent with the agreed expert evidence: see paragraph 42(16) above.
120. Mr Muradi’s steering and emergency braking were responses to the BMW entering the westbound lane. The experts agreed that his steering input and the collision both contributed to the Range Rover’s subsequent path onto the footway. I am therefore satisfied that Mr Djumaliev’s negligence contributed both to the collision between the vehicles and to the ensuing collision with the pedestrians. The relative significance of each driver’s conduct is a matter for apportionment. What apportionment is appropriate?
121. The parties’ positions on apportionment are far apart. Mr Woodhouse, for Mr Muradi, submitted that the appropriate apportionment lay between equal responsibility and 60:40 in Mr Muradi’s favour (that is, with Mr Djumaliev bearing 60%). Mr O’Sullivan submitted in his closing note that any share attributed to Mr Djumaliev should be no greater than 20%, with 15% properly open to me. In determining the appropriate apportionment I follow the approach I have set out at paragraphs 51 to 59 and 69(5) above. Culpability
122. In my judgment, Mr Muradi’s driving was much more culpable than Mr Djumaliev’s. Mr Muradi’s culpability lies not merely in speeding, but in its deliberate and grossly excessive character, Mr Muradi’s awareness of it, and the urban environment in which he chose to accelerate.
123. I have set out my findings in relation to Mr Muradi’s driving at paragraphs 70 to 77 above. He deliberately applied maximum pedal acceleration and knew he was travelling twice the speed limit. His actions are to be distinguished from a driver whose speed increases because he fails to monitor it properly. As I have explained, I do not accept his account of starting to brake in order to bring the car back to the speed limit. I take into account in his favour that his brakes stayed on from when the light braking started before a sightline developed. Emergency braking was also applied swiftly after that sightline was obtained. These features provide, however, little mitigation. Mr Woodhouse also relied on the short duration of the acceleration, on the fact that the road ahead was clear, and on Mr Muradi’s conduct after the collision: he did not leave the scene, he made himself known to the police, and he attended interview. I accept those facts, but they carry little weight. The brevity of the acceleration reflects how quickly maximum acceleration took the Range Rover from an already unlawful speed to 51mph; it does little to lessen the culpability of the decision to apply it. A clear road ahead was no licence to exceed a limit that exists because of side roads, parked vehicles and pedestrians, all of which were present. His conduct after the collision was required and to be expected of any driver in the circumstances; it does not bear on the culpability of the driving which caused it.
124. In cross-examination Mr Muradi accepted that this was a busy central London street with parked vehicles restricting sightlines, side roads from which drivers might emerge, and pedestrians. A cyclist is also clearly visible in the video footage. Mr Muradi accepted that these were the very reasons for the 20mph limit, and that the limit “served such an important safety purpose” on a road of this kind. He knew it was to reduce the likelihood and the severity of collisions. He had been working as a chauffeur for his cousin earlier in the day and drove regularly in the area. This was therefore not a driver who misjudged an unfamiliar road. He chose to test a powerful vehicle at grossly excessive speed in the very kind of environment that the limit was designed to protect.
125. I have referred to Mr Muradi lying to the police in his initial interview. Whilst that untruthfulness goes to the reliability of his evidence in the way I have explained, it is not part of the culpability of his driving, and I have not increased his share of responsibility because of it. His conviction for causing serious injury by careless driving similarly is a consequence of the nature of the driving and what resulted from it. I have not increased his responsibility because of the conviction.
126. Mr Djumaliev’s fault was of a different kind. For the reasons given above, he failed to exercise reasonable care when turning right from Hans Place. He relied on a glimpse and an inference when approaching the junction. He committed to a manoeuvre into a lane he could see only about 32 metres along. He did not edge out and improve his view to his left. Indeed, he did not look left again once he was moving. That was a serious failure. The duty he breached is an important continuing duty of an emerging driver, and the Highway Code gives it great emphasis. His failure was not a split-second lapse: the manoeuvre took some 5.3 seconds, albeit the improved view did not present itself until he was past the back of the taxi. Its seriousness was increased by his knowledge that he had poor side visibility from his low car. Nonetheless, Mr Djumaliev’s negligence was careless, not deliberate. He looked left on his approach and again while stationary, although neither look was adequate.
127. I take into account that he was carrying out a difficult right turn across traffic in the dark (albeit with street lighting), with a taxi and a coach approaching from his right. His error was one of observation and judgment, made while several demands were competing for his attention. I reject Mr Woodhouse’s submission that his driving “bordered on reckless”. Nor do I accept Mr O’Sullivan’s description of it as no more than “a momentary error of judgment”. The truth lies between the two, but it is closer to Mr O’Sullivan’s position.
128. For these reasons I consider there is a real difference in culpability and measured by this factor alone, Mr Muradi’s share of responsibility is the more substantial. Causative potency
129. The other factor I must weigh in the balance is causative potency. Each driver’s negligence was a necessary cause of the collision and its aftermath. On the experts’ agreed evidence, the collision would probably have been avoided if either driver had exercised reasonable care, notwithstanding the negligence of the other.
130. Several considerations bear on the causative potency of Mr Djumaliev’s negligence. His entry into the westbound lane was the event that brought the two vehicles into conflict. The Range Rover had priority, and it was Mr Djumaliev who moved into its path. The experts agree that the two deviations that sent the Range Rover onto the footway were Mr Muradi’s steering response to seeing the BMW and the impact itself. Mr Fidler’s evidence was that, had the BMW not encroached into the westbound lane, Mr Muradi would not have needed to steer to the left or apply emergency braking, the Range Rover would not have left the carriageway, and it would not have collided with the pedestrians. I agree with that analysis.
131. Against that, Mr Muradi’s speed was what turned a manageable urban traffic situation into an emergency. When the BMW set off, the Range Rover was more than 100 metres away. The experts have agreed that if the Range Rover had been travelling at the speed limit when the sightline developed, Mr Muradi could have brought it to a stop well before the point of collision. Mr Muradi’s high speed at that point meant that each driver had only about 1.2 to 1.4 seconds sight of each other.
132. Mr O’Sullivan submitted that the BMW probably stopped accelerating when driving at about 13mph in the final second before the collision because the Range Rover, and the sound of its emergency braking, had by then become an imminent hazard. He argued that any counterfactual scenario which holds the BMW at 13mph would incorporate part of the emergency created by Mr Muradi's speed. I accept that submission: Mr Djumaliev heard the braking during his manoeuvre (paragraph 21 above), and the experts agreed that the BMW’s brake lights illuminated just before impact (paragraph 43(7) above). The point reinforces my view that Mr Muradi’s speed both created the emergency and left too little time to resolve it. It does not, however, reduce the causative significance of Mr Djumaliev’s entry into the westbound lane without looking left. On the agreed evidence, had he looked as his view opened up, he could have stopped before entering that lane (paragraph 42(16) above).
133. In submissions there was some debate about the relevance of vulnerability to the assessment of causative potency. In Jones and Hernandez , the vulnerability of the motorcyclist affected the assessment. In Stark at §29, Master Davison noted an inconsistency between that approach and the approach of the Court of Appeal in Woodham v JM Turner [2012] EWCA Civ 375 . He considered the Court of Appeal in Woodham approached a similar accident “on the basis that there was parity in the causative potency of each driver’s negligence”. In Stark , Master Davison preferred the approach in Jones but held that “the causative disparity in this type of accident must be regarded as diminishing in line with the excessive speed of the motorcyclist.”
134. Whilst this issue may require resolution in an appropriate case, it does not arise in the same way on the facts before me. Both drivers were in cars. The relevant vulnerable road users were the pedestrians. Their vulnerability bears on the nature and extent of the harm which each driver’s negligence was capable of causing.
135. In my view Mr Muradi’s speed made the consequences of the accident more severe. In evidence, Mr Fidler was asked about the joint report he had agreed with Ms Wray in the criminal proceedings. That report recorded that it was agreed that had Mr Muradi been travelling at the speed limit of 20mph, he would not have ended up mounting the footway and colliding with the pedestrians. Mr Fidler confirmed this point in his evidence before me. He also accepted that if the collision had happened at a significantly lower speed, the Range Rover would not have carried on onto the footpath. I must exercise care with this counterfactual because, as Mr Fidler pointed out, a lower approach speed would mean none of the events would have happened as they did.
136. Nonetheless, the evidence before me is that the Range Rover was still travelling at between about 35mph and 39.5mph when it struck the BMW, and that the glancing collision caused it to lose very little speed. In the criminal proceedings Mr Fidler calculated that the Range Rover was travelling at about 29.5 to 35mph when it struck the pedestrians, as recorded in his joint report with Ms Wray; before me he accepted that about 35mph was a reasonable estimate. The two impacts therefore occurred at speeds substantially above the limit. The Range Rover’s residual speed materially increased the potential for serious injury when a vehicle of approximately 2.4 tonnes struck the pedestrians.
137. Mr O’Sullivan relied on the identification, in the footage from camera 4, of one of the pedestrians standing at the rear offside of her parked car in a position suggesting that she might have been about to cross Pont Street, and submitted that, absent the BMW, the Range Rover would have been heading towards her at a speed in the mid to high 40s. Mr Woodhouse submitted that causative potency in relation to a different, hypothetical accident is irrelevant. I agree that the apportionment I must conduct concerns the accident that actually happened, and I attach no weight to a collision that did not occur. The point does, however, illustrate the danger to which Mr Muradi’s speed exposed pedestrians on this street.
138. There were, therefore, two causes of the collision between the vehicles and, ultimately, of the collision with the pedestrians. Mr Djumaliev’s negligent manoeuvre brought the vehicles into conflict and caused the steering response which, together with the impact, contributed to the Range Rover’s departure onto the footway. Mr Muradi’s excessive speed meant that he could not stop in time to avoid the BMW; it also materially contributed to the Range Rover leaving the carriageway and magnified the consequences when it struck the pedestrians. Considering those matters in the round, I conclude that Mr Muradi’s negligence had the greater causative potency. His speed turned what would otherwise have been a manageable traffic situation into an emergency and substantially increased the severity of its consequences for the pedestrians. Conclusion on apportionment
139. Apportionment is not a mathematical exercise. The authorities provide illustrations, not a tariff. My analysis of the parties’ respective culpability and causative potency indicates that Mr Muradi bears the greater responsibility on both measures. I conclude that the just and equitable apportionment is 75% to Mr Muradi and 25% to Mr Djumaliev. In accordance with the parties’ agreement, that apportionment applies both to the collision between the vehicles and to its consequences for the pedestrians. E. Conclusion
140. I therefore give judgment on the basis that Mr Muradi bears 75% of the responsibility for the accident and its aftermath, and Mr Djumaliev 25%. I invite counsel to draw up an appropriate order, to include such ancillary matters as the parties are able to agree.
141. I conclude by thanking Mr O’Sullivan KC and Mr Woodhouse KC for the considerable assistance they have provided to the Court. F. Appendix: Image of locus