UK case law
Avanton Capital CC Limited v LUC Construction Limited
[2026] EWHC TCC 2630 · High Court (Technology and Construction Court) · 2026
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Full judgment
Mr Justice Constable: A. Introduction
1. The Claimant, Avanton Capital CC Limited (‘Avanton’), applies for summary judgment to enforce the decision of an adjudicator, dated 9 July 2026 (‘the Decision’). Until the service of skeleton arguments, the Defendant, LUC Construction Limited (‘LUC’), resisted enforcement on the basis of alleged breaches of natural justice. However, these arguments have been abandoned. In consequence, the application for summary judgment is no longer opposed, and is to be granted as sought save only, as conceded by Avanton, to reflect an award of £184,140 owing to LUC pursuant to a separate adjudication decision.
2. The remaining issue, therefore, is LUC’s cross-application for a stay of execution pursuant to CPR 83.7(4).
3. The underlying dispute arises out of a design and build contract (‘the Contract’) entered into on or about 15 November 2023 under which LUC was engaged by Avanton to construct three industrial units at Culvert Court, London. Practical completion was certified on 10 April 2025. Thereafter disputes emerged concerning the value of the final account.
4. On 22 May 2026, LUC commenced seven different adjudications relating to different aspects of the value dispute before seven different adjudicators. On 13 June 2026 Avanton responded with its own adjudication. It alleged that LUC had failed to serve a valid payment or pay less notice in respect of the notified sum of £1,877,640.25 and that as a result LUC was obliged to pay that sum in full. Between 24 June 2026 and 10 July 2026, LUC obtained three adjudicators’ awards, each of which decided that contracharges applied in the final account by Avanton were overstated by an aggregate of £710,264. On 9 July 2026, the Decision held that LUC was to pay to Avanton: £1,877,640.25 plus interest and £11,460 plus VAT in respect of the adjudicator’s fees and expenses. After receipt of the Decision the other adjudicators resigned, so that the remaining adjudications were not completed.
5. The application for a stay is advanced on the following grounds: (1) Avanton would probably be unable to repay the judgment sum at the end of the substantive trial or arbitration if the adjudicator’s decision were reversed; (2) Avanton’s financial position has substantially deteriorated since entering into the Contract; (3) Enforcement would be manifestly unjust in circumstances where: (a) LUC’s financial position is such that it would be likely forced to cease trading and would not be able to continue to a final determination of the account by the arbitration which it has commenced; (b) LUC is the beneficiary of the adjudicator’s decisions finding that Avanton’s valuation of the notified sum was overstated; (c) It considers that it is likely to be the net payee, which position it is pursuing in arbitration. Its position is supported by contemporaneous messages from or on behalf of the CEO of Avanton up to and following practical completion;
6. Avanton relies, in relation to the remaining issues in dispute, upon two witness statements from Omer Weinberger, the CEO of Avanton Capital, the ultimate owner of Avanton, of which he is a director. LUC relies upon two statements from Ben Spencer, a director and shareholder of Toma Holdings AG which is a 50% shareholder in LUC.
7. I was greatly assisted by helpful and focussed submissions from both Mr Pangraz and Mr Webb KC for which I thank them. B. The Principles A Claimant’s Inability to Repay
8. Both sides refer to the principles applicable to a stay of execution in the context of an adjudication enforcement, set out by HHJ Coulson QC (as he was then) in Wimbledon Construction Company 2000 Limited v Vago [2005] EWHC 1086 (TCC) at [26]. The principles were drawn from a review of preceding authorities including AWG Construction Services v Rockingham Motor Speedway [2004] EWHC 888 at [186], quoted by the judge at [23], as follows: “ In general a court must balance (a) the intention of the legislation that adjudication should be enforced summarily; (b) the right of the successful party not to be prejudiced by being kept out of its money; and (c) in cases where there is a serious risk that the party will not be able to recover the money, that the defendant is not being seriously prejudiced in a way not contemplated by the Act which is silent as to the position where a defendant runs more than a nominal risk of being unable to recover money after trial or arbitration award. ”
9. After echoing (a) and (b) above, the further principles outlined by the judge relevant to this case were: “d) The probable inability of the claimant to repay the judgment sum (awarded by the Adjudicator and enforced by way of summary judgment) at the end of the substantive trial, or arbitration hearing, may constitute special circumstances within the meaning of Order 47 rule 1(1)(a) rendering it appropriate to grant a stay… f) Even if the evidence of the claimant's present financial position suggested that it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due, that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if: (i) the claimant's financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at the time that the relevant contract was made (see Herschell); or (ii) The claimant's financial position is due, either wholly, or in significant part, to the defendant's failure to pay those sums which were awarded by the adjudicator…. ”
10. There was no dispute that the burden lies on the applicant to prove the elements of its application (see WRW Construction Limited v Datblygau Davies Developments Ltd [2020] EWHC 1965 (TCC) ; [2020] Bus LR 2336 (TCC) at [27]).
11. The test is ‘probable inability’ to pay; establishing that there ‘ may ’ be an inability to pay is insufficient: see Akenhead J in Bewley Homes plc v CNM Estates (Surbiton) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2619 (TCC) ; [2011] BLR 67. A Defendant’s Inability to Pay
12. Both sides addressed whether or to what extent a defendant’s inability to pay (to the extent established) was relevant to the Court’s decision-making.
13. Reliance by a defendant on its own inability to pay on the part of the judgment creditor is unusual, as noted by Coulson LJ at 17.35 of Construction Adjudication (4 th Edn). The reason for this was articulated clearly in Bewley Homes , in which Akenhead J said, at paragraph [33]: “ It is then suggested that the Court can exercise its discretion under RSC Order 47 to stay execution where, in this case, CNM can not pay. In commercial cases, such as this, it must be rare and exceptional for the Court to stay execution of a judgement sum because the defendant cannot pay. If it was at all common, impecunious defendants, who defaulted on their payment obligations, could always avoid having to pay through the exercise of this discretion and defendants would never go into liquidation .”
14. The burden rests firmly on an applicant to show that it is unable to pay, including that no funds would be made available to it including by its owner. This follows from Lord Wilson JSC's dictum in Goldtrail Travel Limited (in liquidation) v Onur Air Tasimacil ik AS [2017] UKSC 57 , [2017] 1 WLR 3014 , a case involving a requirement to pay the judgment sum into Court as a condition of pursuing an appeal. In Goldtrail, Lord Wilson observed: “17. It is clear that, even when the appellant appears to have no realisable assets of its own with which to satisfy it, a condition for payment will not stifle its appeal if it can raise the required sum. As Brandon LJ said in the Court of Appeal in the Yorke Motors case (unreported) 5 June 1981, cited with approval by Lord Diplock .” [1982] 1 WLR 444 , 449: “The fact that the man has no capital of his own does not mean that he cannot raise any capital; he may have friends, he may have business associates, he may have relatives, all of whom can help him in his hour of need
15. He went on to articulate the test as follows: “ Has the appellant company established on the balance of probabilities that no such funds would be made available to it, whether by its owner or by some other closely associated person, as would enable it to satisfy the requested condition? ”
16. Once established, various authorities demonstrate that it may then be a factor which plays a part in Court’s evaluation.
17. In Galliford Try Building Ltd v Estura Ltd [2015] EWHC 412 (TCC) , the application in dispute before the adjudicator was a quintessential technical adjudication for almost £4 million, raised by the contractor after practical completion, and far above the stated contract value. Because it was the penultimate application, it would be months, if not years, before the final account was resolved. Estura argued that as a result of the decision the contractor had no incentive whatever to submit its final account so that the sum that was properly due to it could be challenged and reassessed.
18. Edwards-Stuart J cited Coulson J in Hillview Industrial Developments (UK) Ltd v Botes Building Ltd [2006] EWHC 1365 (TCC) (a case in which the application to stay execution was refused), where he said: “ Finally, I must consider whether or not to grant a stay in the circumstances of this case. I am satisfied that Hillview is entitled to judgment but I am also satisfied that the purpose of the 1996 Act is to provide a statutory framework which would enable justice to be done between parties to a dispute. It was not intended to cause injustice. This can, in appropriate cases, be dealt with by the grant of a stay. I am satisfied that the jurisdiction in adjudication enforcement cases to grant a stay under the CPR must be limited to cases where there is a risk of manifest injustice. ”
19. Summary judgment was given in the sum of around £4 million, including interest. On the application to stay execution, the judge noted that there existed a difference between what the funders behind Estura had said they were prepared to fund (£450,000) and what they may be able to pay. However, the judge found, albeit not without some hesitation, that Estura would be unable to pay the adjudicator’s award in full if ordered to do so; as such he found that payment of the award would probably be impossible. He also noted that the very unusual circumstances of the case yielded the result that, if Galliford were to be paid the full sum awarded by the adjudicator, it would have little or no incentive to remain on site and complete the works and the process of obtaining, even by adjudication, a true value final account would take many months. The judge then concluded: “ Whilst I have been very tempted by the solution of simply refusing to grant a stay at all, thereby leaving the parties to negotiate a solution for themselves if they can, I have come to the conclusion that, in the very unusual circumstance of this case, that would not be fair to Estura I should make it very clear that I regard the facts of this case as being exceptional, and those in the industry should take note that the course that I propose to adopt in this case will be appropriate only in rare cases. ”
20. Of the sum for which summary judgment was given, a partial stay was granted in respect of the amount due in excess of £1.5m.
21. In JRT Developments Ltd v TW Dixon (Developments) Ltd [2020] 10 WLUK 106 (TCC), HHJ Sarah Watson considered an application for a stay in relation to an adjudicator’s decision in circumstances where the Defendant, TWD, was a company that was formed for the purposes of carrying out a development of 14 houses on land previously owned by Mr & Mrs Dixon, who were related to the owner of JRT, a construction company. The judge formed the view that the relationship was informal and closer to a joint venture than arm’s length employer and contractor. The development was to be constructed on a cost-plus basis through funding by a loan from the Homes and Communities Agency, and the overheads of TWD were paid by JRT. There was a disputed Payment Notice, and an adjudicator determined payment in favour of JRT based on failure to service a pay less notice. On enforcement, the judge found that (a) it was very highly probable that JRT would be unable to repay the judgment sum if ordered to do so after the trial of the Part 7 proceedings and (b) the financial position of JRT was substantially different from when the JCT contract was entered into and that it now posed a significantly higher risk than it did; and (c) that JRT’s financial position was not caused either wholly or in significant part by TWD’s failure to pay the sums awarded by the adjudicator. Having reached those conclusions, the application was already capable of determination under orthodox Wimbledon v Vago principles. Nevertheless, the judge also considered that TWD had no means to pay the judgment debt, itself unsurprising given its purpose and the funding model operated during the contract; and that it was at least likely that, following trial, there would be an order for a significant repayment to TWD on the evidence. In the circumstances, described as exceptional, a stay was granted.
22. J&B Hopkins Ltd v A&V Building Solution Ltd [2023] EWHC 2475 (TCC) concerned an application for a stay of execution by the defendant (A&V) in respect of an adjudicator’s decision in favour of the claimant (J&BH). Roger Ter Haar KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, had found it “ clear beyond doubt that A&V itself cannot afford to pay ”, and then turned, in accordance with the authorities, to look at those standing behind the company. The judge concluded that family and friends had made loans to A&V, which source had dried up, and that the owner had exhausted all other obvious sources of finance. There was therefore an inability to pay. The judge went on to exercise his discretion to stay the judgment in circumstances he described as ‘ exceptional ’, including the conduct of the judgment creditor in exacerbating the debtor’s financial difficulties, the judgment creditor’s own failure to pay an earlier adjudicator’s award, and concerns about the merits of the decision sought to be enforced.
23. The foregoing discussion has looked at the relevance of a defendant’s inability to pay as militating towards the exercise of discretion to stay execution. However, Mr Webb KC argued that it may be an additional factor to be accounted for as part of the Wimbledon v Vago test militating against a stay. With the balancing exercise in AWG in mind, Mr Webb KC submitted that where it is established that a defendant is unable to pay the judgment sum, then even where a claimant would probably be unable to repay, the solvency risks in each direction cancel out, so that the court is left only to consider giving effect to the intention of the legislation that adjudication should be enforced summarily, and the right of the successful party not to be prejudiced by being kept out of its money, both of which favour enforcement (i.e.(a) and (b) in AWG).
24. Mr Webb is right that, as confirmed by Coulson LJ in Gosvenor London Ltd v Aygun Aluminium UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2695 at [9] that the summary of factors in Wimbledon v Vago “was not intended to be an inflexible list”.
25. I agree with the thrust of Mr Webb KC’s submission that the Court is entitled, in considering whether special circumstances exist so as to stay enforcement, to look at the potential prejudice arising from an inability to pay, viewed from all relevant perspectives. A defendant who says that the money is safer in its hands pending final determination cannot fairly complain if the claimant responds that a stay creates a real risk that the adjudicator's award will never be satisfied. In some cases such considerations may reinforce the ordinary position that adjudicators' decisions should be enforced. However, it does not follow that a defendant's inability to pay is always neutralised by corresponding concerns about the claimant's financial position. Such an approach would be unduly mechanistic, and would sit uneasily with those authorities in which the defendant’s inability to pay has, exceptionally, played a role in a decision by the court to stay enforcement. The exercise remains one of evaluating all relevant circumstances and the differing forms of prejudice that may arise. Where there are finely balanced competing risks of injustice arising both out of an inability to repay (on the part of the claimant) or to pay in due course (on the part of the defendant), I consider that the Court should favour what would be the ordinary course – namely, enforcing the judgment. This approach would reflect the approach exemplified by O’Farrell J in Kersfield Developments (Bridge Road Ltd v Bray and Slaughter Ltd [2017] EWHC 15 (TCC) in which, where arguments were finely balanced (in that case, about whether the claimant would be unable to pay), the court should lean in favour of enforcement of the judgment.
26. Distilling this: (1) whilst it will be rare for a Defendant's impecuniosity, of itself, to play a material part in the exercise of discretion under CPR 83.7(4)(b), it may do so in exceptional circumstances where it gives rise to a risk of manifest injustice; (2) in the context of adjudication enforcement, a Court will be alive to the temporary binding nature of the adjudicator’s decision and the risk that enforcement may deprive a judgment debtor of any realistic opportunity to obtain a final determination yielding a different result; (3) that said, where it is said the effect of enforcement would be to stifle a claim to reverse the adjudicator’s award, the Court would ordinarily wish to be satisfied that no realistic source of funding exists, whether from owners, associated persons or, where appropriate, external funders. By analogy with Goldtrail , a bare assertion that payment cannot be made will not suffice if there remains a realistic possibility that funds could be raised from available sources; (4) other factors then to be taken account of once an inability to pay and/or fund proceedings to overturn the adjudication award has been established may include: (a) without descending into a trial of the issues, whether there is a realistic likelihood that some or all of the adjudicator’s award will ultimately be repaid; (b) whether a stay of execution merely delays the point at which there is a substantial judgment against the defendant, and the potential prejudice to the claimant were this to transpire; (c) the part the judgment creditor played in the debtor’s impecuniosity; (d) the conduct of the parties more generally. C. Avanton’s financial position
27. Avanton is a Single Purpose Vehicle (‘SPV’) set up for the purposes of developing Culvert Court. Although in his first witness statement, Mr Weinberger described Avanton Capital as a shareholder in and the controlling party of Avanton, he corrected this in his second witness statement, in answer to queries from LUC, that Avanton Capital was a shareholder indirectly. Sitting between Avanton Capital and Avanton is a holding company called Avanton Capital CC Hold Co, which is the directly controlling shareholder.
28. The source financial information provided by Mr Weinberger comprises company accounts as filed for the periods ending 30 April 2023, 2024 and 2025, and management accounts dated July 2026.
29. On their face, the filed accounts show:
30. The Management accounts show as follows:
31. The value of the building, the principal asset, is taken in the accounts to be the cost of the development. Mr Weinberger exhibits two desktop valuations of the development dated by Newmark, which estimate the market value as between £24,000,000 and £27,390,000. However, it is noted that the valuation states, ‘ These figures are draft and indicative only and are subject to final review and further due diligence should a formal valuation be instructed. They should not, therefore, be relied upon and we cannot accept any liability for them. ’
32. He also exhibits a report from CBRE dated 7 May 2025. This gives the market value of the development as £20,500,000.
33. The main asset in the management accounts other than the development is the amount owed pursuant to the adjudication (at £1.6m, allowing for the set off described in paragraph 1 above). Ignoring that, the management accounts on their face show a net liability of just over £200,000, taking the value of the development as set out in the management accounts. This is not dissimilar to the net liability of £278,000 stated in the filed management accounts to April 2025. However, as identified by Mr Pangraz, they contain what is likely to be a material error. Under the line item ‘Capital and Reserves’ there is an entry for ‘Shareholder Loans’, at £1,423,358.40. It falls within the overall calculation as an asset. However, as a loan repayable by Avanton with no particular conditions restricting a requirement to repay, it should as Mr Webb KC fairly conceded properly be treated as a liability. This means that adjusted to remove both the sum in dispute and to treat properly the Shareholder Loan, the management accounts would show a negative figure for equity and capital reserves of -£1,656,758. Moreover, if one then substituted the CBRE figure for the value of the development (the only formal valuation upon which material weight can safely be placed), that sum drops further to -£2,488,161.
34. Mr Weinberger’s evidence is that Avanton Capital's balance sheet records a positive net asset value of approximately £8.9 million, as shown in the latest available management account balance sheet up to 31 July 2026. Avanton Capital’s filed accounts as at 31 July 2025 show net assets of £9,427,350. He states that Avanton Capital has provided substantial financial support to Avanton, through direct funding or by making payments on behalf of Avanton, with total support to date of approximately £4.157 million. In his second witness statement, Mr Weinberger said that this is contained within the “Investments” figure of £18,220,000 and the total intercompany figure of £3,343,106.97 in the balance sheet page of the July 2026 Avanton Capital management accounts. Mr Pangraz, for LUC, makes the point that a loan is not an investment, and should be recorded as a ‘debtor’. In the context of a loan to a subsidiary, the point does not perhaps go very far, and it is not disputed that it should – either way – be regarded as an asset. Mr Pangraz’s better point is that the loan could not be within the ‘Intercompany Creditor’ figure of £3,343,106.97 because it should be a debtor, not a creditor. On the face of it, Mr Weinberger’s evidence does not make sense on this point.
35. Mr Weinberger says that the £4.157 million is contained within the “Shareholder Loans” figure of £1,423,356.40 and “Creditors” figure of £3,005,720.71 within Avanton’s accounts. Mr Pangraz makes the further point that Avanton Capital is not in fact a (direct) shareholder, and that it does not make much sense to split the sums between ‘Shareholder Loans’ and ‘Creditors’, although on any view, they are shown as debts owed by Avanton. Whilst Mr Pangraz’s submission that there is no documentary or contemporaneous evidence of any of the inter-company financial support (e.g. loan agreements) is a fair one, this point only goes so far in circumstances where, as made clear by Ramsey J in Farrelly (M&E) Building Services Ltd v Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd [2013] Bus LR 1413 , that there is no general obligation on a party when seeking enforcement to disclose to the other party confidential information of its financial and business position so that the other party can consider whether there are grounds for applying for a stay of any judgment.
36. In response to Mr Weinberger’s evidence that Avanton Capital intends to continue providing support to ACCC as required until such time as Culvert Court has either been sold or is fully let and generating rental income, ‘ unless and until management determines otherwise ’ and that the shareholder funding provided by Avanton Capital is not ‘ presently ’ intended to be called upon or required to be repaid until the development has been sold or is fully let and generating rental income, Mr Pangraz correctly makes the point that nothing said in fact prevents Avanton Capital from calling for the repayment of the shareholder funding at any time.
37. I also note Mr Spencer’s evidence that as the Works were carried out, Avanton failed on a number of occasions to make certified payments to LUC, who gave notices of intention to suspend the performance of its obligations under the Contract and a notice of specified default under the termination provisions of the contract, but do not regard these points as particularly significant given that these issues arose early in the contract and there is not in fact any claim for unpaid certified sums.
38. Put at its highest, I accept Mr Pangraz’s submission that on the available evidence there is a negligible cash position, substantial secured borrowing and negative historical net assets, and Avanton is plainly reliant upon discretionary third-party funding which may be removed at any stage. This plainly supports a conclusion that Avanton may not be able to repay the sum in due course if the Adjudicator’s decision is reversed in arbitration.
39. The absence of present cash is not determinative. The relevant question is whether, at the conclusion of the arbitration, Avanton would probably lack access to resources from the development, refinancing, realisation or group support sufficient to meet any repayment liability. The evidence does not establish a binding commitment by Avanton Capital to meet any future repayment liability of Avanton. The support is discretionary and parts of the accounting evidence is unsatisfactory in the respects identified above. Nevertheless, the burden rests on LUC to establish probable, rather than possible, inability to repay, not merely a material risk of non-payment. Although the precise composition and accounting treatment of the asserted £4.157 million have not been satisfactorily explained, the evidence and accounts do establish that substantial group funding has historically been made available to Avanton during the development. There is direct evidence that, whilst no guarantee, this will continue. The ultimate parent has significant positive net assets. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that LUC has discharged the burden to establish that Avanton would not repay following arbitration.
40. The first limb of the Wimbledon v Vago test at (d) is not therefore established. D. Change Avanton’s financial position
41. Assuming I am wrong in this conclusion, I nevertheless look to whether the position now can be regarded as a change in Avanton’s financial standing.
42. Mr Pangraz relies upon there having been a substantial deterioration in the assets and liquidity of Avanton. Whilst I do not accept this in relation to liquidity, which was and remains limited, in light of the management accounts as amended, Avanton had limited negative equity in April 2023; it now has negative equity exceeding £2m. Whilst these figures do not reflect a precise comparison between the date of entering the contract (November 2023, some months after the data from April 2023) and now, I am prepared to accept that it is likely that there has been a deterioration in position, at least in absolute and numerical terms.
43. However, as Mr Webb KC points out, whether the accounts of an SPV of the nature of Avanton is, at a given date, going to show positive or negative equity is going to be a function of the costs incurred carrying out the development (likely to be reflected in loans charged to the property) and the value of the property. Whether at the end of the project the outcome would be positive or negative was uncertain at the time of entering into the project, and remains so. In this context, the words of HHJ Lloyd QC in Herschell Engineering Limited v Breen Property Limited (unreported, 28th July 2000), quoted at paragraph [20] of Wimbledon v Vago are relevant: “19. In my view on an application for a stay where a party has entered into a contract with a company whose financial status is or may be uncertain and finds itself liable to pay money to that company under an adjudicator's decision, the question may properly be posed: is this not an inevitable consequence of the commercial activities of the applicant that it finds itself in the position it is in? It has, as it were, contracted for the result. That is not normally a ground for avoiding the consequences of a debt created by the contractual mechanism (which is how, in the absence of express terms, adjudication operates: see section 114 of the Act). ”
44. Mr Spencer’s evidence makes clear his understanding of the nature and purpose of the company with which LUC contracted from the outset: ‘ My understanding from my dealings with the Claimant (I used to be a good personal friend of Mr Weinberger, the sole director and an indirect shareholder of the Claimant) and its filings at Companies House is that the Claimant company was incorporated as a vehicle solely to undertake the development of Culvert Court (this is why it has “CC” in its name, CC being an acronym for Culvert Court) i.e. a special purpose vehicle. I do not understand it to have any commercial purpose beyond the development and either management (as landlord) or disposal (as owner) of the property at Culvert Court. Its financial statements record that it has £1 share capital and that it has zero employees (and never has had any employees). Mr Weinberger has on numerous occasions in the past confirmed to me the Claimant’s commercial intention is to sell the property, whether tenanted or not, and with the Claimant being an SPV, the reasonable expectation is that following a disposal of the sole asset held in the company, it will be liquidated. ’
45. This was the case at the time of contracting and remains the case. Indeed, it is Mr Spencer’s own description of Avanton, of which he was always aware, that lies behind his conclusion that Avanton will not repay any sums to LUC. Immediately following the preceding paragraph, Mr Spencer continues… ‘ That being so, I cannot see a world in which, if the arbitration proceeds to a final determination that the amount payable under the Contract is a higher amount than the amount paid to the Defendant to date, the Claimant will be in a position to make repayment to the Defendant ’.
46. Avanton’s financial standing was always and remains uncertain. The deterioration that has been demonstrated is the direct consequence of the anticipated development structure and the asset value. Seen through the lens of the commercial entity with which Mr Spencer knew LUC would be contracting, I draw a similar conclusion on the evidence before me as that reached by Stuart-Smith J in LXB RP (Crown Road) Ltd v Squibb Group Limited [2016] EWHC 2669 (TCC) on the evidence before him when he said, ‘ When all is said and done it was and is an SPV with limited assets. Whether Squibb appreciated that at the time of contracting is a moot point, but it is not remotely unusual for substantial construction projects to be carried out by SPVs in this way. ’
47. The only point of distinction is that in this case LUC’s appreciation of the nature of Avanton and the structure within which it sat is not moot. Mr Spencer fully appreciated these facts from the outset.
48. Even if, therefore, I had concluded that the first limb of the test had been satisfied, although Avanton’s accounting position has deteriorated numerically, I am not satisfied that LUC has shown that it represents a materially different repayment risk from that inherent in the structure which LUC knowingly accepted at the date of contracting, militating against the grant of a stay of execution. E. Cause of the Claimant’s Financial Position
49. In light of the necessary correction to the management accounts identified above, Mr Webb KC did not pursue his argument as he had advanced in written submissions that the non-payment of the award was the cause of any deterioration in Avanton’s position. F. The Defendant’s Financial Position
50. It is for the Court to consider first whether there is satisfactory evidence before the Court of an inability to pay the judgment and/or a likelihood that the ability to pursue a final determination will be stifled.
51. LUC is an established trading company, with its most recent accounts showing a turnover of over £14 million, and profit after tax of £453,121. Dividends declared and paid to the year ending 31 January 2026 were £491,883.
52. Mr Webb KC concedes that LUC would not be able to pay the judgment without recourse to raising funds. The authorities are clear that a defendant claiming inability to pay must go beyond assertion, and also deal with other potential sources of funding. As Mr Pangraz conceded, the evidence does not address in any way what money could be raised from other sources. For example, there is no direct evidence of the financial position of Toma Holdings AG, the company which is a 50% shareholder in LUC. There is no evidence about whether either Toma Holdings, or the other shareholder(s) would be in a position to fund payment of the judgment and/or pursuing the arbitration. That omission is notable because Mr Spencer himself describes himself as a director and shareholder of Toma Holdings AG, and was therefore in a position to address whether support had been sought or might realistically be available.
53. This is fatal to LUC’s application on this ground: the evidence advanced by LUC falls far short of what is required pursuant to the authorities to establish an inability to pay, or that its intention to pursue the arbitration to recover some or all of the sums forming part of the adjudicator’s award would be stifled. In the absence of such a finding, it is not possible to conclude that refusing a stay would result in manifest injustice.
54. I should add that Mr Pangraz did not, absent a finding of inability to pay, suggest the mere fact of the three adjudication decisions which, prior to and very shortly after delivery of the Decision, determined that parts of the notified sum were not justified on a ‘true value’ basis, amounted to a reason to stay the judgment. It is, therefore, unnecessary to determine Mr Webb KC’s submission that the adjudicators lacked jurisdiction to decide those disputes before LUC had discharged its notified-sum liability (on the basis of Henry Construction Projects Limited v Alu-Fix (UK) Limited [2023] EWHC 2010 (TCC) and Bexheat v Essex Services Group [2022] EWHC 936 (TCC) ). Nor is it necessary to determine what weight those decisions might otherwise have carried in the discretionary exercise. In the way the application was advanced, their potential relevance depended upon LUC first establishing inability to pay or stifling. It did not do so.
55. In the circumstances, the application to stay is refused. Summary judgment is entered in the sum of £1,603,500.25 plus interest, together with £13,742 (£11,460 plus VAT) in respect of the adjudicator’s fees.