UK case law
Avios Group (AGL) Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC
[2026] UKFTT TC 1405 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026
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Full judgment
Introduction
1. This is the application made by the Appellant (‘AGL’) on 14 February 2025 to stay their appeal against a taxpayer information notice issued by the Respondents (‘HMRC’) under Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008 (‘the Information Notice Appeal’). The stay sought is until the later of the final determination of the statutory appeals regarding VAT assessments (‘the VAT Appeal’) or the judicial review proceedings (‘the JR’). HMRC opposes the stay.
2. The hearing lasted 1 day. The documents to which I was referred were contained within the 328-page document bundle, 198-page authorities bundle, a correction to the authorities bundle of 14 pages and skeleton arguments from both parties. I am grateful to counsel for their helpful submissions. Background
3. HMRC commenced a VAT enquiry in October 2021 and subsequently issued assessments under section 73 Value Added Tax Act 1994 for periods March 2018 to February 2024, totalling approximately £550 million. On 29 October 2024, HMRC issued a VAT decision, which was upheld on review on 5 February 2025. AGL lodged the VAT Appeal with this Tribunal on 14 February 2025. The JR claim was filed on 15 January 2025.
4. On 2 December 2024, HMRC issued an information notice under Schedule 36 Finance Act 2008 seeking documents and information said to be reasonably required to check the tax position as regards potential penalties under Schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 . AGL appealed that notice and now applies for a stay of that appeal pending the outcome of the VAT Appeal and the JR. legal framework
5. Rule 5(3)(j) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (‘Tribunal Rules’) provides that the Tribunal may by direction stay proceedings.
6. In determining the application I am mindful that the Tribunal Rules provide that I must deal with cases fairly and justly as follows: “2. —(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes— (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; (b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; (d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and (e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. (3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction.”
7. I have also considered Schedule 36 Finance Act 2008 , under which HMRC may issue a notice requiring information or documents reasonably required for checking a taxpayer’s tax position, which includes liability for penalties, and Schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 , which provides for penalties for inaccuracies in tax documents and prescribes a 12-month time limit for assessments following the end of the appeal period for the decision correcting the inaccuracy.
8. It is common ground that the Tribunal has a broad discretion whether to stay proceedings. I agree with Judge Scott in GAP Group Limited v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 397 (TC) (‘ GAP Group’ ) at [52] that the burden in making out the grounds for a stay lies with the party seeking the stay and that the general principle is that the parties are entitled to have the appeal proceed to conclusion. Position of the parties
9. AGL submits that the dispute regarding penalty information is premature and should await resolution of the VAT Appeal and the JR. They argue that penalties only arise if VAT is ultimately found to be due and that, until then, the “reasonably required” scope is uncertain. They also submit that the burden of complying now involves reviewing approximately 900,000 items for relevance and privilege, and HMRC does not need the material for the VAT Appeal or the JR. AGL contends that HMRC agreed to separate internal governance on the VAT and penalty and they refer to HMRC’s Compliance Handbook CH83040 which recognises that penalties cannot always be determined contemporaneously. AGL submits that granting the stay is consistent with the overriding objective.
10. HMRC opposes the stay. They argue that delay is inconsistent with the overriding objective, that the statute entitles them to check penalties in parallel with the VAT enquiry, that a multi-year hiatus risks loss or degradation of information and personnel knowledge and compresses the statutory 12-month period to issue penalties, and that HMRC practice, reflecting ECHR Article 6 concerns, aims to determine penalties at the same time as, or promptly after, tax decisions, with reference to King v UK (Application no. 13881/02, 16 February 2005) ( ‘King’ ). HMRC submits that any potential efficiencies are contingent and do not justify a stay. Discussion Approach to the Discretion
11. I am mindful of the overriding objective (set out in rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules). I consider the burden of establishing grounds for a stay rests upon AGL and the general presumption is that appeals should proceed to hearing and determination without interruption (as set out in GAP Group at [52]). A stay should not be granted merely because it could be more convenient or because related litigation is in train. The applicant must show that a stay better serves the fair and just disposal of the case. Prematurity and the Statutory Scheme
12. I accept that the VAT issues are complex and that potential litigation outcomes range from no VAT being due to some measure of liability. However, Schedule 36 expressly empowers HMRC to require information for checking the taxpayer’s tax position, and expressly includes penalties within that position. That power is not conditioned on final determination of the underlying tax liability. The purpose is investigative and enables HMRC to decide whether penalties should be assessed, and on what basis (careless or deliberate), in tandem with or shortly after consideration of the tax position.
13. Against that, AGL relies on HMRC’s internal manual CH83040, which recognises there are cases where it is not possible to decide whether a penalty is due until the related tax decision has been determined. I accept that the guidance acknowledges such cases. The question for the Tribunal, however, is not whether contemporaneous penalty determination is always possible, but whether, in the circumstances of this case, the interests of justice favour interposing a multi-year stay in the Information Notice Appeal. The guidance is not a legal authority and does not, in any event, create a presumption in favour of a stay. It simply recognises that contemporaneity may not always be achievable.
14. AGL also relies on HMRC’s internal decision to consider VAT and penalties separately through governance. I accept that HMRC did agree to sequence their internal governance in that way. However, that internal allocation does not alter the statutory position or the Tribunal’s procedural discretion. Proportionality
15. AGL argues that the Information Notice Appeal hearing would likely take three to four days now, but only one to two days after the VAT issues crystallise, and that compliance would entail the review of approximately 900,000 documents for relevance and privilege. Those are significant burdens. They also contend that some materials may be rendered unnecessary because HMRC’s pleaded case has evolved on some topics.
16. Proportionality is a central feature of the overriding objective. That said, the suggested future saving here depends on how the VAT issues are ultimately resolved. The prospect of a shorter hearing later does not, without more, outweigh the other factors. Preservation, Risks of Delay, and Statutory Timelines
17. AGL has taken steps to preserve relevant sources, including email archives and document repositories. I accept that those steps are genuine and mitigate risks. Nevertheless, delay on the scale sought, until the later of final determination of the VAT Appeal or the JR, carries inherent forensic risks, including inevitable staff turnover, system migrations, access limitations, changes to third-party systems, and the natural degradation of recollection. Even where sources are preserved, practical issues of accessibility and context become more acute over time.
18. There are also considerations regarding the time limit provisions of Schedule 24 paragraph 13(3)–(5) Finance Act 2007 . The parties differ as to the precise end-point of the appeal period. I do not need to resolve that point to determine this application. What matters is that, even on analysis suggested by AGL (i.e. that the 12-month period only starts after final determination), substantial steps would still be required within that window, including completion of the Information Notice Appeal, compliance with any upheld notice, HMRC’s review and follow-up, internal governance, and the issuing of assessments. A prolonged stay now materially compresses the practical time available later. That is, in my view, inconsistent with the efficient administration of the penalty regime and weighs against a stay. Human Rights Context and Practice
19. HMRC refers to its practice, reflected in CH83040, of issuing penalty assessments at or around the time of tax assessments, in part to ensure compliance with Article 6 ECHR as discussed in King . AGL contends that the same guidance recognises that contemporaneous assessment is not always possible. I accept both propositions. The guidance and King do not mandate contemporaneity in every case. They do, however, underline the need to avoid undue and unnecessary delay in penalty matters. In the present circumstances, where a stay would likely involve a multi-year deferment, I take the view that those considerations weigh against granting the stay. Precedent and Wider Consequences
20. HMRC submits that granting a stay here on the basis that penalty-related information should await final determination of the underlying tax liability would be likely to prompt similar applications in other cases, seeking serial deferral of Schedule 36 appeals, inconsistent with the statutory scheme. I consider that the Tribunal must decide each application on its own facts and merits, and I do not accept that granting or refusing a stay here creates a presumption in favour or against stays in other cases. Weighing the Competing Considerations
21. The relevant statutory scheme permits HMRC to check penalties during an enquiry and there is no requirement to await final VAT determination. AGL has shown that HMRC’s internal governance contemplated separate sequencing and that HMRC’s guidance recognises that contemporaneity is not always possible. However, the internal governance point does not alter HMRC’s statutory powers, and whilst I agree with AGL that contemporaneous assessment is not always possible, the principle in King highlights the need to avoid undue delay. The human rights context and HMRC practice, while not determinative, point away from a multi year deferral.
22. I accept that AGL has taken preservation steps in respect of the information notice material. However, it seems to me that the longer the hiatus, the greater the risk of information loss, systems change and staff turnover, in addition to the potential impact of unforeseen circumstances. I consider the risks inherent in prolonged delay, both forensic and practical, together with the compression of statutory timelines under Schedule 24, weigh materially against a stay.
23. I also accept that compliance with the information notice will impose a significant burden on AGL. However, the extent of any future cost savings if the stay is granted is unpredictable and the general principle is that appeals should proceed to conclusion. The compliance burden on AGL does not, in my view, outweigh the prejudice to HMRC from deferment, including risks to investigatory efficacy and statutory deadlines.
24. Taking all of these matters into consideration, on balance, I am not satisfied that a stay would better serve the overriding objective. conclusion
25. For the reasons set out above, the application for a stay is refused. Right to apply for permission to appeal
26. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. KIM SUKUL TRIBUNAL JUDGE Release date: 12 th OCTOBER 2026