UK case law
Brian Padgett v David Boulter
[2026] EWHC CH 2744 · High Court (Business List) · 2026
The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Full judgment
1. The Claimant, Mr Brian Padgett, brings this claim as the sole proving executor on behalf of the estate of Mr John Porter (“the Estate”). Mr Porter died in Switzerland, where it appears he was domiciled, on 10 November 2021. The dispute between the parties arises out of a failed business venture. In around 2016, the Defendant, Mr David Boulter, was looking to secure funding for a project (“the Kew Project”) to develop a care home on the site of a former Biothene Plant, located at Melliss Avenue, Kew, London (“the Kew Site”). Mr Boulter had known Mr Porter socially since 2008, and since 2016, the two men had been discussing the possibility of Mr Porter becoming an investor in the Kew Project. Following detailed negotiations in 2020, in August and September 2020 Mr Porter entered into a series of connected transactions by which, amongst other things, he invested £4.35 million in the Kew Project through a complicated buyout of existing investment which I shall describe in more detail in due course. Ultimately, the Kew Project failed and the Estate lost Mr Porter’s entire investment.
2. During this time Mr Boulter and Mr Porter were both living in Verbier, Switzerland. Mr Porter owned several properties in Verbier, two of which feature prominently in this dispute: le Petit Monde, and Cheval Marin. As part of their agreement concerning Mr Porter’s investment, it was agreed that Mr Boulter should have certain rights of occupation initially of le Petit Monde and, subsequently by a variation to the principal agreement, of Cheval Marin. Mr Boulter took up occupation of Cheval Marin in summer/autumn 2021, his children living with him during some of the school holidays. This occupation continues to this day.
3. In its original manifestation, by this claim Mr Padgett as Mr Porter’s executor sought declaratory relief concerning what were said to be the lack of rights of Mr Boulter in respect of his occupation of Cheval Marin, on the basis that the agreements said to found such rights were void under Swiss law and hence unenforceable. Mr Padgett also sought an account of all profits received by Mr Boulter in respect of rental income received from 2 studio flats at Cheval Marin (“the Studio Flats”). Mr Boulter counterclaimed for contrary declarations, confirming his entitlement to continue in occupation of Cheval Marin, and an order requiring Mr Padgett to perform certain alleged obligations regarding Cheval Marin.
4. Subsequently the claim was amended to add a claim in misrepresentation said to arise from the circumstances in which Mr Porter was allegedly induced to enter into the agreement to make the investment in the Kew Project, and a subsequent amendment to that agreement. The Counterclaim was amended to include claims regarding sums said to be owing to Mr Boulter by Mr Porter, the failure to pay which has, it is said, interfered with the amenity and marketability of Cheval Marin and the Studio Flats. I now set out further details of the background leading to the agreements at the centre of the dispute between the parties. The Kew Project
5. The Kew Site had been purchased on 17 December 2017 for £13 million in the name of Melliss Ave Planco Limited (“Planco”). The original equity investors in Planco comprised three entities (“the Planco Investors”): Beaufort Ventures II (Jersey) Limited (“Beaufort”); Tenor Associated Investments Limited (“Tenor”); and Avalion Living Limited (“Avalion”). Mr Boulter was the 87.5% shareholder of Avalion with Beaufort holding the remaining 12.5%. The original senior debt financier in respect of the purchase was Bentall Green Oak (“Green Oak”).
6. On 24 July 2019 Richmond upon Thames Council resolved to grant permission for the development of the care home subject to planning conditions and the conclusion of a section 106 agreement. At that stage, the Planco Investors started to seek further institutional funding for the development work. They had instructed CBRE to advise on raising £30 million in equity and £55 million in debt for this purpose. At the same time, Beaufort was showing signs of wanting to exit the Kew Project and its interest would need to be bought out to avoid a situation where it forced a sale of the Kew Site.
7. Discussions between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter were conducted with a view to Mr Porter purchasing the majority of Beaufort’s interest in the Kew Project for £4.35 million, and acquiring from Mr Boulter a 12.5% interest in Avalion. The figure of £4.35 million was the capital injection required to buy out Beaufort’s equity investment. In the months prior to June 2020 he and Mr Padgett, who ran the Porter family office, were seeking financial information about the Kew Project. Mr Boulter kept Mr Porter aware of the financial situation (though to what extent is in issue). He explained that CBRE was making progress and that the front runners in terms of investment funding were Patrizia Property Investment Managers (“Patrizia”).
8. During this period, Mr Porter made enquiries and Mr Boulter continued to supply him, and when requested, Mr Padgett, with documents and information concerning the proposed deal and the progress of CBRE’s endeavour to source development funding. Mr Boulter also frequently made calls to Mr Porter reporting conversations with a Mr Jamie Younger of Patrizia. Mr Boulter’s evidence, on which he was not challenged, was that Mr Porter “never took on trust anything I said to him about the Kew Project, and he questioned, examined and checked every detail. He often asked me to send him emails for him to send on to [Mr Padgett]”. I will need to examine some of these communications in more detail later in this judgment when I come to consider the misrepresentation claim.
9. By the end of July 2020 Mr Porter had made the decision to invest in the Kew Project. The terms of the investment were to be recorded in a shareholder agreement (“the Shareholder Agreement”) between all the Planco Investors. Whilst the Shareholder Agreement was still in draft, but practically final, form, Mr Porter and Mr Boulter entered into a bilateral deed of agreement (“the Letter Agreement”) dated 21 August 2020 which, as well as providing for the mechanics of Mr Porter’s investment, included further terms, notably those concerning Mr Boulter’s occupation of le Petit Monde and an option to buy the same; and an option for Mr Porter to acquire an additional interest in Avalion, which it was anticipated would then become the sole shareholder in Planco, which would retain the freehold of the Kew Site. Handwritten Agreement and Letter Agreement
10. On 2 August 2020 Mr Porter and Mr Boulter recorded in manuscript the terms they had agreed up to that point (“the Handwritten Agreement”). The Handwritten Agreement was converted (as modified in the light of continuing negotiations) into a deed which has become known as the Letter Agreement, dated 21 August 2020, by the solicitor acting for Mr Porter on the Kew Project, Mr Krishna Omkar. The principal terms of the Letter Agreement for the purposes of this dispute were as follows.
11. By Clause 1, the Handwritten Agreement was extinguished and superseded in its entirety by the provisions of the Letter Agreement.
12. Clause 2 provided for the “Beaufort Buyout”, by which Mr Porter agreed to buy out the shareholder loan held by Beaufort for the sum of £4.35 million, and Beaufort’s shareholding in Planco for £1.
13. By Clause 3, Mr Porter was to purchase the Avalion shares held by Beaufort.
14. By Clause 4, the parties agreed to enter into a shareholder agreement as soon as reasonably practicable following completion of the Beaufort Buyout, with the result that of 624 Planco shares, Mr Porter would hold 364, Tenor 160, and Avalion 100.
15. Clause 5 addressed the agreement between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter concerning Mr Boulter’s occupation of le Petit Monde. “In consideration for Mr Boulter procuring the Avalion Transfer Mr Porter agrees to permit Mr Boulter to utilise Chalet Petit Monde, Route de Verbier Station, Verbier 1936, Switzerland (“Petit Monde”), as a residence without charge of rent for a period of 12 years from the date of this Deed, and further Mr Porter irrevocably grants Mr Boulter an option to purchase Petit Monde for the sum of CHF 3.5 million on or before the expiry of 30 months from the date of the completion of the Beaufort Buyout. The Parties agree that, as soon as reasonably practicable following completion of the Avalion SPA, they shall seek to put in place a standard lease agreement in respect of Petit Monde.”
16. Clause 14 was an entire agreement clause.
17. Clause 15 provided that other than in the case of fraud, no party would have any right of action against the other arising out of or in connection with any pre-contractual statement which was not expressly set out in the Letter Agreement or appended documents.
18. Clause 16 defined the phrase “pre-contractual statement” as used in clause 15 to mean “any draft, agreement, undertaking, representation, warranty, promise, assurance or arrangement of any nature whatsoever, whether or not in writing, relating to the subject matter of the Share Purchase Documents made or given by any person at any time prior to the date of this Deed”.
19. Clause 20 provided that Mr Porter would do or procure the doing of all acts and/or execute or procure the execution of all documents which Mr Boulter might reasonably consider necessary to give effect to the Letter Agreement and to secure the benefit of the rights, powers and remedies conferred in the Letter Agreement.
20. Clause 22 stated that the Letter Agreement was to be governed and construed in accordance with English law and that any dispute arising out of the Deed was to be governed and determined in accordance with English law.
21. Clause 23 provided that English courts should have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of the Letter Agreement.
22. The Handwritten Agreement was attached to the Letter Agreement. Mr Padgett relies in particular on Clause 5 of the Handwritten Agreement which provides that Mr Porter “will receive a £1.5m priority on [his] £4.35m in Planco (without interest)” as being a representation that was false and which induced Mr Porter to enter into the Handwritten Agreement. Reliance is also placed on a number of earlier emails and conversations which it is said contained similar representations, which I will examine in further detail in due course. Shareholder Agreement
23. On or around 8 September 2020 the Shareholder Agreement was executed and the Beaufort Buyout completed. The parties to the Shareholder Agreement were Avalion, Beaufort, Mr Porter, Mr Boulter, Tenor and Planco. Of prime relevance to this dispute is clause 17, setting out the priority of distributions and payments of any cash available to Planco, including cash received in respect of an Exit Event, defined at clause 15.3(g) as any future sale of Planco, any subsidiary, the Kew Site or other defined assets. To summarise, insofar as relevant, it provided for distribution of available cash to pay down: first, interest and then principal of the Senior Debt Finance; second, interest and then principal of any Mezzanine Debt Finance; third (at Clause 17.1(e) (“Clause 17.1(e)”)) part payment of the Beaufort Loan in the sum of £1.5 million (not including interest) (“the First Tranche”); and fourth, part payment of the Beaufort Loan as to the remaining £2.85 million and accrued interest on the First Tranche. Then followed the repayment of other shareholder loans. Mr Boulter relies on this clause as showing what was meant by any reference by Mr Porter and himself to “priority payment” concerning the Beaufort Loan. Variation Agreement
24. On 11 July 2021 Mr Porter and Mr Boulter entered into an agreement to vary the terms of the Letter Agreement. This followed problems arising regarding Mr Boulter’s occupation of le Petit Monde, as a result of difficulties in Mr Porter’s relationship with his ex-partner, who asserted, and exercised, a right to occupy it together with the children she co-parented with Mr Porter. It also touched on the Avalion share options. A short document, most of the provisions will require exploration, and I now set it out in full. “1. Mr Boulter to have full use of Chalet Cheval Marin for 6 years from 1 st September 2021 and then the full use of Chalet Petit Monde for another 6 years. a. Rent (after costs) from 2x studio flats to be split between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter
2. ChF120,000 budget to refurbish and furnish upstairs and downstairs at Cheval Marin. All to be split 50/50 – Mr Boulter half repayable from proceeds of Kew site (not from Kew site sale or DM fee)
3. Mr Boulter to have an option that lasts for 6 years over the land labelled “B” as per diagram below a. for chf300,000 + chf150,000 = chf450,000; unless b. additional sites behind the parcel are purchased by Mr Porter in which case the option price will be chf300,000
4. Mr Porter to provide Mr Boulter with cash flow loan £150k per year for 2 years, repayable from proceeds [sic] Kew site (not from Kew site sale or DM fee). To be paid every 6 months in £75k instalments in advance
5. 12.5% to be transferred to Mr Porter on completion of this agreement
6. All Avalion shares / options to be exercised on completion of development funding”.
25. The land labelled “B” (“Plot B”) was shown on a plan at the bottom of the Variation Agreement; its labelling includes the words “David Boulter has option to purchase this side”. The “side” referred to is the right hand quadrangular piece of a larger plot of land, the left hand side of which is labelled “A. John Porter retains this side”. The plan of the land labelled “A” shows what appears to be an existing building, which I take to be Cheval Marin.
26. The reference to “DM Fee” is a reference to a Deferred Management Fee. This was the key to unlocking a return on the investment in the Kew Project. Whilst the units, once sold, were not expected to generate significant profit, each subsequent sale was subject to an obligation to pay a Deferred Management Fee (“DMF”). The DMF was to provide the principal return on investment.
27. It is said that further representations were made by Mr Boulter after the Letter Agreement but prior to the Variation Agreement on which Mr Porter is said to have relied when agreeing to vary the Letter Agreement. Again I shall examine the evidence relating to these alleged representations in more detail when considering the misrepresentation claim. Subsequent events
28. The Kew Project failed to achieve development or equity funding. Mr Boulter rearranged finance resulting in a new loan being advanced to Planco through a senior facility from Octopus Real Estate, as a result of which Octopus was placed ahead of Mr Porter in priority. The Kew Project collapsed, Planco entering into liquidation since it was unable to repay the loan to Octopus. No monies were available to be paid out to Mr Porter or any of the equity partners. Mr Porter’s health
29. Mr Porter had been diagnosed with stage 4 lung cancer in 2016. He underwent various treatments over the next years, but largely remained active and functioning normally. This changed in early 2021, when, according to Mr Padgett, Mr Porter deteriorated notably “in both physical and mental condition”. In July 2021, Mr Porter collapsed in Mr Padgett’s office and had to be carried to a taxi to get him home. He was admitted to hospital on 25 August 2021 for an emergency lumbar puncture. It is Mr Padgett’s evidence that during the final year of his life he observed Mr Porter suffering symptoms including confusion, delirium and poor judgment as a result of a combination of strong medication for pain and cancer management. Mr Padgett suggests that “his impaired judgment manifested in a series of irrational financial commitments during 2021, including investments he could not coherently explain. This was entirely out of character. I had to intervene repeatedly to cancel such commitments”. These claims are said to be relevant to the claims in misrepresentation. I entertain doubts as to whether such evidence is relevant or admissible as a matter of law, but for reasons which will become apparent I do not have to decide that question. Procedural difficulties
30. In spite of a direction made by order of the Court, and a number of requests I made at the beginning, and during the course, of the trial, the parties failed to produce an agreed list of issues. During the hearing I was told that the Claimant was content to proceed on the Defendant’s list of issues, and “there doesn’t appear to be any major variance in it”. A similar submission was made at the adjourned closing hearing, subject to the addition of submissions on a claim in unjust enrichment, which “was pretty much agreed”. Also before the closing hearing a “conjoined list of issues” was filed, but could not be agreed, allegedly because the defendant sought to introduce further, un-pleaded issues by amendment, the Claimant’s position being that those had to be pleaded. At the end of the closing submissions, Counsel for both parties agreed they would provide an agreed list of issues for my use when preparing my judgment. No such list materialised.
31. The failure to prepare adequately for trial went further. The trial bundle also had not been agreed, but comprised a Claimant’s bundle (1270 pages), Claimant’s supplemental bundle, a Defendant’s chronological bundle (2892 pages), and a Defendant’s core bundle. This meant that the same documents on occasion appeared in three different bundles and very often in at least two. References to the duplicated documents during the hearing were not directed to a single appearance in the bundle. Witness statements were cross referenced to a combination of the principal bundles, making navigation of the documents cumbersome and slow. The failure ever to agree a list of issues and the proliferation of unagreed trial bundles delayed my preparation for the trial, impeded the conduct of the trial itself, and contributed to the delay in producing this judgment.
32. Court time was also wasted by the need to hear an application to strike out the second witness statement of Ms Margherita Barbagallo, a solicitor in Dragon Argent Limited (“Dragon”), instructed by Mr Padgett. Ms Barbagallo commenced her employment with Dragon after all of the events with which this trial is concerned took place, so she had no relevant first hand knowledge of any factual matters relevant to the dispute. Moreover, her second witness statement consisted almost exclusively of (1) comments upon documents, all of which had been executed prior to her employment with Dragon, and (2) submissions and arguments in support of her client’s case, in flagrant and wholesale breach of CPR PD 57AC.
33. It was submitted in Mr Padgett’s skeleton argument that this witness statement “necessarily contains evidence of fact conveyed by way of opinion which is admissible under s.3 (2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 . It ensures that the Claimant’s legal representatives comply with their duty to the Court, as well as a fair and effective hearing.”
34. I found it impossible to understand this submission. Insofar as it sought to justify the inclusion of the evidence in Ms Barbagallo’s second witness statement, it failed, not merely because it makes no sense, but also because there is no possible justification for drafting and seeking to rely on that evidence. In oral submissions, the explanation given for the witness statement was that, in the absence of the deceased Mr Porter, the documentary evidence could only be conveyed by the solicitor commenting on it. This in my judgment entirely misses the point of PD 57AC, which is to prohibit witness statements containing evidence which refers to or explains documents. In any event significant parts of the witness statement contained argument, speculation and submission, and it was inadmissible on those grounds as well. I gave an extempore judgment recording my decision to strike out the witness statement, but mention it here as a further example of the procedural and preparation difficulties that contributed to the overrunning of the time estimate of three days, requiring a fourth day to be listed some weeks later. The Issues
35. The rival lists of issues included several matters, such as the standing of Mr Padgett to bring this claim, which are not in issue at all. They may be matters which require to be formally proved, but they are not contested, and no point is taken on them. In the absence of an agreed list of issues, for the purposes of giving this judgment, I have formulated a list of the issues requiring determination as they emerged during the trial. It is convenient to determine the misrepresentation claim first, because that requires reference to the facts and matters leading up to the conclusion of each of the agreements, which sets the scene for consideration of the remainder of the issues. (1) Did Mr Boulter make any of the alleged actionable misrepresentations prior to Mr Porter entering into either the Letter Agreement or the Variation Agreement? (2) If so, what is the consequence? (3) If neither agreement was procured by reason of an actionable misrepresentation, was either the Letter Agreement or the Variation Agreement invalid for a. Want of certainty; b. Want of consideration; or c. Lack of intention to create legal relations? (4) Does the validity of (i) an option in the form contained at clause 3 of the Variation Agreement and (ii) a right of occupation in the form set out at clause 1 of the Variation Agreement fall to be determined under Swiss law? (5) Is the right granted under Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement valid under Swiss law? (6) Is the right of occupation granted under clause 1 of the Variation Agreement valid under Swiss law? (7) If Clause 3 and/or Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement are null and void for want of formality under Swiss law, does the remainder of the Letter Agreement as varied by the Variation Agreement survive? The remaining issues arise if the answer to Issue (7) above is affirmative. (8) Would the Court nonetheless be prevented from making an order as regards the surviving elements of the Letter Agreement as varied on the grounds of Swiss public policy? (9) Is Mr Porter/Mr Padgett in breach of a. Clause 2 of the Variation Agreement, to provide CHF120,000 to refurbish Cheval Marin? b. Clause 4 of the Variation Agreement, to pay Mr Boulter £300,000 for cash flow purposes? (10) If so, what are Mr Boulter’s remedies? (11) Is Mr Boulter liable to account to Mr Padgett in respect of rental income Mr Boulter has received from letting the Studio Flats? (12) Is Mr Padgett as landlord under any obligation to repair Cheval Marin or le Petit Monde? Evidence
36. I heard evidence from three witnesses of fact. On behalf of Mr Padgett, evidence was given by Mr Padgett himself as to his memory of and involvement in the events in question. He gave his evidence in a straightforward manner, although with a tendency to speculate on what he believed Mr Porter must have thought or believed or intended. Nonetheless he was doing his best to assist the Court. I disregard those parts of his evidence which cast doubt on Mr Porter’s mental capacity. That issue is not pleaded and is not an issue in this case.
37. Evidence was also given on Mr Padgett’s behalf by Ms Mary MacCarthy, who worked for Mr Porter as his personal assistant from 1999 to his death in November 2021. Her statement went principally to her experience of the mental and physical effects on Mr Porter of his ill health, and of the treatment he was receiving. She opines that managing an undertaking such as the Kew Project would have been far beyond his physical and cognitive capacity. This opinion evidence is in the nature of expert evidence, which she is not qualified, nor permitted, to give. Nor is it pleaded as being relevant to any issue. I have placed no weight on her evidence insofar as it offers opinions of this sort. Ms MacCarthy came across as pleasant and straightforward. I did not find her evidence of very much if any relevance to the issues between the parties.
38. The only factual witness giving evidence on behalf of Mr Boulter was Mr Boulter himself. He too gave it in a straightforward and unremarkable way, albeit he clearly feels aggrieved at finding himself as defendant to possession proceedings in respect of his occupation of Cheval Marin, which he thought was secured as (he believed) had been agreed in the Variation Agreement. That was in all the circumstances an understandable reaction given that the outcome of these issues depends on complex issues of law which evidently neither he nor Mr Porter could have anticipated.
39. Evidence was given on questions of Swiss law by Monsieur Yves de Coulon, an expert jointly appointed by the parties (“the Expert”). In addition to his report he submitted what he termed a “Complementary Report” in which he answered questions posed to him by both Mr Padgett and Mr Boulter arising out of his original report. When giving oral evidence he was asked some consequential questions which he answered clearly and carefully. His evidence is not challenged, though the legal consequences of his conclusions are hotly contested.
40. Expert valuation evidence was given on behalf of both parties on the questions of the market value of Plot B, and the rental value of Cheval Marin and le Petit Monde. Monsieur Axel Spiilthooren of naef Prestige produced a report on behalf of Mr Padgett under the logo of Knight Frank. He made no reference in his report to CPR Part 35, or PD35. On being questioned about this by me it transpired he was unaware of their existence, and of the duties they imposed on him. Prior to the adjourned hearing for oral closing submissions, he submitted a statement confirming that his report had been prepared in accordance with the duties of an expert for the purposes of CPR Part 35, and purporting to sign the expert’s declaration retrospectively. His original omission was described as a procedural irregularity which was capable of being cured by the Court, ex post facto , by the subsequent declaration. It was said there was no prejudice because the expert owed the Court continuous duties, and that it was the expert’s continuing duty to the Court that had prompted the post hoc declaration, and that the Court could treat the original omission as an irregularity under CPR 3.10.
41. This was a doomed attempt to cure a fundamental defect in his original report. He did not, when producing that report, know of, and therefore could not have appreciated, the overriding duty on him to provide independent advice in order to assist the Court. Monsieur Spiilthooren’s report was never prepared on the basis of, or in accordance with, the duties which underpin the court’s permission to Mr Padgett to rely on his report. It is an evidential oddity that he remained unaware of the Part 35 duty which was referenced in the expert report of his counterpart which he clearly saw prior to completing their joint statement. Regardless, in my judgment no reliance can or should be placed on his evidence. In those circumstances I reject his evidence save to the extent that any of his expressed opinions accord with those of his counterpart, where such evidence itself is accepted.
42. Monsieur Malko Schraner, Federal Certified Real Estate Appraiser, gave evidence on behalf of Mr Boulter concerning the value of Plot B and the rental value of Cheval Marin and le Petit Monde. I have not accepted it without scrutiny, but have had regard to such criticisms as have been made of it in reaching my conclusions.
43. I now turn to address the issues as set out at paragraph 35 above. Issue (1): Did Mr Boulter make any of the alleged actionable misrepresentations prior to Mr Porter entering into either the Letter Agreement or the Variation Agreement?
44. Mr Padgett on behalf of the Estate claims that Mr Porter relied on a number of representations, some express, some implied, when entering into first the Letter Agreement, and subsequently the Variation Agreement. It is alleged that those representations were false or substantially false, as a result of which both agreements are liable to rescission and/or Mr Padgett is entitled to damages under s.2(1) or damages in lieu under s.2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 .
45. The pleaded particulars of the alleged misrepresentations are not straightforward, and not susceptible of easy summary. Further, they were expressed in somewhat different terms in Mr Padgett’s skeleton argument, although from what I can see and was able to determine through oral submissions the differences are not material. Further, no application to amend the Particulars of Claim was made, and it was not suggested that Mr Padgett was advancing his case in terms that materially differed from the pleaded case. Accordingly, the claim falls to be adjudged on the pleaded basis. In any event the conclusions I have reached apply equally to the way in which the claims were developed in the skeleton argument and at trial.
46. First, it is said that prior to or on 2 August 2020, Mr Boulter “expressly represented to [Mr Porter] that [Mr Porter] would receive £1.5 million in equity as a priority on his investment of £4.35 million in Planco, excluding interest” (“Express Representation 1”).
47. Express Representation 1 is said to be “evidenced” by the Handwritten Agreement. Representation 1 is then developed into a further, parasitical, implied representation (“Implied Representation 1”), namely that “the term “priority” was expressly used in [Express Representation 1] and in the context of a personal arrangement between [Mr Porter] and [Mr Boulter], implied that in exchange for [Mr Porter’s] £4.35 million investment: (i) The £1.5m would be paid by [Mr Boulter] personally in preference to any other debt or financial obligation arising from Planco, or otherwise as he stood to benefit from it. (ii) The payment would be derived from [Mr Boulter’s] anticipated profits from business activities in Planco given that [Mr Boulter’s] company, Avalion, owned 100 A shares in Planco.”
48. These are said to be misrepresentations on which Mr Porter relied when entering into the Letter Agreement, and in executing the Beaufort Buyout.
49. Next, it is said that on or around 23 April 2021, by email, Mr Boulter “Continued to make the earlier representations by expressly and impliedly representing to [Mr Porter] in a personal capacity that: (i) He held £4.35 million in equity in the Kew Project; and (ii) He would receive a priority return of £1.5 million on his investment.” (“Express Representation 2”).
50. Express Representation 2 is said to be evidenced by an email of 23 April 2021. This too is developed into an implied representation, namely that “by using the term “priority return of £1.5” [Mr Boulter] implied that [Mr Porter] would receive the £1.5 million as aforesaid in preference to any other financial obligations or debtors associated with the Kew Project, whether arising under the … Shareholder Agreement or otherwise. It was further implied that this would be paid by [Mr Boulter] personally given that (i) he stood to benefit from the above investment; (ii) he had direct personal dealings with [Mr Porter]; and (iii) the .. Shareholder Agreement did not expressly provide for the priority return of £1.5 million referred to above.”
51. Mr Padgett alleges that these representations (together, “the Representations”) were false, or substantially false, because “the £1.5 million priority return has not been realised”. He says that Mr Porter was induced by Express Representation 1 and Implied Representation 1 to enter into the Letter Agreement and to execute the Beaufort Buyout, and by Express Representation 1, Implied Representation 1, Express Representation 2, and Implied Representation 2 to enter into the Variation Agreement.
52. Mr Padgett also alleges a third misrepresentation (“Representation 3”), comprising a number of elements contained in an email from Mr Boulter to Mr Porter dated 1 October 2020, in which it is said that Mr Boulter “represented to [Mr Porter] both expressly and impliedly, that the Kew site was profitable in that it was adequately positioned to secure development funding and generate equity” in a number of ways: a. Mr Boulter expressly represented that “we are in a good position to source the development funding”; b. Mr Boulter told Mr Porter that a letter of intent from a major institutional investor with £40 billion under management had already been received; c. Mr Boulter told Mr Porter that Beaufort had received two offers for the Kew Site of £26.5 million and £28 million, which would have generated a profit of £12.5 – 14 million.
53. It is claimed that Mr Porter relied on Representation 3 and as a result entered into the Variation Agreement. It is said that Representation 3 was false or substantially false because the Kew Site was not profitable and it was not adequately positioned to generate and source development funding or equity because a. The Kew Site failed to generate funding or equity, Planco instead entering liquidation because it could not afford to repay the mezzanine or senior debt; b. The letter of intent from Patrizia dated 11 September 2020 was non-binding and contingent on further due diligence. It was not addressed to Mr Porter and did not generate funding or equity. c. Patrizia required a £10 million guarantee for investment which was never provided.
54. Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides "Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were true."
55. Liability therefore comprises four elements: (a) a misrepresentation made by one person to another; (b) a subsequent contract between them; (c) consequential loss; and (d) an absence, at the time the contract was made, of a belief or reasonable grounds therefore in the truth of the facts represented.
56. There is little if any dispute between the parties as to the applicable law, which is set out by Chadwick V-C, in the well known passage in Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV [2002] EWCA Civ 15 , at [51]: “At the outset it is necessary to reiterate certain well-established principles. First, though the representation must be one of fact representations as to the future or of opinion frequently contain implied representations with regard to the present or to the knowledge of the representor. Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley on Actionable Misrepresentation 4th Ed. paras 26 to 28. Second, a representation once made is likely to have continuing effect. So if made for the purpose of an intended transaction it will continue until the transaction is completed or abandoned or the representation ceases to be operative on the mind of the representee. With v O'Flanagan [1936] 1 Ch. 575 , 585. Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley 4th Ed. paras 61 and 62. Third, if at a time when it is continuing the representor discovers that the representation was false when made or has become false since he should correct it. The principle is most clearly expounded in the judgment of Romer LJ in With v O'Flanagan [1936] 1 Ch. 575, 586 where he said "If A with a view to inducing B to enter into a contract makes a representation as to a material fact, then if at a later date and before the contract is actually entered into, owing to a change of circumstances, the representation then made would to the knowledge of A be untrue and B subsequently enters into the contract in ignorance of that change of circumstances and relying upon that representation, A cannot hold B to the bargain. There is ample authority for that statement and, indeed, I doubt myself whether any authority is necessary, it being, it seems to me, so obviously consistent with the plainest principles of equity." An alternative formulation, with which Romer LJ agreed, appears in the judgment of Lord Wright MR at page 583. After citing with approval the judgment of Turner LJ in Traill v Baring 4 De G.J.& S 318, 329 he said that "the position is based on a duty to communicate the change of circumstances". Fourth, the meaning and effect of a statement or of conduct must be ascertained in the light of the circumstances pertaining at the time. Those circumstances will include the course of the negotiations and any earlier representations.”
57. It is now necessary to delve in some detail into the facts leading up to the Letter Agreement, in order to understand the mechanics of what was being proposed, and the context in which the various statements said to comprise, or to found, the various alleged misrepresentations were made. On 24 July 2019 Richmond upon Thames Council resolved to grant planning permission for the Kew Project, subject to certain planning conditions and conclusion of a section 106 agreement. This was at a time when Mr Porter and Mr Boulter, who had known each other since 2008, were getting to know each other better. During this time Mr Porter explained to Mr Boulter that he had a “playground limit” of £2.5 million, imposed on him he said by Mr Padgett, and that any investment above that would require Mr Padgett’s detailed involvement. Mr Boulter’s evidence is that he began around that time to discuss the Kew Project with Mr Porter in detail.
58. By Spring 2020 Mr Boulter had heard rumours that Beaufort had been soft marketing the Kew Site for sale and it was becoming clear to Mr Boulter that Beaufort wanted either to exit or at entering liquidation substantially reduce its investment in the Kew Project. Mr Boulter was keen to secure funding so that he could continue with the Kew Project. Thus Beaufort’s equity investment needed to be redeemed.
59. Mr Boulter explained this to Mr Porter, and made him aware that it was necessary to raise institutional funding for the development work that was anticipated and for which planning permission had been given. He also explained that at the end of 2019, the equity partners had instructed CBRE to advise on the need to raise £30 million in equity and £55 million in debt. So the twin prongs of the strategy – replacing the Beaufort equity investment, and raising development finance – continued in parallel over the winter months and through the spring of 2020. Tenor was thinking of stepping into the breach, and by June 2020 heads of terms had been reached, with the price of £4.35 million being the price that Tenor was prepared to pay to buy out Beaufort’s equity investment in the Kew Project. In terms of fundraising, Patrizia had by then expressed an interest.
60. Around this time Mr Porter began to consider investing in the Kew Project himself. In late May Mr Boulter had emailed him an analysis of the price that had been paid for the Kew Site. On 7 June 2020 Mr Boulter wrote to Mr Porter saying “you wanted some detail on where we were with Patrizia” and forwarding a summary that Mr Boulter had received on 5 June 2020 from Philip Schmid of CBRE on the current situation, which Mr Boulter then summarises: “in short, Patrizia have done a lot of DD and have now hired JLL to assist with this which is a good sign. Patrizia are making all the expected positive noises. Phil [Schmid] remain [ sic ] close to the JLL head of advisory …. It all looks and sounds very positive and the next step is receiving Heads of Terms.”
61. This email also comments that Mr Porter had mentioned recently that Mr Padgett “was concerned about the event fee”, which I take to be a reference to the DMF. This suggests that Mr Padgett was taking an active interest in the detail of the proposed deal.
62. By email dated 11 June 2020, Mr Boulter sent Mr Porter a summary of the proposed buyout of the Beaufort investment, saying “the proposed deal would see you … purchase all of Beaufort’s interest in the project at par (£3.6m) and an additional £750,000 at the point of transaction for a total consideration of £4.35m. … The proposed Patirizia [ sic ] deal is based on £2.6m of equity being paid back out at the point of the transaction later this year with the rest of the equity remaining in the structure. ….. This £2.6m would be distributed as per the “Preference Share Ownership” 60.6% for [Mr Porter] (£1.575m), 26.9% for Tenor (£0.7m) and 12.5% for Avalion (£0.325m). Once the Patrizia transaction is completed [Mr Porter] would then have £2.775m of funds invested out of a total £3.58m or Preference Share equity attracting a 12% coupon. …” (emphasis added)
63. What is being suggested here is a proposal to the effect that there would be a payment back to Mr Porter (or to the corporate vehicle through which it was at that time anticipated he would make the investment) after concluding the proposed deal with Patrizia, which would produce a payment out of £2.6 million of equity.
64. By email to Mr Porter dated 28 June 2020, Mr Boulter summarised the Kew Project (as requested by Mr Porter) in 9 headline points, the seventh and eighth of which were as follows: “Capital requirement of £4.35m to buy out existing majority investor representing a site price well below market level Well-advanced institutional funding process underway with CBRE for £82.8m, of which equity is approximately £27.8 m. When this funding is secured the £4.35m will be reduced to £2.85m with £1.5m coming out as part of the institutional funding deal ”. (emphasis added)
65. Again, the repayment of £1.5 million was seen as taking place “when this funding is secured”, the £1.5 million “coming out as part of the institutional funding deal”. This was reiterated and expanded in the fuller summary attached as follows: “9. I am proposing that you would buy Beaufort out now for £3.6 + £740k. … this represents a site price of £20.75m. The site is worth £25m+. It is the only scheme with planning consent in London that is ready to build out.
10. CBRE have been instructed to secure the development funding required as per the Investment Memorandum. This process is now well advanced and Patrizia are the front runners although a number of well-known parties are also in the process. Patrizia are one of the few investors that have been active through the lockdown and as an institutional investor they would make an excellent funding partner for this and future projects.
11. …. It is proposed that we forward fund the DMF which would mean that you would receive £1.5m back out (out of the £4.35m you are investing now) leaving £2.85m in the structure”.
66. Again, the payment out of £1.5 million is referred to in the context of securing Patrizia as an institutional investor. Mr Porter forwarded this email to Mr Padgett by email dated 16 July 2020.
67. On 4 July 2020 Mr Boulter sent a suite of documents to Mr Porter as (he says) Mr Porter had requested. These included a link to the Patrizia Due Diligence Folder; CBRE’s summary of Phil’s role at JLL/CBRE and details on Patrizia attached to that email; 12 month hold cost on the Kew Project; and the Development Appraisal, lifted from the Investment Memorandum, also attached.
68. In an email to Mr Porter dated 9 July 2020, Mr Boulter further summarised the deal, including the following: “2. You would invest £4.35m reducing to £2.85m for 40% … . …. b. This would be used to buy out the Beaufort position. c. You would have a priority return over the first £1.5m that is released from the Patrizia deal ”. (emphasis added)
69. This again explicitly links the priority return of the £1.5 million to a point after inward funding from Patrizia had been received.
70. By email dated 20 July 2020, Mr Boulter states that if Mr Porter were to make the investment there were two potential outcomes: either finance would be secured from Patrizia, or another of the alternative investors then being considered; or, if no investor/funder could be found, the Kew Site would be sold and “ at the time of sale you would receive all of your £4.35m back …” (emphasis added). Even if the sale price were to be discounted by 25% the expected sale value [£18.75m] “still covers all equity in full”.
71. On the second of these potential alternatives, Mr Porter is being told he could not expect a return of his investment until the Kew Site was sold.
72. It appears that Mr Porter started to question the medium term value in the Kew Project. By email dated 23 July 2020, Mr Boulter seeks to reassure him: “I had understood from our conversations that you were not against investing £4.35m for a 40% stake in [Avalion] and that it was not ridiculous that this could be done in short order once you were comfortable with details. The £4.35m would be used to buy out the Beaufort equity position in the Kew project. We would then raise the development funding required to build the project out. When this funding came in at least £1.5m would be released from the structure and you would have a priority over all of this £1.5m leaving you no more than £2.85m at risk (we are currently expecting all the equity back out ie Patrizia would simply buy the site at the same value as you are so you would receive all your £4.35m back).” (emphasis added)
73. Again, this description expressly envisages the repayment of at least £1.5 million when the development funding “came in”; it was that payout at that time (ie when the funding came in) that was to have priority. If the development did not happen, Patrizia would simply buy the Kew Site and Mr Porter would obtain the return of his investment from the proceeds of that sale.
74. The next document on which Mr Padgett relies as evidence of the Representations is the Handwritten Agreement dated 2 August 2020. This provided that Mr Porter would invest £4.35 million for all of Beaufort’s interest in Planco. “Dear John We have agreed the following.
1. You will invest £4.35m for all of Beaufort’s interest in Planco. This will mean the equity is distributed pari passu: £4.35m - you £1.6m - Kevin £1.0m - me
2. You will receive 12.5% of [Avalion] in exchange for allowing me to live in Petit Monde without charge for 8 years.
3. [Avalion] would receive the freehold on the Kew Site as part of the phase 2 (eg Patrizia) funding deal. Any funds not repaid in (1) above will be returned as priority before [Planco] receives dividends.
4. …
5. You will receive a £1.5m priority on your £4.35m in Planco (without interest)”.
75. The last document on which Mr Padgett relies is an email dated 19 August 2020, from Mr Boulter to Mr Porter, with Mr Omkar (Mr Porter’s lawyer advising him on the transaction) copied in. The parties had asked Mr Omkar to embody their agreement as recorded in the Handwritten Agreement and he had advised that a deed was required and provided a draft. In this letter, Mr Boulter states in terms that the Handwritten Agreement was written in haste, and that “almost as soon as I had signed this there were a few points I wanted to clarify …. and you also wanted to clarify a few points …. The intention of this Email is to update and clarify the [Handwritten] Letter which together represent the entire agreement between us relating to the Avalion shares.” Insofar as relevant to the Representations, it is said: “(i) As per para 5 of the [Handwritten Agreement], you will continue with a priority return on your £4.35m of £1.5m as we would like to investigate reducing your exposure from £4.35m to £2.85m as part of the forward purchase funding deal we are seeking with CBRE acting for us ”. (emphasis added)
76. Again the return of the £1.5m is expressly linked to the funding deal being sought.
77. These are the documents on which Mr Padgett relies to substantiate the claim that the Representations, both express and implied, were made, prior to Mr Porter entering into the Letter Agreement and completing the Beaufort Buyout.
78. I have no hesitation in finding that the correspondence, facts and matters relied on do not support the claim that any of the Representations were made. To the contrary, they do the opposite: they make it clear beyond doubt that it was always in both Mr Porter’s and Mr Boulter’s mind that £1.5m would be repaid to Mr Porter, in priority to the other shareholders but after payment of senior and mezzanine debt and interest, upon the inward investment of the development funding, whether that was to come from Patrizia or another entity. If that were to fail, then the return would come from, and not before, the proceeds of sale of the Kew Site. There is not the merest hint of any promise or agreement that the £1.5m would be repaid in any other circumstance, whether or not in priority to the other shareholders.
79. Express Representation 1 is straightforward and in one sense uncontroversial. It is said that Mr Boulter “expressly represented to [Mr Porter] that [Mr Porter] would receive £1.5 million in equity as a priority on his investment of £4.35 million in Planco, excluding interest”. Mr Boulter did on multiple occasions in the correspondence expressly represent that Mr Porter would receive £1.5 million equity as a priority return on his investment of £4.35 million in Planco. However, on every occasion bar one the reference was expressly linked to the receipt of incoming investment, whether from Patrizia or another entity; or to the proceeds of sale of the Kew Site.
80. This makes commercial sense. Mr Porter was to buy out the Beaufort Loan in order to keep the equity in the Kew Site, against a background of Beaufort appearing restive. There would be no occasion on which monies would become available to repay Mr Porter’s investment other than the receipt of investment funds from Patrizia or similar; or, if that funding did not materialise, from selling the Kew Site. At no point was any other circumstance suggested as the trigger which would permit the repayment of £1.5 million to Mr Porter. So Express Representation 1 as formulated is a materially incomplete summary of representations that were made. It omits a key component present on (almost) all the occasions on which it was made, namely, the trigger by which a payment of £1.5 million would be made first to Mr Porter ahead of the other equity holders.
81. The one exception is the Handwritten Agreement which does not in terms link the priority return of the £1.5 million to the receipt of development funding. However, I reject the submission that Express Representation 1 (in its pleaded form, without any accompanying reference to the trigger for repayment) was evidenced by the Handwritten Agreement. Point 5 of the Handwritten Agreement – “you will receive a £1.5m priority on your £4.35m in Planco” - begs the question as to the circumstances which would trigger a repayment, a matter on which it is wholly silent. The answer is to be found in the other documents passing between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter, and often also to Mr Padgett, around that period, which I have set out above, all of which point to one of two potential triggers: either the receipt of inward funding from Patrizia or similar investor; or, if investment funding were not secured, the sale of the Kew Site. In particular, the email from Mr Boulter to Mr Porter dated 19 August 2020 following the Handwritten Agreement comments that he had already thought of other points he wished to clarify and expected that Mr Porter was in the same position. That email again clearly linked the return of the £1.5 million to the receipt of the “forward purchase funding deal we are seeking”. It is fanciful to suppose that point 5 of the Handwritten Agreement promised a priority return of £1.5 million, at any point it might be demanded by Mr Porter, and prior to senior and mezzanine debt being repaid. Such an arrangement would confound the very purpose of the Beaufort Buyout. What was actually meant was clarified in the email of 19 August 2020, prior to the Letter Agreement being entered into.
82. It seems Mr Padgett is aware that Express Representation 1 cannot without more do the work asked of it since it is followed by the Implied Representation 1, which I set out again here for ease of reference. “the term “priority” was expressly used in [Express Representation 1] and in the context of a personal arrangement between [Mr Porter] and [Mr Boulter], implied that in exchange for [Mr Porter’s] £4.35 million investment: (iii) The £1.5m would be paid by [Mr Boulter] personally in preference to any other debt or financial obligation arising from Planco, or otherwise, as he stood to benefit from it. (iv) The payment would be derived from [Mr Boulter’s] anticipated profits from business activities in Planco given that [Mr Boulter’s] company, Avalion, owned 100 A shares in Planco.”
83. I can find no evidential basis for Implied Representation 1. It would amount to a personal guarantee that Mr Boulter would repay £1.5 million to Mr Porter, although the circumstances in which that obligation would arise are not specified. The meaning of the word “priority” is clearly set out in Clause 17.1(e): after repayment of senior and mezzanine debt and interest (which in order to be secured would have to take priority over equity loan repayment), £1.5 million was to be paid to Mr Porter in priority to the other equity partners’ investments/loans. However at no point was there any suggestion in any of the documents, and there is no warrant for its implication from Express Representation 1 or from the context, that Mr Boulter was to act as a longstop, with a personal obligation to repay the £1.5 million, if the funding did not materialise and the sale of the Kew Site was not sufficient to repay the equity investors.
84. Clause 17.1(e) reinforces this conclusion. Clause 17.1(e) was wholly consistent with the correspondence set out above: it provided for repayment of £1.5 million to Mr Porter, after senior and mezzanine debt and interest had been paid, in priority to the other shareholders. The Shareholder Agreement was not entered into until 8 September 2020, some two and a half weeks after the Letter Agreement. It had however been circulated in draft form as part of the suite of documents sent to Mr Boulter and Mr Omkar under cover of email dated 18 August 2020. Mr Omkar was Mr Porter’s solicitor, and friend, and responsible for advising Mr Porter on the Beaufort Buyout and the legal side of the transactions involved. Clause 8 of the Letter Agreement makes specific reference to Clause 17.1(e), referring to “the distribution of £1.5 million set out at [Clause 17.1(e)]”. On this basis, and there being no contrary or inconsistent evidence, I find that the draft Shareholder Agreement contained Clause 17.1(e) in materially the same form as that in which it was executed on 8 September 2020. The relevance of that is that when entering the Letter Agreement Mr Porter knew full well what arrangements had been made in the Shareholder Agreement regarding the basis on which his investment would be returned to him. Given the technical complexity of the deal between the various parties, and given the position on the priority return expressly referred to on many occasions, there is no room in my judgment to infer that Mr Boulter took on any personal obligation to repay any part of the £4.35 million.
85. Lastly, by email to Mr Boulter and Mr Porter dated 21 August 2020, the date on which the Letter Agreement was executed, Mr Omkar states: “John will rely solely on Planco for his £1.5m preference which is already provided for in the Planco documents so no need to agree that here.”
86. This demonstrates that all parties were aware that what is referred to in shorthand as the “£1.5 million preference” was provided for in the Planco documents, that is to say, the Shareholder Agreement. I note the use of the word “solely”. This letter negates any remaining possibility that there was either an express or implied representation to the effect that Mr Boulter was personally undertaking liability to repay that sum in the event it could not be funded as anticipated.
87. Accordingly, there was no representation, and no agreement, that Mr Boulter would personally repay the £1.5 million if the planned investment funding or proceeds of sale did not materialise. Viewed in context, the Handwritten Agreement is not even arguably capable of bearing the construction advanced. Even if it were, the true position was in any event clarified in the email dated 19 August 2020; and moreover the Handwritten Agreement was expressly “extinguished and superseded” by clause 1 of the Letter Agreement.
88. I accordingly reject the claim that a representation is to be implied in the terms of Implied Representation 1.
89. I turn now to Representation 2. This relates to an email to Mr Padgett dated 23 April 2021, in which Mr Boulter was responding to a request from Mr Padgett to provide a summary of paid up equity amounts in the transaction, and the same for the debt situation. He also asked for details of the funding required to completion, and of the funders that Mr Boulter was in discussions with. Mr Boulter responded with “[Mr Porter] - £4,350,000 (priority return of £1.5m)”.
90. This request and response followed an earlier email exchange between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter in which Mr Boulter on 6 April 2021 had suggested that in return for a 20% stake in the DMF Mr Porter would provide Patrizia with a £10 million bank guarantee to address the risk of a Late Stage review. Mr Boulter went on: “I trust this 20% of the DMF will also compensate you for leaving the £1.5m in the deal.”
91. Mr Porter replied by email dated 8 April 2021: “We discussed the terms in which we would contemplate a guarantee: capped at £10M. we did not commit[.] [T]he issue of what is appropriate compensation for £1.5M being kept in : a strict breach of previous terms was not discussed and I will consult with Brian about this.”
92. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Padgett that “in the absence of evidence from Mr Porter, and as a matter of construction, that seems to be reference to the terms of the Hand Written Agreement in which Mr Porter was promised a priority return and which he viewed as having been breached by the Defendant. This is because the Defendant made no protective provision for it in the … Shareholder Agreement.” That submission is predicated on a view of the contents, meaning, and status of the Handwritten Agreement which I have already rejected. Moreover it is clear that what is being contemplated is not a change to the Handwritten Agreement but a deviation from the terms of Clause 17.1(e). Patrizia it seems was driving a harder bargain than had been anticipated, seeking a bank guarantee from Mr Porter, and requiring that its investment not be disbursed in accordance with Clause 17.1(e), but rather that Mr Porter should leave the £1.5 million in Planco.
93. It was suggested in closing submissions that the change being referred to was a change to the terms that had been negotiated with Patrizia in the period after the Letter Agreement had been entered into, and after the documents including the Shareholder Agreement had been finalised and executed on 8 September 2020. There was a set of terms offered by Patrizia on 30 November 2020 where Mr Porter’s £1.5 million was still anticipated as being repaid to him ahead of the other shareholders. But by April 2021 negotiations had moved on, Patrizia was becoming more risk averse, or perhaps had a better idea of what the risks were, and was looking to impose stricter terms.
94. Be that as it may, Mr Boulter acknowledged that the latest Patrizia demands would effect a change in the arrangement, but in context that plainly means a change to Clause 17.1(e) of the Shareholder Agreement, not to the Handwritten Agreement, which first did not bear the construction contended for, and secondly had been wholly extinguished and superseded by the Letter Agreement, which itself expressly contemplated the terms of Clause 17.1(e). Mr Porter’s reference to “a strict breach of the terms” is in my judgment a clear implied reference to Clause 17.1(e): keeping Mr Porter’s £1.5 million in the Kew Project after funding had been received would plainly be a breach of that clause.
95. The email of 23 April 2021 therefore does not constitute a misrepresentation, fresh or otherwise, and nor is it a negligent failure to correct an existing false impression, of which there was none. It accurately summarises the extent of Mr Porter’s investment in the Kew Project, and refers to the priority return provided by Clause 17.1(e). There is no evidence, indeed it is contrary to the evidence, to support an argument that Mr Porter was unaware of the terms of Clause 17.1(e), much less that he thought Mr Boulter had promised him something different or more in the form of a personal obligation. Mr Porter was advised by an experienced solicitor, and had personally signed an agreement expressly referring to the true situation. Given my conclusions on construction above, and based on the evidence before me, it is impossible to even reasonably speculate that Mr Porter believed he had any right to a priority return other than that provided by Clause 17.1(e).
96. Given my conclusions, I do not need to consider the complex, creative, but wholly unsustainable arguments developed on behalf of Mr Padgett at paragraphs 143 – 148 of Mr Padgett’s skeleton argument, to the effect that Representations 1 and 2 were properly characterised as personal representations. I will however address one element of that contention to the effect that Mr Porter relied on Mr Boulter personally, not on independently verifiable documents. On the evidence this is simply wrong. Mr Boulter provided Mr Porter with reams of Kew Project documentation, including a comprehensive suite of documents sent under cover of email on 4 July 2020. He also sent many emails of quite technical detail concerning the genesis of the Kew Project, its funding, and the current situation regarding Planco and the Beaufort Loan. Moreover Mr Porter was in regular contact with Mr Padgett, who ran the family office, and also had the legal advice and support of Mr Omkar.
97. The emails from that period reveal that many of the queries originated from Mr Porter (whether at Mr Boulter’s behest or not), and that he was taking an active and informed interest in not merely the mechanics of the deal but the specifics of the financial position and his intended part in it. Moreover, Mr Porter was an experienced and successful businessman and was accustomed to investing in business enterprises: I note the £2.5 million “playground” threshold, beyond which Mr Padgett had to become involved in Mr Porter’s investment decisions. I entirely reject the suggestion that Mr Porter was entering into a private, personal arrangement with Mr Boulter in which he was the inexperienced naïve junior partner, at the mercy of Mr Boulter’s superior experience and knowledge, and dependent on his advice rather than having access to independent documents. That picture is fanciful, and contrary to the evidence.
98. Turning to Representation 3, that (impliedly) the Kew Site was profitable in that it was adequately positioned to secure development funding and generate equity, I once again have no hesitation in finding that there was no misrepresentation. The facts said to give rise to Representation 3 – namely, the statement “that we are in a good position to source the development funding”; the letter of intent from a major institutional investor; and the fact that Beaufort received two offers for the Kew Site – are not alleged to be false. What is said to be false is the implied representation as set out at the beginning of this paragraph.
99. There are a number of problems with Representation 3. First, it is an expression of opinion. Mr Padgett relies on Brown v Raphael [1958] Ch 636 , at 642, in which it is said that if the facts are not well known to both parties, then a statement of opinion by one party who best knows the facts, amounts to a statement of material facts since he impliedly asserts that he knows the facts which justify his opinion. The Master of the Rolls states (also at 642) “the real question for the court is to say, on the basis of the facts and the context of this case, whether this is an instance in which the representation that the [representor] has reasonable grounds for his belief ought to be imported”.
100. This approach does not assist Mr Padgett, who has pleaded the material facts on which the (implied) Representation 3 is said to be based. All those facts were in fact true, or expressions of opinion, and Mr Padgett does not claim otherwise. Accordingly, if Mr Boulter can be said to have been making the implied Representation 3, that implied opinion was based on true facts. This is a different situation from that facing the Court in Brown v Raphael , where the representor gave an (express) opinion based on facts he believed to be true, but which turned out to be untrue.
101. Mr Padgett suggests that the underlying factual representations were not true for a number of reasons. First, no development funding was ever secured. But that does not render the implied representation untrue, and indeed highlights its quality as a statement of opinion, not fact, which in the context is all it ever could have been.
102. Second, it is said that the “purported” letter of intent of Patrizia dated 11 September 2020 was non-binding, conditional on further due diligence, addressed to a third party, and did not result in funding. The first three of those were all known to Mr Porter, who knew the situation full well: Mr Boulter was through CBRE attempting to secure funding, and the interest shown by Patrizia at that stage was no more than that – an expression of interest. Mr Porter knew that an expression of interest was non-binding. Indeed Mr Porter and Mr Boulter had expressly contemplated that there might be investors other than Patrizia who would provide the development funding. The fact that a hope for funding did not result in funding does not render untrue an implied statement that the Kew Site was profitable and well positioned to obtain funding. The Kew Project clearly brought with it commercial risk and there is no evidence that Mr Porter, a shrewd and demanding business partner, was not aware that this was the case. In fact all the evidence is to the contrary.
103. Third, it is said that Representation 3 is false because the proposed investment by Patrizia required a £10 million guarantee. That was a development which arose later on, and was of concern both to Mr Porter and Mr Boulter. It cannot render an earlier representation untrue. It was clear after the expression of interest from Patrizia that negotiations would ensue, and that Patrizia would take a view of the viability of the Kew Project and the security of its investment. The fact that during the negotiation process which took place after the original expression of interest it sought to impose terms to safeguard its investment cannot render false an earlier statement that it had expressed an interest. This simply does not add up.
104. A further point of distinction is that it is not the case that Mr Boulter knew the facts and Mr Porter did not. Whilst the negotiations appear to have been handled direct between Mr Boulter and CBRE/Patrizia, Mr Boulter had at Mr Porter’s request forwarded all the relevant facts and documents to Mr Porter (and often to Mr Padgett) and continued to keep him updated. So when Patrizia demanded a £10 million guarantee, and that Mr Porter’s £1.5 million be kept in the business, Mr Boulter told Mr Porter this was the case. In other words, Mr Porter knew the relevant facts and was in a position to form his own view.
105. Even if one accepts that Representation 3 can be reasonably implied from the facts stated, it was obvious that Mr Boulter was trying to persuade Mr Porter to continue to invest, on the basis of the known facts, and on Mr Boulter’s opinion that the Kew Project would be profitable, and/or that the value of the Kew Site would be more than sufficient to repay Mr Porter’s investment. It was clear he was trying to persuade Mr Porter that this was the case. But Mr Porter was not missing any important material relevant to the formation of his own opinion, and as a shrewd and experienced business man, well used to investing in property, he was equipped to form his own opinion. There is no evidence that he was reliant on Mr Boulter’s implied opinion as to the viability of the Kew Project. The two men thrashed out the details extensively in correspondence and in conversations. Each had advisors. Each had experience. Mr Boulter was arguing a case, and trying to make a deal with Mr Porter. Mr Porter interrogated the facts over the following months. There is no question of misrepresentation.
106. Lastly I note that Representation 3 relates only to the Variation Agreement, which principally concerns the residential property agreements between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter, together with provision for cash flow and the exercise of the options concerning the Avalion shares. It does not materially affect the Shareholder Agreement into which Mr Boulter and Mr Porter entered on 8 September 2020. If, contrary to my rulings Mr Padgett were to have succeeded on this element of the misrepresentation claim, it would nonetheless leave intact the Letter Agreement, by which Mr Porter would continue to be bound.
107. I note for completeness that Mr Padgett sought to introduce the issue of Mr Porter’s failing health as relevant to the claim in misrepresentation. I no longer need to consider whether such material was either admissible or relevant, though I am sceptical that it was admissible and doubtful whether it would have been relevant. Nor do I need to decide the arguments concerning the effect of the entire agreement clause or the contractual exclusion of liability for misrepresentation claims in the Letter Agreement.
108. In conclusion, I reject Mr Padgett’s claims in misrepresentation, since – to the extent that the representations can be made out at all – none of them constitute actionable misrepresentations, and so the claims fail at the first hurdle. It follows that there is no need to consider any consequences, and so Issue (2), concerning the effect of any misrepresentations, does not arise. Issue (3) - Was either the Letter Agreement or the Variation Agreement invalid for (i) uncertainty, (ii) want of consideration; or (iii) lack of intention to enter into legal relations? (3) (i) Uncertainty
109. As to lack of certainty, it is said by Mr Padgett that the terms are too vague, that the trigger payment events are contingent, and that the Variation Agreement “attempts to vary the purported Letter Agreement but the parties’ conduct … is inconsistent with that purported Letter Agreement”. The allegation that the terms are vague, uncertain and lack definitive meaning is particularised by reference to the fact that “the trigger payments are contingent on uncertain occurrences that, in any event, did not materialise”. The allegation that its terms are contingent is correct, if what is meant is that some of its terms cannot be performed unless a specific event happens. That in my judgment does not compromise the validity of the Variation Agreement. The fact that the parties’ conduct was inconsistent with the purported Letter Agreement is a strange point which was never properly explained and the relevance of which I do not understand. (3) (ii) Want of consideration
110. As to alleged lack of consideration, it is alleged on behalf of Mr Padgett that the 12.5% interest in Avalion shares referred to in clause 5 of the Variation Agreement was never transferred. Next it is said that the repayment of the “cash flow loan” under Clause 4 of the Variation Agreement was never made since the stipulated source of the repayment (namely, proceeds from the Kew Site) never materialised. And it is said that there was no consideration because the Clause 3 option and the Clause 1 occupation rights were void. I reject these as justifying a submission that there was no consideration for the Variation Agreement. First, I accept Mr Boulter’s evidence that the transfer of the 12.5% interest in Avalion shares had already taken place by the time of the Variation Agreement. The only remaining matter of concern was that the Companies House records had not been updated to reflect the transfer.
111. I agree with the submission made on behalf of Mr Boulter, and hold, that the essential consideration for the Variation Agreement was the mutual agreement to amend the Letter Agreement. I further agree, and hold, that where repayment of the loan is said to depend on a source which both parties know may not materialise, the risk of that happening was necessarily accepted by the lender at the formation of the agreement, and does not avoid the obligation on the lender to make the loan: see Chitty on Contracts, 36th ed, paras 33-063 - 064. That has nothing to do with consideration. Lastly in relation to the contention that there was no consideration because the clause 3 rights were void, both parties clearly thought at the time they entered the Variation Agreement that the clause 3 rights were effective and of value, and so there was consideration in being willing to give up those rights. (3) (iii) Lack of intention to create legal relations
112. Finally, Mr Padgett seeks to challenge the validity of the Variation Agreement on the grounds that there was a lack of intention to create legal relations. In written submissions it was argued that “there could be no intention to create legally binding relations where the Defendant knew, or must be taken to have known, that mandatory Swiss law requirements had not been satisfied and that the arrangements were incapable of giving rise to legally enforceable rights under their governing law.” Reliance is placed on an email of 24 November 2021 to a Mr Kevin Cassandro of Tenor, in which Mr Boulter acknowledged that the option to purchase Plot B was not enforceable in Switzerland.
113. I reject the submission that the parties did not intend to create legal relations. From the parties’ first attempt to reduce their agreement to writing in the Handwritten Agreement, which they signed, through the execution of the Letter Agreement by deed on the advice of Mr Omkar, to their final decision to record the variations they had agreed in a typed and signed document, the evidence all points to Mr Porter and Mr Boulter having a conscious and deliberate intention to create legal relations. In particular, Mr Porter had a need to provide alternative living arrangements given that he could not deliver on his obligation under the Letter Agreement to provide le Petit Monde for Mr Boulter to use. Equally, Mr Boulter needed urgently to make adequate arrangements for somewhere to live and where his children could stay with him on their holidays. In my judgment there is no doubt that Mr Porter and Mr Boulter intended the Variation Agreement to have the same status as the Letter Agreement which it varied, that of a legally binding document regulating the sundry affairs of the parties to it.
114. The admission on 24 November 2021 cannot be relevant to Mr Boulter’s state of mind when he entered into the Variation Agreement. The evidence does not establish that he knew that the option was unenforceable in Switzerland at the time he entered into the Variation Agreement. Even if it did, that would not be enough to establish that he did not intend to create legal relations, given that Clause 20 of the Letter Agreement provided him with the opportunity to request Mr Porter to do what was necessary to effect their agreement. I shall be considering the wider effect of Clause 20 of the Letter Agreement below.
115. Accordingly I reject the challenges made to the validity of the Letter Agreement, and the Variation Agreement, on the grounds of want of certainty, want of consideration, and lack of intention to create legal relations. Issue 4: Does the validity of (i) an option to buy land and (ii) a right of occupation of property fall to be determined under Swiss law?
116. The answer to this question depends on whether the right granted in each case is a right in rem . The position is conveniently set out in Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, (16 th ed) in the following passages. “Rule 227: (1) This Rule applies to determine the law applicable to a contract relating to right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property .... (2) If the parties have chosen the law applicable to the contract ..., the contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties, subject to clause (6) … . … (6) The requirement of form of the law of the country where the property is situated will be applied in any event if by that law: (a) those requirements are imposed irrespective of the country where the contract is concluded and irrespective of the law governing the contract, and (b) those requirements cannot be derogated from by agreement.”
117. Rule 227(6)(b) reflects Article 11(5) of the Rome 1 Regulation. Dicey elaborates on Rule 227(6) at paragraph 33-072: “Where the contract falls within Art. 11(5), its formal validity will be governed … by the requirements of form of the country where the property is situated if by that law: (a) those requirements of form are imposed irrespective of the country where the contract is concluded and irrespective of the law governing the contract, and (b) those requirements cannot be derogated by agreement. The effect of this rule …. is to impose the requirements of form of the lex situs , which have the requisite characteristics, on the contract even though the contract is governed by a law other than that of the site and even though the contract is concluded otherwise than in the country where the property is situated …”.
118. Dicey Rule 140 provides that “all rights over, or in relation to, immovable (land) are …. governed by the law of the country where the immovable is situate ( lex situs ).”
119. And Dicey elaborates at 24-069 - 70: “As a general rule, all questions that arise concerning rights over immovables (land) are governed by the law of the place where the immovables are situate ( lex situs) . The general principle is beyond dispute, and applied to rights of every description. It is based upon obvious considerations of convenience and expediency. Any other rule would be ineffective, because in the last resort land can only be dealt with in a manner which the lex situs allows. … The sovereign of the country where land is situate has absolute control over the land within his or her dominions: he or she alone can bestow effective rights over it; his or her courts alone are, as a rule, entitled to exercise jurisdiction over such land. Consequently, any decision by an English court which ran counter to what the lex situs had decided or would decide would be in most cases a brutum fulmen .”
120. Neither of these rules affects the interpretation of the Letter Agreement or the Variation Agreement, which falls within the English law on the interpretation of contracts.
121. Accordingly, insofar as the rights granted at (i) clause 3 of the Variation Agreement and (ii) clause 1 of the Variation Agreement are properly regarded as rights in rem , any questions about them, including their validity, fall to be determined under Swiss law, and not under the law of England. Issue 5: Is the right granted under clause 3 of the Variation Agreement valid under Swiss law?
122. The Court has the benefit of the expert evidence of Monsieur Yves de Coulon (“the Expert”) who was instructed on a joint basis. The Expert recited, and clearly understood, his duties under CPR Part 35 and PD 35, and the Civil Justice Council’s Guidance for the instruction of experts in civil claims. There is no question in my mind but that he has fulfilled those duties.
123. The Expert records the parties’ agreement that the Letter Agreement and the Variation Agreement are to be construed in accordance with English law, and confirms at paragraph 9 of his expert report (“the Expert Report”) that he does not deal with the interpretation of the provisions set out in those documents.
124. The Expert was thorough and detailed in providing the answers to the questions he was asked. His conclusions are not challenged by either party, and so I will set out in summary form the conclusions he reached without descending to the level of detail in which the Expert helpfully and cogently explained his reasoning. His principal conclusions are as follows.
125. First, Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement, which purported to grant Mr Boulter an option to purchase le Petit Monde, should have, but did not, strictly comply with the requirement under Swiss law that it be executed in public deed form. It is “highly probable” that Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement is null and void and cannot produce legal effects.
126. The Letter Agreement itself should not however be declared entirely void unless the clause containing the option right is so essential that the contract would not have been concluded without it. However, it falls outside of the scope of the Expert’s mandate to assess the parties’ intentions in order to answer that question.
127. As to Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement by which the parties agreed that Mr Boulter be granted the option to purchase Plot B in substitution of the option in clause 5 of the Letter Agreement to buy le Petit Monde, applying the same reasoning as he applied to Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement, the Expert concluded that the option purportedly granted is highly likely not to constitute a valid and enforceable option right under Swiss law. Again, the Variation Agreement should not be declared entirely void unless the clause containing the option right is so essential that the contract would not have been concluded without it.
128. The Expert also commented that if an English court were to order the parties to create a valid option, that could only happen by the parties agreeing a contract in the form of a public deed, since only then can the right be annotated in the land register. It was unlikely that a Swiss court would enforce any such order, since it would be contrary to public policy which prioritises parties’ freedom to contract.
129. Accordingly, Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement was ineffective at Swiss law to grant the option it purported to grant. It failed to comply with the requirements of Swiss law, to use a public form of deed and annotate the option in the land register. As a result, it was null and void and of no effect.
130. This is on the basis that the grant of an option is a right in rem . On this point, I need to refer to a further submission made by Mr Evans, Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr Boulter. It was submitted in closing that an option is not a right in rem but rather a right in personam , on the basis that it is only exercisable against the contracting party, and not enforceable against the world. If that is the case, then it does not fall to be determined by Swiss law, but can be enforced person to person by an English Court. Mr Evans’ “broad submission” was that in relation to clause 3 of the Variation Agreement we are not dealing with a contract which involves rights in rem . We are dealing only with personal rights and Article 11(5) does not apply.
131. I have considerable hesitation in accepting this submission. The fact that the grantee’s right can only be enforced against the grantor does not by itself make it a mere personal right. There remains a difference between (1) the contractual right of the grantee of the option as against the grantor, and (2) the equitable interest in land, which is created the minute the grant takes effect, and which is a right in rem . The proprietary character derives from the fact that the right affects the land itself. This is fundamentally different from an ordinary contractual right, which creates only personal obligations between the contracting parties. On this view, it is not registration of the option that makes the difference, operating to convert a personal right into a right in rem as Mr Evans suggested; registration merely provides for priorities of interest.
132. In the light of my doubts, I have decided that the argument, newly introduced in the afternoon of a day of closing submissions, would require more extensive development and scrutiny than was possible in order for Mr Boulter to succeed on this basis. Issue 6: Is the right granted under clause 1 of the Variation Agreement valid under Swiss law?
133. The answer to this depends crucially on the nature of the right of occupation granted. Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement, which provided that Mr Boulter was to have the full use of Cheval Marin for 6 years and then the full use of le Petit Monde for another 6 years, with rent from the studio flats being divided equally between Mr Porter and Mr Boulter, would, if interpreted as a droit d’habitation (“right for residence”), be subject to a requirement of a public deed, failure to comply with which renders the contract, and consequently the right, null and void, as form is a condition of validity. If by contrast the grant of use is interpreted as a prêt à usage (“loan for use”), it qualifies as an obligation under the law of contract rather than a right in rem , in which case no specific form is required under Swiss law. Such an agreement may be valid even if concluded in simple written or oral form. Determining which kind of right it is depends on the meaning of the words used, and the intentions of the parties, which the Expert (rightly) regards as a function of the English Court, and not for him to opine on.
134. The Expert dismisses a third theoretical possibility, that the right granted is a lease, in the Swiss law meaning of that word, due to the absence of rent which constitutes an essential element of such a contract (contrary to the position in English law).
135. If the English court did consider that Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement constitutes a droit d’habitation , it is only once executed in the form of a public deed that the right can then be annotated in the land register. Until both of those things happen, the grant is null and void. An order of an English court compelling the parties to enter into a new agreement might not be enforceable in Switzerland as it may be incompatible with Swiss public policy. If on the other hand the English court considers that Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement is a simple prêt à usage , no further steps would be required in order to validate it.
136. As to termination, if Clause 1 was effective to create a droit d’habitation , then assuming it had been validly registered the owner cannot terminate the right before the expiry of the agreed term. If Clause 1 qualifies as a prêt à usage , and a fixed term has been agreed, early termination of the loan is subject to conditions. Just cause must be demonstrated, such as the need to reclaim the property for personal use. In the absence of just cause, unilateral termination of the loan for use is not permitted.
137. Turning to the second operative part of Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement, granting a future right to occupy le Petit Monde, if the right granted is a droit d’habitation it will be invalid in the absence of a form of public deed, and annotation on the register. If by contrast it is a simple prêt à usage , no additional steps are required for validity, before Mr Boulter could take up, or retain, occupation of le Petit Monde. The same principles regarding enforcement and termination apply to the future occupation of le Petit Monde as summarised above in relation to Mr Boulter’s current occupation of Cheval Marin.
138. Accordingly, the validity of the grant of the right to occupy Cheval Marin under Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement depends on what species of right it is. That in turn depends on the intention of the parties, determination of which lies in the province of this Court.
139. The original right to occupy le Petit Monde arose under Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement, in which Mr Porter agreed “to permit [Mr Boulter] to utilise … le Petit Monde … as a residence without charge of rent for a period of 12 years from the date of this Deed …”. It was also expressly provided that the parties would “as soon as reasonably practicable following the completion of the Avalion SPA seek to put in place a standard lease agreement in respect of Petit Monde.”. Thus it was envisaged that Mr Boulter’s occupation of le Petit Monde was to be recorded in a “lease” agreement, notwithstanding it was to be rent free.
140. This right was varied by Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement, which substituted for the permission “to utilise” le Petit Monde for 12 years a right for Mr Boulter to have “full use” of Cheval Marin for 6 years from 1 September 2021, and thereafter of le Petit Monde for a further 6 years. Mr Boulter explains the reasons for the changes in his witness statement, including importantly that the intended occupation of le Petit Monde under clause 5 of the Letter Agreement had been compromised by a continuing row between Mr Porter and his ex-partner, who continued to expect to use (and was using) le Petit Monde for her family’s trips to Verbier. In the light of that, Mr Boulter said he somewhat reluctantly agreed to move to Cheval Marin (which he himself had found for Mr Porter to purchase as an “interesting development opportunity”), but only on the express understanding that he was to have “full use”.
141. Further, in negotiating the Variation Agreement, Mr Porter had tried to retain access to use the Studio Flats, to let staff or friends stay there. Mr Boulter pushed back on this, explaining that the Studio Flats, and their income-producing potential, were the reason he was willing to move to what he described as a worse location compared to that in which le Petit Monde was situated. Mr Boulter also stipulated that he did not want Mr Porter to have any kind of day to day involvement with or any form of control over Cheval Marin. After the Variation Agreement was executed, Mr Boulter said he felt happy that he had secured a place to live until his youngest child left school.
142. Bearing in mind the context, and applying the well-known principles of construction as set out in Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 at [15], I conclude that on a true construction of the Variation Agreement the reference to “full use” meant the equivalent of exclusive occupation (as that term is understood in English law) for a fixed term of 6 years at Cheval Marin, followed by 6 years at le Petit Monde. The arrangement granted was therefore a lease of Cheval Marin and the grant of a future lease of le Petit Monde, within the meaning of that term in English law, (the payment of rent not being an essential characteristic of a lease: Street v Mountford [1985] UKHL 4 ). Being of a fixed term, that lease would under English law be protected from termination save in accordance with its terms.
143. Further, the right to occupy Cheval Marin includes the right to rent out the Studio Flats. This was clearly contemplated by reference to Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement which provided amongst other things for Mr Boulter to account to Mr Porter for half of the net income from renting out the Studio Flats. I can see no basis for arguing otherwise.
144. I note that it is open to Mr Boulter to invoke Clause 20 to ensure that his lease of Cheval Marin, and the future lease of le Petit Monde, are protected in accordance with the intentions of the parties, who evidently agreed that the arrangement should be recorded in writing (viz the reference in the Letter Agreement to entering into a “standard lease agreement”). Given there is no standard Swiss form of lease, the word “standard” must be taken to mean normal or usual, with no provisions out of the ordinary.
145. The Expert declined to say what the nature of the arrangement added up to as a matter of Swiss law on the basis it was for the English court to determine the matters concerning the parties’ intentions. The Expert also highlighted the fact that the difference between alternative legal bases of tenure did not subsist in the use that the occupant can make of the property, but in the protections each was to provide, and in the requirement (or not) of being executed in a public form of deed and annotated on the register. The Expert was clear that a right of occupation granted for no rent cannot be a lease as such. That means the right granted must have been intended either to be a droit d’habitation , or a prêt à usage , either of which could have been granted at no rent.
146. If it was intended that the right should be a droit d’habitation , the grant is invalid since it is not in the form of a public deed and is not registered. Mr Boulter would be entitled, under clause 20 of the Letter Agreement, to request Mr Padgett, standing in the shoes of Mr Porter, to execute all such documentation and take all such steps as are reasonably required to effect a droit d’habitation on the terms recorded in clause 1 of the Variation Agreement. This request would include taking steps to satisfy the requirement for a public deed and annotation on the register.
147. The alternative possibility is that the right is a prêt à usage for a fixed term, of 6 years from 1 September 2021 in the case of Cheval Marin, and a further 6 years in the case of le Petit Monde. In that case, formalities and registration would not be required. A prêt à usage “is a contract whereby the lender undertakes to make an object available free of charge to the borrower for the latter’s use and the borrower undertakes to return it to him after having made use of it.” (Article 305 SCO)
148. Such an arrangement “qualifies as an obligation under the law of contracts rather than a right in rem . In such cases, no specific form is required under Swiss law, and the agreement may be valid even if concluded in simple written or oral form” (Expert report page 24, 2)(xiii)).
149. The landlord cannot terminate a fixed term prêt à usage by means of a simple written notice. The landlord would need to justify reasons warranting the premature return of the property: since under Article 309(2) SCO “the lender is entitled to reclaim the object before [the contractual expiry date] if the borrower uses it for a purpose contrary to the agreement, if he damages it, if he permits a third party to use it or if unforeseen developments occur which leave the lender in urgent need of the object.”
150. There is scant evidence as to what the parties intended in this respect. Whilst negotiating the Letter Agreement, one draft lease for le Petit Monde (for the 8 years being considered at that time) was sent under cover of email from Mr Boulter to Mr Porter. This was headed “Fixed Term Rental” and contained a number of provisions, none that were inconsistent with a prêt à usage , and making no reference to any of the formalities required for a droit d’habitation . The only positive clue as to the parties’ intentions lies in the provision that Mr Boulter and Mr Porter “shall seek to put in place a standard lease agreement in respect of Petit Monde” contained in clause 5 of the Letter Agreement. That reference was not expressly repeated in clause 1 of the Variation Agreement but in my judgment must be taken to be transferred into the arrangement contemplated under clause 1 of the Variation Agreement, since the contents of the Letter Agreement that were not expressly or impliedly varied by the Variation Agreement survive.
151. The question then becomes whether the reference to a standard lease agreement was intended to be a reference to the public form of deed required if the intention was to create a droit d’habitation , or merely to a written lease agreement containing standard terms (ie conventional terms with no unusual provisions). I have reached the conclusion it can only be the latter. The Expert indicates that the answer to the question lies not in the quality of occupation but in the intention of the parties. Neither Mr Boulter nor Mr Padgett (insofar as he was involved) give evidence that they were aware of any distinction between the types of agreement, nor (consequently) of any formal requirements for a droit d’habitation . Neither is there any evidence that Mr Porter had any such awareness. Without that awareness, they cannot have formed an intention for the arrangement to be a droit d’habitation . They clearly anticipated that the agreement would be reduced to writing, but no more than that.
152. It follows that the leases created by clause 1 of the Variation Agreement were not rights in rem , but personal contractual rights. I note that the draft lease referred to in paragraph 150 provided that “in the case of any disputes, the court local to the Property has sole jurisdiction”. However, no such lease was entered into, and not even a draft was produced for the two leases granted under clause 1 of the Variation Agreement. It must follow that, pursuant to clauses 22 and 23 of the Letter Agreement the leases, not being rights in rem , are to be governed by and construed in accordance with English law, and any dispute about them is to be governed by and determined in accordance with English law. Issue 7: If Clause 3 and/or Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement are null and void for want of formality under Swiss law, does the remainder of the Letter Agreement as varied by the Variation Agreement survive?
153. Mr Padgett takes the position that the evidence of the Expert is the end of the matter as regards the options. They were null and void for want of formality. He also asserts that the remainder of the Variation Agreement falls with Clause 3, and so does not survive to be enforced. Mr Boulter argues to the contrary. He maintains that the Variation Agreement was a contract to grant an option, which is a personal right, and as such the English court can make an order for specific performance against Mr Padgett (standing in the shoes of Mr Porter) to grant a valid option. Further, Mr Boulter can rely on Clause 20 of the Letter Agreement, which requires Mr Porter (now Mr Padgett) to do all things, from time to time on request, and/or execute or procure the execution of all documents in a form satisfactory to Mr Boulter which Mr Boulter may reasonably consider necessary for giving full effect to the Letter Agreement as varied.
154. The first of those arguments is not without difficulties. In my judgment, on a true construction of Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement, Mr Porter was not agreeing to grant an option in the future; he was purporting to grant one by that contractual provision. Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement says “Mr Boulter to have an option that lasts for 6 years over the land labelled “B” … “. Without more it might be said that the phrase “to have an option” connoted a time in the future, with the result that clause 3 of the Variation Agreement was a contract for the grant of an option, rather than the actual grant. I would reject that approach for two reasons. First, all bar one of the obligations contained in the Variation Agreement use the formula “to be … ”, or “to have … ”. The impression is created of an attempt to keep the language objective and semi-formal. Thus, taking the Variation Agreement in isolation, the use of “to be” does not connote that the parties are to be taken to have agreed only that some further step is going to be taken.
155. Second, the Variation Agreement was intended to vary the Letter Agreement. It is common ground that Clause 3 was designed to replace Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement; it is not argued that the option to buy le Petit Monde was intended to survive, and co-exist, with the option to buy Plot B. Rather the evidence is that the parties intended to substitute the option granted in the Letter Agreement by the one granted in the Variation Agreement. Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement states “Mr Porter irrevocably grants Mr Boulter an option to purchase le Petit Monde on or before the expiry of 30 months from the date of the completion of the Beaufort Buyout”. This is the language of grant, not an obligation to make a grant at a future date. It seems to me obvious (and it was not contended otherwise) that the intention in relation to Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement was to reproduce the like obligation, in effect a surrender of the option granted at Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement and a grant instead of an option to buy Plot B. So I do not accept that the obligation in Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement is a contract to grant an option at a future date.
156. The Expert has indicated that the test under Swiss law for whether the invalidity of the option invalidates the remainder of the Variation Agreement is whether the clause containing the option right is so essential that the contract would not have been concluded without it. That falls to me to determine, applying English law, for the purposes of this claim.
157. Mr Boulter’s evidence is that he and Mr Porter entered into the Letter Agreement “alongside the arrangements being made for [Mr Porter’s] £4.35 million investment in the Kew Project”. He describes it as “a connected deal, that depended on John’s investment in Planco”, but was designed to deal with both Mr Boulter’s need to obtain a secure home for himself and children in Verbier and also to ensure that Mr Porter had an interest in Avalion. On one view, the main purpose of the Letter Agreement therefore was to grant an option to purchase le Petit Monde in return for an interest in Avalion. That would suggest that Clause 5 is so essential that the Letter Agreement would not have been concluded without it.
158. The contrary view is that the Letter Agreement addressed much more than merely the Option and the purchase of Avalion Shares. It also bound Mr Porter to the Beaufort Buyout, and to take up his position as a major investor in the Kew Project. Whilst the Shareholder Agreement was not concluded until around 8 September 2020, it was contemplated by Clause 2 of the Letter Agreement that it would happen “on or around the date hereof”, and it appears that the Shareholder Agreement was in its final form at that time. The clause embodying that element of the agreement occupies the first operative provision of the Letter Agreement. The Letter Agreement addresses sundry other matters, such as the Avalion Shareholder Agreement, the issue of the DMF and how that will generate the majority of the value in the Kew Site, and further it made provision for what should happen if Avalion were to develop a second site.
159. I do not need to recite the many other provisions that relate principally to the Kew Project and what was to happen in the future regarding Avalion and any future sites to be delivered. It is clear to me that, whilst the issue of Mr Boulter’s occupation of le Petit Monde was loosely connected to the Planco deal, that occupation, and the option to buy, were not the only, nor even the principal, reasons Mr Porter and Mr Boulter entered into the Letter Agreement. I note that the Handwritten Agreement, which was the original version of the agreement written up by Mr Porter and Mr Boulter themselves, prior to being passed on to Mr Omkar for drafting in the form of a deed, made reference to Mr Boulter’s living arrangements only in relation to the purchase of 12.5% of Avalion shares”.
160. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Clause 5 of the Letter Agreement, and by extension clause 3 of the Variation Agreement, were not so essential that the contract would not have been concluded without it. The Variation Agreement effects amendments to the Letter Agreement, and it is that contract, the Letter Agreement as varied, which must be examined in order to determine whether the provisions which are unenforceable are so essential to its purpose that the whole agreement fails because of the unenforceability of two of its clauses. On that basis, for the reasons set out above, the Letter Agreement survives the deletion of Clause 5, and, as varied, the deletion of Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement.
161. As to the test of severance under English law, the Supreme Court in Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd [2019] UKSC 32 held that severance of an invalid provision in a commercial contract is permissible only if all three cumulative requirements are satisfied: a. The provision must be capable of removal by simple excision without adding to, modifying, or rewriting the remaining wording (the “Blue Pencil” test). b. The remaining obligations must continue to be supported by consideration sufficient to sustain them as enforceable contracts. c. Removal must not materially alter the overall legal effect or character of the contract; the post-severance agreement must remain recognisably the same bargain the parties originally made.
162. Mr Padgett submits that each of clause 1 and clause 3 of the Variation Agreement is essential and that excision of either would fail the “Blue Pencil Test”. Together they constitute the core commercial purpose of the Variation Agreement. Removal would fail the consideration requirement because the remaining elements, such as the sharing of rental income from the Studio Flats, derive their value from the occupation and acquisition benefits. Most critically, severance would mean the Variation Agreement would be stripped of its core legal character and commercial effect, leaving no recognisable contractual bargain.
163. I do not accept those submissions. First, clause 1 of the Variation Agreement is not null and void, as discussed above. Second, the Agreement to which the test should be applied is the Letter Agreement as varied by the Variation Agreement. The value of the Letter Agreement did not derive principally from the option benefit. It subsisted principally in the arrangements being made in respect of the Beaufort Buyout, and Mr Porter’s entry into the Kew Project as a preferred shareholder. Thus the Letter Agreement as varied retains sufficient consideration. The Letter Agreement retains its core legal character and commercial effect, and the legal bargain struck is substantial and recognisable.
164. It follows then that the remainder of the clauses of the Letter Agreement and of the Letter Agreement as varied survive the invalidity of the option agreements in each agreement. Those clauses are available to be invoked in an English court under the parties’ choice of law. Whilst Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement was not effective on its face to grant the option, Mr Boulter is entitled in my judgment to rely on the other clauses of the Letter Agreement as varied, including Clause 20.
165. It is however an open question as to how far this currently takes Mr Boulter. Clause 20 obliges Mr Porter (amongst other things) “from time to time on request ” (my emphasis) to execute or procure the execution of all documents which Mr Boulter may reasonably consider necessary for giving full effect to this Deed. In my judgment this permits Mr Boulter to request Mr Porter to complete the documentation necessary to validate the option intended to be granted by Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement, whereupon the obligation will arise. I have seen no evidence that Mr Boulter has ever made such a request.
166. Paragraph 45 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim pleads that Mr Boulter is entitled to require Mr Padgett as Mr Porter’s executor to do all such things as are necessary and in his power to grant Mr Boulter the option enforceable under local Swiss law at any time within 6 years. Paragraph (4)(b) of the Prayer to the Counterclaim seeks an order requiring Mr Padgett as Mr Porter’s executor to do all such things as are necessary under Swiss law and in his power to grant Mr Boulter the option, enforceable under local Swiss law and exercisable at any time within 6 years, of buying the land identified in Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement in accordance with that clause.
167. As far as I am aware, this is the only occasion on which Mr Boulter could (arguably) be said to satisfy the requirement under Clause 20 of the Letter Agreement for a request to be made to execute the correct documentation. Even if that is correct, it may not suffice, since the request does not specify when it is said the six years should commence and so is incapable of being acted upon without clarification. Further, I have not heard argument on the question whether such a request can be said to have been made by pleading, nor on the question from when the six years is to run. Accordingly, I propose to seek the parties’ submissions on these questions, in the light of this judgment, with a view to reaching a conclusion on those issues in short order. Issue 8: Would the Court nonetheless be prevented from making an order as regards the surviving elements of the Letter Agreement as varied on the grounds of Swiss public policy?
168. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Padgett that it is not open to the Court to make an order for the perfecting of the grant of the option because it is contrary to Swiss public policy, and as the Expert confirmed, the Swiss Courts would likely not enforce any such order. However, any order this court makes would (and could) not be made under Swiss law, nor would the Swiss Court be called upon to enforce it (should there be a failure to comply). Such an order would be made by an English court applying the law of England, which does permit an order requiring specific performance of the obligation at Clause 20 of the Letter Agreement. Enforcement would also be via the English Court, as the claims between the parties have been. I see no merit in the submission based on Swiss public policy on this point.
169. On this point I am fortified by the decision of the Privy Council in Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping [1939] AC 277 (PC). The case concerned a shipment of herrings that got shipwrecked and turned up eventually at the consigned port in poor condition. The bill of lading was a Newfoundland bill of lading but was illegal in Newfoundland because it did not incorporate the Hague Rules. But the case was in Nova Scotia, which was then subject to English law. The decision went from Nova Scotia to the Privy Council. At page 296, Lord Wright states: “If [the English Court] has before it a contract good by its own law or by the proper law of contract, it will in proper cases give effect to the contract and ignore the foreign law. This was done in re Missouri Steamship Co, both by Chitty J and by the Court of Appeal, Lord Halsbury, having stated that the contrary view would mean that no country would enforce a contract made in another country unless their laws were the same, said: “there may be situations which one country may enforce and another country may not enforce, and that to determine whether they are enforceable or not you must have regards to the law of the contract, by which I mean the law which the contract itself imports to be the law governing the contract.” Having held that the law of the contract was English, he went on to hold that the exception of negligence, even if of no validity in the place where made, must receive effect in English law, although the exception of negligence was invalid in the United States as being against the public policy of that country, and although to do an act contrary to public policy is one type of illegal action.”
170. In conclusion, the grant of the option pursuant to Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement is unenforceable for want of formality. But, in the light of my conclusions above, it survives in the form of an obligation to do all things necessary in order to give effect to it in accordance with Clause 20. This court has jurisdiction to order specific performance of the obligations under clause 20 of the Letter Agreement regardless of the fact that Clause 3 of the Variation Agreement is unenforceable.
171. Reliance was also placed on the so-called Moçambique rule based on the case of British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 . In that case it was held that there was no jurisdiction to entertain an action to recover damages for trespass to land situated abroad. The rationale for the rule is understood to be territorial sovereignty and public international law comity. Dicey (at 24-062) comments that “the Rule rests on a somewhat slender basis of precedent, and its exact scope is matter of some doubt. It is a corollary of the principle that English courts have no jurisdiction to determine the title to, or the right to the possession of, any immovable situate outside England, But though this principle is subject to exceptions, the present Rule is not; or to put it more precisely, none have yet been formulated.”
172. In Pattni v Ali [2006] UKPC 51 , the Privy Council delivered judgment on appeal from the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man Staff of Government Division. The issue under consideration was whether an alleged sale agreement was genuine or a forgery. That issue gave rise in 1998 to Kenyan proceedings in the High Court of Kenya. That determination itself gave rise to a claim brought in the High Court in the Isle of Man, in which a claim was made for an order declaring one party to be the beneficial owner of the share capital in a company. In considering this issue, Lord Mance said: “21. For present purposes, a judgment in rem … is a judgment by a court where the relevant property is situate adjudicating on its title or disposition as against the whole world (and not merely as between parties or their privies in the litigation before it). The distinction is shortly and accurately put in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, … “ a judgment in personam binds only the parties to the proceedings as distinguished from one in rem which fixes the status of the matter in litigation once for all, and concludes all persons”. Later Lord Mance went on to say: “Immovables fall into a different and special category in private international law: cf British South Africa Company v Companhia de Moçambique. … Even so it has long been accepted in England that an English court may, as between parties before it, give an in personam judgment to enforce contractual or equitable rights in respect of immovable property situate in a foreign country: see Dicey, rule 122(3).”
173. The submission was made on behalf of Mr Padgett that this rule did not apply when there was no contract or equity which can be sued upon. In such a case, the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an in personam action for the contract which has been held not to exist to be enforced: Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6 . I accept that submission. That is not this case. I have determined that the Letter Agreement as varied by the Variation Agreement did survive. Mr Boulter sought not specific performance of the option per se , but, relying on clause 20 of the Letter Agreement, an order for Mr Padgett to do all such things as are necessary under Swiss law and in his power to perfect the provisions which have been held to be null and void for want of formality. That is based on a contractual right, in personam , seeking an order operating in personam against Mr Padgett in his c£150,000 for 2 years in his capacity as executor of the Estate. Under the Moçambique rule, that is permitted.
174. Mr Boulter has indicated that he wishes to elect a remedy based on his right to common law damages or damages in lieu of specific performance, rather than an order for specific performance of the obligation under clause 20 of the Letter Agreement to perfect the option. It is said that an order for specific performance might be difficult if not impossible to enforce against a party domiciled outside the United Kingdom. It has not been argued (nor could it be in my judgment) that Mr Boulter would not be entitled to a remedy by way of damages, whether at common law or in lieu of specific performance. However, I have yet to hear the parties’ submissions on the issue of whether Mr Padgett is in breach of the obligation at clause 20 of the Letter Agreement. Any award of damages would be consequential on such a breach. Accordingly I defer the decision as to the availability, and quantum, of an award in damages until I have heard further submissions on that question. Issue 9: Is Mr Porter/Mr Padgett in breach of (a) Clause 2 of the Variation Agreement to provide CHF120,000 to refurbish Cheval Marin and (b) Clause 4 of the Variation Agreement to pay Mr Boulter £300,000 for the purposes of “cash flow”?
175. Under Clause 2 of the Variation Agreement the parties agreed that CHF120,000 (roughly £108,000) was to be provided to refurbish and furnish both upstairs and downstairs at Cheval Marin. Such monies were to be split 50/50 with the portion due from Mr Boulter to be paid from the “proceeds of the Kew Site (not from a Kew Site Sale or DM fee)”. This provision is only consistent with an agreement that Mr Porter would fund the refurbishment to the tune of CHF120,000 in the first instance, to be repaid once the Kew Project started yielding returns beyond any DMF.
176. In the event, Mr Porter provided none of the funds. Mr Boulter says he should now do so. He also argues that since there are no proceeds from the Kew Site, his liability to contribute half of that sum simply falls away. If the obligation had been performed, Mr Porter would have provided the CHF120,000, and the liability to repay CHF60,000 simply never arose. The same analysis applies to Clause 4, by which Mr Porter was to provide Mr Boulter with “cash flow” loan for £150,000 per year for 2 years, repayable from the proceeds of the Kew Site (but not a Kew Site Sale or DM fee).
177. Mr Padgett’s case is that the specified contractual source of repayment never materialised and the condition upon which repayment depended was therefore unsatisfied. As a result, it was argued, the obligation to pay the sums falls away. However, the failure of the intended source of repayment cannot prevent the obligation to provide the funds from arising: see Chitty on Contracts, 36th ed, paras 33-063-064.
178. I have found that the remainder of the Variation Agreement survived the nullity of Clause 3. That means the obligations to make the payments survived. It is accepted that the sums were not paid. I conclude that Mr Porter was in default of both obligations. Issue 10: If Mr Porter/Mr Padgett are in breach of either of those obligations, to what remedy or remedies is Mr Boulter entitled?
179. Mr Padgett’s case is that even if the obligation to make a loan is established, Mr Boulter is not entitled to recover the principal loan sum. This is because the remedy for breach of an agreement to lend is not to bring an action on the promise; and the losses are not measured by the sum to be advanced, but by any consequential loss caused by the failure to lend. Mr Padgett relies on two 19 th century cases for this proposition: South African Territories v Wallington [1897] 1 QB 692 at 696 – 697; and Western Wagon v West [1892] 7 Ch 271 , at 277.
180. In relation to the obligation to advance the sums for refurbishing Cheval Marin under Clause 2 of the Variation Agreement, damages are pleaded further or in the alternative to an order requiring payment of the sum promised. It is said that since 1 September 2021 Mr Boulter has been unable to let Cheval Marin at the rent that would have been achievable, nor himself to enjoy the property as an amenity to the degree that would have been available to him, had Mr Porter complied with Clause 2 of the Variation Agreement. The evidence of Mr Boulter’s expert, which I accept, is that the estimated annual rental value of Cheval Marin in its current condition is a total of CHF174,600. The estimated annual rental value of Cheval Marin in its refurbished condition would be CHF244,675. It follows that Mr Padgett is liable to pay as damages the difference between what would have been received and what has in fact been received.
181. In relation to the payment provided for at clause 4 of the Variation Agreement, the cash flow loans, no claim is made in respect of losses as a result of the breach. Specific performance of the obligation to lend the money is not available as a remedy. In the absence of a claim in damages based on losses said to have been suffered as a result, no remedy is sought. Issue 11: Is Mr Boulter liable to account to Mr Padgett in respect of rental income Mr Boulter has received from the Studio Flats?
182. This was framed as a claim in unjust enrichment. However, Mr Boulter is, as he accepts, contractually liable to pay Mr Padgett half of the rental income that he receives, net of the operating costs incurred. This applies to past and future rental income, presumably whilst he continues to reside in Cheval Marin until 1 September 2027. No accounting exercise has yet been done, nor was the issue explored at trial. I will make an appropriate order for the taking of an account. Issue 12: Is Mr Padgett as landlord under any obligation to repair Cheval Marin or le Petit Monde?
183. Mr Boulter claims a declaration that Mr Padgett as Mr Boulter’s landlord is obliged under Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement to maintain and repair the structure, installations and fixtures in Cheval Marin and le Petit Monde, to the extent ordinarily to be expected of a landlord of property let as fully furnished accommodation.
184. Clause 1 of the Variation Agreement sets out the terms of occupation. It makes no reference to any obligation to repair, whether that of the tenant or the landlord. It was suggested on behalf of Mr Boulter that such a term could and should be implied. However, I was taken to no authority relating to either landlord’s repairing covenants or the implication of terms. In the absence of argument and authority to the contrary, I conclude that the leases of Cheval Marin and le Petit Monde impose no repairing obligations on the landlord.
185. I invite submissions on the question identified above as to whether Mr Boulter has in the past made a request to Mr Padgett to perfect the grant in clause 3 of the Variation Agreement; and as to when it is said the 6 year period commences. Those should be in writing and should accompany the list of corrections.
186. I also invite the parties to agree a form of order reflecting my findings and holdings above. If no such agreement can be reached, I require the submission of a draft order using colours to show the rival contentions of each party. This should be submitted along with the submissions referred to above and the list of corrections.
187. If it is not possible to agree a substantive order, or if it is felt that a consequentials hearing is necessary, I require the submission of an order reflecting that, to accompany the list of corrections.