UK case law
David Anthony Burton v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors
[2026] UKFTT GRC 1334 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Transport · 2026
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Full judgment
1. This appeal was listed for oral hearing by CVP on 24 August 2026 at 14.00. The Appellant gave oral evidence and made oral submissions. Oral evidence and submissions were heard on behalf of the Respondent from its representative.
2. The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 5 January 2026 to remove his name from the Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), pursuant to section 128(2) (e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘ the Act ’) on the basis that, having taken account of the Appellant’s representations dated 22 and 29 December 2025, he was no longer a fit and proper person (‘FPP’) to have his name remain on the Register due to him having accepted that, on 28 October 2025, he had committed a motoring offence, namely, a breach of legislative requirements concerning control of a motor vehicle, mobile telephones and so on (CU80) for which he accepted a fixed penalty of an endorsement of 6 penalty points on his licence, pursuant to a Fixed Penalty Notice (‘FPN’) being issued to him.
3. ‘CU80’ is a penalty code for breaching vehicle control requirements, specifically for using a handheld phone or device while driving. ‘Using’ includes texting, calling, browsing, taking photographs or checking notifications while driving, even if stationary at traffic lights or queuing in traffic. The Highway Code refers to it being illegal to hold or use a mobile phone or any device capable of sending or receiving data while driving. The importance of this is that holding or using a mobile phone or device while driving automatically attracts a fine and a driving licence endorsement of 6 penalty points.
4. The Appellant submitted an appeal dated 18 January 2026 against the Respondent’s said decision. In summary, the Appellant having elaborated on each point elsewhere in greater detail: - accepted responsibility for his wrongdoing; - that removal of his name from the Register would have serious financial consequences for himself and his family; - that the decision under appeal would adversely impact his pupils who may end up ‘out of pocket’ if they had driving tests booked or were unable to find an alternative instructor or may need more lessons; - that the offence occurred in a private vehicle rather than a liveried vehicle; - that receiving a FPN for the said offence did not mean he was not a FPP and did not reflect his true character; - that he had held an unblemished driving record for more than 20 years and had never been in trouble with the law; - that he was, and would remain, a valuable addition to the Register; - that he was remorseful and would not commit such an offence in the future.
5. The Appellant also submitted a bundle of character references from his wife; his franchise; police sources; rugby sources; pupils and others.
6. In his oral evidence, the Appellant essentially reiterated the representations he had made to the Respondent before the appealed decision was made and the contents of his appeal document. He confirmed he did pick up his mobile phone while in his wife’s car, that was non-liveried, after helping his son with schoolwork, he having some difficulty at school; that he had ongoing calls (3-4 per day to his home phone) from his ill mother for whom he was her main carer. He had gone out to collect his wife, not realising that his wife had disconnected the hands-free facility in her vehicle. He had been stopped in traffic for 10 minutes when his mobile phone had rung. He picked it up without thinking, concerned that it was his mother, but it was his wife and spoken to her for 18 seconds. While speaking, he was photographed by a member of the public who must have passed the photograph to the police. He confirmed he had nothing previous and would not do this again. He stated that the decision, if his appeal was not allowed, would cause hardship to himself, his family and pupils since he was the main breadwinner in the family. He confirmed he had reported the matter immediately to the Respondent. He advised that as a result of committing the offence, his sponsor would not provide him with pupils, that he had lost two pupils, that his wife had taken early retirement and that he had a high level of expenses. He also referred to the atter having an effect on his mental health, due to shame, embarrassment, anger and frustration and that he was on anti-depressants. He confirmed that he was a former teacher and referred to his character references. He stated he was using his commission of the offence as a teaching point, that he loved his job as an ADI, that had brought purpose back to his life, particularly teaching pupils with special needs. He stated that working as an ADI allowed him flexibility to attend medical appointments and care for his mother. He pointed out that there was no definition of a ‘FPP’ that meant there had to be some discretion. He admitted he had made a human mistake. He referred to the Upper Tribunal authority of Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors v C [2019] UKUT 230 (AAC) in support of this argument in the context of 6 penalty points, rather than 5 being a ‘tipping point’ when considering the concept of a FPP, but emphasised he was not trivialising the offence. He drew a distinction, however, between himself and other people convicted of more serious offences being properly regarded as not being a FPP. HE advised that he now checked the position in respect of mobile phone connections on getting into a vehicle. He submitted that there was precedent to allow appeals based upon his evidence and submissions but agreed that the offence was properly seen as serious. He submitted he was of good character and remained a FPP to be allowed to have his name remain on the Register.
7. In response to questions from the Tribunal, the Appellant advised that he had never been spoken to by the police in connection with the offence and that he accepted that an ADI was held to a higher standard than an ordinary motorist. He stated that if his appeal was allowed, he would use his experience to advise pupils and that, since the incident, he made certain that a hands-free facility was connected or that he would simply turn off his mobile telephone. He felt the Respondent had not taken everything into consideration in making his decision. He confirmed that on 28 October 2025, his mother was a frequent caller to him. He stated that his mobile phone was in a console in front of the shift lever of the vehicle and that he had been alerted to the incoming call by the phone vibrating. He did not know whether a photograph or a video had been sent to the police; that he should have followed what the Respondent advised concerning managing or ignoring mobile phone calls. He confirmed he had notified his insurers who were awaiting the outcome of the appeal before deciding on any action. He advised that his solicitor had advised him to put in all points and to ‘flesh out’ his case. He stated that young people were very impressionable and he tried to instil good practice in them as his pupils.
8. The representative of the Respondent had no questions for the Appellant.
9. In his Response document, the Respondent stated that an ADI receiving 6 penalty points was a serious road safety matter; that he had to maintain public confidence in the Register and ensure that those whose name were entered onto the Register met the standards expected by the public and other ADIs; ADIs were expected to understand the law in relation to using mobile phones while driving and to model compliant behaviour as pupils often took their cue from instructors’ conduct, as compliance with road traffic legislation was central to their role; that ADIs should have the skills and knowledge to operate, interact and manage mobile phones and/or to ignore them while driving always ensuring that they remain within the law; was a considerable duration; that they must develop the skills and knowledge of pupils in the use of mobile phones; that commission of the offence fell well short of the standards expected of an ADI; that the Appellant accepted responsibility for the offence; that a call lasting 18 seconds was of considerable duration; that the incident attracted the notice and intervention of the police; that the conditions for entry onto the Register extended beyond instructional ability alone to take account of matters of character, behaviour and standards of conduct, that were expected to be above those of an ordinary motorist; that teaching generally young people to drive was a responsible and demanding task that should only be entrusted to those with high standards and a keen regard for road safety; that the Appellant had not displayed the level of responsibility and commitment to road safety expected of an ADI; that the function of the Respondent was preventative and protective, not punitive concerning issues of judgement, responsibility and respect for road safety; that Parliament had increase penalties for serious motoring offence such as this that created a significant risk to road users, and that 6 points for a first offence reflected this; that using a mobile phone while driving significantly increased cognitive distraction and reduced the driver’s attention where even a momentary lapse may be sufficient to cause an accident; that the offence was particularly significant as it concerned compliance with a fundamental rule of road safety where an ADI was expected to teach, model and reinforce in pupils; that the standing of the Register and public confidence in it would be diminished if the Appellant’s name was permitted to remain on the Register; that the Appellant’s conduct directly contradicted standards and risks; that the Respondent could not condone a motoring offence of this nature as to do so would effectively sanction such behaviour if his name was allowed to remain on an official Register that allows him to teach others; that it would not be fair on other ADIs or aspiring ADIs who had been scrupulous in observing the law to ignore this recent and serious motoring offence; that the reputation and integrity of the Register were matters of legitimate public concern.
10. The Respondent’s representative summarised orally the Respondent’s case. He emphasised that the Appellant had been using his mobile phone while driving; that account had been taken of the Appellant’s representations, but that the imposition of 6 penalty points could not be ignored; the contents of the ADI Code and Guide and that an ADI was held to a higher standard than that of an ordinary motorist.
11. In response to a question from the Tribunal, whether a single conviction for a CU80 offence would automatically lead to the removal of an ADI’s name from the Register, the Respondent’s representative stated that where an ADI was convicted by accepting a Fixed Penalty Notice, or otherwise in respect of a CU80 offence, a balancing exercise was undertaken by the Respondent by reference to the contents of an internal document (that was not before the Tribunal) but that the ‘tipping point’ was the imposition of 5 penalty points, in accordance with the ADI Guide. He also confirmed that the ‘balancing exercise’ was not referred to in the Response document. He accepted that there had been no failure by the Appellant to notify the Respondent, despite the Response document stating the contrary. The Respondent’s representative apologised for this error, but stated this had not come into account in making the decision; that it was illegal to hold or use a mobile phone, an act that resulted in the ADI being subject to his name maybe being removed from the Register, but that the Respondent would look at the Appellant’s representations, the seriousness of the matter, any relevant history and the ADI Code and Guide. He submitted that Parliament had decided that an offence of the nature of that involved in this appeal was a serios matter, but that removal was not automatic. He emphasised the reputation of the Respondent to the public and other ADIs, in the context of teaching driving pupils.
12. In response to questions from the Appellant, the Respondent’s representative confirmed that the ADI Code was a voluntary Code but had been agreed with representative bodies of ADIs and so, the Respondent did, and should, take its contents into account: the Code provided a framework within which ADIs should operate and the Appellant had signed a declaration concerning abiding by the Code. The Respondents representative confirmed there was no definition of a FPP.
13. The Respondent’s representative had no closing submissions to make.
14. The Appellant, in closing, stated he was genuinely sorry; that the incident had occurred due to an ‘anomaly’; that he was aware of the severity of what he had done and the potential implications but repeated that removal of his name from the Register would cause him and his pupils significant hardship.
15. Every piece of evidence and submissions, both written and oral from, and on behalf of the parties, was considered by the Tribunal, resulting in the Tribunal taking an exceptional course to allow this appeal, on balance of probabilities. Each appeal is considered on its own merits, previous First-tier Tribunal decisions not being binding authorities.
16. Whilst it is not the role of the Tribunal, on appeal, to review the decision-making processes of the Respondent, there is limited evidence before the Tribunal as to whether, and how, the Respondent conducted the balancing exercise necessary to assess whether removal from the Register was a proportionate response in the particular circumstances of this case. The Tribunal accepts that the Respondent was entitled to regard the offence as a serious matter and to consider whether it affected the Appellant's fitness to remain on the Register. However, whilst the Tribunal was informed that a balancing exercise was undertaken, there is little evidence before it as to how the Appellant's individual mitigation, character evidence and personal circumstances were weighed against the public interest considerations relied upon by the Respondent. As a consequence, neither the Tribunal nor the Appellant is readily able to identify what relative weight was attached to the competing aggravating and mitigating factors in reaching the conclusion that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person. The Tribunal considers that greater transparency in this regard would have assisted both the parties and the Tribunal. In particular, if an internal assessment, balancing document or similar record forms part of the Respondent's decision-making process, the Respondent may wish to consider including such material, where appropriate, within future appeal bundles so that the parties and the Tribunal can better understand how the competing factors were evaluated and weighed.
17. The basis of the Respondent’s decision was that the Appellant did not fulfil the criteria to be a ‘fit and proper person’, as required by the relevant provisions in the Act .
18. Conditions require that an ADI (the Appellant in this case) to be a ‘fit and proper person’. This requires account to be taken of an Appellant’s character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions for offences including, as in this case, a motoring offence, and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate. The Respondent may take the view that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change in circumstances.
19. An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way of re-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must give such weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions.
20. The Appellant, in essence, correctly submitted in both his written and oral evidence that all of the circumstances had to examined and that the penalty imposed on him in respect of a motoring offence did not, and should not, result in automatic removal of his name from the Register.
21. While the Tribunal was conscious of, and was bound by, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 that stated, inter alia - “..... the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor; it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval ..... the maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutiny effectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or a R egistered Approved Driving Instructor. That is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.” However, the Tribunal considered that, on the facts of the instant appeal, where there were exceptional circumstances, the application of this authority could be distinguished in the Appellant’s favour.
22. In reaching its Decision, the Tribunal took into account all of the evidence and submissions received, both written and oral, and considered all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal.
23. The Tribunal also considered the wider context of the Appellant’s professional conduct.
27. The decision of the Tribunal in this appeal does not take away from the importance which attaches to the integrity of the Register. For the public to have trust in it, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those on it have high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards. These are matters of wider, and public interest, which attract significant weight.
28. There were, however, a number of factors that tipped the balance, insofar as the Tribunal was concerned, in favour of the Appellant: - he accepted responsibility at the earliest opportunity and demonstrated genuine remorse and insight throughout. He did not dispute the offence, contest the fixed penalty or seek to blame others. He immediately identified himself as the driver and accepted the consequences of the endorsement. The Tribunal heard evidence of genuine remorse rather than mere regret at being caught. He appeared upset not simply about the loss of his livelihood, but by the fact that his conduct had fallen below the standards he had taught and expected of others throughout his professional life. He repeatedly acknowledged that he should not have picked up the phone, accepted that ADIs must be held to a higher standard and accepted that what occurred was a serious error of judgement. His case was not that the offence was excusable, but that it was uncharacteristic. - his conduct both before and after the offence is consistent with an otherwise responsible individual. He self-reported the offence to the Respondent despite knowing that it might place his registration at risk. This speaks to honesty and compliance with regulatory obligations. The evidence before the Tribunal disclosed no pattern of offending, but rather an isolated incident against a lengthy period of otherwise good conduct. The Tribunal heard evidence that he had maintained a clean licence for approximately 20 years, with no evidence of previous mobile phone offending or comparable misconduct. There was also no evidence of previous regulatory concerns, complaints, disciplinary issues, safeguarding concerns, standards check concerns or criticism of his conduct as an ADI. - the Appellant's professional history and character evidence weigh materially in his favour. The Tribunal heard evidence of a lengthy career as a teacher, service as a Special Constable, and involvement in safeguarding and voluntary roles. Whilst none of those matters is determinative, they are relevant when considering overall character and fitness. The character evidence was unusually extensive and came from a broad range of sources, including former pupils, professional colleagues, police colleagues, his ORDIT trainer and others who spoke highly of his integrity, professionalism and commitment to safety. The evidence from former pupils was particularly persuasive. A recurring theme was that he consistently taught safe and lawful driving, repeatedly emphasised the dangers of mobile phone use whilst driving and modelled the standards expected of a responsible ADI. - the circumstances of the offence were unusual, fact specific and assist in understanding how the incident occurred. Whilst those circumstances do not excuse the conduct, they provide context. The Tribunal heard evidence regarding the use of his wife's vehicle, the fact that he believed the Bluetooth system remained connected as it had previously been, the unexpected absence of the anticipated Bluetooth connection, his hearing difficulties and the emotional significance of being near the hospital associated with his daughter's illness and treatment. The Tribunal also heard evidence that he had spent part of the day assisting his 17 year old son with coursework, that tensions had arisen within the family, and that the journey itself was largely unplanned as he was providing his wife with transport because train services were unavailable. We further heard evidence regarding his caring responsibilities for his elderly mother, who frequently contacts him for assistance and support. Taken together, these matters assist in explaining how what appears otherwise to have been entirely uncharacteristic conduct occurred. - the offence occurred outside the Appellant's professional duties and was less directly connected to the profession than it might otherwise have been. He was not teaching, no pupil was present and he was driving a private vehicle rather than a liveried tuition vehicle. Whilst ADIs must maintain appropriate standards whether working or not, the Tribunal placed some weight on the fact that a member of the public observing the incident would not have known that the driver was an ADI. The conduct therefore had a less direct connection with the reputation of the profession than offending committed whilst instructing or driving a marked teaching vehicle. - the Appellant demonstrated evidence of learning from the incident and there appears to be limited evidence of ongoing risk. He described practical changes he had made since the offence and gave evidence aimed at showing that similar circumstances would not arise again. He used the offence as a teaching point with current pupils and appeared genuine in describing the lessons he had learned from it. The Respondent relied heavily upon the seriousness of the offence itself, but there was relatively little evidence suggesting that the Appellant presents a continuing risk of repetition. On the contrary, the Appellant showed considerable insight into the risks involved and gave evidence that he had reflected deeply upon the incident and taken practical steps to prevent any recurrence. - the consequences of removal are already having a significant impact on the appellant, his family and his pupils. The Appellant had stopped taking on new pupils because of uncertainty regarding his registration and future ability to continue working. As a result, he had experienced a significant reduction in income and was not being offered new pupils by his franchise. The Tribunal heard evidence that the family finances depend primarily upon his income, that his wife had taken early retirement and was caring for his mother, and that her pension had been reduced because she had previously spent a significant period away from work caring for their daughter during her illness. The Tribunal also heard evidence that the uncertainty surrounding these proceedings had affected family decision making and financial planning and was placing considerable strain upon the family. One son had deferred university plans because of uncertainty about the family's financial position and another remained living at home partly to assist financially. The evidence of hardship appeared genuine and substantial rather than speculative. - the impact upon existing pupils is a relevant factor. The Tribunal heard evidence that a number of pupils have practical tests booked between September and December and that there was concern regarding their ability to secure replacement instruction at a late stage in their preparation. The Appellant appeared genuinely concerned about the impact of these proceedings upon learners who had invested considerable time and money in their training, particularly one pupil with Asperger's who had developed a long standing relationship with him during the journey towards obtaining a driving licence. - the Tribunal had concerns regarding the extent to which the Respondent's reasoning demonstrated engagement with the Appellant's particular circumstances. The Respondent’s Response document contained extensive discussion of the seriousness of mobile phone offending generally, public confidence and the role of the Register. There is comparatively little explanation of why the Appellant's specific mitigation, character evidence, history and personal circumstances were insufficient in this particular case. Certain aspects of the Respondent's account also appeared inconsistent with the evidence before the Tribunal. The Response document referred to police involvement when the evidence before the Tribunal was that the matter arose following a report by a member of the public. The Response document also proceeded on the basis that the Appellant failed to self-report when the evidence established that he did, in fact, notify the Respondent of the endorsement. Whilst these matters are not necessarily determinative individually, they reinforce concerns regarding the extent to which the Appellant's representations were specifically considered. The Tribunal was also concerned by the evidence that an internal assessment or balancing document may exist recording the factors considered by the Respondent. If such material formed part of the decision-making process, it has not been disclosed. Consequently, neither the Appellant nor the Tribunal was able to understand what relative weight was attached to the competing aggravating and mitigating considerations. In the absence of such material, the Respondent's reasoning appeared largely formulaic and provided limited insight into how the conclusion was reached that this particular Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person. The Appellant could reasonably struggle to identify which aspects of his mitigation were weighed and rejected and why.
29. Ultimately, the evidence clearly established a serious offence and a serious error of judgement. The Tribunal found this to be a finely balanced case. It gave considerable weight to the importance of road safety, the standards expected of ADIs and the need to maintain public confidence in the Register. However, the weight to be attached to those considerations is necessarily fact sensitive.
30. The Tribunal attached significant weight on the fact that the offending did not occur whilst the Appellant was instructing, no pupil was present, and he was driving a private vehicle rather than a liveried tuition vehicle. Whilst these matters do not diminish the seriousness of the offence itself, they are relevant when assessing the extent to which the conduct impacted upon the standing of the Register and public confidence in the profession.
31. The Tribunal also took account of the Appellant's immediate acceptance of responsibility, prompt self-reporting, genuine remorse, extensive and persuasive character evidence, lengthy history of public service and positions of trust, absence of previous regulatory concerns, and the particular personal circumstances in which this incident occurred. Viewed cumulatively, those matters satisfied the Tribunal that this was an isolated lapse of judgement rather than evidence of an enduring deficiency in character, integrity or professional suitability.
32. The Tribunal readily acknowledges that another Tribunal, properly directing itself to the evidence, might reasonably place greater weight on the seriousness of the offending and reach a different conclusion. However, having considered all of the evidence in the round and carried out the necessary balancing exercise, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Respondent had established that this Appellant had ceased to be a FPP to remain on the Register and, on the contrary, the Appellant had proved, on the balance of probabilities, that he remained a FPP.
33. This conclusion is reached on the particular facts of this case and should not be taken as diminishing the seriousness with which mobile phone offending by ADIs should ordinarily be regarded. Rather, it reflects the Tribunal's assessment that the exceptional combination of factors present here is sufficient, albeit only just, to tip the balance in favour of retention of the Appellant’s name on the Register.
34. The Appellant is strongly reminded that he must always take care to meet his responsibilities as a qualified ADI and is warned that, in allowing this appeal, the Tribunal, very much, took an exceptional step, that cannot, under any circumstances be regarded as setting a precedent. It is emphasised to the Appellant that the decision of the Tribunal could equally, and very nearly did, have gone the other way.
35. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.