UK case law

Domus Living Limited v Edward VII Estates Limited

[2026] UKUT LC 407 · Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

Introduction

1. In Domus Living Limited v Edward VII Estates Limited [2026] UKUT 287 (LC) the Tribunal granted the application for discharge of a restrictive covenant. The applicant has now applied for an order that the objector pay its costs; in response, the objector argues that no order for costs would be appropriate.

2. We order that the objector pay the applicant’s costs, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed, for the following reasons.

3. When an objection to an application under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 is unsuccessful, costs do not normally follow the event. The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) Practice Directions provide: 16.7 The Tribunal has power to award costs on an application to discharge or modify a restrictive covenant affecting land, but the following principles will be applied to the exercise of that power. […] 16.10 Unsuccessful objectors will not normally be ordered to pay any of the applicant's costs, unless they have acted unreasonably. Because the applicant is seeking to remove or diminish the property rights of the objector the Tribunal will not usually regard making an objection and pursuing it to a hearing as unreasonable.

4. A person with the benefit of a restrictive covenant is entitled to defend their property right, and for that reason an unsuccessful objector will not be required to pay the applicant’s costs unless the objector has acted unreasonably. As Mr Galtrey has observed, guidance on the meaning of “unreasonable” has been given by the Tribunal in Willow Court management Co (1985) Ltd v Alexander [2016] UKUT 29: ““Unreasonable” conduct includes conduct which is vexatious, and designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case. It is not enough that the conduct leads in the event to an unsuccessful outcome. The test may be expressed in different ways. Would a reasonable person in the position of the party have conducted themselves in the manner complained of? Or Sir Thomas Bingham's “acid test”: is there a reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of?”

5. We begin by saying that we have taken no account of what the applicant says about rejected offers of settlement, and have not looked at the copy correspondence provided by the applicant. It would be disproportionate to engage in an examination of what is and what is not privileged since this point is not essential to the success of the application.

6. We have taken no account of the applicant’s allegation that the objector was motivated by the wish to obtain a payment for release. Realistically, that may be true of many objectors in section 84 proceedings; but an order for costs is made on the basis of action, not of motivation.

7. Nor do we make our order on the basis of the objector’s allegation that this was a cynical breach. That was not an allegation of fraud, and the making of the allegation was not out of the ordinary in terms of the conduct of parties to applications under section 84 .

8. We also make clear that we are not moved to make an order for costs in response to alleged failures to provide information or failures of disclosure. We acknowledge that it was surprising that the contract and memorandum of sale, referred to in paragraph 2(x) of the costs application, were disclosed so late but we do not think that the proceedings would have been resolved prior to the hearing even if that disclosure had been made earlier, because the objector’s approach would not have changed.

9. The application for costs makes allegations of bad faith. The difficulty for the applicant is that such allegations were not put to the objector’s witness at the hearing. However, as paragraph 5 of the application itself makes clear, bad faith is not a re-requisite for an order for costs in these circumstances. We make our order in response to the objector’s persistence in an objection that was without substance; as the application for costs states in paragraph 5 this is a ground, without more, for the award of costs in such section 84 cases. The decision in Father’s Field Developments Ltd v Namulas Pension Trustees Ltd [2021] UKUT 252 (LC) is an example of such an order.

10. We focus on two points in particular.

11. The first is that once the application for the admission of Edward VII Estates Two Limited had failed, the objector did not re-assess its own position. It had permission to amend its statement of case but did not do so. It persisted in claiming the same loss despite its now being clear that the land whose development it had said it wanted to protect now did not belong to it. It is impossible to understand why the objector persisted in maintaining the same objection when the foundation of its case had apparently disappeared.

12. The second is that it became apparent in the course of the hearing that the objector’s director had given no thought to whether the objection had any substance. He had not troubled to ascertain the most basic factual information that might have supported it. As we said at paragraph 50 of our decision: “If this set of assumptions had a shred of plausibility the respondent would have been able to assemble some evidence of fact to support it. It appears that no attempt was made to do so. When asked by Mr Maynard whether there was any remaining conservation deficit Mr Marner said he did not know. As to the likelihood of planning permission, no enquiries have been made of the SDNPA.”

13. Argument valiantly made for the objection was devoid of any factual foundation. Mr Galtrey’s “gift card” analogy was ingenious, but it had no basis in fact. Mr Galtrey’s assertion that the objector was entitled to be free of worry about planning risk was both legally irrelevant, and strikingly at odds with the fact that Mr Marner was completely unable to substantiate his assertion of risk with any factual evidence. We did not make any finding that Mr Marner’s concern was sincere; it was not put to him that he was insincere; but we had no hesitation in finding that his concern was completely without substance.

14. Furthermore, the expert evidence advanced in an attempt to substantiate that risk was, as we said in our decision, “fanciful”. Indeed, it was of remarkably poor quality.

15. The objector advanced a hopeless case. It was well within the ability of Mr Marner and other officers of the objector to ascertain that the objector’s case was hopeless and to appreciate that it had no evidential basis whatsoever. It was well within the ability of the objector’s officers to understand that Ms Seal’s evidence could not assist the objector. Either they chose not to think about the evidential basis of their objection, or they chose to ignore it. A reasonable person in the position of the objector would have withdrawn its objection. The matter should have been resolved by agreement once it was clear that Edward VII Estates Two Limited did not have the benefit of the covenant; the objector’s persistence in its hopeless objection was unreasonable and we order it to pay the applicant’s costs.

16. Costs will be assessed on the standard basis. We are mindful of some well-founded criticism of the applicant’s conduct, in particular the letter of instruction to Mr Meeson, and the fact that both experts failed to follow the Tribunal’s instruction in the valuation exercise. In light of that it would not be appropriate to go further and award indemnity costs.

17. The applicants have asked for a payment on account of costs. We have not seen a schedule of costs, and no amount has been suggested. If the applicants wish to pursue their application for an interim payment they should provide a schedule of costs within 28 days of the date of this order and say what they consider to be an appropriate sum by way of interim payment. The parties are to seek to agree costs and if they cannot do so within two months of the date of this order the matter will be referred to the Senior Courts Costs Office for detailed assessment. Judge Elizabeth Cooke Mrs Diane Martin MRICS FAAV 21 October 2026 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.