UK case law
Ellen Michelle Short v Jane Pascoe
[2026] UKFTT PC 1187 · Land Registration Division (Property Chamber) · 2026
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Full judgment
Cases referred to: a) J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 b) Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 c) Brown v Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 ; [2025] AC 1155 d) Dowse v Bradford MBC [2020] UKUT 202 (LC) ; [2021] 1 P & CR 8 e) Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306 ; [2012] 1 WLR 1240 f) Randall v Stevens (1853) 2 E & B 641 Introduction – the land and the applications
1. These two references arise from applications made by the Applicant, Ellen Michelle Short, to HM Land Registry in November 2022. The Applicant claims to have acquired title by adverse possession to two parcels of land at the rear and side of 54 Elm High Road, Wisbech. The Respondent, Jane Pascoe, is the registered proprietor of title NK398552, which she and her former husband purchased from Norfolk County Council in 2010. The Respondent objected to both applications and gave notice under paragraph 3 of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 , requiring the applications to be dealt with under paragraph 5 of that Schedule.
2. The first application (REF/2024/0530) relates to what I shall call the “Disputed Land” – land at the rear of 54 Elm High Road which forms part of the Respondent’s registered title NK398552. This land is part of the former Wisbech canal. The second application (REF/2024/0531) relates to what I shall call the “Side Land” – a strip of unregistered land at the side of 54 Elm High Road.
3. The Respondent’s title NK398552 extends from behind Nos. 54 and 56 Elm High Road down to the hammerhead on Elm Low Road. It comprises a substantial tract of former canal land. The Disputed Land is a portion of that larger tract, lying immediately at the rear of the Applicant’s property.
4. The Applicant claims to have used the Disputed Land as the garden of 54 Elm High Road continuously since 1996, when her mother purchased the property. She asserts that she has been in continuous adverse possession for at least 10 years after 2010 (when the Respondent acquired the registered title). The Applicant relies, in the alternative, on the third condition in paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 6 (the boundary/adjacent land condition).
5. I conducted a site inspection on 7 April 2026. The Disputed Land is former canal land of modest size which backs onto the rear of 54 Elm High Road. I observed that similar strips of former canal land along this stretch have been the subject of multiple adverse possession claims by neighbouring owners. The hearing took place on 8 and 9 April 2026 at the Peterborough Combined Court Centre. Both parties appeared in person.
6. The key issues which I must determine are: (1) Has the Applicant proved factual possession and an intention to possess the Disputed Land for a continuous period of 10 years ending in November 2022? (2) Did the levelling and seeding works carried out on the Respondent’s instructions between April and September 2018 amount to an interruption of any adverse possession? (3) Can the Applicant satisfy any of the conditions in paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 LRA 2002 , specifically the second condition (“some other reason”) or the third condition (the boundary/adjacent land condition)? (4) Has the Applicant proved adverse possession of the Side Land for 12 years (being unregistered land, the Limitation Act 1980 applies)? The Law – Adverse Possession
7. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 provides that a person may apply to the registrar to be registered as the proprietor of a registered estate in land if he has been in adverse possession of the estate for a period of ten years ending on the date of the application.
8. By paragraph 11 of Schedule 6, a person is in “adverse possession” for the purposes of the Schedule if, but for section 96 of the 2002 Act , a period of limitation under section 15 of the Limitation Act 1980 would run in his favour in relation to the estate.
9. The meaning of adverse possession was authoritatively considered by the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 . At paragraph 40, Lord Browne-Wilkinson identified two elements that must be established: (1) a sufficient degree of physical custody and control (“factual possession”); and (2) an intention to exercise such custody and control on one’s own behalf and for one’s own benefit (“intention to possess”).
10. In Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452, at pp 470-471, Slade J (as he then was) described factual possession in the following terms, which were subsequently approved by the House of Lords in Pye: “Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control… broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so.”
11. On the intention to possess, Slade J stated in Powell at p 472: “…intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.”
12. Slade J further observed in Powell that the burden on a trespasser asserting adverse possession is a heavy one. There must be “clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser… not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world.” It is an important principle that the owner of land is presumed to be in possession; the slightest acts by the owner will serve to negative discontinuance of possession. The Law – Interruption of Adverse Possession
13. Zarb v Parry [2012] 1 WLR 1240 is the leading modern authority on interruption of adverse possession. To interrupt a period of adverse possession, the paper title owner must retake exclusive physical possession of the land to the exclusion of the adverse possessor. Acts done with the intention of retaking possession but which do not establish exclusive control are not sufficient. However, the Court of Appeal accepted that retaking possession can be achieved in a very short period if it amounts to establishing exclusive physical control over the land.
14. The older authority of Randall v Stevens (1853) 2 E & B 641 establishes that the legal owner can interrupt adverse possession by physically retaking possession, even very briefly, provided there is an intention to possess. The distinction is between acts that are merely “symbolic” or preparatory (which are insufficient per Zarb v Parry) and acts that actually establish exclusive physical control (which are sufficient). The Law – The Paragraph 5 Conditions
15. Where the registered proprietor gives a counter-notice under paragraph 3 of Schedule 6, the applicant can only succeed if one of the conditions in paragraph 5 of that Schedule is met. Two conditions are potentially relevant in this case.
16. The second condition (paragraph 5(3)) provides that the applicant must be “for some other reason entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the estate.” This requires proof of some fact or circumstance additional to adverse possession. As the Law Commission explained in Law Com No. 271, at paragraph 14.43, and Law Com No. 380, at paragraph 17.12, a longer period of adverse possession is not “some other reason” – something more is needed.
17. The third condition (paragraph 5(4)) – the “boundary condition” – requires the applicant to establish: a) the land to which the application relates is adjacent to land belonging to the applicant; b) the exact line of the boundary between the two has not been determined under section 60; c) for at least 10 years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him; and d) the estate to which the application relates was registered more than one year prior to the date of the application.
18. In Brown v Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 ; [2025] AC 1155 , the Supreme Court provided authoritative guidance on the third condition. At paragraph 18, Lord Briggs observed that the “adjacent” requirement confines the condition effectively to actual or potential boundary disputes. In Dowse v Bradford MBC [2020] UKUT 202 (LC) at paragraphs 42-48, the Upper Tribunal held that the whole (or substantially the whole) of the disputed land must be capable of being described as adjacent to the applicant’s land.
19. At paragraph 24 of Brown v Ridley, Lord Briggs stated that the boundary condition is “plainly designed to confine reliance upon adverse possession… to the scenario where the register is at its weakest in answering questions about land ownership, namely issues as to boundaries.” The Supreme Court also resolved the question of whether reasonable belief must be held for the last 10 years or any 10 years within the period of adverse possession: it is sufficient that reasonable belief was held for any 10-year period within the overall period. The Evidence
20. I heard oral evidence from both parties over the two days of the hearing. I also had before me extensive documentary evidence including contemporaneous photographs, satellite imagery, Google Street View images, correspondence with Norfolk County Council, Land Registry documents, and witness statements. I set out the relevant evidence below in summary. If I have not set out a particular piece of evidence, that does not mean I have not had regard to it in my considerations. Preliminary Issue – Witness Statement of Mrs Jenny Thorpe
21. I must deal with the procedural dispute concerning the witness statement of Mrs Jenny Thorpe (née Winsor) dated 2 July 2025. By order of Judge Verduyn dated 16 September 2025, the Applicant was directed to refile Mrs Thorpe’s witness statement in unredacted form, with Mrs Thorpe’s address provided for service. The Applicant failed to comply with that order. She offered various reasons for her refusal but demonstrated no material change of circumstances that might justify departure from the order.
22. I declined to re-open Judge Verduyn’s order. The Applicant was in breach. The statement of Mrs Thorpe was not admitted in evidence. The Applicant’s evidence
23. The Applicant’s case is that her mother purchased 54 Elm High Road in 1996. At that time, the former canal land at the rear was already being used and maintained as part of the garden. The family believed it formed part of the property. In 2001, title to 54 Elm High Road was transferred to the Applicant and her sister.
24. The Applicant claims that she continued to use and control the Disputed Land throughout the relevant period, including maintaining it, planting upon it, using structures such as a greenhouse and polytunnel, and challenging interference both in 2010 (when the Respondent’s purchase from the Council became apparent) and in 2018 (when building works began).
25. It emerged during the course of these proceedings – and only after the Respondent obtained evidence from private investigators (Verity Henson Ltd) and from speaking to Rebecca Winsor – that from 2003 to approximately 2015, the Applicant was not the sole or even the primary occupant of 54 Elm High Road. A family named the Winsors (a mother and three teenage children) lived at the property as the primary occupants throughout that period. The Applicant’s case, as eventually disclosed in her witness statement of June 2025, is that she shared occupation, visiting at weekends, holidays, and in her free time, while the Winsors were the main bill payers and day-to-day residents.
26. The Applicant did not disclose the existence of the Winsors in her original application to HM Land Registry or in her Statement of Case. This was, in my view, a serious omission, and I shall return to its significance below.
27. The property was offered for sale at auction in 2015 or 2016, although was not sold. The Applicant’s partner subsequently refurbished No. 54 and the Applicant moved back full-time in approximately 2016 or 2017.
28. As discussed above Jenny Thorpe (née Winsor), provided a witness statement dated 2 July 2025. There was a procedural dispute about whether this statement could be relied upon, because the Applicant refused to provide Mrs Thorpe’s address in breach of Judge Verduyn’s express order on that point of 16 September 2025. I deal with this issue separately as set out above.
29. The Applicant had also proposed to call evidence from her mother, which may have potentially been of some significance in relation to her (and indeed her husband’s) use and occupation of the disputed land during their period of occupation and ownership. Indeed many of the contemporaneous photos the Applicant relied upon related to her mother’s period of ownership.
30. However, despite the Court explaining the significance of this evidence, and the implications of a witness not attending to be cross examined on disputed matters, the Applicant informed the Court that her mother would not be attending to be cross examined, despite the Court attempting to be flexible with the time table. As such, it is not possible to attach any weight to any disputed evidence given by the Applicant’s mother. The Respondent’s evidence
31. The Respondent and her former husband purchased 56 Elm High Road in 2002. In 2010, they purchased the former canal land (including the Disputed Land) from Norfolk County Council, registered as title NK398552. The Respondent’s evidence is that when they purchased the canal land in 2010, it was “clearly disused… completely uncultivated rough wasteland.”
32. In 2018, the Respondent sold part of the garden of No. 56 to Grey and Red Design and Build Ltd for housing development. As a condition of sale, she stipulated that Grey and Red had to level and seed the Disputed Land (and land behind No. 56) to provide a substitute garden. The levelling and seeding works began in April 2018 with heavy machinery (mechanical diggers) and the depositing of large quantities of excavated soil. The Applicant complained to Norfolk County Council. Contemporaneous photographs – from the Applicant herself, the Council, and the developers – show machinery on the land, the land completely churned up, and the land inaccessible to anyone not involved in the works.
33. The works continued intermittently until September 2018. The Disputed Land was levelled and seeded. Contemporaneous photographs show it fully open with no fence on the south-eastern boundary separating it from the remainder of the Respondent’s title.
34. Victor Simoes, the Respondent’s tenant at No. 56 from 2004 to mid-2022, gave evidence that he did not see the Applicant until the Grey and Red houses were being built in 2018, and that a young family occupied No. 54 during most of his tenancy.
35. Rebecca Winsor (by hearsay evidence adduced through the Respondent and her husband’s recollection of a telephone conversation had with her) states that the Winsors lived at No. 54 from 2003 to 2015, that the Disputed Land was fenced off from No. 54 and was rough and overgrown with rubbish, and that the family never used it or regarded it as their garden. This evidence is fairly telling, and while the Court would have preferred to hear live evidence from Ms Winsor, I accept that was not possible. I place limited weight on this evidence, but I record it nonetheless.
36. Robert Palmer of Verity Henson Ltd (private investigator) confirmed that there is no evidence of the Applicant’s residence at No. 54 between 2003 and 2016/17. The Applicant accepted Mr Palmer’s evidence and did not wish to cross-examine him.
37. Satellite imagery and Google Street View images consistently show the Disputed Land as overgrown wilderness from 2006 to 2016, with no visible fencing on the south-eastern boundary separating it from the rest of the canal land behind No. 56. Richard Patchett of Grey and Red Design and Build confirmed the levelling and seeding works in 2018 and stated that there was no fence on the south-eastern boundary when those works began. Applying the Law to the Evidence – My Decision Issue 1: Factual possession and intention to possess (2012–2022)
38. I find against the Applicant on the Disputed Land. My reasons are as follows.
39. First, as to credibility. The Applicant’s credibility is seriously undermined by her failure to disclose the existence of the Winsors until compelled to do so by the Respondent’s investigative evidence. Her initial claims to HM Land Registry and in her Statement of Case presented herself as continuously resident at No. 54 throughout the relevant period. In fact, she was largely absent from 2003 to 2015 or 2016. This was not a minor omission – it goes to the heart of her case. I formed the impression that the Applicant was prepared to put forward a false picture of events in order to advance her claim, and that impression casts a shadow over the entirety of her evidence.
40. Second, as to evidence of factual possession. The Applicant’s claims of regular maintenance, planting, and use of the Disputed Land are largely unsupported by corroborative evidence for the critical period of 2003 to 2018. Such corroboration is usually seen by the Court in cases of this nature, and the lack of any support for the Applicant’s case was telling. In contrast to her self supporting evidence, the satellite imagery and Google Street View images – which are objective and contemporaneous evidence – consistently show the Disputed Land as overgrown wilderness. That evidence is wholly inconsistent with the Applicant’s claim of regular garden maintenance. The hearsay evidence of Rebecca Winsor, which I accept as broadly credible given the other contemporaneous evidence set out above, is that the Disputed Land was rough, overgrown, and littered with rubbish during the Winsors’ tenure at No. 54.
41. Third, as to enclosure. The satellite imagery shows no fence on the south-eastern boundary of the Disputed Land between at least 2012 and 2018. Throughout that period, the Disputed Land was part of a larger open tract owned by the Respondent and remained physically open to it. Without enclosure, and with only a claim to garden use contradicted by the photographic evidence, the Applicant has not shown the “single and exclusive possession” required by Powell v McFarlane. In my judgment, the Applicant has not been dealing with the Disputed Land “as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it.”
42. Fourth, as to the intention to possess. Even if some use of the Disputed Land were accepted, that use is equivocal. The Applicant’s own absence from the property for prolonged periods, the offering of No. 54 for sale at auction in 2015/2016, and the general condition of the land all suggest that there was no clear intention to exclude the world at large. I consider that the Applicant has failed to discharge the heavy burden described in Powell of showing “clear and affirmative evidence” of an intention to possess.
43. For these reasons, I find that the Applicant has not established factual possession or an intention to possess the Disputed Land for the 10-year period ending in November 2022.
44. I should add, even had the statement of Jenny Thorpe had been admitted, it would not have altered the outcome. Mrs Thorpe’s evidence, at its highest, would have supported only a limited degree of use of the Disputed Land during the Winsors’ tenure. Given the weight of the objective evidence to the contrary – the satellite imagery, the absence of enclosure, and the Applicant’s own absence from the property – the result would have been the same. Issue 2: Interruption (April–September 2018)
45. Even if, contrary to my findings above, the Applicant had established some form of possession prior to April 2018, I find that the levelling and seeding works carried out on the Respondent’s instructions between April and September 2018 constituted an interruption of any adverse possession.
46. Applying the principles in Zarb v Parry, the Respondent did not merely perform symbolic or preparatory acts. Heavy machinery was brought onto the Disputed Land. Large quantities of soil were deposited. The land was levelled and seeded. The Applicant’s own contemporaneous photographs show the land was inaccessible to her during the works. The evidence establishes that the Respondent, through her contractors, took exclusive physical control of the Disputed Land for a sustained period of weeks and months. This goes far beyond the acts found insufficient in Zarb v Parry (which were brief and incomplete). It is analogous to the kind of retaking of possession described in Randall v Stevens.
47. The interruption is fatal to the Applicant’s claim. Even if time began to run again after September 2018 (when a fence was erected on the south-eastern boundary), only approximately four years elapsed before the application in November 2022 – far short of the 10 years required by paragraph 1 of Schedule 6. Issue 3: The Paragraph 5 Conditions
48. The second condition (paragraph 5(3)): The Applicant relies only on a claimed longer period of adverse possession as the “some other reason” entitling her to registration. That is not sufficient. As Law Com No. 271 (paragraph 14.43) and Law Com No. 380 (paragraph 17.12) confirm, a longer period of adverse possession is not “some other reason” additional to adverse possession. Something more is needed, and nothing more has been shown. The second condition is not met.
49. The third condition (paragraph 5(4) – the boundary condition): I find that the Applicant cannot satisfy this condition.
50. In my judgment the Applicant cannot establish that she reasonably believed the Disputed Land belonged to her for any 10-year period. The Applicant’s own evidence – including voicemails and WhatsApp messages from June 2022 – reveals that she knew her father had previously tried to purchase the Disputed Land from the Council. A person who knows that a family member sought to purchase a parcel of land from its owner cannot reasonably claim to have believed that the land already belonged to them. Issue 4: The Side Land
51. The Applicant’s claim to the Side Land (unregistered land, to which the 12-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980 applies) also fails. The evidence is insufficient to establish 12 years of exclusive physical possession. The Side Land was accessible from the passageway at the side of No. 56 and was never enclosed by the Applicant until she erected a new fence in December 2022 – after commencing her application. The satellite and photographic evidence shows the land as unmaintained. In my judgment, the erection of the fence immediately after making the claim tends to undermine rather than support the claim to prior exclusive possession. Conclusion – disposal and costs
52. For the reasons set out above, both applications fail. The Applicant has not established adverse possession of the Disputed Land for the requisite 10-year period. Even if she had established some degree of possession prior to April 2018, that possession was interrupted by the levelling and seeding works. The Applicant cannot satisfy any of the conditions in paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002 . Her claim to the Side Land under the Limitation Act 1980 also fails.
53. I direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel the Applicant’s applications REF/2024/0530 and REF/2024/0531.
54. As to costs: the Respondent has been wholly successful and is in principle entitled to her costs. However, since both parties appeared in person as litigants in person, recoverable costs are limited.
55. I direct that: a. If the Respondent seeks a costs order, she shall file and serve a schedule of her costs, specifying what they cover, what rate is claimed and for what time periods, within 21 days of service of this judgment. Guidance on what the is required can be found by looking at Form N260. In default of such a schedule, there shall be no order as to costs; b. if the Applicant receives such a schedule and objects to my making an order that she pay the costs, I will consider representations on the point. I direct that she is to provide submissions on writing as to why the usual order that “costs follow the event” should not apply, and her submissions as to the quantum of the costs set out in the Respondent’s schedule, within 21 days of receipt of such a schedule as envisaged in paragraph a above; c. The issue of liability for costs and the sum of those costs will thereafter be summarily determined on the papers without the need for any further hearing, unless there are compelling reasons provided by the parties that suggest otherwise. Dated this 11 th day of August 2026 Judge Aaron Walder By Order of The Tribunal