UK case law

Executors of Major Michael Thomas Noel Hamilton Wills v David Keith John Holder

[2026] UKUT LC 409 · Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

Introduction

1. This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (the FTT) under the succession provisions in Part IV of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 ( the 1986 Act ). Part IV makes provision for certain close relatives of the tenant of an agricultural holding to apply for a direction entitling them to succeed to a new tenancy of the holding following the death or retirement of the tenant.

2. Until his death on 22 September 2021, Mr Keith Holder was the tenant of Clements Farm at Miserden in Gloucestershire (the Holding) under a tenancy granted to him in 1964. His father had been tenant of the Holding before him. This appeal is about the entitlement of his son, Mr David Holder, to apply for a direction under Part IV of the 1986 Act entitling him to a new tenancy of the Holding.

3. David Holder was born on the Holding and has worked there all his life, and his Landlords agree that he is a suitable person to become their tenant. The issue in the appeal is whether the FTT was entitled to find that Mr Holder (whom we will refer to as the Applicant) was eligible to apply for a direction.

4. To be eligible to apply for a direction an applicant must satisfy the “livelihood” condition in section 36(3) (a) of the 1986 Act , and the “commercial unit” condition in section 36(3) (b). Both conditions are concerned with the extent to which an applicant is economically dependent on the holding. Broadly speaking the livelihood condition focuses on the applicant’s dependence on the holding in the recent past by looking at the contribution it has made to his livelihood in the seven years before the tenant’s death, while the commercial unit condition looks additionally to the future by considering what other land the applicant has available to him from which he could continue to make his living if he no longer had access to the holding.

5. In this case it is agreed that the Applicant satisfies the commercial unit condition. His eligibility therefore depends only on the livelihood condition in section 36(3) (a) which requires him to demonstrate that: “in the seven years ending with the date of death his only or principal source of livelihood throughout a continuous period of not less than five years, or two or more discontinuous periods together amounting to not less than five years, derived from his agricultural work on the holding or on an agricultural unit of which the holding forms part, …”

6. In its decision published on 27 November 2025, the FTT found that the Applicant satisfied the livelihood condition, and it issued a direction entitling him to a tenancy of the Holding in succession to his father. In making that finding, the FTT decided that the contribution to the Applicant’s livelihood made by contracting work done for other farmers on land away from the Holding should count towards the satisfaction of the condition. We will explain why it reached that conclusion when we look in detail at the decision. In this appeal, the FTT’s conclusion is challenged by the appellants, the executors of the estate of the late Major Michael Wills, who are the owners of the Holding and the current landlords under the tenancy (the Landlords).

7. In circumstances described in section 41 of the 1986 Act an applicant who does not satisfy the livelihood condition and who is therefore not eligible to make an application for a direction, may nevertheless be treated as if they were eligible. In this case the Applicant asked the FTT to find that he was fully eligible, or alternatively, to treat him as eligible. The FTT was satisfied that the Applicant was fully eligible but said that, if it had been required to determine whether he should be treated as eligible, it would not have found in his favour. By his respondent’s notice, the Applicant challenges the FTT’s approach to his request to be treated as eligible and he invites this Tribunal, if we are unable to uphold the FTT’s primary conclusion on eligibility, nevertheless to confirm its determination that he is entitled to a succession tenancy by substituting a finding of our own that he should be treated as eligible under section 41 .

8. At the hearing of the appeal the Landlords were represented by Ms Emily Windsor and the Applicant by Mr Jamie Sutherland, both of whom had appeared before the FTT. We are grateful to them for their submissions. The facts

9. By the conclusion of the evidence before the FTT the relevant facts were not in dispute and we take the following abbreviated account from the FTT’s decision or from the Applicant’s witness statement.

10. The Holding is spectacularly situated on the Cotswold escarpment a few miles south of the village of Birdlip. It is of modest size and comprises approximately 56 hectares of arable land and 1.5 hectares of permanent pasture (about 145 acres in all). It forms part of a slightly larger agricultural unit comprising the Holding and some small parcels of additional land which were either owned by the applicant’s father or were let to him by the Landlords under a farm business tenancy. It is not necessary to distinguish between these different parcels since all of the land is treated as a single agricultural unit for the purpose of the livelihood condition, and for the sake of simplicity we will continue to refer only to the Holding.

11. The Holding includes a farmhouse which is now vacant, but which was formerly occupied by the deceased tenant and his family; the Applicant himself was born there, as was his father, and the Applicant lived there with his parents until his marriage to his wife, Claire, in 1997. In addition to the farmhouse, the Holding includes some modest traditional farm buildings and two large portal framed buildings which were erected by the Applicant’s father.

12. The Holding is let by an agreement in writing dated 31 December 1964 made between Mrs Margaret Hamilton Sinclair as landlord and the Applicant’s father as tenant. The tenancy is one to which Part IV of the 1986 Act applies and in respect of which there are statutory rights of succession. A notice to quit given to the tenant’s executors by the Landlords following his death will have the effect of bringing the tenancy to an end once it has been determined in these proceedings whether the Applicant is entitled to succeed to a new tenancy of the Holding in his own right.

13. The Holding is used almost entirely for the cultivation of arable crops and although since 2006 it has been farmed by the applicant in partnership (first with his father until his retirement in 2020 and subsequently with his wife) all of the manual work on the Holding has been done by the Applicant alone. He is responsible for all of the cultivations and he maintains and repairs the vehicles and farm machinery which are used in those cultivations. The paperwork and administration was done by the Applicant’s father until 2020 when it was taken over by Claire.

14. The Applicant owns another farm of about 126 acres known as Quarry Farm, located about 3 miles from the Holding. The Applicant, his wife and their two children live at Quarry Farm in a house which he built there. The main farming activity at Quarry Farm is the production of beef from livestock which are kept in sheds and fed on crops grown on the surrounding land. The cultivation of the land and the livestock husbandry at Quarry Farm are undertaken by Claire with assistance from employees or contractors, and the Applicant’s involvement there is minimal. The business at Quarry Farm was initially conducted through a separate partnership between the Applicant and Claire and was not part of the business at the Holding conducted through his partnership with his father, but since his father’s retirement both enterprises have been brought within the couple’s own partnership.

15. It is agreed between the parties that Quarry Farm does not form part of a single agricultural unit with the Holding. That means that any contribution which Quarry Farm makes to the Applicant’s livelihood does not count towards his satisfaction of the livelihood condition.

16. Before he became tenant of the Holding in 1964, the Applicant’s father had started an agricultural contracting business of his own, which he then continued in partnership with the Applicant and which the Applicant now carries on in partnership with his wife. This business undertakes all types of arable and grassland work for customers within a 30 mile radius of the Holding. Most of the work is done by self-employed workers under the Applicant’s direction, and he undertakes relatively little of the routine work himself. He does carry out some of the more skilled work, such as drilling, and he is also responsible for maintaining and repairing the equipment and machinery used in the contracting business. The contracting business is based on the Holding; its fuel store is located there and the machinery it uses is housed and maintained in the two portal framed sheds constructed on the Holding by the Applicant’s father. The livelihood condition

17. An applicant for a direction under Part IV of the 1986 Act must prove they are eligible to make the application by demonstrating that they satisfy the two conditions in section 36(3) . If they do, the FTT must determine whether, in their opinion, the applicant is a suitable person to become the tenant of the holding (section 39(2)). If the applicant is both eligible and suitable then, unless the FTT gives its consent to the operation of a landlord’s notice to quit (which it rarely does), the FTT will make a direction entitling the applicant to a new tenancy of the holding.

18. We have already set out the text of section 36(3) (a) in paragraph 5 above. It requires the applicant to show that in five of the preceding seven years “his only or principal source of livelihood … derived from his agricultural work on the holding or an agricultural unit of which the holding forms part”.

19. In Trinity College, Cambridge v Caines [1984] 2 EGLR 17 , Webster J was asked to consider whether an applicant’s livelihood included her undrawn share of the profits of a partnership, which she left in the partnership’s account. He determined that it did not, and provided the following explanation of the expression “source of livelihood” (at 19H): “I conclude that the expression ‘source of livelihood’ means what the applicant spends or consumes on her ordinary living expenses from time to time in money and/or in kind and that it does not include money that she has available to spend but does not in fact spend for that purpose.”

20. In Casswell v Welby (1996) 71 P&CR 137, the Court of Appeal gave guidance on the approach which a tribunal should adopt when determining the source of an applicant’s livelihood. In that case, the applicant’s drawings from a farming partnership were largely funded from capital injections by the partners in the form of family loans or borrowing from their bank, rather than from net profits of the business. The applicant argued that the proper enquiry was to ask why he was able to have access to the money he drew from the partnership, not where that money in the partnership had come from. At page 142 Stuart-Smith LJ accepted the applicant’s case and discouraged an over-analytical approach: “Like most questions of construction, this one is largely a matter of impression. Moreover, I consider that the subsection should be construed in a purposive manner and very much in the way that a jury would do and without adopting too legalistic an approach. Livelihood can be defined as “means of living” (see Shorter Oxford Dictionary), that is to say what is spent or consumed for the purpose of living. The source of one’s livelihood in so far as it is money, is income; in so far as it is the use or consumption of goods, it is benefits in kind. An applicant may have income derived from one or more sources. If so, in order to qualify under section 36(3) (a), the income derived from work on the agricultural holding must be greater than his income from his other sources.”

21. It was common ground in Caswell, and in this appeal , that the “principal” source of a person’s livelihood means a source which contributes more than 50 percent of that livelihood. But, as the evidence in this case demonstrates, where a person draws their income from a partnership business which carries on a number of profitable activities, some of which are more closely related to the holding than others, different approaches may be adopted when determining the source of a partner’s income.

22. The partnership businesses from which the Applicant derived his livelihood generated revenue from three sources: the arable crops grown by the Applicant on the Holding, the livestock raised at Quarry Farm, and the contracting business. The attribution of those income streams to qualifying and non-qualifying sources of the Applicant’s livelihood was critical to his eligibility. By a qualifying source of livelihood we mean one which is derived from the Applicant’s work on the Holding and which therefore counts towards meeting the 50% threshold.

23. At the FTT both parties relied on the evidence of accountants, Mrs Lucie Hammond for the Applicant and Mr Iain McVicar for the Landlords. The accountants reached agreement on different analyses of the partnerships’ accounts and their agreement was recorded in a schedule which was provided to the parties and to the FTT on the final day of the hearing. That schedule crunched the numbers to produce an agreed apportionment of the Applicant’s total expenditure in each of four different “scenarios” for each of the seven years before the date of his father’s death.

24. In all four scenarios the income derived from the partnerships’ beef enterprise was agreed to be non-qualifying. The beef enterprise was a source of the Applicant’s livelihood because although he did no work in connection with it, as a partner in the business the Applicant was entitled to share in the whole of its profits. One reason those profits were non-qualifying was because Quarry Farm, where they were generated, was not part of a single agricultural unit with the Holding.

25. The Landlord’s case was that the Applicant’s livelihood should be taken to be derived from the three income streams in proportion to their profitability, and that all of the income derived from the contracting business should be counted as non-qualifying. This was scenario 2 in the accountants’ schedule, and it resulted in the Applicant being ineligible. In only one of the relevant seven years did the profits of the arable business exceed the combined profits of the beef and contracting enterprises. In two years out of seven the arable profit had come close to parity with the other sources (nearly 49% in 2018, and 45% in 2017) and in 2021 it was a little above 41%, but in the other years it made a much smaller contribution.

26. The Applicant’s primary case, reflected in scenario 1 in the accountants’ schedule, was that that the whole of the income derived from the contracting enterprise was the product of his agricultural work on the Holding and was qualifying income. On that scenario he was eligible, because the combined profit of the arable and contracting streams exceeded the profit from the beef unit in six of the relevant seven years.

27. In the alternative, the Applicant advanced both a secondary case, and a tertiary case, neither of which established that he was eligible but which were relied on in support of his application under section 41 of the 1986 Act to be treated as eligible. We will say more about these scenarios 3 and 4 when we come to consider the respondent’s notice, but each involved treating part of the income of the partnership derived from the arable enterprise and the contracting business as qualifying income, and part as non-qualifying. If 80% of the arable and contracting income was treated as qualifying, the Applicant was eligible in three of the required five years, and if 70% was so treated he was eligible in one of the required years. The justification for the 80% figure was said to be that it reflected the relative significance of the Holding to the business; that was its centre of activities where both the arable and the contracting enterprises were based and that was where the Applicant spent most of his time and made his most significant contribution to the partnership. The basis of the 70% figure was the applicant’s own evidence that he spent 70% of his time working on the Holding (including time spent maintaining the farm machinery used for the contracting business) and 30% of his time working off the Holding. The FTT’s primary conclusion and the appeal

28. The FTT’s primary conclusion was that the applicant was fully eligible. It is that conclusion which is challenged in the appeal and we will focus on it first, before considering the alternative section 41 application which is the subject of the respondent’s notice.

29. At paragraph 24 of the decision the FTT explained that the dispute centred on the treatment of the income derived from the contracting enterprise. On the experts’ figures if the contracting income was treated as agricultural work on the Holding then the Applicant succeeded in demonstrating that in each of the relevant years prior to his father’s death more than 51% of his livelihood was derived from his agricultural work on the Holding (in fact there was one non-qualifying year, but that made no difference to his eligibility). On the other hand, if contracting income was not treated as qualifying income, then the Applicant was not eligible.

30. The FTT began its consideration of the issue by dismissing the suggestion made by Mr McVicar (but not adopted by Ms Windsor) that contracting work was not agricultural work at all. The remainder of the FTT’s primary reasoning pursued a number of different strands, the most important of which, or so it seems to us, is found in paragraphs 30 to 35, which we need to set out in full: “30. Once it is determined that contract farming is agricultural work then the question is from where is it carried on. On any basis at least some of it has to be on the Holding, namely the maintenance and repair of the machinery and plant, parking over winter, storage of fuel and refuelling and all administrative tasks such as record keeping, invoicing and bill paying. Additionally, this equipment was used for agricultural work on the Unit.

31. It is equally obvious that the work done on other farms is agricultural work. There are therefore two elements; one based on the Unit and the other operations elsewhere. Each element does not preclude the other from being agricultural work.

32. In this case the contracting business was clearly based on the Unit and administered and controlled from there. The two large portal framed sheds paid for by Keith housed the machinery and repair shop, the fuel was kept on the Holding and Keith did the office work there and the Applicant repaired and maintained the machinery there. In the winter the machinery was parked there. Keith had started the business in the late 50s and so the business had been present at the Holding throughout the duration of the tenancy. Indeed from the site visit a picture emerged of the contracting business playing a significant role given the size of the buildings facilitating it and associated operations carried out.

33. Although the machinery owned by the partnership is used on the Unit the number and nature of these vehicles was greater than required for the Unit alone, nevertheless they were clearly connected with the Unit.

34. The contracting enterprise was a single enterprise engaged in agricultural work. The business could not have been carried on in the absence of the Holding and the facilities it offered: control of the business resided there as did the essential resources provided by the sheds, repair shop and fuel storage. The contracts between the KD Partnership and the customers were made on the Holding when each farmer contacted Keith to engage the partnership to carry out a job on the customer’s farm.

35. We are thus of the view that the farm contracting enterprise was agricultural work on the holding, with its operations being carried on other farms. It follows that we agree with Mrs Hammond’s view set out in paragraph 3.1 [scenario 1] of the Experts’ Joint Statement.”

31. In this part of its decision the FTT began its analysis by directing itself that the question to be determined was “from where” the Applicant’s agricultural work (the contract farming) was carried on. That was said by Ms Windsor to have been an error of law, the true question being simply where the Applicant’s agricultural work was done. It can be seen in these paragraphs that the FTT made uncontroversial references to the place where work was done but also introduced wider considerations, namely, where the machinery used in the contracting business was parked over winter, and where the fuel was stored. When it contrasted the two elements it had identified it said that one was “based on the Unit”, which is consistent with the “from where” question it had originally formulated for itself. Read as a whole, these passages suggest that the FTT considered that the livelihood condition is about more than just where an applicant carries out their agricultural work.

32. Paragraphs 32, 33 and 34, develop the same idea by emphasising the connections between the contracting business and the Holding. Thus, the contracting business was “clearly based on the Unit” and “could not have been carried on in the absence of the Holding and the facilities it offered”, various administrative and other tasks were performed there, the same machinery was used on the Holding and in the contracting business, and the connection pre-dated the tenancy. These were all factors which contributed to the FTT’s view, in paragraph 35, that “the farm contracting enterprise was agricultural work on the holding, with its operations being carried on other farms.”

33. These passages are central to the Landlords’ appeal. Ms Windsor submitted that they betray a clear error of law. In order to satisfy the condition an applicant must show that the principal source of their livelihood has been their agricultural work on the holding (or a unit including the holding). Agricultural work carried out elsewhere cannot be relied on for that purpose. The FTT posed a different question and concerned itself with irrelevant considerations. Factors linking a business which an applicant is engaged in with the holding are irrelevant, except to the extent that they involve agricultural work on the holding. The relevant question was not about where the business was conducted from, but where the applicant’s agricultural work was done.

34. On behalf of the Applicant, Mr Sutherland reminded us of the uncontroversial facts which demonstrated the close connection between the livelihood which the Applicant derived from the contracting business and his work on the Holding. We have mentioned most of these factors already. They included the fact that although the Holding is farmed by a partnership which derives profits from a number of sources, all of the agricultural cultivations on the Holding itself are done by the Applicant alone. His engagement in activities off the Holding is limited and he is not involved at all in the activities at Quarry Farm. The contracting work is seasonal and could not be carried on without the facilities provided by the Holding. Mr Sutherland submitted that the FTT had been entitled to have regard to these facts and to approach the livelihood issue “very much in the way that a jury would do”, as Stuart-Smith LJ had encouraged tribunals to do in Caswell. This Tribunal should leave its finding of fact undisturbed and dismiss the appeal.

35. Mr Sutherland’s argument was seductive. One cannot fail to have sympathy with the Applicant, as the third generation of his family who have farmed the Holding, who was born there and who has worked there for the whole of his adult life. But our task is to interpret the statutory language. The livelihood condition is expressed in imprecise language which might have been interpreted by courts and tribunals in a more impressionistic and less mechanical or arithmetical way, but which has long since come to be treated as an exercise in accountancy. But even were a more impressionistic approach to be taken, we do not think that the language of section 36(3) (a) is open to the interpretation put on it by the FTT. The proper focus is not on where the business is conducted from, or what connection exists between the holding and different parts of the business; the correct focus is on where the applicant undertakes his agricultural work. Having identified what agricultural work the applicant did on the holding, it is for the FTT to determine what proportion of his livelihood, what he spent or consumed in money or benefits in kind, was derived from that work. That is not the approach which was taken by the FTT.

36. Our preferred interpretation of section 36(3) (a) is consistent with section 36(6) which, as the FTT noted, was added to the 1986 Act by amendment in 2006. It was introduced following a report by the Tenancy Reform Industry Group (TRIG) which had been asked by the government to develop proposals to strengthen the rural economy by encouraging farmers to diversify their businesses. In its wide ranging report TRIG had identified aspects of the livelihood condition as tending to inhibit diversification in the tenanted sector, in particular that the prospects of succession for the younger generation may be undermined by “so basic an action as the son taking a tractor to do contract work in the evenings to supplement his income”. TRIG proposed a change which was adopted in modified form in the Regulatory Reform (Agricultural Tenancies) (England and Wales) Order 2006 and became section 36(6) , which now supplements the livelihood condition in section 36(3) (a) as follows: “(6) The reference in subsection 3(a) above to agricultural work carried out by a person on the holding or on an agricultural unit of which the holding forms part includes– (a) agricultural work carried out by him from the holding or an agricultural unit of which the holding forms part; and (b) other work carried out by him on or from the holding or an agricultural unit of which the holding forms part; which is of a description approved in writing by the landlord after the commencement of this subsection.”

37. Ms Windsor acknowledged that section 36(6) , and the material which explained its purpose, could not be relied on as casting light on what Parliament had intended in 1986 when it enacted section 36(3) , but it did support her reading of the livelihood condition and the proper treatment of work done off the holding or the unit of which the holding is part. We agree. The reference in section 36(6) (a) to “agricultural work carried out by him from the holding” is clearly intended to allow work done off the holding by someone who is based on the holding, to be counted towards satisfaction of the livelihood condition. The amendment was obviously made on the understanding that, without it, such work could not count towards satisfaction of the condition.

38. Mr Sutherland suggested that section 36(6) was neutral and did not support the view that work done off the holding could not previously have been qualifying work, and that it could have been intended simply to provide clarification and remove potential uncertainty. We think it goes further than that. Not all agricultural work carried out “from the holding” can now be treated as qualifying work but only work which has been approved in writing by the landlord after the commencement of section 36(6) . If Mr Sutherland was right in saying that work done “from the holding” was capable of being qualifying work all along, then the effect of the amendment would have been to make the qualifying test more restrictive, by requiring landlord’s consent before such work could be relied on. That was clearly not the purpose of the amendment.

39. The FTT acknowledged the force of Ms Windsor’s argument based on section 36(6) but suggested that her objection “does not address the question posed by the facts of this case as to where such a business is in fact carried on”. That observation provides further confirmation of the FTT’s error; it was not asked to determine where the contracting business was carried on, but only where the Applicant did his agricultural work.

40. In her grounds of appeal Ms Windsor took issue with a number of passages in the FTT’s decision, including where it had speculated about the early history of the tenancy, and where it had appeared to rely on one learned author’s inaccurate précis of an unreported decision of the Agricultural Land Tribunal in 2000, Sandercock v Sandercock . We need not refer to those grounds, as Mr Sutherland did not rely on the textbook or the tribunal decision, and agreed that the early history did not assist his case.

41. Before concluding this part of our decision, we should refer to one other part of the FTT’s decision. As Ms Windsor suggested, and Mr Sutherland did not demur, paragraphs 41 and 42 of the decision also form part of the FTT’s primary reasoning, or were intended to support it, although they come after the conclusion stated in paragraph 39, and after the FTT had begun to explain the Applicant’s alternative claim to be treated as eligible. In those additional paragraphs the FTT said this: “41. We agree with the Applicant’s contention that all his drawings (subject to the appropriate split) from the successive partnerships should be treated as qualifying income irrespective of the source of that income either arable or contracting. This is because he is entitled to those drawings on the basis of the work he does on the Unit and the source of those funds is not relevant: Caswell v Welby and another op cit: Bailey v Sitwell [1986] 2 EGLR 7 .

42. Ms Windsor seeks to distinguish those cases on the basis that those partnerships comprised one business and the introductions of capital came from outside sources. In this case she says all the income was generated by the partnership enterprises so the farming income was topped up from contract farming from an outside source. That does not seem to us a substantive distinction given the findings in those cases was that the source of the drawings should not be considered but rather the reason why the Applicant was entitled to make his drawings from the partnership: which was his work on the Unit.”

42. We agree with Ms Windsor that both cases relied on by the FTT are distinguishable on their facts from this case and do not assist. Caswell involved an applicant whose drawings exceeded his share of the partnership income but who did no work other than on the holding. Bailey v Sitwell [1986] 2 EGLR 7 was a similar case in which the applicant’s living expenses were met from the farm account into which his father also paid his pension and disability benefits. In both cases all of the applicant’s work was on the holding and the tribunal was satisfied that his work was the sole reason for his ability to make the drawings which funded his livelihood. The same cannot be said of the Applicant in this case, and we disagree with the conclusion of the FTT in the final sentence quoted above. Part of the reason the Applicant was able to make the drawings he did from the partnership accounts was that the businesses in which he was a partner were raising beef in a separate agricultural unit and engaging in contracting work off the Holding in which he participated. In this case it could not be said that the only reason the Applicant was able to make those drawings was because he was working on the Holding. It was therefore necessary to apportion the Applicant’s sources of livelihood between the different income streams to which his status as a partner gave him access.

43. For these reasons we are satisfied that the FTT’s primary conclusion was based on a misunderstanding of the law and cannot stand. But that is not the end of the matter. The respondent’s notice and application under section 41

44. On an appeal to this Tribunal the party who succeeded before the FTT is entitled to ask the Tribunal to uphold the order made by the FTT for different or additional reasons from those which it gave. Importantly, the successful party does not need to obtain permission to appeal before seeking to uphold the FTT’s decision on different grounds.

45. The order made by the FTT in this case was a direction under section 39(5) of the 1986 Act entitling the Applicant to a tenancy of the Holding. By his respondent’s notice the Applicant asks the Tribunal to confirm that direction for an additional reason. If, contrary to the view of the FTT, he did not satisfy the livelihood condition and so was not fully eligible to apply for a direction, the Applicant argues that the FTT was wrong not to treat him as eligible. Ms Windsor agreed that the Applicant is entitled to advance that argument without first obtaining permission to appeal. If there had been any disagreement on that point we would have granted permission to appeal in any event.

46. So far as is relevant to the arguments in this case, section 41 of the 1986 Act provides as follows:

41. — Application by not fully eligible person to be treated as eligible. (1) This section applies to any surviving close relative of the deceased who for some part of the seven years ending with the date of death engaged (whether full-time or part-time) in agricultural work on the holding, being a person in whose case— (a) the condition specified in paragraph (b) of the definition of “eligible person” in section 36(3) above is satisfied, and (b) the condition specified in paragraph (a) of that definition, though not fully satisfied, is satisfied to a material extent. (2) A person to whom this section applies may within the period of three months beginning with the day after the date of death apply to the Tribunal for a determination that he is to be treated as an eligible person for the purposes of sections 36 to 48 of this Act . (3) If on an application under this section— (a) the Tribunal are satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom this section applies, and (b) it appears to the Tribunal that in all the circumstances it would be fair and reasonable for the applicant to be able to apply under section 39 above for a direction entitling him to a tenancy of the holding, the Tribunal shall determine that he is to be treated as an eligible person for the purposes of sections 36 to 48 of this Act , but shall otherwise dismiss the application. (4) In relation to a person in respect of whom the Tribunal have determined as mentioned in sub section (3 ) above sections 36 to 48 of this Act shall apply as if he were an eligible person. (5) […] (6) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) above, cases where the condition mentioned in that paragraph might be less than fully satisfied include cases where the close relative's agricultural work on the holding fell short of providing him with his principal source of livelihood because the holding was too small. […]

47. The effect of this provision is that a close relative of the deceased tenant who satisfies the commercial unit condition may be treated as eligible without fully satisfying the livelihood condition if they satisfy the livelihood condition “to a material extent” and if the FTT is persuaded that it would be fair and reasonable that they be able to apply for a direction entitling them to a tenancy. Section 41(6) provides one illustration of circumstances in which a close relative may need to apply to be treated as eligible.

48. The Applicant made an application to the FTT under section 41 at the same time as he made his application under section 36 .

49. For some time after the introduction of the statutory succession regime tribunals struggled with the notion that a condition which was not satisfied might nevertheless be satisfied “to a material extent”. Some interpreted this as applying only to “near miss” cases, where an applicant had “only just” failed to show that they fully satisfied the livelihood condition. Others applied a more generous interpretation. A consistent approach came to be accepted following the decision of His Honour Edgar Fay QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court in Littlewood v Rolfe [1981] 2 All ER 51 .

50. In Littlewood v Rolfe the widow of a deceased tenant, who had derived her principal source of livelihood from the holding for 44 of the required 60 months, applied to be treated as eligible under section 21 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (the predecessor of section 41 of the 1986 Act ). The Agricultural Land Tribunal refused her application, interpreting the section narrowly and reading “satisfied to a material extent” as equivalent to “almost fulfilled”. On appeal to the High Court the Judge reversed that decision. Having reviewed the range of interpretations which tribunals had adopted, he pointed out that one ordinary meaning of “material” was “something substantial, more than minimal” and concluded that in the current context it meant “substantial in terms of time and important in terms of value”. In reaching that conclusion he took account of the additional requirement that the tribunal must be satisfied that it would be fair and reasonable for the applicant to be able to apply for a tenancy before it could give a direction in their favour. The Judge thought that, in practice, that additional requirement would be pointless if the “not quite” view prevailed and a direction could only be given in a case where 49% of the applicant’s livelihood derived from the holding.

51. In Wilson v Earl Spencer’s Settlement Trustees [1985] 1 EGLR 3 , Hodgson J said that he entirely agreed with the approach taken in Littlewood v Rolfe to the interpretation of “that strange, almost weird, subsection (1)(b)”, and thought that the test of materiality should be looked at “in the context of the extent of failure”. As he explained, at page 6: “What the tribunal have to consider is the extent to which the condition is not satisfied, or, to put it another way, the extent of failure. If on the facts it is shown that there has been, in the words of one of the tribunal decisions, “a really large failure”, then the applicant cannot bring himself within the section. Clearly the test requires a comparison between the value of what the applicant derives from the holding and her total livelihood. It is not the importance of the “holding value” to her which is relevant, but whether the “holding value” is an important satisfaction of the requirement of 51%.” The FTT’s approach

52. Although the FTT was satisfied that the Applicant was fully eligible, it also considered his alternative case and asked whether, if necessary, he should be treated as eligible. It explained that in his evidence the Applicant estimated that he spent 70% of his time working on the Holding and 30% working elsewhere, but that his case was that “taking in the added factors to which we have alluded” 80% of the contracting income should be apportioned to the Holding. The “added factors” were those which had already been relied on to demonstrate the close connection between the Holding and the contracting enterprise (paragraph 34 above) and which had persuaded the FTT that (after disregarding the beef enterprise) all the Applicant’s drawings from the partnership carried on between the applicant and his father should be treated as qualifying income.

53. Having described the Applicant’s alternative case, the FTT continued as follows: “43. It is our view that the correct split is 70:30 as that most accurately reflects the Applicant’s agricultural work off the Unit. The experts have agreed the figures for qualifying livelihood on this basis as 2015 39.7%, 2016 42.2%, 2017 37.2%, 2018 42.0%, 2019 44.7%, 2020 45.9% and 2021 59.7%.

44. We are urged by Mr Sutherland to find that on these figures the Applicant satisfies the livelihood condition to a material extent under s.41 (1) (b) 1986 Act. He drew our attention to the well-known authorities in this regard namely Dagg v Lovett (1979) 251 EG 75, Littlewood v Rolfe (1982) 43 P & CR 262 and Wilson v Earl Spencer’s Trustees [1985] 1 EGLR 3

45. Mr Sutherland submits that the focus should be on whether the qualifying livelihood goes an important way towards full satisfaction of the livelihood condition see Wilson v Spencer Trustees . Set against that is the guidance in Dagg and Littlewood v Rolfe in which it is said that “material “means “substantial in terms of time and important in terms of value”.

46. Our conclusion is that it cannot be said on these percentages that the Applicant has succeeded in demonstrating that the livelihood condition is “satisfied to a material extent” as in only one year is more than 51% achieved and for five years it is less than 45%.”

54. As for the suggested 80:20 split, the FTT added this: “50. We cannot accept however that a 80:20 split is justified under this part of the argument as the extra factors we are urged to take into account are ones which have led us to our conclusion that the contracting enterprise is with the arable farming, the agricultural work carried on at the Holding.

51. As it is the Applicant’s own analysis shows that over the course of a year he spends 30% of his time engaged in agricultural work off the Unit, and on that calculation we come to the conclusion he cannot show that he complies with the livelihood condition to a material extent.”

55. The FTT also said that, had it adopted an 80:20 split of the contracting income in the Applicant’s favour it would have been satisfied that the livelihood condition was satisfied to a material extent, because in that case “there would be three years over 50% and two years over 48%”. It would also have considered it fair and reasonable for the Applicant to be entitled to apply for a succession tenancy. Accordingly, although the Applicant succeeded before the FTT in his primary case, he would not have succeeded had he been required to rely on section 41 . The argument

56. Mr Sutherland relied on four arguments in support of his contention that the FTT was wrong to find that the Applicant did not satisfy the livelihood condition to a material extent. Before dealing with them in turn, we remind ourselves of the approach which an appellate court or tribunal is required to take when asked to interfere with a finding of this sort.

57. The parties agree that whether an applicant satisfies the livelihood condition to a material extent is not simply a question of law, it is in very large part a question of fact. That was the view of Mr Andrew Nicol QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, in Thomson v Church Commissioners for England [2006] 3 EGLR 1 , when he was asked to direct an Agricultural Land Tribunal to state a case to the High Court on a supposed issue of law following its refusal of an application by the sister of a deceased tenant to be treated as eligible to apply for succession. As he explained, at [17]: “It is, of course, a question of law as to whether a Tribunal has probably directed itself according to the statute and the authorities. There would also be an error of law if the Tribunal reached a conclusion which was not one that was reasonably open to it on the evidence, but Ms Windsor (and Mr Harris) go further and say that there would be an error of law if the Tribunal's decision as to materiality was rational but wrong. In my view there is considerable force in the alternative written submissions from the Church Commissioners (who were not represented at the hearing but whose submissions I have read) that 'Whether the livelihood condition is satisfied to a material extent is a question of assessment, judgment and appreciation for the ALT.' In my view these are questions of fact. They may depend on prior findings of primary facts (such as what were the Claimant's earnings in the previous years and the percentage which derived from the holding), but it is by no means unusual to have secondary questions of fact dependent on such prior primary findings.”

58. I agree with Mr Nicol QC that we are here dealing with secondary questions of fact. The primary facts are not in dispute: in particular, the Applicant spent 70% of his time working on the Holding and 30% working elsewhere, the partnerships made the profits shown in their accounts, and the contracting business was based at and dependent on the Holding. Whether it can be said in those circumstances that the Applicant satisfied the livelihood condition to a material extent involves an evaluation of those primary facts, giving such weight to them as the decision maker thinks appropriate before arriving at a conclusion which is itself a determination of fact.

59. When this Tribunal is asked to review a decision of the FTT on an issue of fact, it does not ask whether, faced with the same evidence, it would have reached the same decision. The proper approach has recently been considered in some detail by the former Chamber President (Edwin Johnson J) in AP Wireless II (UK) Ltd v EE Ltd [2026] UKUT 45 (LC) at [66] to [75], and it is not necessary to cover the ground at comparable length in this decision. I will refer only to two short passages from decisions of the Court of Appeal. The first is Lewison LJ’s well known summary in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 , at [114]: “Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them.”

60. In Clin v Walter Lilly & Co. Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 136 [2021] WLR 2753, Carr LJ (as she then was) explained in her judgment, at [86], the restrictions on the ability of an appellate court to interfere with an evaluation of primary facts: “An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to the exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.”

61. Mr Sutherland did not shy away from the challenge of finding “some identifiable flaw” in the FTT’s decision which would permit this Tribunal to interfere with its findings. He submitted that the FTT’s consideration of whether the livelihood condition was satisfied to a material extent was undermined by the following errors.

62. First, Mr Sutherland submitted that the FTT did not apply established principles correctly. He reminded us of the relevant authorities, all of which were referred to by the FTT in its decision and most of which we have already mentioned ( Dagg v Lovett to which the FTT also referred is the case in which the agricultural land tribunal coined the paraphrase “substantial in terms of time and important in terms of value”). He suggested that if the FTT had correctly applied the principles illustrated by those authorities, it would have concluded that the livelihood condition had been satisfied to a material extent. Apportioning only 70% of the Applicant’s share of the arable and contracting profits as qualifying income, as the FTT had done, had the result that in five out of seven years his qualifying livelihood was at least 42% of his total livelihood (and so represented at least 84% of full satisfaction of the livelihood condition), and in one of those years it was 59.7% of his total livelihood. Mr Sutherland submitted that these figures were plainly substantial in terms of time and important in terms of value and went a material way towards satisfying the livelihood condition.

63. Secondly, Mr Sutherland suggested that in paragraph 46 of its reasons (paragraph 53 above) the FTT wrongly considered that the livelihood condition could not be satisfied to a material extent when the livelihood derived from the Applicant’s agricultural work on the Holding exceeded 50% in only one of the relevant years. There was no such principle.

64. Thirdly, Mr Sutherland submitted that the FTT had failed to have regard to the relevant values and periods when considering whether there was material satisfaction of the livelihood condition. Referring again to paragraph 46 of the decision he suggested that of the relevant seven years the FTT had focused on the five poorest years, rather than on the five best on which the Applicant had relied.

65. Finally, Mr Sutherland asserted that the FTT failed to have regard to the relevant factual context when it made its assessment. It had made its own apportionment simply by comparing the time the Applicant spent on the Holding and on his work elsewhere. It should have considered the wider picture and taken account of what it called the “added factors” which demonstrated the close connection between the Holding and the contracting enterprise. Had it done so it should have adopted the 80:20 apportionment of contracting and arable income to qualifying and non-qualifying livelihood, and on that basis, as it confirmed, that Applicant would have satisfied the condition to a material extent.

66. We will consider Mr Sutherland’s submissions in turn.

67. Mr Sutherland’s first point is simply a disagreement with the FTT’s assessment of the evidence. It was for the FTT to determine whether the livelihood condition was satisfied to a material extent; it is for us to determine whether it made a mistake in the way it went about its task. A mere assertion that the figures justify the conclusion the Applicant seeks is not enough. The hearing before the FTT took three days, during which extensive submissions were made by counsel with considerable experience of this type of case. The FTT itself is an expert tribunal which in this jurisdiction is constituted of three members, two appointed for their knowledge and experience of farming and the third a tribunal judge (in this case the Principal Judge of the FTT’s Agricultural Land and Drainage Division). The parties can be confident that the FTT was very familiar with the principles to be applied and had a thorough understanding of each party’s case. The decision shows that it had the agreed figures well in mind and we cannot accept the submission that those figures compelled an answer in the Applicant’s favour. His qualifying work crossed the 50% threshold in only one of the five years required, and in the other four which were relied on it reached 42.0%, 42.2%, 44.7% and 45.9%. The FTT was entitled to conclude that the condition had not been satisfied to a material extent on those figures. Whether we, or a different tribunal, would have reached the same or a different conclusion is not relevant; all that matters is whether the FTT made the sort of identifiable error that would entitle us to set aside its decision. Mr Sutherland’s first proposition does not meet that requirement.

68. Mr Sutherland’s second and third points focussed on paragraph 46 of the FTT’s decision, which briefly stated the FTT’s conclusion that the Applicant did not satisfy the livelihood condition to a material extent. Like any conclusion it must be read in context and any suggested error must be assessed in the light of the FTT’s reasoning as a whole. The FTT had the agreed figures well in mind, having recited them in paragraph 43, and it directed itself specifically by reference to the correct test. Mr Sutherland’s suggestion that the FTT wrongly believed that the livelihood condition could not be satisfied to a material extent if only one of the relevant years was a qualifying year is untenable. The FTT did not say that but instead noted correctly that the 51% threshold was reached in only one year. Similarly, it was factually correct that, on the agreed figures, the contribution to the Applicant’s livelihood made by his agricultural work on the Holding was less than 45% for five of the years under consideration. That statement does not justify the assumption that the FTT thought that the only relevant years were those in which the Holding made its lowest contribution, nor that they lost sight of the only other year not mentioned specifically in paragraph 46 (though it had featured in paragraph 43), in which the relevant proportion was 45.9%. In our judgment the FTT was entitled to have regard to the extent of the shortfall over the whole seven-year period when it assessed whether the livelihood condition was satisfied to a material extent. There is nothing in paragraph 46 of its decision to suggest it made an error in its assessment.

69. Mr Sutherland’s fourth and final submission challenged the FTT’s apportionment of the Applicant’s income between qualifying and non-qualifying sources, and its preference for a 70:30 split based on the time spent by the Applicant in work on and off the Holding.

70. How the Applicant’s income from the partnerships ought to be apportioned, and how much of his corresponding livelihood should be treated as deriving from his work on the Holding, was a matter of judgment for the FTT. Both parties considered that time spent working in different locations was a relevant consideration, and both provided apportionments in which time was determinative (although that was not the Applicant’s preferred approach). An approach which focussed on time alone might be said to be logical and appropriate because the subject of the assessment was the contribution which the Applicant’s work in different places made to his livelihood, and the time spent doing the work is one possible measure of the extent to which livelihood was derived from it. That seems to have been the FTT’s reason for adopting it, as it said of the 70:30 split that it “most accurately reflects the Applicant’s agricultural work off the Unit.”

71. It cannot be said that there is only one way of making the required assessment, and that was not Mr Sutherland’s submission. He suggested instead that the reason given by the FTT for not accepting an 80:20 apportionment, which had it been accepted would have been enough to see the Applicant home, was incoherent and insupportable. That reason was explained by the FTT at paragraph 50 of its decision where it said that it could not accept an 80:20 split because “the extra factors we are urged to take into account are ones which have led us to our conclusion that the contracting enterprise is, with the arable farming, the agricultural work carried on at the Holding”.

72. Mr Sutherland submitted that the fact that the wider factors on which the Applicant relied had been taken into account by the FTT when finding in his favour on his primary case was no reason to ignore them when it came to determine his alternative case. The premise of the alternative case was that the Applicant had failed in his primary case; his alternative case therefore had to be approached on the basis that he was not fully eligible and could only succeed if he could be treated as eligible. At that stage it was illogical to disregard factors which had helped persuade the FFT of the Applicant’s eligibility and which it had obviously regarded as relevant and important to the livelihood condition.

73. On behalf of the Landlords Ms Windsor submitted that the FTT had made its choice in paragraph 43 of its decision and had explained that the 70:30 split “most accurately reflects the Applicant’s agricultural work off the Unit”. That was a finding of fact which impliedly rejected the Applicant’s alternative case and which this Tribunal should not interfere with. She also suggested that the wider factors on which the Applicant relied were insubstantial and provided no evidential basis for an apportionment of income more favourable to the Applicant.

74. Ms Windsor did not seek to explain or justify the reason given by the FTT for rejecting the 80:20 split in paragraph 50 of the decision. For our part we have struggled to make sense of it. As Mr Sutherland submitted, the reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the weight the FTT was obviously willing to give to the connections it identified between the Holding and the contracting business when deciding that the whole of the contacting income should be regarded as qualifying income. If those factors made all the difference when deciding that the Applicant was fully eligible, why were they ruled irrelevant when considering whether he should be treated as eligible?

75. The closest we have come to a possible explanation for what the FTT meant by its paragraph 50 is that it may have reasoned that if it had been wrong to have regard to the wider connections between the contracting business and the Holding when deciding that the Applicant was eligible, it ought logically to disregard them when considering whether he should be treated as eligible. We are not confident that is what the FTT meant, and it could easily have said so more clearly if it did. We are also reluctant to reverse the FTT’s decision and deny the Applicant the direction it made in his favour, on the basis of our best guess at what the FTT meant when it dismissed his alternative case.

76. Ms Windsor’s most persuasive submission was that the FTT had made its choice on what was, in effect, a jury question, and we should leave well alone. But taking paragraph 50 of its decision at face value, we can only assume the FTT considered that in deciding how to apportion the Applicant’s income between qualifying and non-qualifying sources it could not have regard to factors other than time because it had already taken them into account when considering whether the livelihood condition was fully satisfied. We are satisfied that to approach the matter in that way would be an error of law. The FTT was not compelled to apportion the Applicant’s income in a particular way and was free to determine for itself how it should be done, taking into account matters which it considered relevant. If it made its determination having excluded matters which it appeared to consider relevant, and did so without a good reason, then it undermined the coherence of its decision. Taken at face value, the reason it gave does not appear to us to hold water. If paragraph 50 was intended to bear some different meaning, it has not been explained in a way which enables the parties to understand what that meaning was, nor does it allow this Tribunal to consider whether it discloses some error of approach.

77. We would add that if we were to disregard paragraph 50 and treat paragraph 43 as the FTT’s reason for apportioning the applicant’s income in the ratio 70:30, as we were effectively invited to do by Ms Windsor, we would be forced to the conclusion that the FTT had not adequately dealt with the Applicant’s alternative case. The Applicant in his evidence and the experts in their schedule all agreed that the 70:30 split accurately reflected the Applicant’s agricultural work on and off the Holding. The Applicant’s case was that despite that agreed fact, a different apportionment should be adopted which was not based exclusively on time but which gave weight to additional factors including those recognised by the FTT in paragraphs 32 and 34 of its decision. The FTT did not address that case anywhere other than in paragraph 50. If paragraph 50 is disregarded, the Applicant’s claim to be treated as eligible remains partially undetermined; if paragraph 50 is regarded as the FTT’s answer to that claim, the answer is not one which can readily be understood, nor does it appear to support the FTT’s conclusion.

78. For these reasons we are satisfied that the FTT was in error when it determined that the Applicant could not be treated as eligible. Disposal

79. We have found that the FTT was wrong to find that the Applicant was fully eligible. We have also been unable to uphold its reason for refusing the Applicant’s alternative application under section 41 to be treated as eligible. The net effect of these conclusions is that the FTT’s decision must be set aside and that further consideration must be given to the Applicant’s section 41 application.

80. In the course of argument we asked Counsel what they would wish us to do if we reached the conclusion we now have. For the Applicant, Mr Sutherland suggested that this Tribunal should substitute a decision of our own on the section 41 application (as we are entitled to do under section 12(2) (b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 whenever we set aside a decision of the FTT). For the Landlords, Ms Windsor submitted that we should remit the section 41 application to the FTT for further consideration by the same panel.

81. We have no doubt that the course advocated by Ms Windsor should be preferred. We have heard none of the evidence and have so far seen only a few of the documents which were relied on before the FTT. Nor have we inspected the Holding. The Applicant’s case cannot be determined without a proper appreciation of the evidence and arguments. The FTT already has that appreciation and it is clearly the appropriate decision maker.

82. We therefore set aside the FTT’s decision, revoke its direction in the Applicant’s favour, dismiss his application under section 36 of the 1986 Act and remit his application under section 41 to the FTT for further consideration. That consideration should be by the original panel. We do not think it should be necessary for the parties to be invited to make further submissions as the matter was fully argued at the original hearing, but it will be for the FTT to determine whether further input from the parties would be of assistance. The parties should refrain from incurring the expense of further submissions unless they are specifically invited to make them by the FTT. We should make it clear that nothing in this decision obliges the FTT to reach a different conclusion on the section 41 application; it is free to maintain its original view or to change it. Martin Rodger KC Mrs Diane Martin TD MRICS Deputy Chamber President FAAV 23 October 2026 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.