UK case law

Gates Industrial Corporation plc, Re

[2026] EWHC CH 2385 · High Court (Insolvency and Companies List) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Thursday, 16 July 2026 MR JUSTICE HILDYARD

1. This judgment concerns an application for sanction pursuant to s.899 of the Companies Act 2006 of a Members Scheme of Arrangement (“the Scheme”) proposed between Gates Industrial Corporation plc (“the Company” or “Gates”) and all its shareholders.

2. The Scheme is what is often called a “cancellation scheme” and the Court’s confirmation is also required for the incidental or necessary reduction of capital under s.645 to s.649 of the Companies Act 2006 .

3. The Company is the holding company for a global business, with a largely US shareholder base, and all its shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

4. The objective of the Scheme and of the reduction of capital which is ancillary to it, is to redomicile the Gates Industrial Group in Bermuda by inserting a new Bermudian holding company, Gates Industrial Corporation Limited (“New Gates”), as the new NYSE listed parent company for the group in place of the Company.

5. Such a scheme is also often referred to as a “redomiciliation or redomicile scheme”. However, what is really occurring is not any change of the domicile of the Company but the insertion at the top of the group structure of a new holding company domiciled in the new jurisdiction (in this case, Bermuda).

6. The purpose of that in this case has been summarised as being to increase the group’s strategic and financial flexibility, including for equity financing, pursuing mergers and other forms of combinations using transaction structures more familiar to US shareholders, to facilitate share buybacks whilst reducing their costs with the removal of the 0.5 per cent stamp duty payable in respect of companies registered in this jurisdiction, and to facilitate or ease the payment of dividends.

7. There is a clear and useful explanation of the steps involved in Part 1 of the Explanatory Statement which was required to be and was sent to shareholders as part of the statutory regime. That reads as follows: “The particular type of scheme of arrangement Gates Industrial Corporation is proposing to use to implement the Redomiciliation is known as a ‘cancellation scheme’. Under a cancellation scheme, a company cancels all of its outstanding shares by way of a reduction of capital (in this case, the Gates Reduction of Capital). This cancellation creates a credit in its books of account which is ‘capitalized’ (i.e., converted into share capital) with such new share capital being issued to a third party (in this case, New Gates). Accordingly, New Gates will be required to (and will commit to the Court that it will) issue one New Gates Share for every Scheme Share then held by such Gates Shareholder as of the Scheme Record Time. Consequently, New Gates will become the sole shareholder of the Company and the parent of Gates Industrial Corporation [that is to say New Gates], and the Shareholders of record will hold shares in New Gates.”

8. These cancellation schemes were, in time past, the preferred route for all takeovers or acquisitions under a scheme of arrangement. They fell back into history because their advantage over transfer schemes was that there was no stamp duty payable in consequence of them, but that advantage was removed by statute. The then-Chancellor of the Exchequer decided that such schemes caused inappropriate loss to the Exchequer, that this should be remedied, and by s.641 (2A) of the Companies Act 2006 , such schemes were rendered impermissible.

9. There is, however, a specific provision in section 641 (2B) to permit the use of a cancellation scheme where the purpose is to insert a new holding company into a group by way of a corporate reorganisation, rather than to effect a change of control. This has become a reasonably well-trodden road.

10. There is a fair wind for this Scheme: it has had very strong support from the scheme shareholders at the scheme meeting, which, as I shall describe in due course, was convened by direction of the Court. 99.61 per cent by value and 100 per cent by number of those voting at the scheme meeting approved the Scheme. There was also an uncommonly high turnout, with 92.4 per cent of the scheme shares voted at the scheme meeting. No intention to oppose the sanctioning of the Scheme has been communicated to the Company, and when the matter was called, it was plain that there was no one who wished to appear before me.

11. Without detracting from their significance, I should explain, as regards these numbers in respect of votes and attendances at the meeting, that in point of fact, and as is common, the shares of the Company are held through Cede & Co in intermediated form. Thus, the 100 per cent attendance is the result of the fact that there are only two registered shareholders, Cede & Co and one of the directors of the Company. The voting figures, however, reflect the instructions given by those who are believed to be the ultimate beneficial holders of the shares. The Company disseminated information about the Scheme through its usual means to those underlying ‘beneficial holders’, and operated its conventional meeting voting procedures as it has done since its NYSE listing in January 2018.

12. As an overview, the Scheme, and for that matter, the reduction of capital which is incidental to it, have seemed to me to be unexceptional. There are a couple of specific features which Mr Horan has very carefully taken me through, and which I should, in due course, address; but they are details as to the sequencing of the steps necessary, and before addressing those peculiarities, if I can describe them as such, it is convenient for me to consider first whether the jurisdictional preconditions for the sanction which is sought have been satisfied.

13. As regards that, I can be fairly brief. It seems to me clear that in every instance these jurisdictional preconditions have been so satisfied. In particular: (1) The Scheme is plainly one which satisfies the definition in that there is the requisite give and take between the Company and the members to qualify as an arrangement between them. (2) The single scheme meeting, which was directed by order of Deputy ICC Judge Baister (on 22 May) giving permission for a single meeting of holders of scheme shares as a virtual meeting to consider and, if thought fit, approve the Scheme, was plainly correctly constituted. There are no other classes and there are, to my mind, no fracturing interests which can be identified. (3) The holding of the scheme meeting virtually is said to have been better suited to participation by the Company’s underlying shareholder base, and to be in line with authorities, beginning with Re Castle Trust Direct Plc [2020] EWHC 969 (Ch) , a decision of Trower J in the grip or aftermath of the Covid pandemic. I have, in other contexts, expressed some disquiet about any general or default resort to virtual meetings, but in this case, and by reference to the particular way that the shares are held and the practices of the Company in the past, I am entirely satisfied that it was appropriate. (4) I have already explained the very considerable, almost unanimous, support expressed at the meeting so directed. I am also satisfied that those votes were cast on the basis of full and sufficient information. More particularly, I am satisfied that the explanatory statement was compliant with the form and requirements of the statute and was sufficiently circulated. In other words, I am satisfied that the relevant persons interested in shares voted on a fully informed basis after sufficient notification, in light of the timetable which is set out in the documentation. (5) I am also satisfied that the method of counting votes on the basis and for the reasons explained and approved by Snowden J, as he then was, in Re GW Pharmaceuticals plc [2021] EWHC 716 (Ch) was appropriate in this case. (6) In these circumstances, as regards the Scheme, it seems to me plain that the jurisdictional preconditions for the grant of a sanction have been satisfied.

14. Satisfaction of these jurisdictional preconditions opens the gate to the Court’s exercise of discretion. That is really the main focus of a sanction hearing, since, apart from the actual results of the meeting, the other matters will have been addressed at the convening hearing which necessarily precedes it.

15. It is always emphasised, and it is important to recognise, that the approval or sanction of the Court is not a ministerial matter; it requires the informed exercise of the Court’s discretion.

16. The criteria to be satisfied at that stage are set out in an extract from Buckley on the Companies Acts, set out in para.71 of Mr Horan’s helpful skeleton argument, which is almost invariably quoted in circumstances such as these. In a more recent case, Re TDG plc [2009] 1 BCLC 445 , Morgan J stated that there were four matters requiring attention when the Court was considering whether, in its discretion, to sanction any proposed scheme of arrangement. Those matters were adumbrated as follows: (1) First, the Court must be satisfied that the provisions of the statute have been complied with. For the reasons I have given, I am so satisfied. (2) Secondly, the Court must be satisfied that the class of shareholders, the subject of the scheme meeting, was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting, and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class they purport to represent. As I sought to explain in my decision in the matter of Re Wise plc [2026] EWHC 1572 (Ch) at para.36, this is a different issue to the statutory majority requirement in that it requires consideration of whether any vitiating interest motivated the majority in achieving the actual result. Given the numbers, it would be surprising to find any such vitiating interests, and I am satisfied that none is apparent. (3) Thirdly, to return to the adumbration of the criteria in Re TDG , the Court must be satisfied that an intelligent and honest person, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his own interests, might reasonably approve the scheme. As I explained in Re Wise also, that requires the Court, in a sense, to stand back and consider whether the Scheme could be said to be irrational and to be promoted against reason. In that regard, the explanatory statement deals clearly and at some length with the various considerations which led to the choice of Bermuda and the necessity or advisability, as it was perceived to be, of redomiciliation. I am entirely satisfied that good reason for redomiciliation has been provided, and apparently accepted by shareholders (including beneficial shareholders), and that this is not an irrational scheme. Indeed, in light of the numbers, it would be a brave judge who felt that he was the only person in the circle with a view of the rationale different from other people and that his or her view should displace the views of such a strong majority. (4) Fourthly, there must not be any so-called “blot” on the scheme. That, as I explained in Re Wise , is a slightly quaint term, generally thought to refer to some technical or legal defect in the scheme. For example, that the scheme plainly does not work according to its own terms, or that it would infringe some mandatory provision of the law. I shall have to consider, as I have said, the peculiarities of the Scheme as they have been explained, but suffice it to say that I am entirely satisfied also that there is no ‘blot’ on the scheme.

17. As regards the requisite reduction of capital, which I turn to next, the Court needs to be satisfied before it confirms a proposed reduction of five points adumbrated in the decision of Marcus Smith J in Re Diversified Energy Company plc [2025] EWHC 3081 (Ch) . These are as follows: (1) First, the resolution reducing capital must be validly passed by special resolution. Mr Horan took me to this aspect of the matter, and I am satisfied in that regard. (2) Secondly, the shareholders must be treated equitably in relation to the reduction. Shareholders do not all have to be treated in the same manner, provided that any unequal treatment is either in accordance with the rights attached to any class, or the consent of those affected by such treatment has been properly obtained, or does not otherwise prejudice them. There is no inequitable treatment in what is proposed, which is that a reduction of capital which will immediately be restored by the issue of new shares in place. (3) Thirdly, the proposals must have been properly explained to the shareholders, so that they can exercise an informed judgment upon them. The circular, which has been provided, as well as the explanatory statement in respect of the Scheme, is suitable for that purpose and has been sufficiently made available. (4) Fourthly, the resolution must be proposed for a discernible purpose. That condition too is satisfied, having regard to the explanation of and justification of what is proposed/offered in the scheme documentation. (5) Fifthly, the creditors of the Company must not be prejudiced in light of the fact that the reduction is immediately answered, or the new shares are substituted in the same amount. There is no question of any prejudice to creditors in this case.

18. I turn back, therefore, having provisionally concluded that both limbs of the application, that is to say the application for sanction and the application for confirmation of the reduction have been well-justified, and the statutory preconditions in respect of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction have likewise been fulfilled, to what I have termed to be the “peculiarities” which I should, as a matter of comprehensiveness, address.

19. Putting it very shortly, and in addition to the way in which the shares are held in dematerialised form (which is to be noted but is not out of the ordinary), the ‘peculiarities’ relate to an issue which arises under s.593 of the Companies Act 2006 , regarding the application of the reserve arising upon cancellation of the Company’s entire share capital.

20. More specifically, there is what Mr Horan has described as a technical ‘anomaly’ arising under s.593 of the Companies 2006 in respect of cancellation schemes. This arises because, if the new holding company does not hold any shares in the scheme company at the time that the scheme becomes effective, s.593 requires a public company to obtain a valuation of non-cash consideration for the allotment of its shares in certain circumstances.

21. In order to get past this anomaly, and as a technical matter, either it must be shown that the new holding company has at least one share in the scheme company, and thus be the only member of the scheme company at the time the reserve arising on the cancellation is applied in paying up the issue of new shares to the new holding company, or that the scheme company is not a public company at the moment that the reserve is applied.

22. Mr Horan explained that in order to preserve exactness in the registers between the position before and after, it is the latter course which is to be adopted in this case. That is to say, in between the cancellation of the scheme shares and the issue of the new shares to New Gates, a step is to be interposed, providing for the re-registration of the Company as a private company pursuant to s.651 of the Companies Act 2006 . As a private company, the provisions relating to the valuation of non-cash consideration simply do not arise.

23. The timing, however, is important and requires that the sequence that I have briefly alluded to is adopted. That requires both a small time between cancellation and re-issue of the shares and the engagement of Companies House to ensure that everything is done on the effective date, presently advertised to be 20 July 2026. It is intricate; but it is of comfort that this technique has been used in at least two recent cancellation schemes involving redomicile to Bermuda for which the orders, but not the explanatory judgments, are available: see the Orders made by Joanna Smith J on 21 November 2023 in Re Liberty Global plc CR-2023-001433 and by Adam Johnson J on 25 November 2025 in Re Cushman & Wakefield plc CR-2025-004659.

24. The obligation under the Scheme for New Gates to issue its shares to the Scheme shareholders as consideration for the scheme shares being cancelled is not dependent upon the re-registration of the Company. It is only dependent upon the scheme shares being cancelled. Any unexpected delay in the re-registration of the Company would not affect the Scheme shareholders. It would only affect New Gates being issued new shares in the Company which are paid up by applying the reserve arising from the cancellation of the scheme shares.

25. The proper sequence and the careful timing are important given the intricacy and importance of the timing, I have been informed that the Company’s solicitors, Sidley Austin LLP, have engaged with Companies House to ensure, as I understand it, that this sequence can be adopted and everything achieved in that sequence on the same day.

26. It seems to me that whilst there is a certain artificiality in one sense, in the whole architecture, nevertheless there is no objection to it, provided, of course, that there is no objection to the Scheme or the reduction of capital as a whole. As I have held, there is not.

27. I have mentioned that the proposed effective date is 20 July, and that is the date by reference to which the documentation has been crafted and is the date also on which I understand the NYSE listing for New Gates will be achieved. Clause 7(a) of the Scheme states that it will become effective upon delivery of a copy of the order to the Registrar of Companies and the approval of the statement of capital by the Court. That is consistent with s.899(4) of the Act , which provides that the Court’s order has no effect until a copy of it has been delivered to the Registrar of Companies.

28. Also, s.649(3) (a) provides for the reduction associated with the scheme of arrangement to become effective upon delivery of the order and statement to the Registrar of Companies rather than upon registration, unless the Court orders otherwise. The Court is not invited to order otherwise, nor there is there any reason for it to do so, and the automatic provisions will achieve the result which is required.

29. I think it remains only for me to note that, as is required, and in light of the fact of the likely application of US Securities Act 1933 to many of the persons interested, there is proposed to be an application of s.3 (a)(10) of that Act , providing for an exemption from the registration requirements of the US Securities Act for the New Gates shares to be issued pursuant to the Scheme. I am satisfied that this is both appropriate and necessary. I am satisfied that the reasons for it have been fully explained.

30. Mr Horan said that I did not have to do or determine anything in response to that notification, and that it was on that basis, amongst other things, that no expert evidence, but only a witness statement from a partner in Sidley Austin LLP, has been provided. I am content with the evidence, though it is not in expert evidence form, because it is simply a matter in a sense of record and for the reasons which I sought to explain in Re Wise plc .

31. Accordingly, it seems to me that this is a scheme which the Court can and should sanction, and the reduction of capital does not cause anything but a momentary lull and should also be confirmed. ______________