UK case law

Gavin Paul Carter & Anor v Terri Ann Davies & Ors

[2026] EWHC CH 2467 · High Court (Business and Property Courts) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. This is the latest round of litigation involving a long-running dispute arising out of C1’s failed project to develop a website platform to live-stream events (“ the Project ”), which was part funded by C1’s late mother.

2. This is my judgment following the hearing of the following cross applications: a. An application by D1 and D2 for (i) an order striking out the claim made against them, (ii) certification of that claim as totally without merit, and (iii) a general civil restraint order or an extended civil restraint order. b. An application by D3 to D5 for (i) an order setting aside a notice of discontinuance of the claim made against them, (ii) an order striking out that claim, (iii) certification of that claim as totally without merit, and (iv) an extended civil restraint order. c. An application by the Claimants to amend their Particulars of Claim. Background

3. D2 was the director and shareholder of The Red Communications Consultancy Limited (“ the Company ”), which was a publications and communications agency. It was dissolved in February 2018.

4. In 2014, the Company was contracted by C1 and/or his late mother to design the website for the Project.

5. C1 considered that the Company delivered a defective product and poor quality service. Rather than litigating that contractual dispute, between 2015 to 2017, C1 pursued his complaints via social media, which resulted in D2 closing all his social media accounts. Thereafter, C1 turned his attention towards D1, who is the wife of D2.

6. D1 brought proceedings against C1 for defamation and harassment (“the Earlier Proceedings ”), which were tried by Saini J, as he then was. In his judgment dated 15 November 2021, Saini J held that: a. C1 genuinely believed there was a legitimate claim for breach of contract against the Company; b. C1 had sought to involve D1 in that contractual dispute by targeting her through communications online, which made serious allegations of wrongdoing and inappropriate behaviour against her; c. it was not necessary for him to determine the merits of the underlying contractual dispute, since the real question to be determined was D1’s involvement, if any, in the Company and its supply of the alleged defective product. If C1 failed to establish D1’s involvement then it was conceded that D1 was the victim of serious wrongdoing at C1’s hands; d. D1 in fact had nothing to do with the business of the Company or the claimed defective product; and e. D1 was entitled to damages in libel and in respect of harassment.

7. By order dated 15 November 2021, Saini J a. Entered judgment for D1 against C1 for damages of £10,000 in libel and £25,000 in respect of harassment. b. Awarded costs against C1 in the sum of £35,000. c. Granted a final injunction prohibiting C1 from harassing D1.

8. C1 failed to pay all the damages and costs, and was made bankrupt on 28 February 2023 on the petition of D1.

9. On 24 November 2023, District Judge Shorthose dismissed C1’s application to annul the bankruptcy order.

10. On 28 November 2023, D3 and Ms Arvindar Singh were appointed as C1’s co-trustees in bankruptcy via their firm D4. D5 is the firm of solicitors acting for D3 and D4.

11. At a hearing on 20 June 2024, Zacaroli J, as he then was, dismissed the appeal against the order of DJ Shorthose dated 24 November 2023.

12. On 12 March 2025, D3 and his co-trustee applied for an order for sale of an apartment at 9, Water Mill Court, Hadley Place, Worcester (“ the Property ”), which had been purchased in the sole name of C2, who is the partner of C1, in November 2022 using £190,000 from C1’s late mother’s estate. Following a trial and by order dated 23 September 2025, District Judge Mody: a. declared that (i) the payment of £190,000 was void under s.284 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“ ”), and (ii) the entire legal and equitable interest in the Property vested in the applicants as C1’s trustees in bankruptcy pursuant to the 1986 Act s.306 of the 1986 Act ; and b. ordered that (i) the Claimants deliver up possession of the Property, (ii) and the Property be sold.

13. On 22 October 2025, DJ Mody dismissed the Claimants’ application for a stay of the possession order.

14. On 13 November 2026, the Claimants applied for permission to appeal the order of DJ Mody dated 22 October 2025.

15. On 3 December 2025, Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court issued an order restraining C1 from contacting or communicating with D1 or D2 save via solicitors or court (“ the Restraining Order ”).

16. On 10 March 2026, in the appeal against the order of DJ Mody, I dismissed the Claimants’ application for an order compelling D1 and D2 to file witness statements addressing the Claimants’ allegations of fraud and certified that application as being totally without merit. I recorded my reasons for doing so because (i) the skeleton argument filed in support of the appeal alleged that the Saini J judgment had been procured by fraud, and (ii) an application to set aside a judgment allegedly procured by fraud was by way of a fresh cause of action (separate Part 7 claim) rather than an appeal.

17. On 26 March 2026, Green J refused permission to appeal the order of DJ Mody dated 22 October 2025 and certified the appeal as totally without merit. In doing so, Green J recorded his reasons for doing so because C1 never appealed the Saini J judgment and instead now suggested that the judgment was procured by fraud, but C1 had not started new proceedings to claim that as he was bound to do as per Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd [2019] UKSC 13 .

18. On 1 May 2026, the Claimants brought the present claim. With no disrespect intended to the Claimants, who are representing themselves, the Particulars of Claim are not easy to follow, but the Claim Form states under ‘Brief details of claim’ – “Action to set aside the 2021 Judgment and resulting Bankruptcy as a manifest Nullity obtained via Fraud on the Court (pursuant to the mandate in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd).”

19. On 5 June 2026, the Defendants made their strike out applications, which were originally listed for hearing on 6 August 2026.

20. On 4 August 2026, the Claimants served a notice of discontinuance against D3 - D5.

21. On 11 August 2026, D3 – D5 applied to set aside the notice of discontinuance as an abuse of process.

22. Also, on 11 August 2026, the Claimants applied for permission to amend their Particulars of Claim. The draft Amended Particulars of Claim remove D3 – D5 as defendants but other than that largely duplicate the Particulars of Claim.

23. I read and heard submissions by the Claimants and counsel for the Defendants. I am unable in the course of this judgment to refer to all the evidence and arguments relied upon by the parties, but I have taken it all into account in reaching my decisions. Applicable legal framework

24. Civil Procedure Rules (“ CPR ”) r.3.4(2) permits strike out of a Particulars of Claim if it appears to the Court: “(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; […]”

25. CPR r.3.4(6) provides that: “If the court strikes out a claimant’s statement of case and it consider that the claim is totally without merit – (a) the court’s order must record that fact; and (b) the court must at the same time consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order” The proper meaning of “totally without merit” is simply “bound to fail” – R. (Grace) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1091 .

26. In Achille v. Calcutt & Carrington (No. 3) [2024] EWHC 2169, Pepperall J summarised the applicable law regarding civil restraint orders as follows: “[4.] Rule 3.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and Practice Direction 3C provide for three different levels of civil restraint orders and put the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control vexatious litigation, recognised in a series of cases culminating in Bhamjee v. Forsdick [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 , [2004] 1 W.L.R. 88 , on a statutory footing: [4.1] At the lowest end, a limited civil restraint order can be made where a party has made two or more applications which are totally without merit. Such order restrains the party subject to the order from making any further application in the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of the court: Practice Direction 3C, paras 2.1-2.2. [4.2] An extended civil restraint order can be made where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. Such order restrains the party subject to the order from issuing claims or making applications concerning any matter “involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made” without first obtaining the permission of the court: Practice Direction 3C, paras 3.1-3.2. [4.3] At the highest end, a general civil restraint order can be made where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate. Such order restrains the party subject to the order from issuing any claim or making any application without first obtaining the permission of the court: Practice Direction 3C, paras 4.1-4.2. [5.] It follows that a limited civil restraint order can effectively control a litigant who repeatedly makes applications in a single set of proceedings which are totally without merit but provides little control over a litigant who persistently issues claims or makes applications in multiple proceedings that are totally without merit. In such cases, the court will consider whether to make an extended or a general civil restraint order; the essential difference being that: [5.1] an extended civil restraint order can effectively control a litigant who has become obsessed with a particular incident or set of circumstances and persists in issuing multiple claims or making applications in multiple proceedings relating to those matters which are totally without merit; whereas, [5.2] a general civil restraint order is apt to cover the situation in which a litigant adopts a “scattergun approach to litigation on a number of different grievances without necessarily exhibiting such an obsessive approach to a single topic that an extended civil restraint order can appropriately be made”: per Brooke LJ in R (Kumar) v. Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [ 2006] EWCA Civ 990, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 536 , at [60]. [6.] In order to make the system work, judges are required to record the fact that a claim or application is totally without merit when striking out such a claim (r.3.4(6)) or dismissing such an application (rr.23.12 and 52.20(5)- (6)). Unless disturbed on appeal, a judge’s finding that a claim or application is totally without merit is conclusive and the court subsequently considering whether to make a civil restraint order should not entertain argument as to whether such claims and applications were in fact totally without merit: Crimson Flower Productions Ltd v. Glass Slipper Ltd [2020] EWHC 942 (Ch) ; Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary v. Gray [2019] EWCA Civ 1675 . In addition, the court can take into account other claims or applications where, although not formally certified as having been totally without merit, the court considering making a civil restraint order is satisfied were totally without merit: Sartipy v. Tigris Industries Inc. [2019] EWCA Civ 225 . ………. [8.] Once the threshold question of the repeated (or for the higher level orders, the persistent) making of claims and applications which are totally without merit has been met, the court must of course consider all the circumstances in order to determine whether it should make a civil restraint order at all; whether any such order should be a limited, extended or general civil restraint order; and the terms of the order.

27. CPR r.38.4 provides that where the claimant discontinues the claim the defendant may apply to have the notice of discontinuance set aside. In Excalibur & Keswick Groundworks Ltd v McDonald [2023] 1 W.L.R. Nicola Davies LJ summarised the applicable legal principles as follows: “[36.] CPR 38.4 provides a procedure and a time limit for a defendant to apply to have a Notice of Discontinuance set aside. In approaching applications to set aside a Notice, the court has a discretion which should be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with a case justly and at a proportionate cost. In Sheltam Rail Company (Proprietary) Ltd v Mirambo Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 829 (Com) at para 34 Aikens J stated in respect of CPR 38.4(1): “The working of the Rule does not impose any particular test that has to be satisfied before the court will set aside a notice of discontinuance that has been issued under 38.2(1) without the court's permission…” [37.] Henderson J (as he then was) in High Commissioner for Pakistan in the United Kingdom v National Westminster Bank [2015] EWHC 55 (Ch) stated at para 46: “… I consider that the court should approach an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance under CPR rule 38.4(1) on the basis that the court has a discretion which it should exercise with the aim of giving effect to the overriding objective of dealing with the case justly and at proportionate cost. If the facts disclose an abuse of the court's process that will, no doubt, continue to be a powerful factor in favour of granting the application but it would, in my view, be wrong to treat abusive process as either a necessary or an exclusive criterion which has to be satisfied if the application is to succeed.” [38.] Given the breadth of the discretion accorded to the court to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance, coupled with the fact that a claimant can discontinue as of right subject to limited exceptions, in my view the Judge was right to state that there need to be powerful reasons why a Notice of Discontinuance should be set aside. Further, I agree with the reasoning of Lavender J in Shaw and May J in Mabb that evidence of abuse of the court's process or egregious conduct of a similar nature is required on an application which has the effect of depriving a claimant of his right to discontinue.”

28. CPR r.17.1(2) provides that, in the absence of the written consent of the Defendant, the Claimant may only amend their Particulars of Claim with the permission of the Court. An application to amend will be refused if it is clear that the proposed amendment has no real prospect of success – SPR North Ltd v Swiss Post International (Uk) Ltd [2019] EWHC 2004 (Ch) . Strike out application of D1 and D2 Standing

29. It is necessary for a person with locus standi to bring a separate cause of action in fraud to set aside the Saini J judgment.

30. D1 and D2 argued that neither C1 nor C2 have standing to bring this claim since it is a claim of C1 that now vests in his trustees in bankruptcy.

31. Section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“ ”) states that: the 1986 Act “(1) The bankrupt’s estate shall vest in the trustee immediately on his appointment taking effect or, in the case of the official receiver, on his becoming trustee. (2) Where any property which is, or is to be, comprised in the bankrupt’s estate vests in the trustee (whether under this section or under any other provision of this Part), it shall so vest without any conveyance, assignment or transfer.”

32. In Heath v Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421 , two bankrupts applied for permission to appeal against the judgments upon which their bankruptcy orders were founded. It was argued that the bankrupts had standing to make the applications because, if they could get rid of the judgments, they would then be able to have the bankruptcy orders annulled on the ground that they should never have been made. Hoffman LJ (as he then was) concluded that there was no justification for departing from the established principle that a bankrupt cannot in his own name appeal from a judgment against him which was enforceable only against the estate vested in his trustee simply because the bankruptcy petition was founded upon that judgment debt. In reaching that conclusion Hoffman LJ stated (at page 1423, D to F) as follows: "An illustration of the incapacity of the bankrupt to bring proceedings is Boaler v Power [1910] 2 KB 229 , in which an action brought by the bankrupt and being dismissed with costs. The bankrupt then commenced another action to have the judgment set aside on the ground of fraud. The successful party presented a bankruptcy petition based on the unsatisfied order for costs and the bankrupt was adjudicated on the petition. The trustee declined to proceed with the second action. The petitioner then applied to have it dismissed and the judge's order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Farwell LJ said at page 232: “The right to continue the action is a chose in action vested in the trustee and the bankrupt has no locus standi … ."

33. The Claimants sought to distinguish Heath v Tang on the following grounds: a. The consequential relief sought by C1 against D1 and D2 is general damages for the psychiatric injury that he has suffered as a result of their multi-year campaign of harassment against him through the court process. That personal injury claim does not vest in C1’s trustees in bankruptcy in accordance with Ord v Upton [2000] Ch 352 . b. C2 is not bankrupt and has independent standing to challenge the underlying Saini J judgment debt, which was obtained by fraud and which resulted in enforcement action being taken against her solely owned home and that was a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

34. C1’s argument on standing proceeds on a misunderstanding of the relief that can be properly sought by a cause of action to set aside a judgment for fraud. The relief is as stated being the setting aside of the earlier judgment, which if granted will result in consequential directions being given for a new trial in the original proceedings. As stated by Aikens LJ in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Highland Partners [2013] EWCA Civ 328 (“ Highland ”) (at para [141]): “It is not for the judge considering this issue [of whether the original judgment is impugned for fraud] to re-try the question of the liability of the parties or to see whether the fresh evidence or new facts is material to the final result in the sense of what the decision might be if the matter were to be retried with honest evidence.” In other words, even if C1 was successful in establishing that the Saini J judgment was obtained by fraud, it would then be necessary to have a re-trial of D1’s claim for defamation and harassment on the true facts in the Earlier Proceedings, which will be re-activated on the setting aside of the Saini J judgment, together with any cross claim then brought by C1 for harassment. It would not be for the court in the present claim to determine the question of liability and damages arising out of those cross claims. Therefore, I conclude that C1’s claim to set aside the Saini J judgment for fraud is vested in his trustees in bankruptcy and he has no standing to bring this claim.

35. So far as C2’s standing, D1 and D2 argue that she has no standing to bring this claim because she was not a party to the original proceedings. However, in Takhar Lord Sumption in his analysis of an action to set aside an earlier judgment for fraud said this: “[61.] The cause of action to set aside a judgment in earlier proceedings for fraud is independent of the cause of action asserted in the earlier proceedings. It relates to the conduct of the earlier proceedings, and not to the underlying dispute. There can therefore be no question of cause of action estoppel. Nor can there be any question of issue estoppel, because the basis of the action is that the decision of the issue in the earlier proceedings is vitiated by the fraud and cannot bind the parties: Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1 , 21 (Viscount Dilhorne). If the claimant establishes his right to have the earlier judgment set aside, it will be of no further legal relevance qua judgment. It follows that res judicata cannot therefore arise in either of its classic forms.” If, properly analysed, a claim to set aside an earlier judgment for fraud is a cause of action wholly independent from the cause of action in the earlier proceedings, then I can see no basis for concluding that as a matter of principle a judgment obtained by fraud cannot be set aside by a non-party to the earlier proceedings provided that the non-party has a sufficient personal interest in doing so. Here C2 argues that she has been cheated out of her beneficial ownership of the Property because of the alleged fraud committed by D1 and D2 in obtaining the Saini J judgment.

36. The difficulty with C2’s argument is that the personal interest upon which she relies did not exist at the time of the Saini J judgment, which was handed down on 15 November 2021. The Property was acquired the following year using C1’s inheritance from his late mother. Therefore, not only was C2 not a party to the Earlier Proceedings, but she did also not possess any proprietary interest affected by the Saini J judgment when it was handed down. The loss of which C2 now complains arises from C1’s resulting bankruptcy and in particular the declarations made by DJ Mody on 23 September 2025 regarding the Property, and following a contested trial in proceedings to which C2 was a party. In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the subsequent acquisition of the Property is capable of conferring upon C2 a sufficient personal interest to maintain a cause of action alleging fraud in the Earlier Proceedings to which she was not a party.

37. I therefore conclude that neither of the Claimants has standing to bring this claim, which is vested solely in C1’s trustees in bankruptcy.

38. However, that does not leave the Claimants without a potential remedy. S.303(1) of the 1986 Act permits the Claimants, if dissatisfied with the decision of the trustees not to pursue the claim, to apply to the court for relief. S.303(1) of the 1986 Act provides: “If a bankrupt or any of his creditors or any other person is dissatisfied by any act, omission or decision of a trustee of the bankrupt’s estate, he may apply to the court; and on such an application the court may confirm, reverse or modify any act or decision of the trustee, may give him directions or may make such other order as it thinks fit.” Indeed, on 14 August 2026, C1 made an application pursuant to s.303(1) of the 1986 Act (“ the ”) seeking relief, which includes (i) a declaration that his trustees in bankruptcy have acted perversely in not pursuing the claim notwithstanding the evidence disclosed to them of the fraud on the part of D1 and D2 in obtaining the Saini J judgment, and (ii) an order that the trustees in bankruptcy assign the claim to C1 for nominal consideration. Section 303 Application Reasonable grounds for bringing the claim

39. In the event that I am wrong and the Claimants do have standing to bring this claim, I now consider whether or not they have reasonable grounds for doing so.

40. The legal principles applicable to a claim to set aside a judgment allegedly obtained by fraud were summarised by Aikens LJ in Highland (at para [106]) as follows: “first, there has to be a 'conscious and deliberate dishonesty' in relation to the relevant evidence given, or action taken, statement made or matter concealed, which is relevant to the judgment now sought to be impugned. Secondly, the relevant evidence, action, statement or concealment (performed with conscious and deliberate dishonesty) must be 'material'. 'Material' means that the fresh evidence that is adduced after the first judgment has been given is such that it demonstrates that the previous relevant evidence, action, statement or concealment was an operative cause of the court's decision to give judgment in the way it did. Put another way, it must be shown that the fresh evidence would have entirely changed the way in which the first court approached and came to its decision. Thus the relevant conscious and deliberate dishonesty must be causative of the impugned judgment being obtained in the terms it was. Thirdly, the question of materiality of the fresh evidence is to be assessed by reference to its impact on the evidence supporting the original decision, not by reference to its impact on what decision might be made if the claim were to be retried on honest evidence.”

41. An allegation of fraud is a very serious allegation, and so the greater is the need for particulars to be given, which explain the basis for the allegation - Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16

42. The allegations of dishonesty contained in the Particulars of Claim (and repeated in the draft Amended Particulars of Claim) are: a. D2 swore/represented that the Project was abandoned in October 2014, but this is directly disproven by the Company’s invoice dated 2 November 2014, which recorded the description “Presented to client on Thursday 23.10.14 all functions working and ready for the Beta test.” (“ the Incomplete Project Fabrication Allegation ”). b. D2 swore that he simply allowed the Project domain names to lapse, but the invoice dated 18 January 2016 confirms that a renewal fee was paid for a further two-year term (“ the Lapsed Domain Deception Allegation ”). c. D1 swore that she had no involvement in the Company or the Project, but this is directly contradicted by her witness statement dated 10 March 2025 made to Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court in support of the Restraining Order and in which she admitted that she had a business profile that included the email address at ‘Redcomms3d.com’ (“ the No Involvement Fraud Allegation ”). d. D2 swore that the contract was summarily terminated and the Company sacked in or around autumn 2014, but this is mathematically impossible as contemporaneous ledgers record that C1’s late mother made seven contract payments totalling £14,970.21 well past the alleged termination date (“ the Sacking Fabrication Allegation ”).

43. Saini J repeatedly made clear in his judgment that he was not making any findings in relation to the underlying contractual dispute, and so as a matter of general principle the Incomplete Project Fabrication Allegation, the Lapsed Domain Deception Allegation and the Sacking Fabrication Allegation could not have been causative of the Saini J judgment being obtained in the terms it was that C1 had no involvement in the Company or the Project.

44. Further, the fresh material now relied upon by the Claimants does not in any way evidence any conscious and deliberate dishonesty in relation to the evidence given by D1 and D2 in the trial before Saini J: a. The Incomplete Project Fabrication Allegation and the Sacking Fabrication Allegation – In his trial witness statement dated 21 July 2020 D2 stated as follows – “[4.] Mr Jed Jones finished the beta test version of the software in October and he and I successfully demonstrated the beta software to [C1] and his mother in Worcester on 23 October 2014…. We both explained that what had been demonstrated was the beta test version of the site and that the next step would be a beta test period during which time we advised [C1] to engage a small group of test users who would join the site as performers and users but without paying any monies. The idea of a beta test is to find all the bugs in the programming…. Mr Jones and I told [C1] that during the beta test phase we would fix any bugs free of charge….. [5.] This is the point at which matters with [C1] and his group went wrong. Instead of operating a thorough beta test and having us fix the issues that were bound to be in the software…. [C1] made the decision to go straight to Go Live and to charge users for access to the site….. ….. [7.] The relationship with [C1] got steadily worse and despite the offer that Mr Jones and I made to fix whatever was causing the issues with users [C1] sacked the agency from the project and demanded the code for the site.” Therefore, D2 did not, as now alleged, give sworn evidence before Saini J that the Project had been abandoned in October 2014 and/or the Company was sacked in or around autumn 2014. Rather, and entirely consistent with the contents of the new material relied upon by the Claimants, it was D2’s evidence before Saini J that, following the client presentation on 23 October 2014 the Project continued but the “relationship with [C1] got steadily worse” before “[C1] sacked the agency”. Indeed, Saini J found (at para [25.]) that C1 sacked the Company in January 2015, and so the Claimants cannot possibly show that the new material they seek to rely upon would have changed the way in which Saini J approached and came to his decision. b. The Lapsed Domain Deception Allegation – D2 stated in his trial witness statement (at para [10]) that – “I charged [C1] the fee associated with using the name he chose for the names I registered for two years – and the names remained registered to me. [C1] subsequently saw the domains up for sale – and assumed I was selling them. This is not the case – I simply allowed the registration to lapse and the Domain Name registrar then offered them for sale to whoever wanted to buy them”. It does not appear to be in dispute that D2 allowed the registration to lapse. The Claimants allege that D2 was guilty of deliberate dishonesty by concealing the fact that the registration lapsed in 2018 following the two-year renewal. However, in his trial witness statement D2 did not give a specific date for when the registration lapsed. Further, the fresh material now relied upon by the Claimants includes an email from D2 to C1 dated 19 January 2016, which states “Fee received for voiceboxlive.com domain names for two year renewal. Done.” Therefore, there can be no suggestion that D2 sought to conceal the action he took to renew the registration for a period of 2 years until 2018. Indeed, in his judgment (at para [27.], Saini J held that – “[D2] cancelled the automatic renewal option for the domain name voiceboxlive.com, although [C1] and his team could have continued to use it until its expiry in January 2018. In January 2018, [D2’s] registration of voiceboxlive.com ended. Another entity purchased it and then advertised it as for sale.” Therefore, and in any event, the Claimants cannot show that the renewal invoice dated 18 January 2016 would have changed the way in which Saini J approached and came to his decision. c. The No Involvement Fraud Allegation – In her witness statement to the Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court in support of the Restraining Order D1 stated – “… on 26 th FEBRUARY 2025.. [C1] sent me along with several other people CC’d an email where [C1] has continued to make allegations regarding the civil case in harassment and defamation, and his dispute with my husband. Within this email [C1] addresses me directly and attaches a screenshot of my business profile…….. The latest contact was an email chain which [C1] split into three chains…... The email chains continue to discuss the civil case and how [C1] believes he and his deceased mother have been defrauded and how he holds me responsible…..” The same screenshot of D1’s business profile was before Saini J, who dealt with it as follows – “[30.] I will turn to the relevant communications below, but for present purposes I note that until June 2019 [D1] was employed in a very senior position with Mercer UK. She reported to the CEO and was a member of UK Leadership Team. A re-organisation at Mercer meant that the role she occupied there was made redundant in June 2019. [31.] At some point [C1] discovered via the "back end" of Voicebox Live (that is, from the coding in the software- see above) that [D1’s] email address was registered as an "admin" at Red Communications. This led to him forming a belief as to [D1’s] involvement in the company from that address. That discovery was on Mr Pandey's evidence (which I accept) in August 2017 (that was some time after the first of the tweets about [D1] which are in issue). [32.] [D1] also had an email address with the Red Communications domain. [D1] only had an email address associated with Red Communications (as a personal one) which her husband had set up for her (purely as a matter of convenience). That does not mean she had any responsibility for the alleged defective services provided by Red Communications or role within it. I have no hesitation in accepting her case that she had absolutely no involvement with any of Mr Davies' businesses, including Red Communications. Their business lives were then, and remain now, completely separate. Mr Davies did not involve her in his businesses, and she was not even aware of the dispute between his company and [C1] until the events which give rise to this claim. [33.] As explained above, [C1’s] case as to [D1’s] involvement in the provision of a defective product is based upon assumptions he has made from the fact that [D1] had an email address and that she appeared in some code as an "admin" person. Against that I have her plainly truthful evidence that she in fact had nothing to do with the business of Red Communications or the claimed defective product. That evidence is the same as the also plainly truthful evidence of Mr Davies and Mr Jones. Mr Jones explained that "Terri" was used as an email address as part of his beta testing. It had nothing to do with [D1] and was never discussed with her. There is also no documentary evidence to suggest these witnesses are wrong. Mr Pandey's evidence to the contrary was based simply on what he regarded as normal practice (as to the role and powers of a person who is "admin"). I prefer the evidence of Mr Jones as the person who actually created the "admin" identity with "Terri". [34.] Parts of [C1’s] case rely on information gathered from so-called "data scrapers" on the internet. A data-scraping service such as holaconnect ([C1’s] source in this case) works by using "bots" (automated services) which pull together information from other sources on the internet and aggregate it if appears that the information from different sources pertains to one person. They do so without keeping that information up-to-date or with any regard for accuracy. To some extent, [C1] has been misled and strengthened in his misguided view as to [D1’s] involvement by such information.” In her witness statement to Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court D1 did not admit to having had any involvement in the Company or the Project. She merely referred to the screenshot of the holaconnect sourced business profile that C1 had sent D1 and which C1 had previously unsuccessfully sought to rely upon in the Earlier Proceedings as evidencing D1’s alleged involvement in the Company. There is absolutely nothing in D1’s witness statement to Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court that would have changed the way in which Saini J approached and came to his decision. This is another example, as noted by Saini J, of C1 having wrongly convinced himself of D1’s involvement based on the slenderest of foundations.

45. In my judgment, even putting the Claimants’ case at its highest, there is no rational basis upon which any of the pleaded allegations could satisfy the requirements identified in Highland . In particular, none is capable of establishing conscious and deliberate dishonesty by D1 and/or D2. Conclusion

46. In conclusion, I: a. dismiss the Claimants’ application for permission to amend their Particulars of Claim; b. strike out the claim against D1 and D2; and c. certify both the Claimants’ application to amend and their claim against D1 and D2 as totally without merit because I am satisfied that they were both bound to fail. D3 – D5’s application to set aside the notice of discontinuance

47. On 10 March 2026, I certified the Claimants’ application in the earlier appeal as being totally without merit.

48. On 26 March 2026, Green J certified the Claimants’ appeal as being totally without merit.

49. I have certified the Claimants’ application to amend their Particulars of Claim and their claim against D1 and D2 as each being totally without merit.

50. I am satisfied that the jurisdictional threshold for making an extended civil restraint order/general civil restraint order is met – persistence requires at least 3 applications or claims that are totally without merit ( Sartipy at [28]).

51. I do not consider that it is necessary, in order to achieve justice between the parties, to set aside the notice of discontinuance. It serves no practical purpose to reinstate the claim against D3 – D5 that has been abandoned by the Claimants simply then to strike out that claim with a view to certifying it as being totally without merit in circumstances where the jurisdictional threshold for considering an extended civil restraint order/general civil restraint order is already met.

52. That said, CPR r.1.4 requires the court to further the overriding objective by actively managing cases, which includes dealing with as many aspects of a case as it can on the same occasion. The Particulars of Claim alleged that by ignoring “the binary proof of fraud” committed by D1 and D2 in obtaining the Saini J judgment, the professional defendants were successors to that fraud. In his witness statement dated 5 June 2026, D3 responded to those allegations as follows: a. He denied all allegations of wilful blindness and/or that he has been a successor of any fraud. b. He confirmed that he has carefully considered C1’s claims that the Saini J judgment was procured by fraud and whether any potential action exists that has vested in him as joint trustee in bankruptcy. c. He explained in detail why he concluded by reference to the material supplied by C1 that any such action has no merit.

53. In light of my conclusions regarding the complete lack of merit in the underlying fraud claim against D1 and D2, I can see no realistic basis upon which C1 can maintain that part of his Section 303 Application alleging that his trustees in bankruptcy acted irrationally or perversely by declining to pursue the very same claim. Civil Restraint Order

54. The Claimants were clearly very emotional during the course of the hearing and undoubtedly under considerable stress. C1 said that he bore no ill-will towards D1 and D2, but was seeking justice for his late mother. Whilst I accept that C1 is genuine in those sentiments, unfortunately he showed absolutely no insight into the emotional harm caused to D1 and D2 as a result of subjecting them to unmeritorious and very serious allegations of fraud made both in these proceedings and the earlier unsuccessful appeal against the order of DJ Mody, which in my view are a continuation of the harassment that D1 and D2 have suffered for many years as a result of the failed Project.

55. Further, having turned his attention towards D1 after D2 had deleted all his social media accounts, C1 also now appears to be turning his attention towards his trustees in bankruptcy. In his witness statement dated 5 June 2026, D3 stated that C1 has raised many claims throughout his administration of C1’s bankruptcy estate and where his position has differed with C1 this has in turn led to the Claimants lodging a complaint about D3’s conduct with the regulatory body. About a week after the Claimants had discontinued the present claim against the professional defendants, C1 made his Section 303 Application.

56. I am satisfied that in all the circumstances it is appropriate to make an extended civil restraint order in the following terms: “The Claimants are restrained from issuing claims in or making applications to the County Court and/or the High Court (or taking any steps to authorise or cause or persuade any other person or persons to do so) concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to (i) the judgment of Saini J dated 15 November 2021, (ii) the First Claimant’s subsequent bankruptcy and/or (iii) the proceedings in which this order is made, without first obtaining the permission of HHJ Richard Williams (or, if not available, another section 9(1) judge sitting in the Business and Property Courts in Birmingham).”

57. The Claimants appear to have lost any sense of objectivity and realism. Unless such an extended civil restraint order is made it is very likely that further related claims/applications will be made by the Claimants, whether against the present defendants or others, which will also prove on examination to be totally without merit. Further unmeritorious claims/applications will continue to put significant pressure on the particular defendants/respondents and the court’s resources, and cause prejudice to other litigants seeking timely access to the courts. Balanced against that, I consider that the additional hurdle of requiring the Claimants to satisfy a judge that any further claims/applications have merit before they can be made is necessary, proportionate and entirely justified.

58. I do not consider that it is necessary to make a general civil restraint order, since the Claimants’ scattergun approach to litigation appears confined to the specific matters identified in the proposed extended civil restraint order.