UK case law

Geoffrey Khan v The Commissioners for HMRC

[2026] UKFTT TC 1362 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

Introduction

1. This is HMRC's application dated 22 December 2025 to strike out Mr Geoffrey Khan's appeal pursuant to rules 5 and 8 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 ("the Tribunal Rules"). The appeal concerns a Personal Liability Notice ("PLN") issued to Mr Khan on 12 January 2023 under section 69 D of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 ("VATA"), making him personally liable for a penalty imposed on Teqniq Limited ("Teqniq") under section 69 C VATA.

2. The hearing lasted 1 day and was conducted by video using the Microsoft Teams platform. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.

3. The documents to which I was referred were contained in the 288-page hearing bundle, 253-page authorities bundle and skeleton arguments from both parties.

4. HMRC contend that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal because Mr Khan previously appealed the same PLN (under appeal reference TC/2023/09574) and that appeal was withdrawn by Mr Khan's authorised representatives on 31 January 2024. HMRC submit that the withdrawal engaged section 85(4) VATA, with the consequence that the decision under appeal is deemed to have been upheld without variation, as though determined by the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal is therefore functus officio (which means the Tribunal has lost the power to change its final decision having ‘performed the office’) in relation to the PLN. Alternatively, HMRC submit that the appeal is barred by the principles of res judicata (which precludes re-arguing the same issue once a Tribunal has made a final decision) and abuse of process and, in any event, that permission should not be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time.

5. Mr Khan opposes the application. Whilst he accepts that his former representatives sent the notification of withdrawal on 31 January 2024, he submits that he did not understand the legal consequences of that withdrawal, that he was not properly advised by his representatives at the time, and that he did not appreciate that the withdrawal would be treated in law as a final determination of his appeal. He further submits that it would be inappropriate to treat the present appeal as an abuse of process without considering the particular circumstances of his case, including what he describes as serious failings on the part of more than one professional adviser.

6. I have sympathy for Mr Khan's position. I accept that he genuinely believes that he was poorly advised, that he did not understand the legal effect of the withdrawal of his earlier appeal, and that he has sought to challenge the PLN once he appreciated that HMRC continued to pursue him personally for the liability. However, the issue before me is ultimately a jurisdictional one. Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, I have concluded that section 85 VATA applies to the withdrawal of the earlier appeal and that the Tribunal consequently has no jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings. HMRC's application must therefore be granted.

7. The Tribunal’s decision, granting HMRC’s application, was given orally at the end of the hearing. Mr Khan requested full reasons for that decision, which are set out below. The law

8. In determining HMRC's application, I have considered rules 5 and 8 of the Tribunal Rules, together with sections 83G and 85 VATA.

9. Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Rules provides that the Tribunal must strike out proceedings if it does not have jurisdiction in relation to them. Rule 8(3)(c) further provides that the Tribunal may strike out proceedings if it considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case succeeding.

10. The principal statutory provision applicable to this application is section 85 VATA. Section 85(1) provides that where HMRC and an appellant reach agreement that the decision under appeal should be upheld without variation, varied or discharged, the same consequences follow as if the Tribunal had determined the appeal in accordance with that agreement. Section 85(4) provides: "Where— (a) a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies HMRC, whether orally or in writing, that he desires not to proceed with the appeal; and (b) 30 days have elapsed since the giving of the notification without HMRC giving to the appellant notice in writing indicating that they are unwilling that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, at the date of the appellant’s notification, the appellant and HMRC had come to an agreement, orally or in writing, as the case may be, that the decision under appeal should be upheld without variation."

11. The effect of section 85(4) VATA has been considered in several Tribunal decisions to which I was referred.

12. In Meridian Defence & Security Ltd v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 300 (TC) the Tribunal held that where section 85(4) applies, a withdrawn appeal is deemed to have been settled by agreement and the decision under appeal is treated as upheld without variation for all purposes as if determined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that the taxpayer was estopped from advancing the same case in subsequent proceedings and that it would amount to an abuse of process to permit the matter to be re-litigated.

13. In OWD Limited t/a Birmingham Cash & Carry (In Liquidation) v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 0497 (TC) (“ OWD ”) the Tribunal held that, once section 85(4) had taken effect and the statutory period had expired, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to reinstate the appeal. Judge Falk (as she then was) concluded that section 85 created the substantive legal consequences of withdrawal and that the Tribunal Rules could not be used to circumvent those statutory consequences. The Tribunal concluded that section 85(4) applied with the result that the Tribunal had no power to reinstate the appeals after the expiry of the statutory period (see OWD at [31]).

14. The same approach was followed in Shazadi Neelam Baig t/a Zara Trading Company v HMRC [2019] UKFTT 0127 (TC) . The Tribunal held that once section 85(4) had taken effect, there was no jurisdiction to entertain a late application to reinstate the withdrawn appeal. The Tribunal further held that a fresh appeal raising the same issues could not proceed because the earlier appeal was treated by statute as having been determined, leaving no appealable matter remaining.

15. Finally, I have considered section 83G(6) VATA, which confers a discretion on the Tribunal to permit an appeal to be made outside the statutory time limit. The exercise of that discretion is governed by the approach set out by the Upper Tribunal in Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (“ Martland ”), namely: (i) assessing the length and seriousness of the delay; (ii) considering the reasons for the default; and (iii) evaluating all the circumstances of the case, giving particular weight to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and for statutory time limits to be respected. I have also had regard to the subsequent authorities referred to by the parties concerning the application of those principles. However, those authorities are relevant only if the Tribunal retains jurisdiction to entertain the appeal notwithstanding the operation of section 85 VATA. If section 85 applies, the question of granting permission under section 83G(6) does not arise because there is no longer an appealable matter before the Tribunal. The facts

16. There is little dispute between the parties regarding the central chronology giving rise to this application. Having considered the hearing bundle, the parties' skeleton arguments and the oral evidence and submissions made at the hearing, I find the facts to be as follows.

17. Mr Khan was the sole director of Teqniq.

18. On 8 November 2022 HMRC issued Teqniq with a penalty under section 69 C VATA in the sum of £247,024.80 on the basis that Teqniq knew or should have known that its transactions were connected with VAT fraud.

19. On 12 January 2023 HMRC issued a PLN to Mr Khan under section 69 D VATA making him personally liable for the same penalty. HMRC considered Mr Khan to be the company officer responsible for the conduct giving rise to the section 69 C penalty.

20. Following a statutory review of the section 69 C penalty issued to Teqniq, HMRC issued a Review Conclusion Letter dated 22 March 2023 varying the penalty from £247,024.80 to £233,013.60.

21. On 22 August 2023, Mr Khan, acting through his then professional representatives, the Independent Tax and Forensic Services LLP, lodged an appeal against the PLN under appeal reference TC/2023/09574. The representatives were authorised to act on Mr Khan's behalf and a completed Form T239 authorising them to represent him before the Tribunal formed part of the appeal documentation.

22. At the same time, Teqniq had appeals before the Tribunal concerning related VAT assessments and penalties. By January 2024 the appeals were being managed together by the Tribunal. Mr Khan submitted that the linked nature of those proceedings contributed to confusion regarding the consequences of withdrawal.

23. On 19 January 2024, Mr Khan sent an email to his representatives indicating that he was no longer intending to pursue the Tribunal proceedings, that he intended to liquidate Teqniq and that he intended to deal with his "personal fine through the liquidator". Mr Khan relies heavily upon that communication as demonstrating that he misunderstood the legal effect of withdrawing his personal appeal.

24. On 31 January 2024, Mr Khan's representatives sent an email to the Tribunal, copied to HMRC, notifying withdrawal of appeal references TC/2023/07722, TC/2023/08565 and TC/2023/09574. The email stated that their client, Teqniq Limited and Geoffrey Khan, had decided to withdraw the appeals.

25. No notice was given by HMRC indicating any unwillingness for the appeal to be treated as withdrawn.

26. By letter dated 1 May 2024 the Tribunal confirmed that the appeals had been withdrawn and that any further application should be made within 28 days, failing which the files would be closed. A copy of the letter was sent to Mr Khan's representatives.

27. No application was made to seek reinstatement of appeal TC/2023/09574 within 28 days of that letter. Nor did HMRC give notice within the 30-day period specified in section 85(4)(b) VATA indicating that it was unwilling for the appeal to be treated as withdrawn.

28. Mr Khan's evidence before me was that he was unaware that the appeal had been withdrawn and that he did not receive either the notice of withdrawal or the Tribunal's subsequent correspondence confirming the withdrawal. He stated that he did not appreciate the legal consequences of the withdrawal and believed that matters relating to the PLN would be resolved through the liquidation process. He further stated that subsequent advisers also failed to advise him of the significance of the withdrawal. His pleaded case was that he subsequently learned, during a telephone call with a Tribunal clerk on 18 September 2025, that the appeal had been withdrawn, but did not appreciate the legal consequences of that withdrawal (which, he said, had not been explained to him by his former representatives, HMRC or the Tribunal) until reading HMRC's skeleton argument on 17 July 2026.

29. On 3 January 2025 HMRC wrote to Mr Khan indicating an intention to publish his name. Mr Khan relied on this letter as the first indication that, contrary to his understanding, the PLN remained a live personal liability.

30. On 14 January 2025 HMRC wrote to Mr Khan regarding the outstanding liability. Thereafter Mr Khan entered into discussions with HMRC and sought advice from professional advisers, including a solicitor and later advisers at Aspire. During this period correspondence took place with HMRC concerning the liability and an application for ADR was explored.

31. On 9 November 2025, Mr Khan, acting as a litigant in person, lodged the present appeal under reference TC/2025/04762 together with an application seeking permission to appeal out of time. The appeal challenged the same PLN which had formed the subject matter of appeal TC/2023/09574.

32. On 22 December 2025, HMRC filed the present application seeking to strike out the appeal. HMRC contends that the operation of section 85(4) VATA following the withdrawal of appeal TC/2023/09574 means that the PLN stands as if determined by the Tribunal and that there is therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal. Discussion Jurisdiction

33. HMRC's primary submission is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal because the earlier appeal against the PLN, appeal reference TC/2023/09574, was withdrawn and section 85(4) VATA therefore operated to deem the appeal determined in HMRC's favour. HMRC submit that, following the expiry of the statutory 30-day period, the Tribunal became functus officio , that is, it had no remaining power in relation to the earlier appeal, and there was no longer any appealable matter capable of being brought before the Tribunal. I accept HMRC's submissions on this issue.

34. The material facts are not in dispute. Mr Khan's appeal against the PLN was lodged by his authorised representatives. The acts of an authorised representative are, in the ordinary course, attributable to the represented party. On 31 January 2024, those representatives notified the Tribunal and HMRC that the appeal was withdrawn. Mr Khan accepts that the email was sent by representatives acting on his behalf and does not dispute that they were authorised to act for him at the relevant time. Nor is it disputed that HMRC did not notify any objection within the statutory period following that notification.

35. Section 85(4) provides that where a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies HMRC that he does not wish to proceed with an appeal, and HMRC does not object within 30 days, the legislation operates as if Mr Khan and HMRC had reached an agreement that the decision under appeal should be upheld without variation. Section 85(1) then gives that deemed agreement the same effect as a determination of the appeal by the Tribunal.

36. The authorities to which I was referred make clear that these statutory consequences are substantive rather than procedural. Section 85(4) deprives the Tribunal of any power to reinstate an appeal once the statutory period had expired. As Judge Falk observed in OWD at [31], once section 85(4) had taken effect there was no extant appeal capable of reinstatement A fresh appeal cannot be pursued because the earlier appeal had already been treated by statute as determined. The effect of the provision is to bring finality to the dispute.

37. Mr Khan submits that section 85 should not apply because he did not understand the consequences of the withdrawal. He says that he believed the matters would be dealt with through the liquidation of Teqniq, that he was not aware that the PLN would survive the liquidation process, and that neither his original representatives nor later advisers properly explained the position to him. He also submits that the fact that the various appeals were being managed together contributed to confusion as to what precisely was being withdrawn.

38. I have carefully considered those submissions. I accept that Mr Khan genuinely believes that he was poorly advised. I also accept that, at the time, he may not have appreciated the legal consequences which would flow from the withdrawal of his personal appeal. Further, I recognise that the financial consequences for him are significant and that he feels strongly that the substantive merits of the PLN have never been determined. However, those matters do not alter the operation of section 85(4). The statutory conditions are concerned with whether a notification of withdrawal was given and whether HMRC objected within 30 days. They do not require the Tribunal to investigate whether the appellant subsequently appreciated the legal effect of the withdrawal, nor do they depend upon the appellant's understanding of the statutory consequences. On the facts before me, I am satisfied that the statutory conditions were met. Mr Khan did not contend that the notification of withdrawal was forged, fabricated or sent without authority. His position was that he did not understand its consequences. Whilst I have sympathy for that position, it does not provide a basis for concluding that section 85(4) did not take effect.

39. I therefore find that appeal TC/2023/09574 became a deemed determination under section 85. The result is that the decision under appeal stands as if it had been determined by the Tribunal in HMRC's favour. There is accordingly no longer an appealable matter before the Tribunal. It follows that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal and that HMRC's application succeeds under rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Rules. Abuse of process

40. Given my conclusion on jurisdiction, it is unnecessary for me to reach any concluded view on abuse of process. Mr Khan submitted that abuse of process is not a mechanical doctrine and requires consideration of all the circumstances, including the quality of the professional advice he received and the fact that he did not understand the legal consequences of the withdrawal. I accept that proposition as a matter of principle. The doctrine involves an evaluative assessment and requires the Tribunal to consider the particular facts of the case before it. However, questions of abuse of process arise only if jurisdiction exists. Had it been necessary to determine the issue, I would have accepted that the matters relied upon by Mr Khan were relevant considerations in that assessment. However, those matters cannot create jurisdiction where the statutory scheme has removed it. Having concluded that section 85 VATA applies and that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the abuse of process issue does not arise for determination. Permission to make a late appeal

41. The parties also made submissions concerning whether the present appeal should be permitted to proceed out of time applying the principles in Martland . Again, that issue only arises if there is an extant appealable matter before the Tribunal. Having concluded that the earlier appeal was finally determined by operation of section 85 VATA, there is no appeal capable of being revived through the grant of permission to make a late appeal.

42. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for me to determine the parties' competing submissions on the length of delay, the reasons for delay, or the wider balancing exercise under Martland . Even if those matters were resolved in Mr Khan's favour, they could not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal once section 85 had taken effect. Conclusion

43. As I stated in my oral decision at the end of the hearing and at [6] above, I have sympathy for Mr Khan's position. I accept that he genuinely believes that he was let down by professional advisers and that he did not appreciate the consequences of the withdrawal of his earlier appeal. However, the Tribunal is a creature of statute and can only exercise those powers conferred upon it by Parliament.

44. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the withdrawal of appeal TC/2023/09574 engaged section 85(4) VATA and that, following the expiry of the statutory period, the appeal fell to be treated as determined in HMRC's favour. In those circumstances the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal. HMRC's application is therefore granted and the appeal is struck out pursuant to rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Rules. Right to apply for permission to appeal

45. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 24 September 2026

Geoffrey Khan v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT TC 1362 — UK case law · My AI Judge