UK case law
Grainful Holding Limited v Igor Mineev (On Contempt and Committal)
[2026] EWHC COMM 318 · High Court (Commercial Court) · 2026
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Full judgment
MR JUSTICE HENSHAW:
1. On 26 November 2025 I heard the Claimant’s contempt application dated 12 March 2025 against the defendant, Mr Mineev. The application alleged that Mr Mineev was in contempt of court in two particular respects. Mr Mineev did not personally attend the hearing on 26 November, but for the reasons I gave in an oral judgment at the time, I permitted him to appear remotely for the purpose of making oral submissions, which he did.
2. I made clear to Mr Mineev at the end of that hearing that he would be required to attend in person any hearing listed to determine sanction. I then handed down judgment on 19 December 2025 concluding that Mr Mineev was in contempt of court by a failure to comply with certain paragraphs of a disclosure order which I had made in October 2024, and I made an order on 19 December 2025 which gave directions for the sanction hearing and stipulated that Mr Mineev “ shall attend the sanction hearing in person ”.
3. There was then an exchange of submissions in relation to sanction. There was also correspondence between the parties and the listing office with a view to fixing today’s sanction hearing. Then, a few days before the hearing, by emails dated 3 and 4 February 2026 Mr Mineev requested permission to attend today’s hearing remotely suggesting that it was impossible for him to attend in person due to financial constraints, family medical circumstances and personal safety concerns.
4. After considering his two emails and an intervening response on behalf of the Claimant, I sent a message to the parties on the morning of 4 February 2026 refusing Mr Mineev’s request to attend the hearing remotely. I gave reasons for that refusal which I will now read into the record. The reasons were as follows: “I have considered Mr Mineev’s emails of 3 and 4 February 2026 and the Claimant’s solicitors’ email of 3 February 2026. At the end of the hearing on 26 November 2025, I made clear that Mr Mineev would be required to attend in person the hearing now listed for this Friday, 6 February 2026; and my order dated 19 December 2025 after handing down judgment expressly required Mr Mineev to attend the hearing in person. Attendance in person is necessary because this is a hearing to consider what, if any, sanction should be imposed on Mr Mineev following a finding of contempt of court. In those circumstances any application to vary the Order by permitting remote attendance (or, for that matter, seeking to adjourn the hearing to allow attendance in person at a later date) would have required compelling grounds supported by cogent evidence. Mr Mineev has provided no such evidence. Instead he has made another last minute request to appear remotely rather than in person, unsupported by any evidence or persuasive reasoning. (I say ‘another’ because Mr Mineev did the same thing shortly before the hearing on 26 November 2025). Mr Mineev’s suggestion in his latest email that he “acted as promptly as I reasonably could once it became clear that the Claimant would take the point that no supporting material had been provided” is hollow. Mr Mineev did not make his request for remote attendance until a few days before the hearing, and it was always obvious that any such request could carry no conviction unless supported by clear evidence. Mr Mineev has failed to establish that financial constraints make travel to London unaffordable to him, and has given no explanation of why that should now have become the case, not having been mentioned in any of the correspondence between the parties and the listing office in relation to the listing of the hearing. Mr Mineev’s undocumented assertion that he is needed on standby to help a relative with mobility limitations following a hip fracture does not establish the asserted impossibility of his making a trip to London for the hearing. At the previous hearing I considered and rejected Mr Mineev’s alleged concerns about personal safety and he has provided no evidence of any change in circumstances or which should otherwise cause the court to reconsider the matter. Mr Mineev’s request to attend the hearing remotely is therefore refused. The existing Order stands, and he must attend the hearing in person.”
5. Despite that decision, Mr Mineev has not attended the hearing this morning and, so far as I know, nothing further has been heard from him since then. I therefore have to decide whether to proceed with the hearing in his absence or to adjourn the hearing and issue a bench warrant to secure his attendance, bearing in mind, however, that he is, based on all the evidence reviewed at the last hearing, abroad and not within this jurisdiction.
6. The court’s power to proceed in the absence of a party at a trial or hearing extends to the hearing of a contempt application, but as the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, continuing in the absence of a party is an exceptional cause that requires justification: see Oliver v Shaikh [2020] EWHC 2253 (QB) at [26]. Because contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, I have had regard to the principles and factors set out in R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5 , including the point that the power to proceed in the defendant’s absence should be exercised with great caution and with close regard to the fairness of the proceedings. I have also had regard to the considerations set out by Cobb J in Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) which are derived in part from the Jones case.
7. In the present case the position appears to me as follows. i) Mr Mineev has chosen not to attend, in circumstances where he has been ordered to attend and has provided no adequate explanation for his absence. In those circumstances, it seems to me correct to view his absence as deliberate and voluntary, and thus as a waiver of his right to participate. ii) It seems to me unlikely that an adjournment would result in Mr Mineev being present at a further hearing. Given that he is abroad, a bench warrant could not be expected to result in his appearance at any time in the near future, if at all; and given the course of events to date, I doubt very much that Mr Mineev would attend voluntarily. iii) Any adjournment would, given the state of the Commercial Court list, result in a delay of some months, which would be prejudicial to the Claimant, and unfairly so in terms of both time and likely irrecoverable costs. iv) The evidence, including that reviewed at the hearing in November 2025, makes clear that Mr Mineev has on several occasions been reminded of the availability of legal aid. v) There is some disadvantage to Mr Mineev in not being able to make submissions on the questions of sanction and costs. However, he has taken the opportunity to provide submissions, particularly in relation to sanction, by way of the written submissions he filed dated 16 January 2026 which I have read and considered. In addition, if the hearing proceeds in Mr Mineev’s absence, then counsel for the Claimant will, of course, be under a heightened obligation to make sure that the case is presented fairly and that all relevant points are drawn to the court’s attention. vi) The general public interest in favour of the sanction hearing taking place within a reasonable time of the events in question supports the view that the hearing should proceed.
8. Taking account of all those circumstances, I have concluded that it would be fair and proper to proceed with the hearing today and I shall therefore do so. (Hearing continues)
9. On 26 November 2025, I heard the Claimant’s committal application issued on 12 March 2025 against Mr Mineev, alleging contempt of court in two categories. As I have already explained in an oral judgment during this hearing, Mr Mineev did not personally attend that hearing but attended remotely and made submissions. In due course, I handed down judgment on 19 December 2025, including a finding that Mr Mineev was in contempt of court, and remained in contempt of court, for failure to comply with paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of a disclosure order which I had made on 22 October 2024. I also concluded that he was not in contempt of court by reason of the other alleged breach.
10. The present hearing is to deal with sanction, and in the circumstances explained in my earlier oral judgment today, it has proceeded in Mr Mineev’s absence. I have nonetheless read, and had careful regard to, written submissions with a statement of truth which Mr Mineev filed on 16 January 2026, which include purported late compliance with his obligations under the disclosure order.
11. Mr Mineev exhibited to those submissions three documents, namely: (1) a certificate of incorporation for Pedal Global Holdings Limited, an English company; (2) an unsigned term sheet listing Mr Mineev’s corporate vehicle, Minstep Limited, as a potential new investor in Pedal; and (3) a spreadsheet of transactions detailing cryptocurrency transactions entered into by Mr Mineev on the GlobalBlock platform between 20 November 2019 and 4 December 2023.
12. I have also taken into consideration the fourth witness statement of Tatiana Menshenina of the Claimant’s solicitors, Fladgate, dated 30 January 2026. That witness statement sets out the Claimant’s response to the disclosure and information provided by Mr Mineev in his submission. I have also had the benefit of oral submissions and a written skeleton argument from counsel for the Claimant, Mr James Goodwin, and I am satisfied that he has fulfilled his duty, during the course of the hearing in Mr Mineev’s absence, to present all matters fairly to the court, including such points as one might reasonably anticipate Mr Mineev or his representatives would have taken had they been present.
13. In considering sanction, I have contemplated the range of powers available under section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 , ranging from no sanction, through a fine, up to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. I have also considered the case VIS Trading Co Ltd v Nazarov [2015] EWHC 3327 (QB) relating to cases such as the present where the defendant/contemnor does not attend the hearing and is abroad, with the result that a sentence may be incapable of being executed unless the contemnor returns to the UK. As indicated in that case, those factors are not a reason for refraining from imposing whatever sanction would otherwise be imposed; and it is important to bear in mind in that context, first, the possibility that the contemnor may wish to return to the UK at some point, and also the reputational and business consequences which flow from the making of a committal order, even in relation to an absent defendant.
14. I have had regard to the considerations set out by the Supreme Court in HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 and also to the categorisation of contempt cases indicated by Jackson LJ in JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No 2) [2012] 1 WLR 350 . Jackson LJ in that case indicated at [56] that the court may see fit to indicate (a) what proportion of any sentence should be served in any event as punishment for past breaches ,and (b) what proportion of any sentence the court might consider remitting in the event of prompt and full compliance thereafter.
15. I have noted also that another approach open to the court, should it decide that only a custodial sentence is appropriate, is to suspend the sentence on condition that the defendant complies with stipulated requirements (arising from the obligations the defendant was required to comply with in the first place). That was the approach taken by Dame Clare Moulder in the case of Deutsche Bank v Sebastian Holdings & Alexander Vik [2022] EWHC 2057 (Comm) , which I later considered in my decision at [2023] EWHC 2563 (Comm) in the same case. The approach taken in Vik in fact turned out not to work, for the reasons considered in my judgment, but in principle it is workable in my view provided the order is appropriately formulated.
16. I have noted that, as Mr Goodwin has fairly drawn to my attention, this is not a case of breach of a freezing order, such breaches being regarded in the authorities as particularly serious and deserving of condign punishment and a custodial sentence. On the other hand, the rationale in the present case is very similar to a disclosure order in a freezing injunction. The order in the present case was granted in aid of an order under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996 for the enforcement of an arbitration award. Like a disclosure order in a freezing injunction, the disclosure order in the present case aims to help the judgment creditor (here, award creditor) obtain enforcement of the sum to which it is entitled under the judgment or award: see eg Kea Investments v Watson [2020] EWHC 2796 (Ch) .
17. As I mentioned, Mr Mineev in his recent submissions (which I also regard as evidence given the statement of truth) purported to comply with the original disclosure order, and disclosed three documents. It is relevant to consider in the context of sanction the extent to which he has thereby belatedly complied with the disclosure order.
18. I have considered carefully, and counsel has taken me through, the detail of Mr Mineev’s submissions as compared with the requirements of the disclosure order. Frankly, it has to be said that, as the Claimant submits, Mr Mineev has not complied meaningfully with the disclosure order, let alone in full.
19. The deficiencies in his purported compliance are set out in a number of paragraphs of the fourth witness statement of Ms Menshenina, and it is fair to say that there is a long list of parts of the disclosure order where Mr Mineev has still failed to provide meaningful, or any, compliance.
20. As regards paragraph 1 of the disclosure order, there has been failure to comply in relation to bank accounts, as set out in paragraphs 13 to 18 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement. Although Mr Mineev’s submissions refer to bank accounts with Halifax and Barclays and to payment services accounts held with Wise and PayPal, he has failed to provide any identifying details of those bank accounts of the kind set out in paragraph 1(a) of the disclosure order including, among other things, the date of closure of closed accounts, and he has not provided statements for any of the accounts. The failure to provide any statements is all the more surprising in circumstances where in his recent emails to the court Mr Mineev stated that he would be able to provide “ current bank. statements ” and current statements and balance confirmations for his accounts with Wise and PayPal “ if required ”.
21. There has also been non-compliance in relation to disclosure of debts owed by Mr Mineev: see paragraph 26 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement. Mr Mineev says he has no complete record of these but, in fact, has provided no details at all of debts owed. I am satisfied that there has also been non-compliance or only partial compliance in relation to sums received from parents/in-laws (see paragraph 30 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement); household income and outgoings (see paragraph 31 of the witness statement); records of business trips (see paragraph 33 of the witness statement): even in circumstances where Mr Mineev has made no suggestion of lack of access to the Airbnb and Booking.com site used for some of those trips; and in relation to steps taken to obtain access to documents not currently in Mr Mineev’s possession, as required by paragraph 1(o) of the disclosure order (see paragraph 38 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement).
22. In relation to paragraph 3 of the disclosure order, there has been material non-compliance in relation to financial statements (see paragraph 42 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement); Mr Mineev’s interest in Minstep: in relation to which no documents have been provided in any of the categories set out in the disclosure order (see paragraphs 43 and 44 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement); and in relation to liabilities, salaries and investment/assets (see paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 respectively of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement).
23. Finally, there has been material non-compliance in relation to paragraph 4 of the disclosure order, which stipulated particular ways by which Mr Mineev was required to comply with the order as regards accounts to which he no longer had access or which had been closed (see paragraph 49 of Ms Menshenina’s witness statement).
24. In these circumstances, I agree with the Claimant that any mitigation which arises from late compliance with the disclosure order should take into account the fact that such belated compliance as has taken place has been at best partial. I also agree that, in those circumstances, it is appropriate for at least part of any sanction or sentence to be designed so as to encourage further (and indeed full) compliance with the disclosure order. I therefore turn to the question of the appropriate sanction.
25. In my view, Mr Mineev’s non-compliance with the disclosure order involved at least a moderately high degree of culpability. Certainly until Mr Mineev’s very recent and very limited efforts to comply, there was a wholesale failure to comply with the disclosure order: and, as set out in my original judgment, that included respects in which there could not have been any inability on Mr Mineev’s part to comply with the order.
26. The harm to the Claimant is high, because Mr Mineev’s non-compliance was and is materially detrimental to the Claimant’s efforts to recover the sums to which it has been held to be entitled.
27. Having considered all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a fine would not represent a sufficient sanction and that only a custodial sentence will suffice in order to mark the seriousness of the contempt.
28. I have taken into account such mitigation as Mr Mineev may be entitled to, by reason of his recent submission/evidence. I also take into account the potential impact of any custodial sentence on third parties, specifically the relative to whom Mr Mineev has referred in his recent communications, who is said to need attention (or at least the availability of attention) following a hip fracture. I do not consider this to be a case where Mr Mineev is entitled to point to any early admission of contempt and, in any event, he remains materially non-compliant with the disclosure order notwithstanding the conclusions I reached in my judgment in November 2025.
29. In my judgment, the shortest sentence commensurate with the seriousness of the contempt is a custodial sentence of five months’ imprisonment.
30. In my view, in all the circumstances and bearing in mind Mr Mineev’s absence from the jurisdiction and the high degree of ongoing non-compliance with the disclosure order, the most appropriate way to proceed is for the sentence to be suspended on condition that Mr Mineev complies with the outstanding obligations in the disclosure order, which will be set out in a schedule to the order following this hearing.
31. It seems to me that a period should be set for compliance with the outstanding obligations which, subject to any further submissions from counsel, I would set at two months. The period of suspension should be sufficient both to incorporate the time for compliance with the conditions, and also to accommodate the need for a further hearing in the event that the Claimant considers that there has not been full compliance with the conditions. Again subject to any further submissions, I propose to make the period of suspension twelve months. I shall hear counsel on the precise terms of the order.
32. The effect of the sentence will be that if Mr Mineev fails to comply in full with the conditions attached to it, the Claimant will be entitled to return to court and ask the court to activate the sentence, which would result in Mr Mineev being taken into custody. He would then serve half of the activated portion of the sentence before being released on licence.
33. Mr Mineev is entitled to appeal the sentence without permission. The appellate court is the Court of Appeal. Any appeal must be commenced within 21 days after the date of the order reflecting this judgment.
34. After hearing further from counsel, I shall read the statement required by the Practice Direction on (Committal for Contempt: Open Court) and I shall also arrange for the publication via the prescribed channels of my judgment once transcribed and of the Practice Direction statement. - - - - - - - - - - (This Judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com