UK case law

HQ Foods (B'Ham) Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC

[2026] UKFTT TC 1349 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Introduction

1. On 27 April 2026, the respondents (“HMRC”) made an application for strike out of the appellant’s appeal pursuant to Rule 8 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended) ("the Rules").

2. In summary, the substantive appeal concerned HMRC’s decision dated 26 June 2024 to issue Post Clearance Demand Notes (“C18s”). Those C18s were issued as follows:- Description Date of Issue Customs Duty C18 – 50648 1 July 2024 £22,179.37 C188336793 8 July 2024 £25,743.89 Total £47,922.76 The notification of the total amount assessed was made under section 20 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule 6, Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 (“TCTA”).

3. The general rule in section 16(3) Finance Act 1994 , the full text of which we include at paragraph 61 below, is that an appellant who wishes to bring an appeal against an assessment must pay or deposit the amount of the assessment with HMRC. If not, HMRC have the power to issue a certificate stating either that they have received adequate security from the appellant or that, on the grounds of potential hardship, a lesser level of, or no, security suffices. If no such certificate is issued by HMRC an appellant can apply to the Tribunal to decide whether HMRC should not have refused to grant such a certificate and that a reasonable level of security, if any, has been given.

4. The Notice of Appeal in this case was lodged with the Tribunal on 18 September 2024. It did not make a hardship application but stated that a decision on hardship was awaited from HMRC and that it had applied to HMRC for their agreement to the appeal proceeding without it first paying the disputed tax. No such application had been made.

5. On 15 January 2025, the Tribunal directed the appellant, within 14 days, to provide the Tribunal with a copy of the hardship application it had previously made or, make a hardship application and provide the Tribunal with a copy or pay, or deposit, the duty in dispute.

6. The appellant did not do so. On 7 February 2025, the deadline having expired, the appellant wrote to the Tribunal enclosing a one page bank statement dated 6 February 2025. HMRC treated that as a hardship application to HMRC.

7. Correspondence ensued and, ultimately, on 1 August 2025, HMRC rejected the hardship application on the basis that the appellant had failed to provide adequate financial evidence.

8. On 13 August 2025, having been notified of the rejection, the Tribunal issued Directions for the determination of the hardship application.

9. On 10 December 2025, this Tribunal had heard the appellant’s hardship application which had been opposed by HMRC (“the First Hearing”). The Tribunal issued a verbal decision that the hardship application was dismissed. However, there followed a discussion and Mr Abernethy, for HMRC, made a concession that since the appellants had argued that the appellant’s bank had ring fenced £47,922.76 (being the amount of the Customs Duty), the appellant should be given the opportunity to pay the duty.

10. The only evidence of that argument was a bank statement, which was produced after a brief adjournment, showing that sum being transferred out of the appellant's bank account into another, and unknown, bank account. The appellant was unable to explain to the Tribunal where the money had gone or why the transfer had not been identified earlier.

11. A period of seven days was offered but ultimately, of consent, the Tribunal issued a verbal decision and Direction during the Hearing. The written Decision and Direction, which was issued on 8 January 2026, was in the same terms. It read as follows: “1. The Tribunal decided that the application for hardship is dismissed and therefore, unless the duty at issue is paid to HMRC in full by no later than noon on 24 December 2025, the appeal will not be entertained as it will be invalid.

2. HMRC are DIRECTED to confirm to the Tribunal by no later than 5pm on Friday 9 January 2026 whether or not the duty has been paid.”

12. There was no compliance with the Direction and no payment was made by 24 December 2025; hence the strike out application

13. We had a Bundle extending to 357 pages and Skeleton Arguments from both parties. The appellant’s Skeleton Argument also exhibited a letter from its exporter dated 16 July 2026 (“the Amanda Letter”).

14. With the consent of the parties, the hearing was conducted by video link using MS Teams. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public. The Facts

15. At all times the appellant has been represented by Vaghela & Co (Services) Limited who are accountants (“the Agent”).

16. The appellant imports tinned fish roe (“the Goods”) from Amanda Roe (“the Exporter”) in Denmark.

17. On import the appellant’s freight agents had declared that the Goods were entitled to preferential treatment under the UK/EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement and/or the Agreement on Trade in Goods between Iceland, Norway and the UK.

18. During post-clearance checks, Officer Grainger requested information regarding the goods that had been declared for preferential treatment. He initially requested information regarding three entries that had presented concerns and, following a visit to the appellant, seven further entries were identified for verification. The officer requested copies of the invoices.

19. HMRC noted that the invoices stated that “The product covered by this document are (sic) NOT of preferential origin…”.

20. Correspondence ensued and on 26 June 2024, the officer issued his decision letter which was to the effect that: (a) The Goods were not wholly obtained from the EU or Norway. (b) The Goods did not qualify for preferential treatment.

21. On 6 September 2024, the Review Conclusion letter was issued concluding that: (a) the C18s had been calculated correctly; (b) the decision to issue the C18s was upheld because the requirements for claiming preferential treatment had not been met; (c) a debt was due under section 4(1) of the TCTA and the appellant was liable for that debt under section 6 of the TCTA.

22. The appellant did not pay the Customs Duty and had simply told HMRC that payment of the duty to HMRC would cause it hardship. HMRC were not persuaded by the information provided by the appellant and had not accepted the appellant’s position. The appellant appealed to the Tribunal on 18 September 2024. As we have indicated, that Notice of Appeal purported to indicate that a hardship application had been made.

23. The hardship application was on the basis that the company did not have the wherewithal to meet the customs duty demand.

24. On 29 April 2025, Officer Fereday began a review of the hardship application.

25. On 2 May 2025, Officer Fereday issued a letter requesting supporting records and she provided details of the Deed of Guarantee process. She requested a response by 31 May 2025. The Agent requested an extension of time and on 3 June 2025, the Agent emailed HMRC containing a letter which stated that the appellant “is prepared to give a Deed of Guarantee to HMRC” and requested that a Deed of Guarantee be sent to the company for signature. The following day the officer emailed the Agent with instructions for completion of a Deed of Guarantee, a Deed of Guarantee form and the relevant website information.

26. On 11 June 2025, the Agent emailed HMRC with a copy of the Deed of Guarantee and a cover letter. The Guarantee had been signed by the appellant as guarantor.

27. On the following day, the officer emailed the Agent and advised them that the guarantor had to be either a bank or a financial institution and the appellant could not be its own guarantor. She provided a link to the .Gov website for further information.

28. On 26 June 2025, the officer emailed the Agent to advise that if a Deed of Guarantee was presented then the hardship application was not required and the Agent was given a deadline of 1 July 2025 for a response.

29. On 8 July 2025, the Agent asked for an extension of time due to a bereavement and stated that the Deed of Guarantee would be remitted by 31 July 2025.

30. On 21 July 2025, the officer replied to the Agent referring to the email of 26 June requesting confirmation that the hardship application was to be withdrawn.

31. On 1 August 2025, the officer formally opposed the hardship application on the basis that no financial records had been supplied. However, she stated that if a Deed of Guarantee, in appropriate terms, was provided a hardship application would not be required. That decision was issued in accordance with the Finance Act 1994 Section 16(3) , and Articles 44-45 of the Union Customs Code.

32. The letter concluded by stating: “If you still wish for your appeal to be heard without securing the amount, you must make an application directly to HM Courts and Tribunals Service who will consider your hardship application. Please be aware that if you do not either make a hardship application to HM Courts & Tribunals Service or pay the tax in dispute, HM Revenue & Customs may apply to the tribunal to have the notice of appeal struck out. If your appeal is struck out by the tribunal the tax/duty will become due and any interest accrued payable. Debt recovery action may commence shortly afterwards.”

33. On 13 August 2025, the Tribunal issued Directions noting that HMRC had rejected the hardship application and stating that a video hearing would be listed. The appellant was directed to serve on HMRC, and file with the Tribunal, a List of Documents on which it intended to rely in the hearing and that by no later than 12 September 2025.

34. On 15 August 2025, the Agent wrote to the Tribunal stating: – “Thank you for your letter of 13 August, and we note its contents. As our client Company wishes to proceed with their Appeal and are in the process of obtaining a Deed of Guarantee from their Bank, we do not think a video Hearing of the Hardship application will be necessary. As soon as we receive the Deed of Guarantee from our client Company we will send a copy of it to you.”.

35. The appellant failed to comply with the Tribunal directions and only served its List of Documents on HMRC on 10 October 2025 after HMRC had filed its own List of Documents and written to the Tribunal, copied to the Agent, stating that the appellant had failed to comply with the Directions. The Agent responded stating that they had filed the List of Documents with the Tribunal (only) on 1 October 2025.

36. The List of Documents did not include either the documents requested by HMRC on 2 May 2025 or a Deed of Guarantee.

37. Correspondence ensued. No Guarantee was produced. The appellant only provided HMRC with a bank statement for single day. Despite repeated requests, the appellant failed to provide the required financial documents including three months bank statements, management accounts, cashflow forecasts, and creditor and debtor lists.

38. HMRC maintained their position opposing the hardship application and, as can be seen, the hardship application was dismissed. That decision was not appealed.

39. When issuing the verbal Direction on 10 December 2025, (and in the written Direction that followed) the Tribunal made it explicit that in the absence of payment of the Customs Duty by 24 December 2025, there would be no valid appeal.

40. On 23 December 2025, the Agent emailed the Tribunal and HMRC stating: – “As directed by the Tribunal on 10 December 2025, we enclose herewith Barclay’s Bank Letter to our client company confirming the availability of Funds of £47,922.76 as deposit of Customs Duty for your attention.”

41. In summary, that letter stated that it was confirmation that the appellant had a guarantee “application underway” and that the bank had funds held in a separate account as cover for a guarantee.

42. On 24 December 2025, at 8:23 am, HMRC wrote to the Tribunal and to the Agent pointing out that the agreed Direction had been for the appellant to pay the Customs Duty in dispute by 24 December 2025 and that the appellant had not been afforded a further opportunity to obtain a guarantee. HMRC sought strike out of the appeal on the basis that the appellant had failed to comply with the Direction (“the Application”). They referred to Rule 6(2)(a) of the Rules.

43. On 8 January 2026, the short Decision of the Tribunal including the Direction was issued to the parties. On the same day, the duty Judge, Judge Brooks, requested that the Tribunal write to the parties confirming that the Application had been referred to him. He directed that by no later than 22 January 2026 the appellant should confirm whether or not there was an objection to the Application, and if so why. HMRC were given 14 days to respond with reasons.

44. On 9 January 2026, the Customs Duty was paid to HMRC.

45. On 12 January 2026, the Agent confirmed that they objected to the Application arguing that the bank had taken “a very long time” to provide the required guarantee and so, on 9 January 2026, the Agent had instructed the appellant to make a “direct payment” to HMRC which they had done. They argued that the delay in making payment was regrettable but had not been in the appellant’s control. They wished to prosecute the appeal.

46. On 13 January 2026, HMRC responded again pointing out that the appellant had been required to pay the Customs Duty by no later than 24 December 2025 and had failed to do so. They reiterated their requests, dated 24 December 2025 and 9 January 2026, for strike out and asked that the matter be referred to Judge Scott for final determination.

47. The Application on 24 December 2025 was premature since the appellant had until noon on that date to make payment of the duty. The second application on 9 January 2026 was timeous.

48. On 1 April 2026, the Tribunal issued Directions which narrated the history and pointed out that: “17. HMRC have thus far not advanced a detailed argument on strike out beyond stating that the appellant had not complied with the Direction. The appellant has not addressed the issue of jurisdiction since there has been no focus on that in the period since the hearing. Indeed, on the contrary, it seems that the appellant’s agent had proceeded on the basis that a guarantee would have sufficed notwithstanding the fact that the hardship application had been dismissed by the Tribunal.

18. The proper course of action would have been for HMRC to have lodged a strike out application with the Tribunal in terms of Rule 8(2) and / or (3) of the Rules. I draw the parties attention to the mandatory nature of Rule 8(2). If the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction it must strike out the appeal.

19. In these circumstances, any decision on strike out would appear to be appropriate for decision on the papers.”

49. HMRC were directed to lodge a formal application for strike out by 27 April 2026, which they did, and the appellant was offered the opportunity to lodge an objection if so wished and the Agent did so timeously on 29 April 2026. This hearing was listed. The legal framework for strike out

50. Insofar as relevant, Rule 8 of the Rules reads: “(2) The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal— (a)does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; … (3) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if— (a)the appellant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the appellant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them; … (c)the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.”

51. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only the powers given to it in terms of the legislation. Strike out in terms of Rule 8(2)(a) is a binary decision.

52. We were not referred to the cases but as far as Rule 8(c) of the Rules is concerned, as the Upper Tribunal confirmed at paragraph 41 in Fairford Group v HMRC [2014] UKUT 329 and at paragraph 33 in The First De Sales Ltd & Others v HMRC [2018] UKUT 396 (TCC) , the Tribunal must “consider whether there is a realistic as opposed to a fanciful (in the sense of it being entirely without substance) prospect of succeeding on the issue at a full hearing. Discussion

53. In their Skeleton Argument HMRC argued that this “must have been one of the oddest hardship applications that have fallen for determination by the Tribunal” and that the appellant’s “conduct of the Hardship Application (and the preceding application to HMRC) was extraordinary”.

54. No explanation has ever been offered for the Notice of Appeal stating that the appellant was awaiting a response to their hardship application in circumstances where no such application had been made.

55. Quite apart from the failure to comply with the Direction issued after the First Hearing, the appellant has consistently failed to comply timeously with the Tribunal’s Directions.

56. The appellant and the Agent should have been in no doubt that the only reason the appeal was not struck out at the First Hearing was because HMRC had made the concession that if the appellant could have “released” the allegedly ring fenced monies (see paragraph 10 above) then the Customs Duty would be treated as having been paid.

57. We do not understand why the Agent and the appellant explored a bank guarantee after the First Hearing and indeed still considered the possibility that it was relevant in the second hearing. The Directions issued during the First Hearing, and followed up in writing, were explicit as can be seen from paragraph 11 above.

58. It had been explained in very clear terms, that because the hardship application had been dismissed, then, in terms of the relevant legislation, the appeal would be invalid unless it was proved that they had paid HMRC the Customs Duty. The opportunity was offered to the appellant to prove that payment had been made and that by no later than 24 December 2025.

59. It was also explained that that was a concession by HMRC and that in the absence of that concession the Tribunal would have struck out the appeal on 10 December 2025 because: (a) No payment of the Customs Duty had been made, (b) No guarantee had been provided, (c) HMRC had not accepted the hardship application, (d) The Tribunal had found that the requirements in section 16(3) Finance Act 1994 had not been met so the hardship application was dismissed, and (e) Therefore the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to admit the appeal.

60. We accept that the Customs Duty was paid on 9 January 2026 but that did not comply with the deadline in the Direction which reflected HMRC’s concession.

61. Since the appellant failed to take advantage of HMRC’s generous, in the circumstances, concession, the Tribunal has no discretion. The legislation is very clear. Section 16(3) Finance Act 1994 reads: “An appeal which relates to a relevant decision falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (h) of section 13A(2), or which relates to a decision on a review of any such relevant decision, shall not be entertained if the amount of relevant duty which HMRC have determined to be payable in relation to that decision has not been paid or deposited with them unless (a) the Commissioners have, on the application of the appellant, issued a certificate stating either — (i) that such security as appears to them to be adequate has been given to them for the payment of that amount; or (ii) that, on the grounds of the hardship that would otherwise be suffered by the appellant, they either do not require the giving of security for the payment of that amount or have accepted such lesser security as they consider appropriate; or (b) the tribunal to which the appeal is made decide that the Commissioners should not have refused to issue a certificate under paragraph (a) above and are satisfied that such security (if any) as it would have been reasonable for the Commissioners to accept in the circumstances has been given to the Commissioners.”

62. As we have indicated, it is a binary decision. The Tribunal had, and has, no jurisdiction.

63. In terms of Rule 8(2)(a) of the Rules the appeal must be struck out on that basis alone.

64. Turning now to Rule 8(3) of the Rules, HMRC did argue that Rule 8(3)(a) applied but, as can be seen, the Direction did not specify that non-compliance could lead to strike out albeit that was a clear inference since the appeal would be invalid. In those circumstances, we do not find that the appeal should be struck out in terms of Rule 8(3)(a) of the Rules. However, HMRC also argued that the appellant’s appeal is “hopeless”. Of course, that well exceeds the test of “no realistic prospect of success”.

65. However, we do agree that there is no realistic prospect of success and, in fact, we agree that the appellant’s case on the substantive issue is indeed hopeless.

66. Quite apart from anything else, as we explained in the hearing, the very real problem for the appellant is the Amanda Letter. That is explicit and states very clearly that: “HMRC has approved a suspension of the import duty on our qualifying roe products, reducing the import duty from 14% to 0% with effect from 5 August 2026”. (Emphasis added)

67. The appellant’s Skeleton Argument, albeit exhibiting the Amanda Letter, still argued that 14% Customs Duty was not due in 2024.

68. The Amanda Letter makes it absolutely explicit that in 2024, being the period with which we are concerned, the preferential rate did not apply. On that basis alone, the appeal has no, or at best, extremely little prospect of success.

69. In any event, as HMRC have consistently argued, the Grounds of Appeal dated 18 June 2024 (which oddly predate both the Decision and the Review Conclusion Letter but it is the letter upon which both the appellant and the Agent rely) exhibit the “Exporter’s declaration as per their attached invoice”.

70. Unfortunately for the appellant, as the Review Conclusion Letter made clear, the invoices stated that “The product covered by this document are (sic) NOT of preferential origin.”

71. There is no basis, in law, upon which the CI8s can be challenged. At that time, the Customs Duty was due and payable. Accordingly, as there is no reasonable prospect of success, the appeal falls to be struck out in terms of Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules. Other arguments for the appellant

72. For completeness, we also explain our approach to the appellant’s main arguments that were put forward to “explain” the repeated non-compliance.

73. We observe that it was argued that the payment was not made by 24 December 2025 because “December is a short working month”; that is precisely why we denied HMRC’s request for seven days for payment and allowed a further seven days.

74. In a similar vein, HMRC were entirely correct to reject the argument that there had not been compliance with Directions because the Agent was an accountant and was “extremely busy” with other work. We agree with HMRC’s reliance upon HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) for the proposition (at paragraph 58) that the general rule is that a taxpayer bears the consequences of an adviser’s failings.

75. Whilst we do accept that “English is not the mother tongue of the Directors of the Company”, we do not accept that that is the reason for the delay in payment of the Customs Duty. The appellant’s Manager attended the hearing and gave clear evidence about the appellant’s dealings with the Bank. He spoke English very well and he accurately, and appropriately, referenced the Hearing Bundle.

76. The appellant also repeatedly blamed the bank for delays but that is not a matter for HMRC or for the Tribunal. If the appellant has an issue with their bank then that should be raised with the bank.

77. The real problem was that the appellant and the Agent did not focus on the requirement for proof of actual payment by 24 December 2026, which was the only reason why the appeal had not been dismissed and they seemed to think a guarantee would suffice. That would never have been the case and they had been told that explicitly.

78. Lastly, the appellant also argued that that the assessments were unfair. It is trite law that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider whether the law in question is fair (see HMRC v Hok [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) ) so we cannot address those arguments. Decision

79. For all these reasons, HMRC’s application for strike out is granted and the appeal is struck out. Right to apply for permission to appeal

80. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 18 September 2026