UK case law
HXZ v NMX
[2026] EWHC KB 2575 · High Court (King's Bench Division) · 2026
The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Full judgment
Mr Justice Cavanagh:
1. This is the Defendant’s application to adjourn today’s hearing. It was notified informally to the Claimant’s solicitors and the court yesterday, 5 October 2026, and made orally at the outset of today’s hearing.
2. I gave this ruling orally at the end of the hearing. I informed the parties that a written copy would be made available.
3. This hearing was listed as a directions hearing in contempt proceedings brought by the Claimant against the Defendant.
4. It is not necessary to set out the nature of the proceedings, save to say that they involve proceedings by the Claimant for damages and an injunction on the grounds of misuse of private information and harassment. The Defendant has counterclaimed for damages, compensation, and injunctive and declaratory relief.
5. In March 2025, Ritchie J granted an urgent ex parte interim injunction and an anonymity order. At a return date on 3 April 2025, Aidan Eardley KC continued the injunction until trial or further order. He also ordered the Defendant to take down certain social media posts and to deliver up certain information.
6. In April 2026, a Case Management Conference took place which had to be adjourned because the Defendant suffered a serious psychiatric episode at court. She was taken to hospital by ambulance. That same day, the Defendant published posts on her social media accounts that were on the face of it in breach of the anonymity order, the injunction, and the return date order. The Defendant does not dispute that she published these posts, or that they were in breach of court orders, but she says that at the time she was very mentally unwell and was suffering a great deal of stress and anxiety as a result of the proceedings and what she said had been her treatment by the Claimant.
7. On 27 May 2026, the Claimant issued an application to commit the Defendant for contempt. It was served on the Defendant on or about 10 June 2026. At that stage the Defendant was very unwell. She says that the service was ineffective because it was served by email, but in any event, there is no doubt that the Defendant has been aware of the application for a number of months. On 17 June, on the papers, Steyn J ordered that a directions hearing in the contempt proceedings should take place today, 6 October 2026, with a time estimate of 1 and 1/2 hours. Steyn J gave various directions, including that any application by the Defendant for her personal appearance to be excused should be made by 21 September 2026. By paragraph 5 of that order, any party wishing to apply to vary, discharge, or stay any part of it had to do so by 6 July 2026.
8. Steyn J indicated that she had listed the directions hearing for 16 weeks ahead to take account of medical evidence that indicated that the Defendant needs a period of stability and that her significant mental health difficulties could be exacerbated by further court hearings. She said that the reasons for this delay included to give the Defendant an opportunity to instruct legal representatives and then to give those representatives an opportunity to obtain medical evidence if appropriate.
9. Steyn J’s reasons, appended to the order, said: “As noted above, the Defendant is advised to seek and obtain legal advice and representation and to do so as soon as possible. LEGAL AID IS AVAILABLE.”
10. A copy of the order was emailed by the Claimant’s solicitors to the Defendant on 23 June 2026. In a reply dated 26 June 2026, the Defendant said that she had sought advice in relation to legal aid but was “unable to obtain legal representation for this matter”. She said that she would attend today’s hearing as a litigant in person.
11. Subsequently, on 21 September 2026, the Defendant filed a detailed skeleton argument. This took issue with the draft list of directions supplied on behalf of the Claimant, and proposed a detailed list of directions that the Defendant invited the Court to make. In this skeleton argument, the Defendant said, “To date, the Defendant has been unable to secure legal representation through Legal Aid. The organisations and legal representatives approached have either declined to become involved without a substantial advance payment, in some instances approximately £50,000 or more, or have explained that Legal Aid does not ordinarily cover the civil aspects of proceedings of this nature and that the complexity of this case makes obtaining representation through Legal Aid particularly difficult. The Defendant’s mental-health team has itself explored the available avenues for legal assistance and encountered the same difficulties.”
12. Very recently, the Claimant’s legal advisers and the court were informed that this position has now changed.
13. The Defendant has been in contact with a solicitor, Chris Stevens of CJS Defence Solicitors, with a view to retaining him to act for her in the contempt proceedings. Mr Stevens wrote to the Court on 2 October enclosing an application for legal aid that he had completed in respect of the Defendant. He said that “I would support this matter being adjourned so that we get legal aid, instruct counsel and review the relevant paperwork.” He enclosed the form that he had sent to the Legal Aid Agency on behalf of the Defendant, to apply for legal aid. In a further email to the Defendant’s solicitors, Mr Stevens said that he cannot attend today’s hearing because of a prior professional commitment, and, in any event, he does not have higher rights of audience. He was unable to instruct Counsel.
14. The Defendant wrote to the Claimant’s solicitors, proposing that the directions hearing should be adjourned until January 2027.
15. In correspondence with the Defendant on 5 October 2026, the Claimant’s solicitors indicated that the Claimant opposes the application to adjourn. They pointed out that the Defendant has had over three months to arrange for legal aid. The Claimant’s solicitors said that it was not tenable for the Defendant to suggest that she had only just become aware that she was entitled to legal aid. The order of Steyn J itself had made clear that legal aid is available. This is a Directions Hearing. It is not the substantive hearing of the Contempt Application. The issues to be determined at this hearing are procedural and ought not to be complex, and the Defendant has a copy of the hearing bundles. The Claimant’s solicitors said that, as these are proceedings for contempt of court, they should be pursued expeditiously.
16. In the course of yesterday afternoon, 5 October 2026, the Defendant filed written submissions in support of her application to adjourn. She said that she had signed the necessary client authority and Legal Aid Agency documentation for Mr Stevens to represent her. She said that the reason she had not been successful in obtaining legal representation earlier was that her ability to deal with the contempt proceedings had been very severely impaired by a mental health crisis. She had nevertheless tried to find someone to represent her, both solicitors and barristers, but without success. She said she did not deliberately delay the instruction of a lawyer to represent her.
17. The Defendant emphasised the importance of giving a litigant every reasonable opportunity to obtain legal aid before a hearing on a contempt matter. She pointed out that she has a right to legal aid for a committal hearing. The Defendant said that, “Although tomorrow's hearing is a directions hearing rather than the final contempt hearing, the directions made now will determine the evidence, witnesses, timetable, disclosure, service issues and structure of the substantive case.”
18. Finally, the Defendant said that the court should bear in mind that, if she is not permitted representation, the Defendant will be placed at a great disadvantage, because her mental and physical health difficulties affect her concentration, memory, processing, stress tolerance, and her ability to manage large amounts of legal material. Decision
19. The starting point is that a person facing committal proceedings for contempt, which might result in imprisonment, has a right to legal aid. There is no means test. This was made clear by Chamberlain J in All England Tennis Club v McKay [2019] EWHC 3065 (QB) , approved by the Court of Appeal in Davies v Lettington [2026] EWCA Civ 364.
20. A litigant facing committal for contempt must be given a reasonable opportunity to be legally represented at the substantive hearing of the contempt proceedings. This is made clear by CPR Part 81.4(2)(i) and (j), which provide that a contempt application must state the following: “(i) that the defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings; (j) that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test.”
21. This is also consistent with the right to a fair trial under Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
22. The importance of this was emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Hammerton v Hammerton [2007] EWCA Civ 248 . At paragraph 9 of the court’s judgment, Moses LJ identified “well-settled principles” which included the following: “The obligation to afford a defendant representation is not unlimited, and a defendant's intransigence in unreasonably refusing it or in co-operating with legal representatives may make it impossible for legal assistance to be provided… Absent such unreasonable behaviour, if the defendant is unrepresented then an adjournment should, save in circumstances of extreme urgency, be granted so that representation may be obtained.”
23. These principles have been reiterated more recently by the Court of Appeal in Davies v Lettington .
24. In my judgment, this is not a case in which the court can be satisfied that the Defendant has been unreasonably intransigent in not seeking legal assistance or legal aid until the last few days. The Defendant has been aware that legal aid is available in cases of committal for contempt since at least the point at which she received Steyn J’s ruling in June 2026. She does not suggest otherwise. According to her, the difficulties have been two-fold.
25. First, she has had difficulty in persuading any solicitors or counsel to take the case. It is true that the Defendant has not provided any documentary evidence of her efforts in this regard, but it is not surprising that she would run into such difficulties. These are complex and somewhat specialised proceedings.
26. Second, the Defendant said that her recent mental health difficulties have impaired her ability to prepare and manage the proceedings, including her ability to make best efforts to obtain legal representation. There is independent medical evidence that the Defendant has suffered serious recent mental health problems which have the potential seriously to impede her ability to defend the committal proceedings.
27. The medical evidence consists primarily of a letter dated 21 September 2026 from Dr Anastasious Dimopoulos of Westminster Adult Mental Health Services NHS Foundation Trust and a letter dated 26 June 2026 from Dr Torsten Wrigley, a specialty doctor at the Mental Health Crisis Assessment Centre at St Charles Hospital in West London. Dr Dimopoulos said that the Defendant is currently under the care of secondary mental health services, with ongoing symptoms of anxiety and depression, increasing difficulties with concentration and the ability to sustain focus.
28. Moreover, it is plainly in the interests not only of the Defendant but of the Claimant and the Court that the Defendant is professionally represented. I have already referred briefly to the mental health challenges that the Defendant faces. It is true that she has been able to prepare a very detailed skeleton argument for today’s hearing and has, in addition, been able to prepare cogent and well-organised supplementary submissions on adjournment at very short notice. She is currently a student undertaking a postgraduate Master Of Laws (LLM) degree in International Law. However, the stakes are very high in committal proceedings, and it is clear from the contents of the Defendant’s skeleton argument for today’s hearing that she would benefit from the focus and experience that a legal representative could provide. If the Defendant is legally represented, it is very likely that the issues will be narrowed and the arguments will be more focused, to the benefit of both parties, and of the Court.
29. It is true also that the Defendant has admitted that she breached the order of the Court in the terms alleged, but this does not mean that she will not benefit from legal representation in the committal proceedings. As Moses LJ said in Hammerton, at paragraph 23, even though a defendant may not deny the breaches, legal representation will be necessary to assist the judge in considering the appropriate disposal.
30. Accordingly, the Defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation before a decision is made on the committal application. That process is now underway. It will necessarily take some time, because legal aid has to be granted before the legal representative can begin. Though it is inevitable that legal aid will be granted, it will no doubt take some time for the necessary processes to be gone through. After that, the new lawyer will need some time to read into the case. There is a great amount of documentation. That is likely to take about two weeks. The bundle for today’s hearing alone consists of five lever arch files.
31. So far, all of this leads to the conclusion that the substantive committal hearing itself must be listed in such a way that it does not take place until legal aid is granted and the Defendant’s legal advisers have a reasonable opportunity to prepare. That means that the timescale proposed by the Claimant, for a hearing on the first available date after 12 November 2026 is now unrealistic.
32. The next question is whether the current absence of legal representation for the Defendant means that today’s hearing should be adjourned. I have not found this entirely easy. I have sympathy for the Claimant. As Ms Mansoori KC pointed out, the parties are here. Steyn J built in a long period between her order and this hearing in order to enable the Defendant to obtain legal advice. The Claimant was not aware of the instruction by the Defendant of a solicitor until last Thursday, 1 October 2026. I am not persuaded that the Claimant’s solicitors have done anything wrong in relation to the contempt application and the arrangements for this hearing which deserve criticism. The Claimant is not responsible for this difficulty. He has attended via leading and junior counsel. He will have incurred costs which may well turn out to be irrecoverable. Contempt proceedings should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. Moreover, it is arguable that the directions leading to the full hearing are relatively straightforward and so I have given anxious consideration to whether I should give such directions and fix a date, probably in early 2027, for the substantive hearing, with a one-day time estimate.
33. In the event, notwithstanding Ms Mansoori KC’s helpful submissions, I have concluded that I should not do so. In my judgment, it would be unfair to the Defendant, and potentially inconsistent with her Art. 6 rights, even to proceed with the directions hearing, at a point at which she is not yet legally represented. The Defendant takes issue with the Claimant’s proposed directions, and proposes a raft of directions of her own. Even though I take the view that most of the Claimant’s proposed directions appear on the face of it to be reasonable and that certain of the Defendant’s proposed directions including that the Claimant should be required effectively to summarise or re-plead his case, are misconceived, the fact remains that there are potentially substantial issues at the directions hearing, and the Defendant and the court would be assisted by the input of a lawyer to advise and represent her. For example, the Claimant seeks a privacy order for the contempt hearing. This is not at all usual and will require careful consideration. Also, the Defendant seeks orders for various adjustments at the hearing. Some if not all of these may fall away if she is legally represented, and others may be left to the judge who deals with the hearing, but there may be some of substance that should be addressed at the directions hearing. The Defendant suggests that the committal hearing needs to be listed for substantially more than one day. At the moment, I think that one day is likely to be enough, but this is another matter for which clarification may be provided when the Defendant is legally represented. The central issue at the committal hearing is likely to be the Defendant’s state of health at the time of the breaches and the extent to which, if at all, there are mitigating factors. Again, legal representation for the Defendant may assist in enabling her to place medical evidence before the court, and it is possible that, if this happens, this may affect the time estimate.
34. I bear in mind also that, though contempt proceedings should always proceed as swiftly as possible, there is no particular great urgency in the present case. This is not a case in which there is any dispute about the scope or effect of the court order to which the complaint allegations relate. It is unlikely that there will be any evidential dispute about the breaches. Importantly, there is no suggestion of any further breaches by the Defendant since April 2026, let alone any ongoing breaches. I make clear to the Defendant that she remains bound by the court orders that have been made in these proceedings and she must comply with them.
35. For these reasons, I accede to the Defendant’s application to adjourn today’s hearing. It will be necessary to re-list the directions hearing, which will have to take place once the Defendant’s legal advisers are on board, unless, of course, the directions can be agreed between the parties.
36. The Defendant asks for a short adjournment. I will direct that the directions hearing should be listed on the first open date after 1 December 2026, with a time estimate of half a day. The listing should take account of the availability of counsel for the Claimant and Defendant. The judge dealing with the directions hearing will require a reading day. I was asked to reserve this hearing to myself but I cannot do so because of my other commitments this term.
37. There are three further matters.
38. The first is that a hearing has been listed of the Defendant’s application dated 30 March 2026 seeking to set aside or vary the Order of Sir Stephen Stewart sealed on 25 March which struck out the Defendant’s appeal against the Order of Master Sullivan dated 2 September 2025 which (retrospectively) granted the Claimant’s application for an extension of time to file and serve his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. This hearing is listed for 20 November 2026. The Defendant says that she cannot have legal aid for this. I expressed the view at the hearing that I am not sure that this is necessarily the case. Though legal aid is not automatic, unlike in contempt proceedings, it may be that the Defendant qualifies on financial grounds for legal aid. The Defendant told me, however, that her new solicitors cannot act for her in this aspect of the case, because they do not have the necessary civil expertise, and she has been unable to find any other solicitors who are willing to be instructed by her. Ms Mansoori KC helpfully pointed out that there is a MAC List Pro Bono Scheme, pursuant to which counsel can act for parties pro bono. The Defendant said that she had looked into this also but had been unable to find representation from this source.
39. Second, Ms Mansoori KC pointed out that directions have not been given for the underlying proceedings, because the Costs and Case Management Conference (CCMC) in April 2026 had to be abandoned. There has yet to be a CCMC. I queried whether the CCMC could take place at the same time as the directions hearing in relation to the committal. The Defendant made the point that it is better if the committal proceedings are kept separate from the rest of the proceedings, and suggested that the CCMC be listed to take place at the time of the set-aside hearing on 20 November 2026. Ms Mansoori KC agreed. Both of them suggested that the CCMC should be listed to take place at the time of the set-aside hearing on 20 November 2026. I agree that this is more appropriate, and so I will direct that the CCMC will take place at the same time as the set-aside hearing. The parties should, therefore, be prepared to make submissions on appropriate directions for the case when they attend the set-aside hearing/CCMC.
40. Finally, the Defendant has recently filed an application notice to join Meta, the owner of Instagram and Facebook, as a party to these proceedings and as a defendant to the counterclaim. Before this can proceed, the Defendant would require leave to serve out of the jurisdiction. The Claimant had asked for this application to be dealt with today.
41. I have decided that I will not deal with the application today, but I am going to make some comments about it. These comments will not bind the judge who eventually deals with it, if it is proceeded with, but it is, in my view, in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective if I comment on it, having read and carefully considered the Defendant’s application. My comments may assist the Defendant’s legal representative if and when they come to advise the Defendant on this matter in due course, if the legal aid extends to this.
42. On 28 September 2026, the Defendant filed an application notice seeking an Order to join Meta Platforms, Inc. as an additional party under CPR 19.2(2)(a) and (b), CPR 19.4 and Part 23. This application is supported by a witness statement and a skeleton argument. The grounds for the application are that Meta investigated, moderated and removed Facebook/Instagram material directly connected with the contempt application and holds relevant records. Consequential directions are sought for amendment, preservation, evidence/disclosure, and service outside the jurisdiction. At paragraph 10 of the Defendant’s witness statement in support of this application, the Defendant said that the acts of Meta create “a direct and material connection between Meta's own decision-making and the subject matter of the present contempt proceedings”. The Defendant elaborated upon why she wished to add Meta as a party in an email to the Claimant’s solicitors dated 28 September 2026.
43. Meta’s solicitors, White and Case, made clear in correspondence with the Defendant that they did not want to be joined.
44. CPR 19.2 provides that the court may order that a person is added as a new party if one of the following criteria applies:
1. It is desirable to add a new party so that the court can resolve all the matters in dispute; or
2. There is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the matters in dispute in the proceedings, and it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve that issue.
45. CPR 19.4(1) provides that the Court’s permission is required before a party can be added.
46. I cannot, at present, identify any cause of action against Meta or any other reason why, even arguably, Meta should be joined in these proceedings. The Defendant has not, I think, identified any such cause of action, and she has not provided a draft pleading of her claim against Meta. There is no issue in the claim or the counterclaim that relates to Meta. The posts that are the subject of the contempt application were made on Instagram and Facebook and were taken down by Meta. That is all. Nothing in this gives the Defendant any cause of action against Meta.
47. At present, the application appears to be wholly misconceived. There is no dispute that the Defendant made the posts which led to the contempt proceedings. There is no dispute that the posts were made in breach of the court’s order. In those circumstances, the Defendant can have no complaint that Meta took them down. There is no issue involving Meta in these proceedings. It would not be appropriate for Meta to be joined simply because the Defendant seeks disclosure from Meta.
48. Meta does not wish to be joined. Joinder would add unnecessary complexity into the existing proceedings, and the joinder would, by a considerable margin, cause more prejudice to the parties opposing it, than it would benefit the Defendant. The addition of Meta as a party to these proceedings would put Meta, and almost certainly the Claimant, to a great deal of additional cost, and it would undoubtedly put the Defendant at risk of liability for very great costs, to no benefit for her. Moreover, the Defendant has been at pains in her evidence to emphasise how much stress and anxiety has been caused to her by her involvement in this litigation. The creation of an additional strand in the litigation of this nature could not fail to cause a great deal of additional, pointless, stress and anxiety for the Defendant.
49. As I consider that leave should be refused to add Meta as a party, no question arises in respect of service out of the jurisdiction under CPR 6. In any event, leave would in all probability have been refused under CPR 6.37, as there is no good arguable case that any of the criteria under PD 6B, paragraph 3.1 applies. In particular, Meta is not a necessary or proper party to the proceedings between the Claimant and the Defendant. There is no serious issue to be tried, or reasonable prospect of success, against Meta.
50. In the circumstances, my current view is that the application relating to Meta is hopeless.
51. If so advised, the Applicant may persist in her application in relation to Meta, and, if she does so, then it can be dealt with on the papers, with a fair opportunity for the Claimant to file submissions in opposition and for the Defendant to reply. So I will order that the Defendant has four weeks to notify the Court if she intends to proceed with her application in relation to Meta. If she does, the Claimant will have two weeks’ thereafter to file written submissions, the Defendant will have two weeks to respond, and then the application will be put before a judge for determination on the papers. I do not consider that a hearing is required to deal with this matter.
52. I stress again that this is not a formal ruling on the Meta application, but in my judgment it is in the Defendant’s own interests that I make these comments at this stage. In the, perhaps unlikely, event that the Defendant persists in the application and I am the judge dealing with the application relating to Meta, I will keep an open mind, and I will consider afresh both the submissions already made and any new submissions that the Defendant and her legal advisers, and, indeed, the Claimant, wish to make.
53. The costs of and occasioned by today’s hearing are reserved.
54. For the avoidance of doubt, the anonymity order continues in force.
55. I have prepared an order to reflect the directions I have given today.