UK case law

Igor Mozolevsky, R (on the application of) v The County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2639 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Mrs Justice Hill: Introduction

1. By a claim form sealed on 6 October 2025 the Claimant, who represents himself, seeks judicial review of the order of His Honour Judge Freedman (“the Circuit Judge”), sitting in the Defendant County Court on 4 July 2025. By that order the Circuit Judge refused the Claimant permission to appeal against an order of District Judge Searl (“the District Judge”) dated 11 June 2025 and certified the Claimant’s application for permission to appeal as totally without merit. Both orders relate to an Early Neutral Evaluation process that took place on 11 June 2025.

2. The Claimant proceeds with permission granted by His Honour Judge Saffman sitting as a Judge of the High Court in retirement on 20 February 2026. The Defendant filed an Acknowledgment of Service indicating that as a court it did not intend to make any submissions. The Interested Party did not file an Acknowledgment of Service. Neither the Defendant nor the Interested Party participated in the hearing. Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”)

3. In Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd v Thomas Sanderson Ltd (Early Neutral Evaluation) [2020] EWHC 368 (QB) at [6] Master McCloud described ENE as follows: “…a procedure which involves…an independent party expressing an opinion about a dispute or parts of it. The evaluative nature of ENE means that positive or negative views as to merits are expressed, perhaps robustly, by the judge. It is therefore different from many forms of ‘mediation’ where the focus is facilitative. The process to be adopted for Judicial (or any other form) of ENE is not stated in the Civil Procedure Rules and it is intended that the approach can be tailored to the needs of any given case. Thus one may for example proceed wholly on the basis of written evidence and submissions or by way of written evidence and written argument supplemented at an oral hearing”.

4. As the White Book 2026 explains at paragraph 14.5, ENE has been a feature of the court’s general powers of case management since October 2015, when the power (now found in CPR r.3.1(2)(p)) to “take any other step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective” was amended by the addition of the following words: “, including hearing an Early Neutral Evaluation with the aim of helping the parties settle the case”: Lomax v Lomax [2019] EWCA Civ 1467 ; [2019] 1 WLR 6527 .

5. Some of the key features of ENE were described by Master McCloud in Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd as follows: “8. ENE is a confidential process. The judge dealing with the ENE will thereafter not (absent agreement) try the case or deal with contentious applications...

10. The outcome of Judicial ENE is normally ‘without prejudice’ unless privilege is mutually waived and is normally not binding unless the parties agree. It is possible that agreed terms of ENE may be that the decision is binding only upon the happening of certain events, or binding only for a defined period such as where an issue is dealt with on an interim basis.

11. Papers considered at the ENE will be returned to the parties at the end and not retained in the court file so as to ensure that subsequent judges or the public will not access them”.

6. As at February 2020, when judgment was handed down in Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd , these principles were set out in the Business and Property Courts Guide. They were then added to the King’s Bench Division Guide (at sections 10.6-10.13 in the 2025 and 2026 editions). There is no basis for thinking that these principles do not apply to ENE proceedings conducted in the County Court. Events in the Claimant’s case

7. At some point in late 2024 the Interested Party commenced proceedings against the Claimant using the Money Claim Online service. The claim was transferred to the Defendant County Court.

8. By an order sealed on 10 April 2025 the claim was allocated to the Small Claims Track and a hearing was listed on 11 June 2025 for a conciliation appointment / ENE to be carried out. Paragraph 3 of the order required the parties to make their final offers to settle the claim to each other no less than 7 days before the ENE. Paragraph 3 also made clear that the Judge conducting the hearing would not be the Judge who conducted the final hearing, (in accordance with Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd at [8]); and that the Judge would expect to be told about the offers, whether or not they were made without prejudice. The Claimant made an offer within the deadline set.

9. On 11 June 2025 the ENE took place. It was conducted by the District Judge. Later that day, the District Judge made an order giving judgment for the Interested Party and ordering the Claimant to pay the Interested Party £288.54.

10. The Claimant was confused by this order when it arrived at his home. On 23 June 2025 he filed an Appellant’s Notice seeking permission to appeal it. He argued that the District Judge’s order was wrong because she had been acting as the neutral evaluator in the ENE process and paragraph 3 of the 10 April 2025 order expressly precluded her from acting as the trial judge and making a final order against him, of the kind referred to in the preceding paragraph. He contended that the District Judge’s order had been made in breach of his right to the determination of his civil rights and obligations by an independent and impartial tribunal, as protected by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”).

11. On 24 June 2025 the Claimant’s Appellant’s Notice was placed before the Circuit Judge. Internal court documentation that has been disclosed to the Claimant shows that on 30 June 2025, the Circuit Judge asked court staff to refer the Appellant’s Notice to the District Judge “for her comments, before I give directions on the appeal”. Later that day the District Judge responded to the Circuit Judge, saying as follows: “It is correct that I stated to [the] parties that I would not be the trial judge if I gave indications as part of ENE”.

12. The District Judge wrote several further lines of text to the Circuit Judge, but these have been redacted under the label “Censored under ENE privilege”. It nevertheless appears clear from the structure of this document and from what happened afterwards that the District Judge reported to the Circuit Judge what had happened at the ENE.

13. On 4 July 2025 the Circuit Judge made the order which is challenged in these proceedings. He refused the application for permission to appeal, giving the following reasons: “The [Claimant] admitted that he owed the amount claimed by the [Interested Party] in the sum of £288.54. The Judge satisfied herself that the debt existed and that the amount was correct. It was therefore entirely correct and appropriate for the Judge, on the occasion of the ENE, to enter Judgment in favour of the [Interested Party] in the amount claimed. Upon the [Claimant’s] unqualified admission of the debt, there is no further or additional triable issue. The litigation is at an end”.

14. The Circuit Judge certified the application for permission to appeal as Totally Without Merit (“TWM”), such that pursuant to CPR 52.4(3), the Claimant was precluded from requesting that it be reconsidered at hearing, as the order made clear. The order continued “This decision is final and not subject to review or appeal”. The legal framework

15. The ability to seek judicial review of the decision of a Circuit Judge is very limited.

16. In Sivasubramaniam v Wandsworth County Court and ors [2002] EWCA Civ 1738 , [2003] WLR 475, the Court of Appeal held that claims for judicial review of the decisions of Circuit Judges would be summarily dismissed save in very exceptional circumstances. This was because: (i) if the claimant had failed to seek permission to appeal under the statutory system for appeals, there was an alternative remedy available; and (ii) if the claimant had sought such permission, but the appeal court had refused it, it was not appropriate that there should be a further review by the High Court, as Parliament had put in place a “fair, adequate and proportionate” appeals system [46]-[48] and [53]-[54].

17. The reasons why the judicial review jurisdiction remains available in a very limited class of case is that “as a matter of jurisprudential theory” Circuit Judges have a limited statutory jurisdiction and it must be open to the High Court to review whether that jurisdiction has been exceeded. However, as Lord Phillips MR (as he was at the time) recognised, the possibility that a Circuit Judge might exceed their jurisdiction where that jurisdiction is the statutory power to determine an application for permission to appeal from the decision of a district judge is “patently unlikely”: [54]. Lord Phillips MR concluded the court’s judgment in Sivasubramaniam as follows: “ Exceptional circumstances

56. The possibility remains that there may be very rare cases where a litigant challenges the jurisdiction of a circuit judge giving or refusing permission to appeal on the ground of jurisdictional error in the narrow, pre- Anisminic sense, or procedural irregularity of such a kind as to constitute a denial of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing. If such grounds are made out we consider that a proper case for judicial review will have been established”.

18. In R (Strickson) v Preston County Court and ors [2007] EWCA Civ 1132 , Laws LJ, with whom Rimer and Gage LJJ agreed, observed that a case where a court had acted in complete disregard of its duties was “only doubtfully an instance of pre- Anisminic jurisdictional error”. Further, where an appeal tribunal declined to grant permission in order to decide a point of law, where there was an imperative need for decision in the public interest, could not be so categorised. However, each of these cases exemplified “a defect much more fundamental than an error of law in the particular case”: [31]. At [32], he questioned how such a defect should be described in principle. He answered it as follows: “…a distinction may be drawn between a case where the judge simply gets it wrong, even extremely wrong (and wrong on the law, or the facts, or both), and a case where, as I would venture to put it, the judicial process itself has been frustrated or corrupted . This, I think, marks the truly exceptional case. It will or may include the case of pre- Anisminic jurisdictional error, where the court embarks upon an enquiry which it lacks all power to deal with, or fails altogether to enquire or adjudicate upon a matter which it was its unequivocal duty to address. It would include substantial denial of the right to a fair hearing, and it may include cases where the lower court has indeed acted “in complete disregard of its duties” ( Gregory ), and cases where the court has declined to go into a point of law in a particular area which, against a background of conflicting decisions of a lower tribunal, the public interest obviously requires to be decided ( Sinclair) . The Sinclair type of case is perhaps a sub-class of the Gregory case. Both, in any event, may be less hard-edged than the pure pre- Anisminic jurisdictional error case. The courts will have to be vigilant to see that only truly exceptional cases -- where there has indeed, as I have put it, been a frustration or corruption of the very judicial process -- are allowed to proceed to judicial review in cases where further appeal rights are barred by section 54(4)” [my emphasis].

19. In R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC 3052, 1 AC 663 [2012] 1 AC 663 at [99] Laws LJ sought to clarify what he had said in Strickson at [32], thus: “I hope it is clear from the context that the reference there to a ‘substantial denial of the right to a fair hearing’ was intended only to denote the case where there has been a wholly exceptional collapse of fair procedure : something as gross as actual bias on the part of the tribunal” [my emphasis]. The merits

20. The Claimant recognised the very limited role of the Administrative Court in reviewing orders made by Circuit Judges, as reflected in the case law set out above. He nevertheless contended that the high threshold set out in Strickson at [32] and Cart at [99] had been met.

21. In my judgment, in this highly unusual case, based on the evidence before me, the Claimant’s submissions are sound. I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons.

22. First , the Claimant denies that he had made a ny “unqualified admission of the debt” as contended by the Circuit Judge in his reasons. In any event, even if he had made such an admission in the ENE that fact should have remained confidential to the parties and the Judge conducting the ENE (unless he had agreed to be bound by it, which he had not) in accordance with Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd at [8].

23. Second , in light of those principles the Circuit Judge should not have sought out information about the ENE process from the District Judge; and she should not have provided it. Further, the Circuit Judge should not have relied on the information he so gained about the ENE process in making his order.

24. Third , the Circuit Judge erred in holding that it was “ entirely correct and appropriate” for the District Judge to enter a final judgment in favour of the Interested Party as a result of the ENE process. On the contrary, as the Judge who conducted the ENE process, the District Judge was expressly prohibited from acting as the “trial judge” (and by analogy, the judge making a final order in the case) by paragraph 3 of the 10 April 2025 order and by Telecom Centre (UK) Ltd at [8].

25. Put another way, the Circuit and District Judges made orders they had no jurisdiction to make, as they wrongly relied on the confidential nature of the ENE process. Accordingly, they can be categorised as pre- Anisminic jurisdictional errors. Further or alternatively, the incorrect reliance on the ENE procedure was, in my judgment, a “frustration or corruption of the…judicial process” and a “wholly exceptional collapse of fair procedure” as described respectively in Strickson at [32] and Cart at [99]

26. Grounds 2 and 3 in the Claimant’s statement of facts and grounds, which contended that the Circuit Judge had acted procedurally improperly and irrationally by seeking out and taking into account information about the ENE process, are therefore made out. For these reasons, the Claimant did not have a fair hearing of his application for permission, by an independent and impartial tribunal, contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention and section 6 of the HRA, as he contended under Ground 4 .

27. The Claimant advanced a further argument under Ground 4 to the effect that his rights to respect for his privacy and correspondence under Article 8(1) of the Convention were breached, by the Circuit Judge’s failure to remove confidential information from the Court file and his reliance on it.

28. I do not accept this argument, because I am not satisfied that the confidentiality of the ENE process engages Article 8(1) in the same way as the correspondence between a prisoner and the European Commission of Human Rights did, in Campbell v UK (Application No. 13590/88, 25 March 1992), with which the Claimant sought to draw an analogy.

29. Under Ground 1 the Claimant argued that the Circuit Judge had also erred by failing to give adequate reasons for his decision, as required by English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 ; [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [16]-[18]. I do not agree: the Circuit Judge did give sufficient reasons to allow the Claimant to understand why the order had been made, albeit that they were reasons which do not survive judicial review scrutiny. Indeed, the reasons evidence the serious procedural failings described in the preceding paragraphs.

30. However, as I have said, the Claimant’s claim for judicial review succeeds on Grounds 2, 3 and 4. Relief

31. In light of this judgment, it is appropriate to make (1) a quashing order under section 31(1) (a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“the SCA”) in respect of the Circuit Judge’s decision dated 4 July 2025; and (2) a mandatory order under section 31(1) (b) of the SCA requiring Court staff to remove all records of the 11 June 2025 ENE from the Newcastle County Court file.

32. The Claimant contended that if the Circuit Judge had properly considered his Appellant’s Notice, permission was bound to be granted. In effect, therefore, he invited me to substitute my own decision for that of the Circuit Judge, under section 31(5) (b) of the SCA.

33. Under section 31 (5A) of the , the power conferred by Senior Courts Act 1981 section 31(5) (b) can only be exercised where a quashing order has been made in respect of the decision of a court of tribunal on the ground that there has been an error of law, and where “there would have been only one decision which the court [below]…could have reached”.

34. In my judgment, in this unusual case, this test is satisfied. Based on the content of the Appellant’s Notice, the only decision that could properly have been reached was that the Claimant had a “real prospect of success” in appealing the District Judge’s order under CPR r. 52.6(1), such that permission should have been granted. I therefore substitute the decision made by the Circuit Judge on 4 July 2025 with a decision to the effect that the Claimant is granted permission to appeal the District Judge’s 11 June 2025 order.

35. The Claimant sought to persuade me that I should go further and allow his appeal, setting aside the District Judge’s order. I do not consider that this would be appropriate: these proceedings only “relate” to the “decision” of the Circuit Judge, such that it is only that decision which can be quashed under section 31(1) (a) of the SCA, as read with section 31(5) thereof.

36. The Claimant’s appeal against the District Judge’s order should be heard by a Circuit Judge from a different Court centre, who has had no prior dealings with this case.

37. The Claimant sought nominal damages in the sum of £10 for the breaches of his Convention rights. T aking account of all the circumstances of the case, including the other relief I have granted in relation to the Circuit Judge’s decision, I am not satisfied that an award of damages is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the Claimant. On that basis, section 8(3) of the HRA applies and precludes the making of an award of damages. Costs

38. The Claimant sought an order that the Defendant pay his court fees and travel costs from these proceedings, in the sum of £1,477.50.

39. Where judicial review proceedings are brought against a Court as Defendant and the Defendant adopts a neutral position, as has occurred in this case, the Administrative Court will generally not make a costs order against them: R (Davies) v HM Deputy Coroner for Birmingham (No. 2) [2004] EWCA Civ 207 , [2004] 1 WLR 2739 at [3] and [47]-[50].

40. The Claimant contended that in his case the Circuit Judge had engaged in “a flagrant instance of improper behaviour” such that one of the exceptions to the general rule set out in Davies (No. 2 ) was engaged.

41. While I have found that the exceptional test set out in Strickson at [32] and Cart at [99] was met by the Circuit Judge’s order, this did not necessarily amount to flagrantly “improper” behaviour: it may have resulted from an ignorance of the rules relating to the ENE process. There has been nothing improper about the way in which the Defendant has responded to these proceedings. In those circumstances I do not consider it appropriate to depart from the general rule set out in Davies (No. 2) and decline to make a costs order against the Defendant. Conclusion

42. Accordingly for all these reasons the Claimant’s claim for judicial review is allowed. I have quashed the Circuit Judge’s decision dated 4 July 2025 and substituted it with a decision to the effect that the Claimant is granted permission to appeal the District Judge’s 11 June 2025 order; given directions for the conduct of that appeal; and ordered that the records of the 11 June 2025 ENE be removed from the Newcastle County Court file.

Igor Mozolevsky, R (on the application of) v The County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne [2026] EWHC ADMIN 2639 — UK case law · My AI Judge