UK case law

IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A., Re

[2026] EWHC CH 2324 · High Court (Insolvency and Companies List) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR Mr Justice Mellor :

1. This judgment concerns a Part 8 Claim issued on 29 August 2025 by which IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. (“IRB” or “the Transferor”) and Community Reinsurance Corporation Limited (“CRC” or “the Transferee”, and together ‘the Applicants’) sought the Court’s sanction of a transfer scheme pursuant to Part VII of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Transfer” or “the Scheme” and “ FSMA 2000 ” respectively).

2. In more detail, the Applicants seek an order under s.111(1) of the FSMA sanctioning an insurance business transfer scheme (“the Scheme”) which effects the transfer of the entire business of the UK branch of IRB to CRC.

3. At the conclusion of the hearing on 16 June 2026, I announced my decision to sanction the scheme, with my reasons to follow. This judgment contains those reasons. I regret I was not able to deliver it before the end of July 2026, but it was delayed by the pressure of work since the hearing. Background

4. IRB is an insurance company, whose UK branch is regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (“the PRA”) and the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).

5. The Transferee, Community Reinsurance Corporation Limited (“Community Re”) is an insurance company registered in England and Wales and is authorised to carry on business as a general insurer in the UK. It is regulated by the PRA and the FCA. It is a subsidiary of Carrick UK Holdings Company Limited (“Carrick”) and is part of the Carrick group, a Bermuda-based group specialising in non-life legacy insurance, reinsurance, and run-off solutions, which was acquired in January 2024 by Northlight QIAIF, an Irish regulated entity managed by Northlight Group LLP, a London based investment manager.

6. The Transferee’s principal activity is to handle the run-off of the assets and liabilities associated with various portfolios of insurance and reinsurance. The transferred business is currently fully reinsured by Carrick Re Limited (“Carrick Re”) under a loss portfolio transfer reinsurance agreement (“the LPTA”) entered into on 28 December 2023 and amended and restated on 8 February 2024. The impact of the scheme will therefore be to align the legal liability to policyholders with the ultimate economic liability.

7. The transferring business comprises all the general reinsurance business underwritten by the UK branch of the Transferor between 1974 and 1983, consisting mainly of contracts in marine, aviation, property and casualty. All of the transferring business is non-life reinsurance written in the London market through Lloyd’s accredited brokers. The business is in run-off with no continuing period of cover. The transfer will allow the Transferor to de-authorise and close its UK branch, which suspended underwriting in December 1982.

8. The transferring business comprises the entire business of the Transferor’s UK branch. The Transferred Business comprises approximately 38,066 policies in respect of 830 transferring policyholders (excluding policies that have been commuted or held by policyholders who have been dissolved). A breakdown of the governing law of the policies is set out in the First Witness Statement of Philip Hernon – some 78% being governed by US law and around 20% by UK law. Mr Sean Keely, a US lawyer, gave his opinion that it is likely that a US Court, if presented with a dispute, would recognise and enforce the Scheme if sanctioned, such that a claim brought against the Transferor which is transferred pursuant to the Scheme should be pursued against Community Re, the Transferee.

9. As at 31 December 2023, the transferring business had 2,298 claims outstanding under approximately 173 policies and gross and net claims reserves (including Incurred But Not Reported (“IBNR”)) of approximately US$32.84 million, not taking into account the LPTA.

10. The transferring business is administered entirely in the UK by Carrick UK Services Limited (“Carrick Services”) pursuant to the terms of a Services Agreement between Carrick Services and IRB. The transferring business will continue to be administered by Carrick Services following the proposed transfer.

11. Some policyholders are currently beneficiaries under letters of credit in respect of obligations under the transferring policies. The Transferee has agreed to replace these as soon as possible after the Scheme has taken effect. Until replacement letters are put into place, the existing arrangements will remain enforceable and the Transferee and Carrick Group have agreed to indemnify the Transferor for any costs incurred by the Transferor under the letters of credit after the Effective Date. The progress of this claim to the hearing

12. As I explain in greater detail below, both the Prudential Regulation Authority (‘PRA’) and the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’) have an essential role in the whole process. Both regulators have been aware of the proposal to seek sanction of the Scheme for many months and the development of the Scheme has been an iterative process involving both of them.

13. A further essential role is performed by the Independent Expert. In this case, the Independent Expert, whose appointment was approved by the PRA and the FCA, is Mr Simon Sheaf of Grant Thornton. Mr Sheaf prepared a first report on the proposed transfer dated 29 August 2025 in which, having analysed the details of the proposed Scheme, he set out his conclusions as to the likely effects of the Scheme on the security of the benefits and reasonable expectations of affected policy holders and the likely effects on the Transferring Reinsurers.

14. Initially, the PRA (having consulted with the FCA) approved the form of the notices to be published advertising the proposal. Accordingly, an application for directions was made to ICCJ Greenwood. In his Order dated 5 September 2025, he made directions for the advertisement of notices concerning the application in various national and international print publications and granted various dispensations from the Regulations in view of the Applicants’ communications plan.

15. The notices required by ICCJ Greenwood were placed on various dates between 26 September and 1 October 2025, but three issues were encountered. These issues were explained in the Second Witness Statement of Philip Hernon along with the remedial steps taken to address them. I am satisfied that the remedial steps appropriately dealt with the issues experienced.

16. On 13 March 2026, Mr Sheaf made his Supplementary Report, providing an update to the conclusions he had set out in his Main Report, following his consideration of the additional information available to him as at that date. It suffices to quote his updated conclusions: “2.4.2 Based on additional information provided to me and my analysis set out in Section 3, I have concluded the following: • There will be no material adverse impact on the level of service provided to Transferring Policyholders nor any material adverse impact on the security of their benefits. Therefore, I do not expect that the Transferring Policyholders would be materially adversely affected by the Scheme. • There will be no material adverse impact on the level of service provided to Existing Community Re Policyholders nor any material adverse impact on the security of their benefits. Therefore, I do not expect that the Existing Community Re Policyholders would be materially adversely affected by the Scheme. • The Transferring Portfolio is immaterial to IRB Brasil and therefore the Scheme would have no material impact on the security or service levels provided to the Remaining IRB Brasil Policyholders. • Given the above, the risk of any group of policyholders being materially adversely affected by the Scheme is sufficiently remote that there is no reason why the Scheme should not proceed. • I do not consider it necessary for additional capital to be injected into Community Re to enable the conclusions above to be reached. 2.4.3 In addition, I have concluded the following. • The Transferring Reinsurers will continue to cover exactly the same risks, under the same contractual terms. Therefore, I do not expect that the Transferring Reinsurers would be materially adversely affected by the Scheme.”

17. However, the communication strategy gave rise to a number of requests for further information and various other notifications. TIG Insurance Company (‘TIG’) gave notice that it objected to the proposed transfer. Their solicitors, Dentons, spelt out three principal concerns in a letter dated 13 March 2026. These were explained in more detail in the Witness Statement of Michael Kuehn dated 17 March 2026 (which I have considered) and stated in the following terms (and I quote): ‘a. the significant questions raised by the discrepancy between the reserve amounts stated in the Independent Expert’s reports when compared to the value of the outstanding claims owed to TIG; b. the real and significant risk that Community Re’s limited capital will be inadequate to meet claims of policyholders (including TIG) over the long-tail exposure period under the policies at issue; c. the deterioration in standards of service since the involvement of the Carrick Group pursuant to an arrangement where it has taken on the economic risk of and servicing for these policies and the real and significant risk that this will worsen if the Scheme is approved and the policies are transferred away from IRB to Community Re.’

18. Some or all of these concerns stemmed from the perception that the policies the subject of the proposed transfer would transfer ‘ from the UK branch of a very large overseas reinsurer to a transferee with a significantly smaller book of business and balance sheet’ .

19. In support of their objection, TIG commissioned an analysis from Mr Kevin Madigan of FTI Consulting, Inc (‘FTI’). Having considered the Main Report and the Supplementary Report, Mr Madigan set out his opinions in a letter dated 17 March 2026, received on 18 March 2026.

20. I understand that this sanction hearing was originally listed to take place on 19 March 2026, but an adjournment was agreed along with a timetable for the service of evidence. In the interim period, the Transferor and TIG managed to resolve their outstanding disputes, and TIG no longer pursues its objection.

21. Nonetheless, Mr Sheaf considered the objections raised by TIG and filed an update to his supplementary report dated 4 June 2026. Mr Thornton took me through that update which addressed, amongst others, the following points which might be considered material: i) First, the ‘Commitment’ in place between Carrick Group Ltd, Carrick and Community Re. This had been amended and restated since Mr Sheaf’s Supplementary Report into a deed between those parties. The purpose of it was to provide Community Re with access to up to $10m of additional capital if there were to be an adverse event or deterioration of Community Re’s solvency position. Based on advice, Mr Sheaf considered the deed was legally enforceable and that if the changes did anything, they benefitted the Transferring Policyholders. ii) Second, whether Community Re will be sufficiently prepared to meet its Solvency UK obligations when they arise. Mr Sheaf concluded that it would. iii) Third, Mr Madigan’s views as set out in the FTI letter dated 17 March 2026, which concerned: a) The limited data available on the Transferring Portfolio. On that point, Mr Sheaf stated his view that the level of data available is typical for a portfolio of this age and nature, particularly bearing in mind that the business was written five to six decades ago. However, he concluded that the absence of detailed data did not mean that it is not possible to derive a reasonable and professionally supportable estimate of the liabilities. b) The difficulty of estimating asbestos liabilities. On that, Mr Sheaf did not disagree that reserving for asbestos liabilities is subject to significant uncertainties, but, again, they did not mean that it is impossible to derive a reasonable and professionally supportable estimate of the liabilities. He pointed out that actuaries are regularly required to estimate asbestos liabilities in circumstances where the underlying data is incomplete and are skilled at utilising established actuarial techniques to do so in a proportionate and robust manner given those data constraints. Mr Sheaf also pointed out that the challenges highlighted by Mr Madigan in this regard are not unique to the Transferring Portfolio and are characteristic of any portfolio containing historic US asbestos exposure, particularly reinsurance portfolios where reinsurers are inherently further removed from the underlying claim information. c) One specific large loss, on which Mr Madigan questioned the allowance Mr Sheaf had made. Mr Sheaf had recognised the inherent uncertainty associated with that specific loss and explained it was one of the reasons why he undertook stress testing of scenarios in which the reserves of Community Re deteriorated significantly following the Scheme. Mr Sheaf mentioned that his stress tests contemplated scenarios which were significantly more severe that those relied on in Mr Madigan’s critique. d) Service Standards. In his witness statement for TIG, Mr Kuehn raised a dispute over policy servicing and claims handling following the implementation of the LPTA. Mr Sheaf noted that this dispute related to a specific large loss which was currently subject to arbitration proceedings between TIG and the Transferor. Mr Sheaf concluded that he had received no information which caused him to change his conclusions set out in his Main and Supplementary Reports with respect to policy servicing and claims handling.

22. Furthermore, in his third witness statement Mr Hernon provided a full response to all the points raised by Mr Kuehn in his witness statement on behalf of TIG. On the service standards issues, Mr Hernon presented a detailed analysis which demonstrated the complaints were unfounded. Yet further, TIG has withdrawn its objections and remains a cedant and the relevant reinsurance contracts transferred from the Transferor to the Transferee when I sanctioned the Scheme.

23. Overall, having carefully considered the objections raised by TIG, Mr Sheaf restated the conclusions he reached in his Main and Supplementary Reports. Applicable Legal Principles

24. Mr Thornton KC gave me comprehensive assistance on this. He emphasised that there are three pillars on which this type of application rests: the Independent Expert, the Regulators and the Court.

25. Mr Thornton took me through the development of the guidance in the case law up to and including the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re The Prudential Assurance Company Limited [2020] EWCA Civ 1626 . Prior to that case, the guidance was from the decisions of Hoffmann J. in Re London Life Association Ltd 21 st February 1989 (Unreported ) and Evans-Lombe J. in Re Axa Equity & Law Life Assurance Society plc and Axa Sun Life plc [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 1010 . At pages 6 and 7 of the transcript in Re London Life Hoffmann J. said:- “In the end the question is whether the scheme as a whole is fair as between the interests of the different classes of persons affected. But the court does not have to be satisfied that no better scheme could have been devised….I am therefore not concerned with whether, by further negotiation, the scheme might be improved, but with whether, taken as a whole, the scheme before the court is unfair to any person or class of persons affected. In providing the court with material upon which to decide this question, the Act assigns important roles to the independent actuary and the Secretary of State. A report from the former is expressly required and the latter is given a right to be heard on the petition.”

26. In Re Axa Equity & Law Evans-Lombe J. applied Hoffmann J’s decision, deriving eight principles which he considered governed the approach of the court to applications for the sanction of transfers of long-term business. The eight principles are set out at pages 1011 and 1012 as follows: “(1) The 1982 Act confers an absolute discretion on the court whether or not to sanction a scheme but this is a discretion which must be exercised by giving due recognition to the commercial judgment entrusted by its constitution to its directors. (2) The court is concerned whether a policyholder, employee or other interested person or any group of them will be adversely affected by the scheme. (3) This is primarily a matter of actuarial judgment involving a comparison of the security and reasonable expectations of policyholders without the scheme with what would be the result if the scheme were implemented. For the purpose of this comparison the 1982 Act assigns an important role to the independent actuary to whose report the court will give close attention. (4) The FSA by reason of its regulatory powers can also be expected to have the necessary material and expertise to express an informed opinion on whether policyholders are likely to be adversely affected. Again the court will pay close attention to any views expressed by the FSA. (5) That individual policyholders or groups of policyholders may be adversely affected does not mean that the scheme has to be rejected by the court. The fundamental question is whether the scheme as a whole is fair as between the interests of the different classes of persons affected. (6) It is not the function of the court to produce what, in its view, is the best possible scheme. As between different schemes, all of which the court may deem fair, it is the directors’ choice which to pursue. (7) Under the same principle the details of the scheme are not a matter for the court provided that the scheme as a whole is found to be fair. Thus the court will not amend the scheme because it thinks that individual provisions could be improved upon. (8) It seems to me to follow from the above and in particular paras (2), (3) and (5) that the court, in arriving at its conclusion, should first determine what the contractual rights and reasonable expectations of policyholders were before the scheme was promulgated and then compare those with the likely result on the rights and expectations of policyholders if the scheme is put into effect.”

27. Mr Thornton submitted, and I accept, that those principles need to be adapted in the case of general insurance business, since their references to fairness and reasonable expectations are more commonly found in relation to long-term business and, in particular, with-profits policies where a significant element of the return on the policy is governed by discretions vested in the insurance company concerned.

28. In Re Royal Sun Alliance Insurance plc [2008] EWHC 3436 (Ch) the court recognised that, in relation to general insurance business, the most obvious application of the concept of ‘ reasonable expectations ’ was in relation to service levels provided by the insurer to its policyholders. David Richards J concluded that, for general insurance business transfers, principles 1-4 from Re Axa Equity & Law are in point (with a slight adaptation to principle 4 to account for the interests of both the FCA and PRA as the relevant regulators).

29. In practice, the most significant concern of the Court is the security of policyholders (that is to say the prospect that, after the scheme, the transferee will be able to meet valid claims made under the policies). As David Richards J. said in Re Royal Sun Alliance : “Accordingly, in approaching this application I shall be concerned to see whether there is any material adverse effect on the position of policyholders… The word ‘material’ is important. The court is not concerned to address theoretical risks. It might be said that a transfer of business from a very large company to a large company involved a reduction in the cover available to the transferring policyholders, but assuming that the transferee is in a financially strong position it matters not that the level of cover in the transferee is less than that in the transferor. What the court is concerned to address is the prospect of real, as opposed to fanciful, risks to the position of policyholders.”

30. The Court’s jurisdiction was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re Prudential Insurance Company Limited [2020] EWCA Civ 1626 . Having reviewed the authorities, Sir Geoffrey Vos set out the following guidance in [75] to [86], which I set out in full below: “ The approach to the sanction of applications under Part VII

75. The judge hearing an application for the sanction of an insurance business transfer scheme under Part VII should first, we think, identify the nature of the business being transferred and the underlying circumstances giving rise to the scheme.

76. As we have already indicated, different considerations affect different types of business. For example, the court considering the transfer of a book of annuities in payment will be primary be concerned with the interests of the transferring policyholders, whereas a transfer of with-profits business may raise directly the question of fairness between the policyholders remains with the transferor, the transferring policyholders, and the companies themselves and their shareholders. Transfers of some types of business may engage the interests of employees or other stakeholders in the transferor or transferee companies.

77. The circumstances giving rise to the scheme proposed will also affect the approach of the court. For example, many schemes will reflect commercial transactions between transferor and transferee companies for the benefit of those companies. Other schemes will be occasioned by external factors (such as the departure of the UK from the European Union) or the financial or other commercial circumstances of the transferor. Some may take the form of a rescue of the business retained or transferred.

78. The discretion of the court has frequently been said to be unfettered and genuine and not to be exercised by way of a rubber stamp, This is true but, as in the exercise of all discretions, the court must take into account and give proper weight to matters that ought to be considered, and ignore matters that ought not properly to be taken into account. The correct identification of which matters fall on which side of the line in particular transfer situations have caused some confusion in this, and perhaps other, cases.

79. From our reading of the decided cases, we have detected a tendency on the part of those presenting these applications, in many cases accepted by the judges hearing them, to treat the judgments of Hoffman J in London Life and Evans-Lombe in Axa as if they were a comprehensive statement of the factors that should be applied by the court in all insurance business transfers. Indeed, counsel for the appellants urged us to accept them as applicable in their entirety to the transfer scheme in the present case, which, as have earlier noted, is both very different from and a good deal simpler than those in London Life and Axa. We consider that this misunderstands those judgements, which were addressed to the particular circumstances of those cases and to the types of business being transferred. We would accept them as containing in many respects the factors likely to be applicable to the transfer of with-profits business, but they involve several factors that have no obvious application to a case such as the present. This was a point made in Royal Sun Alliance and by Snowden J in the present case at [39]-[40]. We very much doubt whether anything is to be gained by setting out and seeking to apply the factors listed in those cases, for example by Evans-Lombe J in Axa at [6], or transfer schemes involving every type of insurance business.

80. In a case such as the present, the paramount concern of the court will be to assess whether the transfer will have any material adverse effect on the receipt by the annuitants of their annuities, and on whether the transfer will have any such effect on the payments that are or may become due to the other annuitants, policyholders and creditors of the transferor and transferee companies. The court will also be concerned to assess whether there may be any material adverse effect on the service standards provided to the transferring annuitants or policyholders. Whether any other factors require consideration will depend on the circumstances of the case.

81. The first duty of the court is carefully to scrutinise the reports of the independent expert and the Regulators, and the evidence of any person required to be heard under section 110 including those who allege that they would be adversely affected by the carrying out of the scheme. The court must understand the opinions presented and is entitled to ask questions about them as necessary. It will do so, in particular, with a view to identifying any errors, omissions, or instances or inadequate or defecting reasoning.

82. In the absence of such defects, however, the court will always, in exercising its discretion, accord full weight to the opinions of the independent expert and the Regulators. That does not mean that the court can never depart from the recommendations of the expert or the non-objections of the Regulators, but it does mean that full weight must be accorded to them, so that a court would not depart from such recommendations and non-objections without significant and appropriate reasons for doing so. This is particularly so in relation to the financial and actuarial assessments required as regards the security of financial benefits. Whilst the judges hearing Part VII applications have considerable experience of the actuarial and specialist issues reported on by both the expert and the Regulators, the court is not itself an expert and should not substitute its own expertise for that of the entities required or entitled by statute to proffer those opinions.

83. This approach to the exercise of the court’s discretion applies to the crucial question of whether the proposed scheme will have any material adverse effect on policyholders, employees or other stakeholders. An adverse effect will only be material to the court’s consideration if it is: (i) a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case, (ii) a consequence of the schemes and (iii) material in the sense that there is the prospect of real or significant, as opposed to fanciful or insignificant, risk to the position of the stakeholder concerned. In some cases, it may also be relevant for the court to consider whether there would be such material adverse effects in the event that the scheme was not sanctioned.

84. Even if the court finds that the proposed scheme will have a material adverse effect on some group or groups of policyholders, it may still sanction the scheme in the exercise of its discretion. For example, this might occur if the scheme is in the nature of a rescue of the business. If there are differential effects on the interests of different classes of person affected, the court will need to consider whether the proposed scheme as a whole is fair between those interests.

85. The court adopt the same approach to the exercise of its discretion (as described at [82] above) when making the more general comparison between the positions that would exist with or without the proposed scheme in respect of (a) the security of the policyholders’ benefits, and (b) the standards of service and corporate governance that the policyholders can expect. In many cases, this comparison will entail the court’s consideration of the contractual rights and reasonable expectations of policyholders, including the standards of service and governance that can be expected if the scheme is implemented.

86. Once the court has undertaken the evaluations we have mentioned, the court will decide whether or not to sanction the proposed scheme, if, under section 111(3) it is, in all the circumstances of the case, appropriate to do so. It cannot require the applicants to vary or alter the scheme, even though that may sometimes be the effect of the court expressing its concerns. The choice of both the scheme itself and its detailed terms are for the directors of the transferor and transferee concerned. The primary duty of those directors is, of course, to promote the success of their companies.”

31. Finally, Mr Thornton referred me to the recent review of the approach of the Court in the judgment of Hildyard J. in Mercantile Indemnity Company Limited [2025] EWHC 3396 (Ch) , which I found most useful. Role and reports of the Regulators and the right to make representations

32. Section 110 of the Act permits various parties to be heard on the application for court approval to an insurance business transfer scheme. The parties entitled to be heard are the PRA and the FCA and “any person (including an employee of the transferor concerned or of the transferee) who alleges that he would be adversely affected by the carrying out of the scheme.”

33. The Regulators, in accordance with standard practice, have submitted their reports. In addition to dealing with certain technical aspects of the jurisdiction, the reports describe the role of the Regulators in relation to Part VII transfer schemes in general and their views of the transfer from their regulatory perspectives.

34. At the date of their first reports neither the PRA nor the FCA objected to the directions sought although each continued to evaluate the Scheme.

35. At the hearing, Mr Thornton took me through the recent second reports from the PRA and the FCA, made for the Sanction hearing. Neither the PRA nor the FCA sought to be heard at the hearing. I need only mention a few points, as follows.

36. At [6] and [50]-[54] of their second report dated 10 June 2026, the PRA considered the position of three policyholders which were the subject of UK sanctions. They noted that that two of the three were existing policyholders of the Transferee. As to the third, it is excluded from the Scheme, so its policies will not be transferred. This means that the transferring business no longer comprises the whole of IRB UK’s entire UK business.

37. At [26]-[29] the PRA reviewed the latest information concerning the Transferee’s preparedness to meet the UK Solvency II requirements when required. The PRA concluded that it gave them no reason to object to the Scheme.

38. At [43]-[49], the PRA considered the latest information concerning the Commitment, from Mr Sheaf’s Update to his Supplementary Report and concluded the Commitment did not give it reason to object to the Scheme.

39. More generally, the PRA reviewed all the developments since their first report and on the basis of all the matters set out in their second report, the PRA concluded as follows: ‘Having considered the Scheme in light of the PRA’s statutory objectives (promoting the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons and contributing to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become policyholders), the PRA is currently not aware of any issue that would cause it to object to the Scheme. Accordingly, the PRA does not object to the Scheme.’

40. As Mr Thornton submitted, the FCA’s second report dated 11 June 2026 reflects a slightly different set of priorities since they focussed on significant FCA related issues in relation to the Scheme. Again, it only necessary to highlight a few points.

41. Generally, the FCA reviewed all the developments and additional information received since their first report, including the position of the three policyholders subject to UK sanctions, all notification issues and the objections made by TIG.

42. At [7], the FCA noted that in their first report, they had not yet reached a view as to whether they objected to the Scheme. In their second report, the FCA confirmed that the Scheme was within the range of fair and reasonable schemes available to the Transferor and Transferee and accordingly did not object to the Scheme.

43. Having reviewed the latest reports from the FCA and the PRA, each of which considered matters pertaining to their particular responsibilities in detail and with care, I derive considerable comfort from their respective conclusions. Necessary Authorisations

44. To conclude the record of formal compliance, under s.111(2)(b) the Court must be satisfied that the Transferee, Community Re, has the necessary authorisation to carry on the business transferred to it. This was confirmed by Mr Hernon to my satisfaction.

45. Under s.111(2)(a) the Court must be satisfied that the appropriate certificates under Schedule 12 have been obtained. In this case that is a certificate from the PRA confirming that Community Re will, taking the proposed transfer into account, possess the necessary margin of solvency. Mr Thornton showed me a copy of the certificate from the PRA dated 12 March 2026. A final point

46. To the extent that full compliance was not possible with the directions given by ICCJ Greenwood, it is appropriate to waive the relatively small degree of non-compliance. Analysis and Conclusions

47. In accordance with the prescribed approach, I have identified above the nature of the business to be transferred and its salient characteristics, as well as the context in which and purpose for which the transfer was proposed. I also sought, in compliance with what is described as my first duty, carefully to scrutinise and understand the reports from the Independent Expert, Mr Sheaf, and also the reports of the PRA and the FCA.

48. Those reports amply support the conclusion as to the central issue that the transfer should not have any material adverse effect on any affected policyholders, employees or other stakeholders.

49. Having regard to the analyses provided I was also satisfied that standards of service and corporate governance will not be adversely affected either.

50. In short, the acid test of material adverse effect remains. As Hildyard J. pointed out in Mercantile Indemnity Company Limited, it remains the case that it is not necessary to show that the transfer will be beneficial to those policyholders affected by it. However, as Mr Thornton submitted, the proposed scheme gives effect to reasoned commercial decisions of the boards of the directors of the Transferor and the Transferee.

51. In summary, I was satisfied that the IE reports and the Regulators’ reports were clear, readily understandable, cogent and convincing and I saw no reason not to accept the overall views expressed in those reports.

52. In the light of all the materials provided to me and the clear and cogent submissions from Mr Thornton, at the conclusion of the hearing I was entirely satisfied that I should exercise my discretion to sanction the proposed scheme. I announced that decision and proceeded to make the Order sanctioning the Scheme, along with various ancillary orders under s.112.