UK case law

Kathleen Brown v Sarah Stephens & Anor

[2026] UKFTT PC 945 · Land Registration Division (Property Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

T410 application to set aside Forms TP1 and CH1 on ground of non est factum – transfer of part by daughter to mother – securing of balance of purchase price by legal charge on the property – terms agreed – evidence as to understanding of the documents signed – whether applicant careless Cases referred to Norwich & Peterborough Building Society v Steed [1992] EWCA Civ

1. This is my decision on Mrs Brown’s application made by a Form T410 dated 17 October 2024 to set aside a Form TP1 and Form CH1 both dated 20 March 2012 on the ground of non est factum (“this is not my deed”). Background

2. Mrs Brown is the mother of Mrs Stephens and mother-in-law of Mr Stephens. This dispute arose because about 15 years ago the parties were looking for a way by which the Stephens might accommodate Mrs Brown at their property. In short, what happened was the Stephens agreed to sell part of their title to Mrs Brown so that she could build a small house upon it. This was not easy for planning permission-related reasons but permission was obtained and, consequently, Forms TP1 and CH1 were executed by the parties which transferred part of the Stephens’ title to Mrs Brown and purported to secure part of the sale price by way of a charge. Mrs Brown pleads non est factum in respect of both documents. Law

3. There was no dispute between the parties as to the law on non est factum , so I will not rehearse it in great detail here. Mr Wilkin referred me to Scott LJ’s summary of the law in Norwich & Peterborough Building Society v Steed from which I have taken much of the following.

4. The doctrine of non est factum permits a signatory to a document to avoid being bound by it where, because of a fundamental mistake as to the nature of the document, the signature was not truly their act so that the element of consent is totally lacking – it is this lack of consent that matters, not the means by which it was brought about. The law requires there to be a fundamental difference between the document signed and the document believed to have been signed and an absence of negligence by the signer. The person invoking the doctrine bears the burden of establishing their lack of understanding of what was signed and an absence of carelessness. The absence of carelessness is important because of the importance of certainty in the signing of documents; people are expected to act responsibly and carefully according to their circumstances in putting their signature to legal documents.

5. If non est factum is established, the document is void ab initio , and not merely voidable. So, if a transfer of title and/or a legal charge, such as are in issue in this matter, are found to be void, the consequence is that no title passes or security is given. In the present matter, this means that Mrs Brown would escape the charge as well as lose legal title to Ynys Loft. Issues

6. The parties’ representatives gave me long lists of issues but I consider the headline issues to be quite simple: 64.1 Was there a fundamental difference between the TP1 and CH1 that Mrs Brown signed and what she believed them to be? 6.2 Was there an absence of negligence or carelessness on Mrs Brown’s part? How judges decide cases

7. The parties may find it helpful if I say a little about how judges in England and Wales decide civil cases such as this.

8. First, judges have no special abilities or superhuman powers that enable them to determine when someone is mistaken or lying, or to go back in time to see what happened in the past other than perhaps with the aid of photographs or recordings. Rather, they consider the parties’ witness statements and supporting documents, listen to the witnesses giving live evidence at trial, listen to the parties’ arguments and then come to a decision. Judges decide cases on the basis of the material and arguments put before them by the parties; they do not investigate or look for evidence. Each party is, therefore, responsible for putting forward the evidence and other material that they wish to rely upon, and formulating their legal arguments, so as to persuade the judge to find in their favour.

9. Secondly, there are two important procedural rules which judges have to observe. First, there is the burden of proof . Generally, the party asserting something in a civil case such as this, will bear the burden of proving it. In this case, Ms Brown bears the burden of proving her case. This is important because if the person bearing the burden of proof satisfies the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. Conversely, if that person does not satisfy the Court or Tribunal that something happened, then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did not happen. The decision is binary: Either something happened or it did not and there is no room for maybe . Sometimes, therefore, the result of a case will depend upon who bears the burden of proof. Secondly, there is the standard of proof . In civil cases such as this, the standard of proof is simply the balance of probabilities. This means that if the judge considers that something that is in issue in the case is more likely to have happened than not , then for the purpose of deciding the case, it did happen. The more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence required to persuade the judge that something is more likely to have happened than not.

10. Thirdly, there is the issue of fallibility of memory . It is nowadays generally acknowledged that human memory is notoriously fallible. This can be particularly important in cases where, as here, some of the relevant facts occurred decades ago and memories may well have dimmed over the years. Civil judges prefer to rely upon contemporaneous documentary evidence, where available, as it tends to be more objective and reliable than memory alone.

11. Lastly, civil judges must give reasons for their decisions. They are not, however, required to address every piece of evidence tendered or every argument raised. They deal with the issues that matter most. It should be borne in mind that a judge’s findings of fact are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression made upon the judge by the evidence. Further, that although judgments are unlikely to explain all aspects of a judge’s reasoning, and might well have been better expressed, they should at least address the main issues and enable the parties to understand how the decision was reached. Evidence

12. Mrs Brown’s evidence was that after her late husband’s death, her stepchildren required her to sell her then home. She did so and this left her with limited funds with which to re-house herself. There is no dispute that between about 2010 and 2012 the parties were in discussion over the Stephens selling her part of their title so that, subject to the grant of planning permission, she could build a small dwelling in which to live. Unbeknownst to each other, both parties obtained valuations from Mathers; Mrs Brown’s was £30,000 without planning permission and the Stephens’ was about £80,000 with planning permission. Mrs Brown says that she offered £30,000, her daughter accepted and the conveyancing happened immediately afterwards. She paid the £30,000 and thought that was the end of it. She was “very happy” at the time. She took issue with her then solicitor Mr Fitzmaurice’s attendance notes dated 25 and 30 January 2012 (at pages 225 and 226) which recorded “She is perfectly happy to complete a simple CH1 Charge which will be registered and then would be cancelled when she takes out the equity release mortgage” and “She is to send us £30,000 now in time for completion on 1 st and would call and see me the following day to sign the Transfer and Mortgage deed.” They had never talked about a mortgage; she was on income support and could not pay one.

13. After she signed the documentation, Mr Fitzmaurice told her to expect the deeds in the next couple of weeks. Just after purchase and the start of construction, Mr Fitzmaurice called her to his office and told her that now she had planning permission and the land was worth £80,000, her daughter “wanted the rest” (i.e. £50,000). Mrs Brown says that she was “dumbfounded” as she had simply bought a small piece of garden and had then spent two years obtaining planning permission. She had never said that she would pay £80,000. There was then, she said, a year of Mr Fitzmaurice and his colleague Eileen Mason, who acted for the Stephens on the sale, trying to extract extra money from her. There had been discussion of a promissory note in which she promised to give the Stephens £40,000 upon her death. She accepted that she had signed the one at page 27 of the trial bundle but did not, however, think that it was ever used. When asked why there was a need for a promissory note for £33,000 if the price was just £30,000, she said “I don’t know” and added that she had been bullied and coerced into admitting that she owed this extra money.

14. Then, sometime later Mr Fitzmaurice called her back to his office because he had received “papers” from the Land Registry that required her signature. She says that prior to this she had been chasing him for her “legal proof of ownership”. She was suspicious as to why she was being asked to sign documents that, insofar as she understood, were simply for her records. Prior to signing, she read the documents and noticed “£73,000” entered on the top right-hand side of one of the forms just above where she was to sign. She thought this was in Eileen Mason’s handwriting. She did not recall seeing “TP1” or “CH1” on either of the forms, which were blank, and Mr Fitzmaurice made no mention of a mortgage or charge. She asked Mr Fitzmaurice about the higher figure (i.e. the £73,000) but he waived his hand and told her that it was nothing to worry about. Although she felt uneasy, she signed the documents - which she thought were the deeds to the land which she had already bought for £30,000 - believing it to be a mere formality. She believes that Mr Fitzmaurice misled her by misrepresenting the nature and effect of the documents. He never told her that she was signing a charge. If she had known what the documents were, she would never have signed them. She only discovered the existence of the charge sometime later when looking into organising an equity release.

15. In April 2015, Mrs Brown wrote a letter to the Stephens. In the second paragraph, she recorded that the Stephens had agreed to sell the land without planning permission for £30,000. In the third paragraph, she wrote “We subsequently agreed that a total price of £73,000 would apply, £30,000 to be paid on completion of the transfer...”. In the fourth paragraph, she set out some deductions and concluded “leaving a final outstanding actually payable on my being able to complete the mortgage of £28,500.” In the remainder of the letter, she explained the difficulties that she was having, made a proposal and asked that the charge be released. Mrs Brown denies writing this letter – in her oral evidence she said that Mr Fitzmaurice did so – but admitted signing it albeit “very reluctantly” and only because she was suffering “extreme duress” on account of tensions with Mrs Stephens and felt that she had to please her. She disputed the legal validity of the letter.

16. By letter dated 15 June 2015, Ashfords LLP wrote to the Stephens explaining that they were acting for Mrs Brown on the refinancing of her home. They went on to write “We confirm that you currently have a charge on the property which we need to remove in order to proceed. It has been confirmed to use that the figure owed to you is around £28,000.” Mrs Brown remembered Ashfords but said that she only dealt with them for a matter of days when she was trying to get some help in settling this dispute but nothing ever came of it.

17. Before I move on to the Stephens’ evidence, I should add that when Mrs Brown was confirming in-chief her Statements of Case and Witness Statement, I took her to her “Order Statement” (at page 142 of the trial bundle) and asked her whether she recognised it. I did this because Mr Egan-Ronanye was unfamiliar with the procedure. She replied “It doesn’t seem familiar to me, I must admit”, “I’ve signed it; I must have agreed to it” and “It’s new to me”. This came as a surprise to Mr Egan-Ronanye and so I rose for roughly 30 minutes to allow him to discuss with Mrs Brown. When we recommenced, Mrs Brown confirmed that she had prepared the document in support of her application, that she had read it through and the contents were all correct.

18. The Stephens’ case is that it was Mrs Brown who suggested that she buy part of their land on which she would build a home. They agreed but only if planning permission could be obtained – she was adamant that there was no point in selling part of their land if permission could not be obtained. The Stephens had the plot valued at between £70,000 and £80,000 with planning permission and this led to Mrs Brown offering £73,000 for the plot. By letter to Mrs Brown dated 16 August 2011, the Stephens accepted, albeit also agreeing (a) to reduce this figure by the cost of obtaining planning permission, (b) a further £1,000 reduction to repay money which Mrs Brown had lent them, and (c) to accept only £30,000 upon completion. Mrs Stephens then supported her mother to obtain planning permission which was, eventually, obtained on 29 July 2011 – Mrs Brown disputed this. The plan was to pay the balance by equity release once the building was completed.

19. Initially, Mrs Brown had wanted the Stephens to trust that she would pay the balance. The Stephens’ solicitor, however, advised them by letter dated 27 September 2011 to take a legal charge over the land that they were selling. Initially Mrs Brown did not agree to this – the proposal caused tensions between them - and wanted to pay the balance via equity release once the building work was finished. Then, by letter dated 24 November 2011, Mrs Brown’s solicitor proposed a promissory note. At first the Stephens were agreeable – they had many discussions with Mrs Brown about them - but subsequently re-affirmed their wish for a charge after some issues arose which gave them cause for concern and on about 25 January 2012, Mr Fitzmaurice confirmed that Mrs Brown would charge the property but with no interest payable or end payment date. There were yet more attempts by Mrs Brown to get the Stephens to agree a promissory note but eventually Mrs Brown signed the TP1 and CH1 on 20 March 2012. The transfer and the charge were not registered at the Registry until 2013 but in closing Mr Egan-Ronayne informed me that this was because the wrong title number had been used and it had taken quite some time to sort out. There was, he said, nothing to be made of this “incidental” delay. The Stephens rely upon the letter that Mrs Brown sent them in April 2015 and Ashfords’ letter the following month. Discussion and analysis

20. This is a factual dispute with competing narratives in which there is a heavy burden on Mrs Brown to establish that her consent was totally lacking because she was fundamentally mistaken - without being careless - as to the nature of the documents that she signed. Mrs Brown accepts that she read and signed both the TP1 and the CH1 and that she understood, at least in general terms, the nature of the transaction (i.e. that she was buying land from the Stephens).

21. Where the parties’ evidence differs, I have no hesitation in preferring that of Mrs Stephens. I found her to be a calm, measured and consistent in her evidence notwithstanding the difficult circumstances. This is in marked contrast to Mrs Brown, who was inconsistent and unable to give satisfactory explanations on various matters and did not, at least initially, recognise one of her Statements of Case (see paragraph 17 above) and her comment “I’ve signed it; I must have agreed to it” is concerning in a case about signing important documents such as this.

22. If I were to accept Mrs Brown’s evidence, I would have to find that solicitors Mr Fitzmaurice and Ms Mason in effect conspired to swindle her out of £38,470 for the Stephens’ benefit by deliberately misrepresenting to her what she was signing. That is a serious allegation and one for which there is absolutely no evidential basis. I would also have to ignore the two 2015 letters which are entirely supportive of the Stephens’ case and consistent with what most likely happened here, namely that the cost of the development increased and that Mrs Brown found it harder than expected to re-mortgage or secure equity release.

23. Mrs Brown did not give satisfactory explanations for why she put her signature to the detailed April 2015 letter containing relatively contemporaneous adverse admissions (she claimed to be suffering extreme duress because of the conflict with her daughter), or how Ashfords had instructions, which must have come from her, that she owed the Stephens £28,000.

24. I would also have to ignore the extensive pre-contract solicitor correspondence from 2011 and 2012 which shows the total price being agreed at £73,000 with £30,000 payable upon completion. There are numerous letters and emails that I could point to but I have in mind, in particular, the Stephens’ letter dated 16 August 2011 to Mrs Brown accepting her offer of £73,000 with £30,000 payable immediately and the balance deferred. This is entirely consistent with the Stephens case and entirely inconsistent with Mrs Brown’s case.

25. Mrs Brown has also failed to explain the promissory note discussions. The very fact that there were such discussions underlines that more money was to be paid after completion. Mrs Brown’s evidence to me that the purchase price was to be £30,000 and nothing more does not square with this or her pleaded case that there was a balance to be paid by equity release (see paragraphs 4 and 5 of her “Order Statement” at page 302). Further, there is Ms Mason’s quite firm advice (found in the contemporaneous email correspondence) that a charge was preferable to a promissory note. Mrs Brown accepted that she had signed at least one promissory note (see page 27 of the trial bundle) and that it had not been used.

26. I also find that there was a complete lack of care on Mrs Brown’s part when signing the TR1 and CH1. I cannot accept her evidence that they were signed quite some time after 20 March 2012 or that they were blank pages. It is highly improbable that Mr Fitzmaurice and Ms Mason somehow procured Mrs Brown’s signature on blank forms and transferred it to the ones in evidence before me. Further, Mrs Brown herself says that she was “suspicious” and queried “£73,000” written on the document put before her. If that was so, it begs the question why did she sign?

27. Lastly, I should add that much of Mrs Brown’s case as advanced at trial by her representative, is not relevant. For example, the “failing to follow client instructions”, “undue influence” and “fraud” allegations that are made against Mr Fitzmaurice. If Mrs Brown has complaint about his conduct, that has to be taken up with him and/or Borlase & Co. Conclusion & disposal

28. Accordingly, I dismiss Mrs Brown’s application to set aside the TP1 and the CH1. Costs

29. As regards costs, paragraph 9.1(b)(i) of the Land Registration Division’s Practice Direction provides that if the Tribunal decides to make an order about costs, ordinarily the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the successful party’s costs.

30. My preliminary view is that the Stephens are entitled to payment by Mrs Brown of their reasonable and proportionate costs (i.e. on the Standard Basis) and so I direct: 30.1 By 5 pm on 18 June 2026, any party who wishes to make an application for costs should file and serve by email (a) written submissions on the principle of who should pay whose costs, and (b) a Form N260 setting out the amount claimed. Enough detail must be given to enable me to understand what time was spent on what part of the case together with receipts for any disbursements. 30.2 If such a costs application is served, then by 5 pm no more than 14 days later, the recipient of that application should file and serve their representations in response. 30.3 The party applying for costs may then file and serve a brief response by no later than 5 pm seven days later.

31. I will then determine the issue of costs on-paper by way of a summary assessment unless at that point I consider that the matter should go for detailed assessment. Judge Alexander Bastin By Order of The Tribunal Dated this 4 th day of June 2026