UK case law
KP McConnell v WM Morrisons Supermarkets Ltd
[2026] EAT 149 · Employment Appeal Tribunal · 2026
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Full judgment
SUMMARY TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS - Assignment DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION The Claimant appealed the ET’s decision that he had been assigned to an organised grouping of resources or employees that transferred as part of a TUPE transfer. He argued that the ET had applied the wrong test for assignment and/or had failed to appreciate that he had been deployed to the relevant department as an unlawful act of victimisation. He also appealed the dismissal of his complaints of indirect discrimination, failure to make reasonable adjustments, and victimisation, on the basis that the ET had fundamentally misunderstood the factual elements of his claim and had misapplied the relevant statutory tests under the Equality Act 2010 . HELD: The ET had not misdirected itself on the question of assignment or otherwise erred in law in its approach. The lawfulness of the original decision to redeploy an employee is not part of the test for assignment. Although the ET erred in its approach to the victimisation claim, its finding on the “reason why” question was sufficient to override the error. However, the ET had taken a wrong turn from the outset in its consideration of the indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments complaints. Those complaints would be remitted to a fresh ET for redetermination. HIS HONOUR JUDGE FEENY: Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the judgment of the Newcastle Employment Tribunal (EJ AE Pitt sitting with members: Mrs C Hunter and Mrs J Johnson); hereinafter “the ET”. In a judgment dated 24 October 2023 the ET dismissed all of the claims before it, following a 4-day final merits hearing from 16-19 October 2023 (“the FMH”). An ex-tempore judgment was given on the fourth day of the hearing albeit the written reasons were not sent to the parties until 15 March 2024. I will use “the Judgment” to refer to both the short-form judgment and the accompanying written reasons.
2. I will refer to the parties as they appeared below.
3. At this appeal, the Claimant was represented by Mr Roberts, Counsel, leading Ms Sutton of Counsel. The Respondent was represented by Mr Davies of Counsel, who had also represented the Respondent below. Mr Roberts and Ms Sutton were instructed through the auspices of Advocate and were therefore acting pro bono. I am grateful to them for their assistance in this regard, and I am sure the Claimant is too. The Claimant acted as a litigant-in-person at the FMH. Background to the appeal
4. The Respondent is a well-known national supermarket chain. The Claimant began his employment with the Respondent back in May 2000. At the material time, he worked at the Respondent’s Stockton-on-Tees distribution centre.
5. Following an accident in 2010, the Claimant developed a disabling back condition. It was common-ground that by 2012 the Claimant was a disabled person by reason of this back condition. Over the subsequent years a number of disputes emerged between the Claimant and the Respondent as to what sort of duties it was appropriate for him to carry out. Relevantly to the issues under appeal, in November 2017 the Claimant began to work in the Returns & Recycling Unit (“RRU”) on a part-time basis. At that stage, he also retained his contractual role in the Ambient warehouse. Following an occupational health (“OH”) review in late 2019/early 2020 a decision was made by the Respondent to transfer the Claimant to the RRU permanently.
6. At this stage, it is necessary to say a little more about the systems of work at the Stockton-on-Tees distribution centre.
7. The Ambient warehouse is where products are stored, picked, and loaded on to HGVs for onward transportation to stores. (There is also a Fresh warehouse where a similar process is followed for fresh goods but this is not material to the claim.) The RRU is where the HGVs return to the depot from the stores, having delivered their stock, and loaded up on recycling materials (mostly cardboard) and waste packaging from the stores.
8. Moving stock around the Ambient warehouse is generally done on fork-lift trucks (“FLTs”), or vehicles of a similar nature. As the name suggests, “loading” is the process of putting the pallets onto the HGVs, which is generally done by manoeuvring the FLT into position and operating the lifting mechanism. “Tipping” is the process of taking items off the HGVs, again, using the FLT. “Tramming” refers to moving the (loaded) pallet around the warehouse on the FLT.
9. “Picking” is the process of taking items from the shelves and placing them onto pallets. Picking does not require use of the FLT and is a manual handling task. By 2019 it had become an agreement (formally recorded in a COT3) that the Claimant would no longer do picking.
10. Initially in the RRU the cardboard and other recycling would come back in the HGVs on pallets. The operation of “tipping” in the RRU was therefore essentially the same as that in the Ambient warehouse, in that it required use of an FLT. However, not long after the Claimant permanently transferred to the RRU in 2020, the Respondent changed its operations so that the recycling and waste would be returned to site in “cages”, i.e. metal cages on wheels. Instead of using an FLT, the employees in the RRU would have to push and pull the cages by hand to the area where other employees would take the carboard off the cages and put it into the baler.
11. The ET undertook a similar exercise of describing the various functions relating to the Claimant’s work in para. 5 of its Judgment. It expressly recorded that “tipping” lorries was a practice in both the Ambient warehouse and the RRU.
12. As already noted, the Claimant worked permanently in the RRU from 2020 onwards. This was on OH advice, with a report dated 9 January 2020 stating that “it is likely that [the Claimant] would benefit from continued work in the RRU”. This advice appears to have been primarily on the basis that the Claimant could not do picking work (which he agreed with) and driving the FLT in the Ambient warehouse risked jarring his back because of the uneven floor.
13. The Claimant’s case before the ET was that this advice was wrong and that driving the FLT in the Ambient warehouse was actually better for his condition as it did not involve manual handling. The ET found that the Claimant had complained about the pushing and pulling of cages in the RRU causing him pain and aggravating his back condition. Nonetheless, the Respondent was not prepared to redeploy the Claimant again, relying instead on the OH advice from 2020.
14. In January 2023 employees working in the RRU, including the Claimant, were put on notice that this operation would be out-sourced to an external company and the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (“TUPE”) would apply. There was no dispute at the FMH that this amounted to a TUPE transfer as defined in reg. 3(1).
15. The Respondent needed to identify which employees were “assigned” to the organised grouping of resources or employees that would transfer. For night shift workers (which included the Claimant), it did so by calculating the percentage of time each person had spent working in the RRU over the previous 26 weeks. In the Claimant’s case the figure was 100%. To add some context, two comparators relied on by the Claimant for the direct discrimination complaint (which is not live on appeal) were found to have worked no more than 25% of their time in the RRU.
16. The Claimant was therefore identified as in scope for transfer. The Claimant was not happy with this, believing that the nature of his restrictions meant that he would inevitably be removed from his role, and very probably dismissed, post-transfer by the new contractor. The Claimant elected to formally object to the transfer, citing reg. 4(9) of TUPE (proposed change in working conditions to his material detriment) to support an argument that he had been constructively dismissed. His employment therefore terminated on the date of the transfer (29 January 2023). The Respondent took the view that the Claimant had voluntarily resigned by objecting to the transfer.
17. As already noted, the ET dismissed all claims. It found that the Claimant had been assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees and he would therefore have TUPE transferred to the new contractor had he not resigned. It found that the transferee was not planning a change in working conditions to the Claimant’s material detriment (in other words, it was not intending to dismiss him post-transfer) so that reg. 4(9) was not engaged. It also found that the Respondent had not breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, and/or the Claimant had not resigned in response to this, so that he was not constructively dismissed. There is no appeal against these latter two findings.
18. The ET dismissed the overlapping indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments complaints, both of which were predicated on a PCP relating to the “tipping” process. I will discuss this in more detail below.
19. The ET rejected a victimisation complaint that the Claimant’s protected act of raising a grievance alleging disability discrimination in October 2017 meant that he was subjected to detrimental treatment in 2017 (and subsequently) in the alteration of his duties, including the move to the RRU.
20. Finally, the ET held that if any of the complaints should have been upheld on the merits, the complaints would still have been dismissed on the basis that the ET1 was presented outside the primary time limit and it was not just and equitable to extend time. Grounds of appeal
21. Ground One challenges the finding that the Claimant was assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees that transferred under TUPE. The Claimant argues that the ET applied the wrong test for assignment, focussing too much on the percentage approach, and also failed to consider that the reason why the Claimant was in the RRU was due to unlawful victimisation and/or a failure to make reasonable adjustments.
22. Grounds Two, Three, and Four all challenge the ET’s conclusions on the indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments complaints. In short, it is submitted that having correctly identified the PCP (tipping lorries) the ET failed to understand that the duties that caused the disadvantage (the pushing and pulling of cages leading to back pain) was an inherent part of the PCP. The Claimant also relies on other errors of law in this section of the Judgment, such as wrongly considering the employer’s knowledge of disadvantage as part of the s. 19 test.
23. Ground Five is in relation to the victimisation claim. The Claimant argues that two of the three detriments were not properly disposed of by the ET. Firstly, the ET appears to have regarded the detriment complaints as defeated by a finding that the Claimant affirmed his contract. The Claimant submits that the doctrine of affirmation has no place in the statutory test for victimisation. Further and in the alternative, the ET made no findings on whether those detriments were because of the protected act; the only clear finding on causation is in respect of the third detriment.
24. Ground Six is in respect of time limits. It is said that the ET applied the wrong test and its reasoning was defective. During oral submissions, both Counsel agreed that if the appeal is allowed on any other ground, the issue of time limits will need to be reconsidered as part of the remittal process. It is not therefore necessary to consider time limits in any detail in this judgment. Legal framework
25. This appeal raises a free-standing issue under TUPE and the proper approach to certain claims under the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”). The relevant legal principles to this appeal are as follows. Assignment
26. Reg. 4 TUPE only applies to employees employed by the transferor at the date of transfer if they are “assigned” to the organised grouping of resources or employees that transfers to the transferee. Reg. 2 (Interpretation) clarifies that “assigned” means “assigned other than on a temporary basis”.
27. Botzen v Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV (186/83) [1986] 2 CMLR 50 was the first EU decision to properly address the question of assignment. The ECJ upheld the Commission’s view that: “the only decisive criterion regarding the transfer of employees' rights and obligations is whether or not a transfer takes place of the department to which they were assigned and which formed the organisational framework within which their employment relationship took effect.” (para. 14)
28. The ECJ went on to hold: “An employment relationship is essentially characterised by the link existing between the employee and the part of the undertaking or business to which he is assigned to carry out his duties. In order to decide whether the rights and obligations under an employment relationship are transferred under Directive 77/187 by reason of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) thereof, it is therefore sufficient to establish to which part of the undertaking or business the employee was assigned.” (para. 15)
29. As for the position in domestic law, in Duncan Web Offset (Maidstone) Ltd v Cooper & Ors [1995] IRLR 633 the EAT (Morison J) declined to set out a specific formula for how the ET should decide the question of whether an employee is assigned to an organised grouping of resources or employees, save for setting out a list of general factors that may be relevant. Morison J described it as a question of fact for the ET hearing an individual claim, which would inevitably vary on a case-by-case basis. As the EAT (HHJ Eady QC) noted in Costain Ltd v Armitage & ERH Communications Ltd (2014, unreported) this means that an appeal against a finding on assignment, where the law has been correctly applied, could only succeed on perversity grounds (para. 40). The EAT also observed in that case: “In approaching that question [of assignment], it is often tempting to try to establish assignment by reference to the percentage of time an employee is engaged in working in the relevant undertaking or part or on the particular activities in question. That might not be an irrelevant question, but it is not the test.” (para. 37)
30. It follows there is no rigid formula when it comes to the task of assessing whether an employee was assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees that transfers. What factors are relevant, and what weight to place on them, are generally matters within the discretion of the ET hearing the claim, as long as it does not misdirect itself or otherwise err in law. Indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments
31. Complaints brought under the EqA for both indirect discrimination (s. 19 EqA) and failure to make reasonable adjustments (s. 20-21 EqA) require the ET to identify the provision, criterion, or practice (“PCP”) applied by the employer. As the Court of Appeal (Simler LJ) observed in Ishola v Transport for London [2020] EWCA Civ 112 , [2020] ICR 1204 : “The function of the PCP in a reasonable adjustment context is to identify what it is about the employer's management of the employee or its operation that causes substantial disadvantage to the disabled employee. The PCP serves a similar function in the context of indirect discrimination, where particular disadvantage is suffered by some and not others because of an employer's PCP.” (para. 36)
32. The EAT (HHJ Serota QC) in Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] ICR 218 provided guidance to ETs on the structured approach that should be taken in deciding whether there has been a failure to make reasonable adjustments (pursuant to s. 20-21 EqA, although the passage below refers to provisions in the predecessor legislation): “[27] It is helpful, therefore, if we restate that guidance to have regard to the amendments to the Act . In our opinion an employment tribunal considering a claim that an employer has discriminated against an employee pursuant to section 3 A(2) of the Act by failing to comply with the section 4A duty must identify: (a) the provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer, or (b) the physical feature of premises occupied by the employer, (c) the identity of non-disabled comparators (where appropriate) and (d) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the claimant. It should be borne in mind that identification of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the claimant may involve a consideration of the cumulative effect of both the “provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of an employer” and the “physical feature of premises” so it would be necessary to look at the overall picture. In our opinion an employment tribunal cannot properly make findings of a failure to make reasonable adjustments under sections 3 A(2) and 4A(1) without going through that process. Unless the employment tribunal has identified the four matters we have set out above it cannot go on to judge if any proposed adjustment is reasonable. It is simply unable to say what adjustments were reasonable to prevent the provision, criterion or practice, or feature, placing the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage.”
33. Whilst a complaint of indirect discrimination also requires the application of a PCP and identification of the disadvantage relied upon, the test is formulated differently. The initial focus of the ET will be on whether the claimant can show that there is a group disadvantage (s. 19(2)(b)), based on the relevant protected characteristic, before deciding whether the individual claimant was put to the same disadvantage (s. 19(2)(c)). It is open to an ET to find the group disadvantage proved but not the individual disadvantage: see discussion to this effect in para. 32 of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27 , [2017] 1 WLR 1343 .
34. There are other differences between the two types of complaints. The employer’s knowledge – both of disability and disadvantage – are conditions of a successful claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments: see Schedule 8, para. 20 of the EqA. There is no such requirement in a s. 19 claim, although, as Counsel for the Claimant accepts, whether the employer knew the PCP had a discriminatory effect will be relevant to the justification defence in s. 19(2)(d): see para. 133 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge [2008] EWCA Civ 885 , [2009] ICR 133 . Victimisation
35. Victimisation is defined in s. 27 EqA: “(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. (2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act ; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act ; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act ; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act . (3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.”
36. A victimisation complaint therefore requires the ET to decide whether the employer subjected the employee to a detriment and, if so, whether that was because the employee either did a protected act or the employer believed that the employee had done, or may do, a protected act. As with direct discrimination, “causation” is established in a victimisation complaint if the “reason why” the employer acted the way he did (which subjected the employee to a detriment) was the doing of a protected act (or belief in the same); the “but for” test is not applicable (see Warburton v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [2022] EAT 42 , [2022] ICR 925 ).
37. The test for detriment is also the same as that for direct discrimination. It requires the ET to ask whether the treatment that the employee complains of is of such a kind “that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment” ( Warburton , para. 50, reiterating the test set out in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL11, [2003] ICR 337 ).
38. The ET is therefore required to: (1) identify the act or omission relied upon by the claimant, (2) decide whether it amounted to a detriment (applying the Shamoon test), and (3) decide whether the “reason why” the respondent subjected the claimant to the detriment was because he had done a protected act (or believed that he had or may do so). Discussion and conclusions
39. I start with Ground One. The Claimant makes three principal submissions in support of this ground: (1) the ET erred by assessing the reasonableness of the Respondent’s decision-making, rather than making its own assessment, (2) the ET fell into the trap of relying solely on the percentage approach, and (3) the ET failed to properly take into account why the Claimant was working in the RRU in the first place. I will take each submission in turn.
40. Firstly, I do not accept that the ET failed to make its own assessment of the assignment question. There was no harm in it commenting on its view of the merits of the approach taken by the Respondent but it is apparent from the reading this section of the Judgment as a whole that the ET went on to make its own assessment of whether the Claimant was assigned to the RRU. Moreover, the ET did not limit its assessment solely to the percentage approach.
41. The ET recognised that a percentage approach may not be the best formula but found that it was appropriate in the circumstances of this case for the Respondent to take that approach. Importantly, the comment to this effect in its Judgment (para. 70) was simply an endorsement of the Respondent’s decision-making process, it was not the sole factor that determined the ET’s own conclusion on the issue.
42. It was a matter of fact that for over two years the Claimant had worked 100% of his time in the RRU. It would be reasonable to take as a starting point an assumption that the Claimant was assigned to the RRU, subject to other factors that might undermine this conclusion, such as whether the assignment was only temporary. It is clear that the ET properly considered this point. It accepted that the two comparators were only temporarily assigned to the RRU due to having reasonable adjustments in place. Their duties were genuinely split between the RRU and other warehouses; the Claimant’s were not. This was a relevant distinction that the ET properly held went to the question of whether the Claimant’s assignment was temporary or permanent.
43. The ET also considered the contractual position. It found that although his contract stated “warehouse operative” the Claimant could be required to work anywhere. The contractual position did not therefore undermine the starting point that his permanent assigned role was in the RRU.
44. The Claimant’s third argument is that the reason why he had spent two years working permanently in the RRU was unlawful victimisation. In other words, he had been placed in the RRU against his will because of his protected act. In the alternative, if the ET had properly considered the reasonable adjustments claim, it would have upheld the Claimant’s claim that he should have been moved back into the Ambient warehouse to operate FLTs. Had the ET done this analysis before considering the assignment question, the temporary nature of the assignment would have revealed itself more clearly.
45. Although I accept in general terms that the factual context as to why an employee is working in a particular department may shed light on the nature of the assignment, I do not accept the Claimant’s submissions in the specific circumstances of this case. In short, if unlawful victimisation has led to the unwilling assignment of the employee to an organised grouping of resources or employees which constitutes part of a TUPE transfer this will be a consequence of the victimisation, and potentially a matter of remedy for a victimisation claim; it does not affect the (separate) question of whether they are assigned for the purposes of TUPE.
46. I accept that the point may have more force when it comes to the reasonable adjustments claim. Some reasonable adjustments are temporary in nature, as illustrated by the ET’s findings on the comparators in this case, and the ET was required to consider whether such was the case here. However, it undertook this task and found that the adjustment was permanent, not temporary. I do not accept that the potential for an ancillary finding on the reasonable adjustments claim, namely that the Claimant should have been moved again to another area on site (over two years later) as another reasonable adjustment, meant that such a conclusion was wrong. This conflates the legality of the treatment of the Claimant at work with the factual question of whether the Claimant was part of the “organisational framework” of the RRU at the point of transfer ( Botzen ).
47. In summary, I do not consider that the ET misdirected itself in law or otherwise took a legally erroneous approach to the question of assignment. Its decision was one open to it on the evidence it heard. This part of the appeal is dismissed.
48. Next the Claimant challenges the ET’s conclusions on the indirect discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments complaints, with overlapping Grounds of Appeal (Two, Three, and Four).
49. Firstly, the Claimant argues that the ET took a wrong turn from the start, in that, having correctly found that the PCP of tipping trailers was applied to the Claimant, it failed to connect the duties which caused the disadvantage (pushing and pulling cages) to that PCP.
50. This section of the Judgment starts with clear findings in support of the indirect discrimination claim, namely that the PCP of tipping trailers was applied and the application of that PCP put people with the Claimant’s disability at a particular disadvantage “in that it increases the amount of pain and makes them very tired” (Judgment para. 85). So far, so good.
51. However, the ET then went on to state: “[the] evidence the [ET] heard about emptying trailers was limited, as the claimant appeared more concerned about the pushing and pulling of cages, not emptying them” (Judgment para. 86). It went on to note that the Claimant’s complaints to management were focused on the pulling and pushing of cages and that there was “little evidence about the emptying of the trailers and the impact” (Judgment para. 87). It also noted the Claimant had not complained about the “emptying of cages” (ibid.).
52. I agree with the Claimant’s submission that the emptying of cages was irrelevant to the PCP the ET had found was applied. The task of emptying cages of cardboard and other recyclables and placing them in the baler was never said to be part of the Claimant’s role in the RRU.
53. Moreover, the ET’s conclusion that the pushing and pulling of cages was not related to the practice of emptying trailers was inconsistent with its finding of fact in Judgment para. 5 that “tipping” included taking cages off the HGVs in the RRU. The ET either lost sight of its earlier finding of fact when considering the indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustment complaints or failed to appreciate that “tipping” was equivalent to the PCP of emptying trailers.
54. In oral submissions, Counsel for the Respondent rather tentatively sought to argue that what the ET had actually found in this section of the Judgment was that the PCP ceased to apply to the Claimant after he moved to the RRU in November 2020 (hence the otherwise inexplicable finding that he did not share the group disadvantage). I cannot accept that submission. Reliance on the temporality of the PCP is not stated in terms in the Judgment and it is inconsistent with the finding in Judgment para. 5 that tipping lorries was part of the duties in the RRU. It should be noted for completeness that the Claimant’s own clear evidence was that tipping lorries in the RRU involved the pushing and pulling of cages which aggravated his back condition. There was, in short, a wealth of evidence to support this conclusion.
55. The Respondent also argues that, notwithstanding this error in approach, the appeal is academic because of the clear finding in Judgment para. 94 that the Respondent had not failed to make a reasonable adjustment because a transfer back to the Ambient warehouse had been ruled out by OH. On this point, I agree with the Claimant that such a brief disposal of the reasonable steps element of the statutory test, where there has been such a fundamental wrong turn taken at the outset, cannot rescue the ET’s decision. I note in any event that the Claimant’s claim was that there may have been other areas in addition to the Ambient warehouse where it was suitable for him to work. The ET has not addressed this wider point in any event.
56. For completeness, I should add that I also accept the Claimant’s submission that the ET was wrong to refer to the Respondent’s knowledge of the disadvantage in its findings on the indirect discrimination complaint. As it is, the ET’s dismissal of the indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments complaints cannot stand and must be remitted for fresh consideration.
57. I turn to the victimisation claim (Ground Five).
58. The Claimant relied on three detriments: (1) taking him off tramming work in November/December 2017, (2) from November 2017 onwards not training him on loading work, and (3) sending him to work in the RRU in November 2017. The ET recited these detriments in Judgment para. 95 and recorded the Claimant’s submission that they amounted to conduct extending over time.
59. In Judgment paras. 96-97 the ET went on to consider events after the alteration to the Claimant’s duties in late 2017. It initially referred to the COT3 agreements entered into by the Claimant and Respondent in July 2018 and December 2019, presumably to assess whether the claims would be caught by estoppel (although the ET did not refer to this term expressly).
60. However, it then directed itself that it did not need to make a decision on the status of the COT3s because the Claimant had ceased to raise any issues, concluding that “he seems to accept the failure [to offer him training] and therefore affirmed the breach ” (Judgment para. 97, emphasis added). It is not disputed by the Respondent that the doctrine of affirmation has no place in the statutory test for victimisation.
61. It is difficult to understand what has gone wrong here. It may be that a stray passage intended for the following section on constructive dismissal has wandered into the wrong section. However, I am inclined to accept the Claimant’s submission that it appears from this passage that the ET thought that “affirmation” on the part of the Claimant disposed of at least detriment (2) in the victimisation claim. If so, this is a clear error of law.
62. The Respondent, however, argues that this error of law is immaterial as the ET went on to make clear findings in Judgment paras. 98-99 that the protected act was not the reason why the Claimant was treated as he was. Having heard from the relevant witnesses, the ET was satisfied that the 2017 grievance (i.e. the protected act) had not been influencing the Respondent’s decisions made about the Claimant’s employment and that the sole reason for the move to the RRU was the OH advice.
63. It is fair to observe, as the Claimant submits, that the ET only expressly mentioned detriment (3) (the move to the RRU) in this part of its Judgment. However, the other two detriments were essentially the other side of the same coin. The Respondent was not going to allow the Claimant to continue tramming and carry out loading if it considered that this was against OH advice. Ultimately, I consider that the ET’s reference in Judgment para. 99 to “his move to the RRU and the subsequent adjustments ” (emphasis added) was just sufficient to capture all three detriments relied upon. The ET’s finding on causation was one made after hearing the relevant evidence and was sufficiently reasoned. I do not consider that it is infected by the “affirmation” error, given that it does not overlap with the “reason why” issue. I therefore accept the Respondent’s submission that the ET’s conclusion on causation overrides the earlier errors of law and renders this Ground of Appeal academic.
64. As noted above, the parties accept that the appeal on time limits (Ground Six) must succeed if any of the claims have to be remitted. It follows that I will allow the appeal on Ground Six in respect of the indirect discrimination and reasonable adjustments complaints. Once the ET on remittal has determined the merits of those complaints it will need to go on to consider the effect of time limits, if applicable. Disposal
65. There is no doubt, applying Jafri v Lincoln College [2014] EWCA Civ 449 , [2014] ICR 920 , that the claims need to be remitted back to the ET for fresh determination. The terms of remittal are for the ET to reconsider the indirect discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments complaints on the merits, applying the correct statutory test. If either complaint is well founded, the ET will need to go on to consider time limits.
66. As for the question of whether remittal should be back to the same ET or a freshly constituted ET I have considered the factors in Sinclair Roche and Temperley & Ors v Heard & Anr [2004] IRLR 763 , EAT. I have decided that remittal should be to a freshly constituted ET. This is for the following reasons.
67. Firstly, I do not consider there is much, if anything, gained or saved by remitting to the same ET. The passage of time since the original FMH has been considerable – some three years – and there is little chance that the evidential matters will have remained fresh in the minds of the ET. Furthermore, remittal is on discreet claims that do not substantially overlap with the findings of fact already made for the aspects of the Judgment that have not been disturbed on appeal.
68. Secondly, without doubting the professionalism of the ET, there is an argument that it might not approach a second bite of the cherry with an entirely open mind. It is clear from aspects of the Judgment that were not appealed that the ET formed a relatively dim view of the Claimant, expressly finding that he had sought to manipulate managers at the Respondent and the transferee company.
69. Thirdly, this is a case where elements of the decision, in particular the complaints being sent back, could be fairly described as “totally flawed”.
70. In short, there is little to be gained by sending it back to the same ET and the resolution of the remaining claims is likely to be assisted by a fresh pair of eyes.
71. In terms of the scope of the remittal, the original’s ET decision that the PCP of tipping lorries was applied to the Claimant (including in the RRU) stands, as does its finding of group disadvantage for the s. 19 claim. The remaining issues under both heads of complaint will need to be determined afresh. Conclusion
72. The appeal succeeds on Grounds Two, Three, Four, and Six. The appeal on the remaining Grounds is dismissed.
73. The complaints of indirect discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments are remitted to a fresh ET for reconsideration (including time limits).