UK case law

Mariusz Waluk v Care Quality Commission

[2026] UKFTT HESC 1310 · Care Standards · 2026

Get your free legal insight →Email to a colleague
Get your free legal insight on this case →

The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

The Application

1. The Appellant has applied for permission to submit a late appeal to the Tribunal. Attendance

2. Mrs Lee-Ann Frampton Anderson, solicitor at the CQC, represented the Respondent.

3. Lydia Finnimore, senior solicitor at the CQC observed the hearing.

4. April Marshall-Deane, solicitor at the CQC, observed the hearing.

5. Ifeyinwa Osu, paralegal at the CQC, observed the hearing. Preliminary issues

6. We were required to decide upon two preliminary issues in respect of this application.

7. Firstly, prior to the hearing the Appellant sought permission to lodge two sets of supplementary written submissions in response to the Respondent’s written submissions. The Tribunal previously ordered the parties to file written submissions simultaneously and this order was complied with by both parties. There was no order for subsequent written submissions.

8. The Respondent invited us to refuse admission of the additional submissions on the basis of procedural unfairness. The Respondent argues that they were written after having seen the Respondent’s own submissions and there was no explanation as to why the information contained therein was not included in the original submissions. The Respondent argues that the Appellant should not have the opportunity to change his case in order to improve his position.

9. In the alternative, the Respondent invited us to refuse to admit the attachments to the Appellant’s second set of submissions dated 05/09/2026, as these were of limited relevance and contained personal information about an employee of the Care home and service users.

10. We decided to grant permission for the Appellant to submit the additional written submissions, and we have taken them into account as part of our final determination. The additional submissions are relevant to the issues that we are required to determine, they were submitted in good time ahead of the hearing and there is no prejudice to the Respondent in them being admitted. We bear in mind that the Appellant is a litigant in person and that it clearly became apparent to him, upon reading the Respondent’s submissions, that he had not addressed the correct legal test in his initial submissions and he needed to provide more detail on the pertinent issue of exceptional circumstances.

11. We also decided to allow the inclusion of a letter from the current Registered Manager of the service dated 06/09/2026 which was attached to the second set of submissions. This letter appears to have been written specifically for the Tribunal’s consideration, and we consider that it adds relevant context to the Appellant’s argument concerning operational disruption which the Appellant submits led to the late appeal. We decided to exclude all the remaining correspondence which does contain details of third parties unconnected to this appeal and which, in our judgment, is not required for us to make our determination. One of the documents is in any event illegible. We accept that the Appellant had a heavy workload during the relevant appeal period. The level of detail that is included in the attachments is unnecessary for our purposes and amounts to evidence, which has not been ordered.

12. Secondly, on the morning of the hearing, we received an application by the Appellant to either adjourn the hearing or to proceed ‘on the papers’, taking into account his written submissions. The application is made on the basis of his ill-health. He states that he has become acutely unwell following prescribed injectable medication and is currently experiencing significant nausea, sickness and headache. He says that these symptoms make it difficult for him to concentrate and participate effectively in formal hearing.

13. We have to decide whether to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence. As such we have applied Rule 27 of the Tribunal Rules. We are satisfied that the Appellant is aware of the hearing and that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in his absence. We are mindful that the Appellant has made the application at a very late stage and has not submitted any medical evidence in support of his position. We have allowed the Appellant permission to file detailed additional submissions in which his case is fully set out. This is a preliminary hearing dealing with a specific issue, in which neither party is required to give oral evidence. We are proceeding on the basis of the extensive submissions submitted on behalf of the Appellant together with the written and oral submissions from the Respondent.

14. In making this decision we have considered the overriding objective and, in particular, the need to deal with the case proportionately, the need to enable the parties to participate fully in the proceedings and the need to avoid delay. Background

15. The Appellant seeks to appeal the refusal of his application for registration as the registered manager of The Dales care home.

16. The Respondent issued a Notice of Proposal on 17/03/2026 proposing refusal of registration. Following representations from the Appellant, the Respondent issued a Notice of Decision on 07/07/2026. This was deemed served on 09/07/2026 and the statutory 28-day period for bringing an appeal expired on 06/08/2026. The Appellant lodged his appeal on 11/08/2026, five days out of time. Legal Framework Health and Social Care Act 2008 Section 32(2) of the Act provides that no appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order. Tribunal Procedure Rules Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008, requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Rule 5(3)(a) provides that the Tribunal may extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit. Rule 20(1)(a) requires that an Appellant must start proceedings before the Tribunal by sending or delivering an application notice to the Tribunal so that it is received - if the time for providing the application notice is specified in another enactment, in accordance with that enactment. Rule 20(4) requires that if the Appellant provides the application notice to the Tribunal later than the time required by paragraph (1) or by any extension of time under rule 5(3)(a) (power to extend time) — a. the application notice must include a request for an extension of time and the reason why the application notice was not provided in time; and b. unless the Tribunal extends time for the application notice under rule 5(3)(a) (power to extend time) the Tribunal must not admit the application notice. Relevant Authorities Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica [2012] UKSC 20 The Supreme Court held that apparently absolute statutory appeal time limits may, in exceptional circumstances, be interpreted compatibly with Article 6 ECHR so that access to justice is preserved. Adesina v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818 The Court of Appeal confirmed that any discretion to permit a late statutory appeal is extremely limited and should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Stuewe v Health and Care Professions Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1605 The High Court reaffirmed that the relevant question is whether the circumstances are exceptional where to deny a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. Ordinary mistakes, misunderstandings or procedural errors will not ordinarily satisfy that threshold. Answering the question may or may not include consideration of whether or not the litigant has done everything possible to serve within time, depending on the facts of the case. Once the discretion (or duty) arises, it must then be exercised to the minimum extent necessary to secure compliance with Article 6 rights. Submissions Appellant

16. We considered three sets of written submissions provided by the Appellant dated 28/08/2026, 05/09/2026 and 08/09/2026.

17. The Appellant submits that the Tribunal should admit the appeal notwithstanding that it was lodged five days outside the statutory time limit. He accepts that the applicable jurisdiction is narrow and arises only in exceptional circumstances but argues that the respondent has misstated the legal test by suggesting that an appellant must demonstrate complete incapacity to act throughout the entirety of the appeal period. The Appellant contends that the correct approach is a fact-sensitive assessment of whether strict enforcement of the statutory time limit would impair the substance of the right of access to an appeal, taking account of all the circumstances of the individual case.

18. In his initial submissions, the Appellant states that the Notice of Decision was correctly sent to him by email on 07/07/2026 but was routed into an email folder which he did not routinely monitor. He therefore did not read the email when it arrived and then forgot that a Notice of Decision was due. The Appellant later reviewed the email folder and discovered the Notice of Decision, which then led him to complete the appeal on 11/08/2026. The Appellant accepts that responsibility to monitor the mailbox rested with him.

19. In his subsequent submissions the Appellant addresses the exceptional circumstances test and provides additional information about why he did not submit the appeal on time. The Appellant submits that exceptional circumstances existed because, during the appeal period, the care home's secretary became unexpectedly absent following the death of her husband, resulting in the sudden loss of a key administrative function without any opportunity for an orderly handover. As Implementation Manager, the Appellant assumed responsibility for a substantial volume of additional administrative, financial and operational duties, including payroll, staff management systems, recruitment, invoicing, banking, supplier contracts and correspondence. He argues that this disruption was compounded by two urgent matters involving vulnerable individuals which required his immediate attention.

20. The first of those matters concerned securing alternative accommodation for an individual who had been provided with emergency housing arrangements and who faced the risk of homelessness if suitable accommodation could not be found before the expiry of the temporary arrangement. The second concerned a significant dispute regarding residential-care funding, which required extensive investigation and engagement with the LA in order to secure funding for a resident and relieve substantial financial pressure on the resident's family. The Appellant submits that these were not routine work pressures but exceptional and urgent matters affecting vulnerable individuals which demanded concentrated attention during the period in which the appeal deadline expired.

21. The Appellant's case is that the cumulative effect of these events caused a temporary breakdown in the normal administrative systems by which important correspondence was identified, prioritised and actioned. Although the Notice of Decision was received electronically, it was not identified as requiring urgent action and was overlooked amidst the exceptional disruption. The Appellant maintains that the omission was neither deliberate nor tactical and arose from an unforeseen convergence of circumstances rather than indifference to the appeal process.

22. The Appellant further submits that he acted promptly once the position became apparent to him. He emphasises that the delay was only five days, that no evidence was lost and that the respondent has identified no prejudice arising from the delay. The Appellant contends that refusing to admit the appeal would permanently prevent consideration of the substantive challenge to the decision refusing his registration application. He therefore invites the Tribunal to consider the circumstances cumulatively, to conclude that they were exceptional, and to find that strict application of the statutory time limit would impair the practical and effective exercise of his right of appeal. Respondent

23. We considered the Respondent’s written submissions dated 28/08/2026 and oral submissions made at the hearing.

24. The Respondent submits that the appeal was lodged outside the statutory 28-day time limit prescribed by section 32(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 and that the Tribunal has no general power to extend that deadline. It argues that, although the authorities recognise a limited jurisdiction to permit a late appeal in exceptional circumstances, that jurisdiction is extremely narrow and arises only where strict application of the statutory time limit would impair the very essence of an individual's right of access to a tribunal.

25. The Respondent accepts that the exceptional circumstances in which a late appeal cannot be admitted are not confirmed to a closed list. The Respondent accepts that such applications are fact sensitive and are not confined to circumstances in which an appellant is incapacitated or fails to receive the notice. As such it rejects the Appellant’s characterisation of its approach to the appeal.

26. The Respondent contends that the circumstances relied upon by the Appellant do not meet that exceptionally high threshold. It submits that the Appellant has not identified any circumstance that prevented him from lodging the appeal within the statutory period and that the explanation originally advanced, namely that he acted once the appeal procedure and deadline became clear, amounts to no more than a misunderstanding or lack of appreciation of the applicable procedural requirements.

27. The Respondent argues that exceptional circumstances are confined to rare cases where an appellant is effectively prevented from exercising the right of appeal, such as where the decision notice was never received or the appellant was physically incapable of acting. It maintains that ordinary administrative difficulties, workload pressures, inadvertence, oversight, uncertainty about procedure or the absence of legal representation cannot constitute exceptional circumstances sufficient to displace a statutory time limit imposed by Parliament.

28. The Respondent further submits that the Tribunal should focus upon whether the Appellant was prevented from appealing during the statutory period and not upon the shortness of the delay or the merits of the underlying registration appeal. It argues that a delay of only five days does not of itself justify departure from the statutory scheme and that the substantive merits of the registration decision are irrelevant to the jurisdictional question.

29. In relation to the Appellant's submissions, the Respondent contends that the explanation for the delay was not adequately set out in the original appeal application and that the circumstances now relied upon do not demonstrate the sort of exceptional impediment recognised by the authorities. The Respondent characterises the circumstances set out by the Appellant as an administrative and email management failure, which is far removed from the high threshold required for the appeal to be accepted late. The Respondent therefore invites the Tribunal to conclude that the statutory time limit has not been displaced, that the exceptional jurisdiction is not engaged, and that the appeal should not be admitted out of time.

30. The Respondent further points out that the Appellant has the ability to submit a new application to become the Registered Manager of the service, and if that application is rejected, he was a fresh right of appeal. As such, any refusal to admit this appeal does not permanently preclude his ability to seek registration. The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons

31. There is no dispute between the parties as to the validity of the service of the Notice of Decision. It is agreed that the Notice of Decision was served on 08/07/2026 by email, with the deemed date of service being 09/07/2026. This means that the Appellant was required to submit his appeal by 06/08/2026. He accepts that he did not do so, and that he ultimately submitted an appeal 5 days late on 11/08/2026.

32. Equally, there is no factual dispute as to the explanation provided by the Appellant for his not submitting the appeal in time. The Appellant initially stated that he did not read the email containing the Notice of Decision when it arrived, as it had been routed into a folder which the Appellant did not routinely monitor. He then forgot that the decision was due. The Appellant acknowledged that this was careless on his part. In his later submissions, the Appellant adds context to the situation by detailing the absence of a member of staff due to bereavement which resulted in the Appellant having to undertake many additional administrative duties. The situation was compounded by the Appellant having to deal with two complex issues regarding service users at the home. The Respondent has not challenged the Appellant’s version of events, and this forms the factual basis for our determination.

33. The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the explanation provided by the Appellant amounts to exceptional circumstances, to the extent that not allowing the late appeal would impair the very essence of the Appellant’s right to appeal. To be clear, whether the required exceptional circumstances exist is a question of fact which depend on the circumstances of the individual case. We are not constrained by the examples set out in the relevant authorities, which are illustrative only and do not form an exhaustive list of limited circumstances in which a late appeal can be allowed.

34. We have considered the circumstances of this particular case and concluded that they do not meet the threshold for the appeal to be accepted out of time. The Appellant’s failure to submit the appeal on time ultimately resulted, as he accepts, from a careless administrative error on his part.

35. The Appellant was engaged for several months in the registration process with the Respondent. He received the Notice of Proposal to refuse his registration as Registered Manager of the service and he completed representations in response. He was aware that the next step in the process would be a Notice of Decision, either accepting the representations or upholding the Notice of Decision. In our judgment, this was a matter of the most profound importance which was fundamental to his role at the service. It was indeed careless of the Appellant to not keep a proper look out for the Notice of Decision and to allow it to enter a folder that he did not routinely monitor.

36. We find that the circumstances described by the Appellant relating to his working environment and workload, while challenging, did not reach the level of exceptionality required by the authorities. We accept that the sudden bereavement-related absence of a key employee created significant operational disruption, but it does not explain why the Appellant failed to monitor his emails. There is no suggestion by the Appellant that it would have been the secretary’s role to monitor the Appellant’s emails. But even if it was, the Notice of Decision related to the Appellant’s personal application for registration which was his responsibility and should have been prioritised.

37. We further note that the secretary went off work on 08/06/2026, a month before the Notice of Decision arrived and nearly 2 months before the expiry of the statutory deadline. Therefore, while her absence was unexpected and undoubtedly increased the Appellant’s workload, there was time subsequently for the service to put in place measures to ensure its continued operation. And the absence did not first occur in or around the crucial period of the appeal window.

38. It is further relevant that the Appellant was not alone in holding responsibility for the service during this period. The Managing Director and Registered Manager of the service Mr Iredale was also present, as was Mrs Barker the General Manager who provided additional support. It is notable that the email address provided by the Appellant for the service of the Notice of Decision is also used by Mr Iredale. As such, there was at least one other person working at the service who could have picked up the email and identified the Notice of Decision.

39. The Appellant has provided two examples of urgent work that he had to undertake which he states required his concentrated attention during the relevant period. As an expert Tribunal, we conclude that, though both examples were serious and would require a certain focus to deal with, they were not out of the ordinary and not beyond the scope of what an implementation manager would be required to deal with. Managing a care home is by its nature challenging and unexpected situations can arise which require careful attention from those in charge. We are not satisfied that the circumstances described by the Appellant justify his failure to properly manage the appeals process.

40. Even taking the Appellant's evidence at its highest, these circumstances did not prevent him from exercising his right of appeal. They created competing demands upon his time and contributed to an administrative oversight, but they did not make it impossible or substantially impracticable for him to lodge an appeal within the statutory period.

41. We do acknowledge that the delay in the Appellant filing the appeal is relatively short, and that the Appellant acted promptly to submit the appeal once he became aware of the Notice of Decision. However, in the context of our finding that there were no exceptional circumstances which resulted in the failure to submit the appeal on time and the lapse was essentially caused by the Appellant’s inaction, we are not satisfied that the shortness of the delay or the promptness of the Appellant’s actions thereafter enables us to exercise our discretion to admit the appeal.

42. Finally, we accept that the refusal to admit the appeal will prevent consideration of the merits of this particular registration decision. However, that consequence alone is insufficient to establish the exceptional circumstances required by the authorities. The Appellant retains the opportunity to submit a new application to be Registered Manager of the service. Any such application may even have a greater chance of success as the Appellant is now aware of the Respondent’s reasons for refusing the previous application. But, if a future application is refused, the Appellant will have the right to appeal once again. Therefore, it cannot be said that the very essence of the right to appeal is impaired in this case.

43. We have considered cumulatively the secretary's absence, the additional administrative burden placed upon the Appellant, the urgent issues concerning residents, the fact that the Notice of Decision was overlooked rather than ignored, the short period of delay and the prompt lodging of the appeal once discovered. Taking those matters together, we are nevertheless not satisfied that this is one of the exceptional cases in which the statutory time limit may be displaced. Decision :

1. The Appellant’s application to submit the appeal late is refused.

2. This is the final hearing, and the appeal is now concluded. Judge Edwards First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 15 September 2026