UK case law
Maureen Smith, R (on the application of) v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council
[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2167 · High Court (Planning Court) · 2026
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Full judgment
Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN:
1. This is the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, permission having been refused on the papers by Lang J by her order dated 22 January 2026.
2. Maureen Smith is the applicant for retrospective planning permission for the material change of use of land for use as a caravan site for gypsy travellers with associated hardstanding, two utility units and a cess tank. That application was made on 20 January 2025, though there has been some indication before me this morning that the application may have been lodged a little bit earlier than that. But, in any event, early in the New Year last year.
3. On 12 March 2025, officers of the respondent local planning authority, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, made a recommendation to the group leader for development management for the outer area to decline to determine the application and return it to the applicant. That recommendation was adopted for these reasons: “The section 70C power states: ‘A local planning authority may decline to determine an application for planning permission for the development of any land if granting permission for the development would involve granting, whether in relation to the whole or any part of the land to which a pre-existing enforcement notice relates, planning permission in respect of the whole or any part of the matters specified in the enforcement notice as constituting a breach of planning control. Granting planning permission for the development would involve granting permission for matters specified in a pre-existing enforcement notice as constituting a breach of planning control. The Site is subject to an upheld Notice against the subject matter of the application. The application itself is a re-submission of a previously refused (including at Appeal) scheme. Therefore, the power is available to the Authority in this case. The Council consider that the planning merits of the application have already been considered before. The Council does not consider that the ‘planning changes’ relied upon by the Applicant are so material or different as to overcome the previous planning concerns specified in the enforcement notice and upheld by the Inspector on the subsequent appeal. The same planning issues arise with this application. The Council considers there is a need to ensure compliance with the requirements of the enforcement notice without delay. Overall, S.70 C of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 sets out that the Council may decline to determine an application for planning permission or permission in principle for the development of any land if granting planning permission for the development would involve granting, whether in relation to the whole or any part of the land to which a pre-existing enforcement notice relates, planning permission in respect of the whole or any part of the matters specified in the enforcement notice as constituting a breach of planning control. In this instance, granting planning permission for the development would involve granting planning permission in respect of a part of the matters specified in an enforcement notice as constituting a breach of planning control. The planning merits of the application have previously been considered, and this application would further delay enforcement proceedings. It is appropriate in these circumstances for the Council to exercise their s.70 C powers. In doing so they have had regard to Best Interests of the Children, the Public Sector Equality Duty and to Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention for Human Rights Act 1998 .”
4. I am told that on 24 June 2022 there was a claim form issued with an application for an interim injunction. That injunction was granted on an interim basis on 1 February 2023. I mention that in the context of other dates which appear within the chronology and to which I will return later.
5. We are now four years into the applications and enforcement history of this particular site and its development, it having started on 20 July 2022 or possibly 20 June 2022 (I am not sure because there are conflicting dates in the papers), when a retrospective application was submitted. One notes there the coincidence between that application in terms of the timing and the issuing of a claim form for the injunction.
6. In any event, that 2022 application was refused on four grounds being, firstly, inappropriate development in the green belt. I am just providing these in shorthand. Secondly, it being contrary to development plan policy GT1, which is concerned with sites for travellers and travelling show people, and the points there being essentially that the site location is not a sustainable location. Thirdly, that the information provided in respect of effects of biodiversity is not adequate. And, fourthly, that the details in respect of foul drainage were not adequate.
7. That refusal was on 14 September 2022 and was then an appeal which resulted in a decision dated 10 July 2023 by Inspector D Hartley, which the parties have referred to as the “Hartley decision”. The Inspector’s decision letter is structured around those four reasons for refusal. In respect of green belt, the Inspector concluded as follows: “8. Paragraphs 147 and 148 of the National Planning Policy Framework 2021 (the Framework) state that inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and that substantial weight should be given to any harm caused to it. This is a matter therefore that weighs against allowing the appeal and, in this regard, there is conflict with the PPTS, the Framework and policy GB1 of the adopted Barnsley Local Plan 2019 (LP) which seek to protect the Green Belt from inappropriate development. …
11. While there is a mature hedge running alongside Clayton Lane, which partly screens the site from public view, there are nevertheless some open views of the site from this road, particularly at the site access. The hardstanding area and associated fencing can be seen from Clayton Lane when the entrance gates are open. Furthermore, the tops of the caravans, which owing to their white colour appear stark in the landscape setting, can also be seen above the existing boundary fencing in this part of Clayton Lane. Such views of the residential part of the appeal site would be even more apparent than now given that a barb wire and timber post fence is proposed to be erected on the boundary near to the site access with Clayton Lane. Therefore, some harm would also be caused to the openness of the Green Belt in visual terms. …
13. Overall, I find that the proposed development would have a moderately adverse localised impact on the openness of the Green Belt. In addition, and, as experienced as part of my site visit, the caravans, vehicles, utility blocks, kennels and hard surfacing would unacceptably urbanise this part of the countryside. While it is accepted that there are other developments in the immediate area, including a school, warehouse and agriculture building, the environment is nonetheless experienced by the passer-by as including more sporadic development and one which is more rural and open in character when compared to the built-up settlement of Thurnscoe. I therefore find that the appeal proposal would conflict with one of the purposes of the Green Belt, i.e., safeguarding the countryside from encroachment.”
8. The Inspector then turned to the question of whether or not the site was sustainably located. The Inspector applied policy GT1 to the facts as he found them and he concluded as follows: “21. For the above reasons, I conclude that the appeal development would not be sustainably located. Overall, it would conflict with the sustainable transport and accessibility requirements of the Framework and with policy GT1 of the LP which states that sites should ‘have good access to facilities’ and ‘good vehicular and pedestrian access from the highway’.”
9. Yesterday I received a witness statement which appended details of a bus stop which is said to be close to the site. It includes photographs of the bus stop and some details of bus timetables. The admission of that evidence is opposed. It is self-evidently very late in these proceedings but it is relied upon as material which seeks to inform the court about the circumstances at the site. I have had regard to the contents of that witness statement and, notwithstanding the lateness of its service, because it is material which merely informs me about the site and its location, I am going to admit it.
10. The Inspector then dealt with biodiversity and at paragraph 23 of his decision he said that the heart of the acceptability of the proposal is affected by this issue and, in the absence of baseline information and mitigation details, it would not be appropriate to deal with this via the imposition of a planning condition. He addressed foul drainage in this way: “25. I have considered whether this is a matter that could be addressed by planning condition, but in the absence of at least basic information about this matter from the appellant, I cannot be certain that it would be possible, in principle, to continue to occupy the site in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner from the point of view of foul drainage.”
11. Inspector Hartley found there to be a five year supply of deliverable gypsy and traveller sites, a point which is important in the context of the attack which is made upon the council’s decision in this case. I will return to that point later in some more detail.
12. The Inspector considered the best interests of children, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the public sector equality duty. Having regard to the factual matters that he found, he concluded as follows: “48. On balance, I therefore find that the harm to the Green Belt by reason of inappropriateness, and the other identified harm, is not clearly outweighed by the other considerations so as to amount to the very special circumstances necessary to justify the development.
49. For the above reasons, I do not find that the grant of permanent planning permission is justified. I have considered whether a temporary planning permission would be appropriate, but it remains possible that an alternative site could be available for the family within the near future, whether on an allocated site or taking pro-active action to secure occupation on a policy compliant windfall site. In respect of the latter, there is no evidence before me to indicate that such an option would not be possible within a period of months rather than years. Furthermore, and, in any event, the harm that would be caused to the Green Belt, and the other identified planning harms, wile for a limited period, would nonetheless still be significant and hence a temporary planning permission would not be justified on this basis.”
13. Of course there is an enforcement notice in this case. It is dated 5 June 2023 and is indicated to take effect on 6 July 2023 unless there is an appeal. The enforcement notice is in respect of two breaches of planning control. Firstly, in respect of operational development which principally comprises the hard surface, the fences and the gates on the land, and secondly the material change of use, which is the change of use of the site to residential occupation of caravans, storage of vehicles, timber huts, gas bottles, shipping container and other domestic items which were associated with the residential use.
14. The reasons given on the notice are as follows: “The unauthorised development [to which I have just referred] constitutes inappropriate development and is not acceptable in planning terms. As outlined in the NPPF, inappropriate development is by definition harmful to the green belt and should not be approved except in very special circumstances. The development fails to preserve the openness of the green belt and as the extent of the works are visible from surrounding views. It is the view of the council that the operations harm the site and the wider openness of the green belt. The local planning authority is not aware of any very special circumstances which would justify the development and therefore the development is considered to be inappropriate. Overall the unauthorised engineering works fails to comply with the aims and objectives of policies GD1 (general development), GB2 (protection of green belt), GB3 (changes of use or green belt), D1 (design), “POL1 (pollution) in the Barnsley local plan 2019 and guidance contained in the National Planning Policy Framework.”
15. An appeal was made, but only on ground (g), there being available the grounds within the statutory framework for appeals against enforcement notice from grounds (a) to (g), ground (g) being solely concerned with time for compliance. That appeal decision provided some success for the appellant in that the time for compliance was extended. The appeal decision was issued on 8 June 2024, so I understand, and I am told that the enforcement notice came into force on 18 December 2024, so just before Christmas.
16. It will be recalled that the application was made to the local planning authority on 22 January 2025, though there was some discussion that it may have been slightly earlier. In any event, one can see that the enforcement notice came into force just before Christmas and a planning application was made just after Christmas.
17. It has been pointed out to me by Mr Cottle, who appears for the claimant, that the making of the application at the beginning of 2025 was also coincident with the of amendments to policies which relate to gypsy and traveller sites. He explained to me that the application was motivated by those changes in policy because on the applicant/claimant’s case this is a change in circumstances which merited consideration in the exercise of the authority’s discretion as to whether or not to consider and determine the application.
18. I now return to the section 70 C decision which is challenged in these proceedings. The application was supported by a planning statement which was settled by Mrs Alison T Heine BSc, MSc, of Heine Planning Consultancy, which is dated January 2025. That planning statement highlighted, in its section 2.1, four particular matters which were then summarised by officers who prepared a report in support of the delegated decision to decline to determine the application. They are summarised at section 6.10 of that officer’s report as: “In the present case the applicant’s agent makes reference to four key changes which they should be taken into account by the Local Authority when determining whether to decline to determine the application. These are: 1-Gypsy-Traveller Planning definition in PPTS December 2023. 2-Appeal Decision Shaw Lane Carlton 2.8.2024. 3-Revised National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and Planning Policy for Traveller Sites (PPTS) December 2024. 4-Personal circumstances.”
19. The decision which is challenged was made for the reasons which I have already referred to but which are supported by further analysis and discussion in the twelve sections of the officer’s report.
20. Having set out that background, it is convenient then to understand what has been said in earlier cases as to how section 70 C of the 1990 Act is properly to be understood and to assist those who are to apply it. In this regard I have been very much assisted by both counsel as to the impact of the first instance and Court of Appeal judgments.
21. In R (on the application of Patrick Moran) v Medway Council [2025] EWHC 350 (Admin) , in which Kerr J had to review the case law as existed at that time and explained the way in which it should be applied in respect of that case, which did touch upon issues which are also relied upon in this case. That case was then appealed and we have the judgment of the Court of Appeal at [2026] EWCA Civ 484 in which, on 17 April of this year, Dove LJ upheld the judgment of Kerr J, with whose judgment Jackson and Arnold LLJ agreed.
22. I start with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In his conclusions, Dove LJ addressed what has been referred to during the course of argument as the two limbs or considerations which are required to be addressed in applying section 70 C. That is as to whether section 70 C applies and as to whether it should be used and the discretion exercised to decline to determine an application. I pause there to make clear that it is common ground in this case that section 70 C can apply in the circumstances of this case.
23. At paragraph 56 of his judgment, Dove LJ said: “In my view given the language used in section 70 C of the 1990 Act its purpose is clear. It is designed to enable a local planning authority to decline to determine an application for planning permission in respect of either the whole or part of a breach of planning control at a parcel of land which has a pre-existing enforcement notice issued in respect of that breach of planning control. It prevents a duplication of the consideration of the planning merits of the breach of planning control which is the subject of the enforcement action unless the local planning authority are prepared for that to be undertaken.” The learned judge then went on to explain what it was that he considered to be the mischief against which the section is directed, which the learned judge explained to be the potential for an occupier to insist on more than one determination of the planning merits.
24. At paragraph 57 of his judgment, the judge explained that: “At its heart, however, it is clear that the purpose of section 70 C is to preclude any requirement that there be two separate considerations of the underlying planning merits of a breach of planning control in circumstances where the local planning authority have issued an enforcement notice against that breach of planning control prior to the submission of any application in respect of that breach.”
25. There is a second feature of this judgment which I need to set out. That arises because Mr Riley-Smith relies upon what was said at first instance by Kerr J as to what were and were not material considerations in a gypsy and traveller case, and there is an issue between the parties as to whether or not those dicta bind me or whether they are superseded by the judgment of the Court of Appeal or otherwise traversed by that judgment.
26. At paragraph 30 of his judgment, Kerr J explained a submission which had been made on behalf of the claimant. That submission was that there was an acknowledged need for an additional 34 pitches for gypsies and travellers in the area and that that significant shortfall was important in the exercise to be undertaken. That factual context is dealt with by Kerr J at his paragraphs 116 and 117 where he said this: “Turning to the first ground of challenge, I start from the premise that all the matters considered in the report signed by Mr Harris are accepted as relevant considerations. It is not said that any irrelevant matter was wrongly taken into account. In my brief summary, the considerations were …”. The judge then went on to include at (vi): “an acknowledged shortfall in sites for gypsies and travellers.” At paragraph 117 the judge said: “I can find nothing in Mr Beglan's submissions to persuade me that any compulsory consideration – i.e. one so obviously material that it was irrational not to have regard to it – was left out of account. The following were not mandatory considerations: the claimant's subjective motive; the changed definition of travellers in 2015; the discrimination recognised in the Lisa Smith case; the supply of housing over five years; the possibility of temporary planning permission; the changed incidence of flood risk …; the absence of objection from those consulted. Nor was it mandatory to mention and comment on policy H13 in the local plan.” Mr Riley-Smith submits that that is an important answer to the claimant’s case because these matters are not, as Kerr J put it, compulsory considerations.
27. Mr Cottle takes the contrary view and submits that Moran in the Court of Appeal reaches a different conclusion. Mr Cottle directed me to paragraph 10 of the judgment of Dove LJ in which the judge sets out the assessment of the planning merits and of the particular considerations associated with the welfare needs of the occupant of the site and as to need. Mr Cottle’s submission is that by reason of paragraph 50 of the judgment, a different line of reasoning was adopted which effectively supersedes what was said by Kerr J where Dove LJ said: “Ground three of the appellant's case is the contention that the respondent failed to take account of mandatory material considerations in exercising the discretion under section 70 C of the 1990 Act . Firstly, the respondent failed to take account of the question of whether or not considering the merits of the appellant's planning application would or might delay effective enforcement action against a current breach of planning control. The respondent failed to take account of the fact that because there was no development currently on the site to enforce against there were no implications to be taken into account in respect of the proper and timely taking of enforcement action.”
28. The rejoinder to that from Mr Riley-Smith is to direct me in particular to paragraph 69, which is the concluding paragraph, in which Dove LJ says: “For all of the reasons set out above each of the grounds of appeal which has been advanced should, in my judgment, be rejected. The analysis which was provided by Kerr J in examining the case at first instance was correct and the reasons he provided accurate. It follows that the appeal against the order which he made must be dismissed.”
29. In my judgment, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment at first instance, including what was said by Kerr J at his paragraphs 116 and 117, and in consequence that is a judgment which I should follow unless there is a good reason not to. I do not find there to be any reason for me not to follow what was said by Kerr J at first instance.
30. Accordingly, I do not consider that the question of need in the context of a section 70 C determination is something which constitutes a material consideration which is compulsory or, in other words, one which a decision-maker is bound to take into account in the way that is explained in R (FoE) v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] PTSR 190 at [117]-[121] per Lord Sales.
31. I turn then to the grounds. The grounds are set out in admirable detail by Mr Cottle. I do not propose to address each of the grounds in sequential order in the way in which they are pleaded because they do interact and I would do a disservice to several of the grounds if I failed to take account of the way in which they provide support to each other.
32. The first issue I will address is concerned with green belt, grey belt and the question of need and it also relates to appeal decisions which were issued subsequent to the Hartley appeal decision. I introduce those grounds by reference to the subsequent appeal decisions to which I have been directed. There are two of them. The first is an appeal decision concerned with the caravan site at Shaw Lane, Carlton in Barnsley in which Inspector Thomas Shields issued his decision on 2 August 2024. He allowed an appeal against an enforcement notice and granted planning permission in respect of a notice which addressed operational development and also the change of use of land for the residential occupation of caravans and storage of vehicles, etc.
33. The way in which this is relied upon by Mr Cottle is disclosed by his discussion of need and the supply of pitches and whether alternative sites are available. He concluded, on the balance of the evidence before him in the hearing which he heard in July 2024, that there was an immediate need for a pitch suitable for the appellant and that there is currently a lack of a five year supply of deliverable pitches within Barnsley, and he attached weight to that in support of allowing the appeal. He also doubted the accuracy of the council’s position on need and supply of pitches because the evidence base from the 2015 gypsy and traveller site assessment (the GTAA) was nine years old and its assessment of longer term of pitch requirements recognised that vacancy and turnover rates could change. So the thrust of that point is that the situation had moved on since July 2023 when the Hartley decision was issued.
34. The second decision is in respect of land on the west side of Sandy Bridge Lane, Shafton in Barnsley in which Inspector Madge issued a decision on 10 March 2025 after holding a hearing in November 2024. There are two keys point. The first is that Inspector Madge concluded that by reason of the combination of the limited supply of pitches with the likely increased demand, that the authority had a significant shortfall in pitch provision and therefore an unmet need. The second point urged upon me by Mr Cottle is the conclusion that, given over 70% of the council’s administrative area is located within green belt, it was accepted by the council that new traveller sites would more likely than not be provided in the green belt. So the point submitted by Mr Cottle is that there is an unmet need and the likelihood is that the sites to meet that need would be in the green belt.
35. Along with the green belt point there is a grey belt point, which also arises from the Madge decision letter. Those who have followed the evolution of green belt and grey belt policy will know that the introduction of the grey belt aspect includes a definition of grey belt as land in the green belt comprising previously developed land and/or any other land that, in either case, does not strongly contribute to any of the purposes (a), (b) or (d), which are set out in paragraph 143 of the Framework. In that case the Inspector found that the land was grey belt land.
36. The claimant’s submission is that the fact of that change in policy and the potential for the site to be grey belt land is a matter which goes to the section 70 C assessment and which assessment the claimant criticises.
37. Along with that point is ground (d) which alleges that there has been a misconstruing of the framework, including as to misconstruing the definition of grey belt and in respect of which the claimant emphasises the change in direction of the presumption from strong resistance to development which is inappropriate development in the green belt to the more permissive approach taken in respect of land which is identified to be grey belt.
38. Still further, there is another interacting aspect of the claimant’s case which integrates the changes with respect to green belt policy and the introduction of a concept of grey belt to changes which took place in respect of National Planning Policy, as it applies specifically to gypsy and traveller sites. In that regard I was particularly taken to paragraph 13 of the policy which provides that: “Local planning authorities should ensure that traveller sites are sustainable economically, socially and environmentally. Local planning authorities should, therefore, ensure that their policies: a) promote peaceful and integrated co-existence between the site and the local community … c) ensure that children can attend school on a regular basis d) provide a settled base that reduces both the need for long-distance travelling and possible environmental damage caused by unauthorised encampment …”. Mr Riley-Smith then emphasised to me that this policy is within the section on plan making.
39. The thrust of the claimant’s case in respect of these points is that the section 70 C decision does not properly take account of those material considerations, most important of which is the change of circumstance in respect of need, but also of significance being the change in policy which has been brought about and which together, having regard to the changes in policy in respect of gypsy and traveller sites and the green belt, give rise to a different policy context which ought to permit the claimant to have her planning application determined.
40. As attractively and as forcefully as those arguments were advanced, I am unable to accept that there is an arguable case in respect of those overlapping grounds. My reasons for arriving at that conclusion derive from the proper understanding of section 70 C as explained so very recently by the Court of Appeal. In my judgment, those grounds invite the planning authority to undertake an entirely fresh assessment of the merits of the planning application which was submitted after the planning enforcement notice took effect. That is what section 70 C enables the planning authority to decline to do. As the Court of Appeal explained, the section 70 C discretion is one which entitles the planning authority to make an assessment of what has already been decided in respect of its earlier decision making and to come to the conclusion, using the terminology in the previous case law, as to whether or not the applicant has already had the bite of the cherry which the planning system provides for.
41. As Mr Cottle submitted, that is a discretion which has limits. It is not a discretion provided by the statute which is unconfined by its statutory purpose. Mr Cottle made reference to Shvidler v Secretary of State for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30 , reported at [2025] 3 WLR 346 at [120-122], [126] and [142] for the same point, which was set out extensively by Dove LJ in reliance on R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p. Spath Holme Limited [2001] 2 AC 349 , in which Lord Nicholls went back to first principles and made clear that no statutory power is unlimited in scope, rather that a discretion given by Parliament is never absolute or unfettered and the powers which are conferred by Parliament had a purpose and may be lawfully exercised only in furtherance of that purpose.
42. With respect, the point made by Mr Cottle is well made and I have borne it carefully in mind. However, the purpose in this case, as set out by the Court of Appeal, is to avoid the contest which is playing out in these proceedings by reference to events and changes in circumstances which were subsequent to the service of the enforcement notice and its taking effect. Planning considerations change frequently and in different categories. So biodiversity may change on a particular site as a protected species either arrives or departs. There may be, and in recent years there have been, frequent changes in national policy and likewise the whole structure of the planning regime is for there to be changes within local plan policy in order to keep plans up to date. Similarly, personal circumstances will change as they no doubt have done in this case.
43. Parliament knew all of that when it came to enact section 70 C. What it did was give a broad discretion to local planning authorities to either determine an application to which section 70 C applied or not. As Dove LJ said at paragraph 65, that discretion is indeed broad.
44. It will also be recalled that in Moran the court observed the close relationship between questions of rationality and the material considerations which might be argued to have been omitted and the wisdom on a claimant’s part of putting its case by reference to material considerations rather than by reference to a rationality ground. There is in this case, at ground (h), a rationality ground but in reality that is a restatement of points made under other grounds.
45. The bar for showing that a section 70 C decision is irrational is a very high one indeed. In my judgment, it has not been arguably passed in this case having regard to the careful decision which was made in respect of the matters relating to need, green belt and grey belt. Firstly, the decision expressly grapples with the four new points raised in the planning statement in support of this application. Secondly, it expresses grapples, within its own section (8), with the Shaw Lane decision of August 2024 and gives reasons for declining to follow the decision in that case. It is said: “The fact that a different inspector presented with different arguments a year later came to a different finding on need does not prevent the council from relying on section 70 C. The owner had the opportunity to raise issues as to need and reliance on the GTAA in the same manner as the Shaw Lane appeal decision. In fact they did raise such arguments and the Inspector considered and addressed the need point in detail. He noted that the appellant claims that the LPA cannot demonstrate a 5 year supply of deliverable gypsy and traveller sites and this is not supported by any objective evidence from the appellant.”
46. I return to the question of whether or not need is a material consideration. As I have found, I am to follow the judgment of Kerr J in Moran as endorsed in the Court of Appeal. That being so, there can be no arguable legal error in the planning authority’s decision in respect of the impact of changing need within its area.
47. So far as the grey belt point is concerned, I accept the submissions made on behalf of the planning authority by Mr Riley-Smith, namely that the planning authority came to an initial view that the site would not automatically in this case be grey belt. So far as the appeal decision in respect of the Sandy Bridge Lane site is concerned, that does not assist at all because it is site specific.
48. Further and in any event, the real difficulty encountered by the grey belt argument in this case is a finding that the appeal site is not sustainable and, in consequence, it would fall outside of the definition and application of the grey belt policy within the NPPF, which point seems to me to be definitive in this regard.
49. Returning to the officer’s report, it dealt within its own particular section, at section (9), with the planning policy for traveller sites from December 2024. It addressed the points which were emphasised in Mr Cottle’s oral submissions, including the point as to tilted balance. I set it out because it seems to me that it contains a typographical error in that it omits the word “not”. It says in respect to change (c) in the policy as to tilted balance: “This change is academic given that the site is in the Green Belt and so the tilted balance would [not] apply anyway even if triggered.” So while it is suggested that there is some point of wider importance as to the role of the tilted balance in respect of gypsy and traveller sites, I can find nothing which is error in the way in which this has been approached in section (9) of the officer’s report, which would arguably give rise to a misinterpretation of the interaction between the NPPF and the PPTS.
50. I hope that I have done justice to the thrust of the claimant’s points in respect of the accumulation of the appellant’s arguments on need, green belt and policy, but that is not the end of the claimant’s grounds.
51. The claimant advances a ground in respect of the proportionality of the decision. The ground integrates the human rights considerations which are in play and also the proper consideration of the best interests of the children. Mr Riley-Smith submitted that the broad legal context here is disclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Alconbury as to the integration of proportionality assessment into the planning balance and decisions which are taken by democratic bodies in respect of planning applications. That broad submission was criticised by Mr Cottle as erroneously taking the proportionality assessment into something which is for the decision-maker rather than for the court.
52. Mr Cottle’s point is a good point in that the proportionality assessment is a matter for the court. However, I think that the submission made by Mr Riley-Smith was perhaps misunderstood. The thrust of was that there is within the decision-making of the local planning authority a proportionality assessment in any event, rather than it being a submission to say that this court is not entitled to or, indeed, obliged to carry out the proportionality assessment. So I accept Mr Cottle’s approach in that regard.
53. The essence of the submission is that there is a denial of a hearing in two senses. First, by the defendant and, secondly, independently in that there would be no opportunity then to appeal. There is therefore a section 6 Human Rights Act 1998 point in that, as Mr Cottle would put it, it is obvious that the claimant has not had a fair chance to have the merits of her case determined by an independent tribunal and that is clearly disproportionate, not least having regard to the policy changes which have taken place.
54. It is a point which Mr Cottle also advances as being of some wider importance as, while we do have the very recent decision in Moran from the Court of Appeal, that did not engage with the interaction between section 70 C and the Human Rights Act.
55. In my judgment, on the facts of this case that is not a point which reaches the threshold of arguability having regard to the decision making to the point at which the enforcement notice was issued and took effect. In particular, paragraphs 37 to 42 of the Hartley appeal decision engaged fully with the Article 8 rights of the appellants in that case, the rights of a child under the United Nations Conventions on the Right of a Child, and also the public sector equality duties which the Equality Act 2010 imposes on the defendant. Those reasons are, of course, addressed to an informed audience, namely those who had a full opportunity to advance their cases in that regard before an independent tribunal.
56. Notably, the facts of this case include an assessment of the merits of this site, both by the local planning authority and by what is sometimes referred to as a “higher authority”, namely the Secretary of State. It was only after that stage in the progress through the structure of the planning regime that the enforcement notice came into effect.
57. As an aside, I note that there was no appeal against the enforcement notice on any other ground than the single legal ground which was in respect of the extension of time for compliance. On my understanding of the law at the relevant time, there was an opportunity to appear before an inspector on a further occasion to argue the planning merits under ground (a) (namely that planning permission should be granted) but that was an opportunity which was not taken. In that regard, I understand that the restriction on ground (a) appeals at s.174 (2A) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 came into force on 25 th April 2024 by Reg 3 The Planning Act (Commencement No 8) and Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 Regulations 2024. By Reg 7, the amendment at s.174 (2A) did not apply to an enforcement notice which was issued before 25 th April 2024. It appears to me that the amendment did not apply to the enforcement notice in this case and ground (a) was available.
58. On the facts of this case, therefore, I consider it to be unarguable that there has been a failure to provide not only an opportunity but also several opportunities for those who seek permission for these uses and operational development to persuade both the local authority and also the Secretary of State. In short, these grounds have failed on the facts of this case and they would in any event be an unsuitable vehicle for exploration of the arguments which Mr Cottle raises.
59. For similar reasons, I would conclude that the public sector equality duty has already been considered and has further been revisited in the context of the section 70 C decision, noting in particular that a section of the officer’s report, at section (11), is directed to the section 149 duty under the Equality Act 2010 . It concludes that the council has considered those matters and has concluded that they are outweighed in this instance by the public interest in the enforcement of planning control and the protection of the green belt.
60. In that regard I will turn then to the Hartley appeal decision and the planning balance, which is set out at paragraphs 43 to 50. I note in particular that at paragraph 47 the Inspector concludes that the harm to the green belt by reason of its inappropriateness and the other harm in particular by reference to impact on openness, is such that the potential for unmet need would not in itself or in combination with other considerations clearly outweigh the identified harm to the green belt and the other identified harm.
61. In my judgment, that renders unarguable the grounds which I dealt with in some detail as to need, green belt, grey belt and, indeed, in respect of proportionality, because the Inspector has dealt with the counterfactual scenario in which there is additional need and carried out that balancing exercise in respect of the green belt assessment. Indeed, in my judgment, it would put the planning authority in some difficulty in reaching an alternative balance in the light of that decision in an appeal considered in some detail by the Secretary of State.
62. Ground (h) is rationality. It is properly pleaded as the last of the eight grounds. I have come to the conclusion, on the basis of the analysis of the other seven grounds, that the factors which go into any rationality argument do not arguably meet the high threshold nor arguably give rise to any reasonable prospect of overcoming the broad discretion which is given to a planning authority in respect of section 70 C. It is put very clearly by Mr Cottle on the basis of process irrationality. However, having regard to the history of this matter over four years and the level of analysis which has been directed towards this site, both by the local planning authority and by inspectors and by those who had the opportunity to run a ground at an appeal but did not, is that it cannot arguably be said that a process to arrive at the decision which is set out in the reasons given for the section 70 C decision is arguably irrational.
63. For all of those reasons, I have come to the conclusion that permission to apply for judicial review should be refused. Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com