UK case law

MG v THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2592 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Introduction

1. This a claim for judicial review of the Defendant's written decision dated 15 January 2026 (“the Decision”), confirming its refusal of the Claimant’s application for Health and Independence points under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 . The award of points would entitle the Claimant (“C”) to a certain degree of priority in bidding for properties available on the Defendant’s housing register. Proceedings were lodged on 16 April 2026.

2. Permission was initially refused on the papers, on 17 May 2026. At a renewed permission hearing held on 7 August 2026, permission was granted solely in respect of Grounds 1 and 3. Mandatory interim relief was refused, but the hearing of the substantive challenge was expedited. The two Grounds that have therefore been argued before me are as follows: i) Ground 1: It is alleged that the Defendant failed to consider the compounding and cumulative effects of the Claimant’s health conditions; ii) Ground 3: It is alleged that the decision as a whole was Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

3. An anonymity order was made on 4 August 2026, in view of the discussion of the Claimant’s health in these proceedings. Adjustments were also made to the format of the proceedings: the hearing was held remotely on a video platform (CVP) to avoid C being required to attend Court in person, and regular breaks were taken throughout the course of that hearing. At the hearing, C represented himself and the Defendant (the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, or “D”) appeared by Counsel. I am grateful to both parties for the clarity of their focussed submissions. Structure of the decision .

4. I have dealt with: i) the procedural issues raised at paragraphs 5 – 14; ii) the background facts: 15 – 22; iii) legal background and the Housing Allocation Scheme: paragraphs 23 – 29; iv) Submissions, including Ground 1: paragraphs 30 – 49; v) Ground 3: paragraphs 51 – 73; vi) Summary of Conclusions and next steps: paragraphs 74 – 77, and the issue of Costs (paragraph 78 onwards). Extension of Time – Service of Detailed Grounds and Further Evidence

5. At the hearing on 29 September, there were preliminary applications by D: i) By an application dated 24 August 2026: for permission to extend time and relief from sanction to enable it to rely on its Detailed Grounds of Defence (D did not at that stage file any evidence, relying simply on its Decision); and ii) By an application dated 25 September 2026: for permission to rely a witness statement from Ms O’Connor dated 24 September 2026. Ms O’Connor made the Decision under challenge and speaks to this, and to the inspection by D’s officer, Dr Rene Rupeiks, in May 2026.

6. In addition, the Defendant filed a Supplementary Bundle on Friday 25 September 2026, and an Authorities Bundle late on the day before the hearing. It was useful to have copies of the authorities and neither of these bundles introduced new material (except for the detailed Housing Allocations Scheme, to which a link had previously been supplied, and the evidence of Ms O’Connor and C’s Reply to it, which were included in the Supplementary Bundle; see further below on these additions). As a result, they were used at the hearing. But still, they were substantially late and filed in breach of the Directions governing the filing of Bundles before a hearing. That this is unsatisfactory is obvious, not least when it adds to the stress already on C, in seeking to prepare for a hearing. It is potentially unfair to add to further bundles, by adding further material that need assimilating. As it was, I am satisfied that C was able to cope with the hearing, which proceeded with a number of breaks. But that is not a justification for the late filing. See, further, FRY & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2571 (Admin) at paras 39 – 45.

7. As to the applications made by D, I heard submissions and made a ruling at the outset of the hearing, with more detailed reasons to follow in this judgment:

8. Detailed Grounds . By an Order dated 14 August 2026, the Detailed Grounds were required to be filed by 4pm on Friday 21 August 2026; instead, they were filed at 4:27pm on Monday 24 August 2026. D apologises for the default, but gave no written reason for the delay. At the hearing before me it was said that there had been miscommunication about when the draft Grounds could be checked by D’s officers; this could not be done until the Monday morning.

9. The relevant Order did not specify any particular sanction for late service of the Detailed Grounds (and neither do the Civil Procedure Rules: XY v Haringey LBC [2019] EWHC 2276 (Admin) at para 44). However, C points out that this default followed (i) late service of the Acknowledgement of Service and (ii) late service of D’s Skeleton for the renewed Permission Hearing. If the Acknowledgement of Service has not been filed in accordance with the Rules, CPR 54.9 does debar a defendant from taking part in a hearing unless the Rules on filing Detailed Grounds and evidence have been complied with, which they have not. So the breaches are cumulative and D requires relief from sanction.

10. C very fairly does not seek to bar D from relying on its Detailed Grounds, but says that the default should be formally recorded and penalised in costs.

11. I have had regard to Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 and specifically paras 24 – 38 which lay down a three-stage test when considering default and relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9. The first stage requires the Court to assess the seriousness or significance of the breach. Clearly, the Order should have been complied with. On the other hand, the relevant delay (in filing the Detailed Grounds) lasted for just fractionally more than one working day, and – in particular - did not cause any prejudice to C’s ability to prepare for the hearing. For that reason, I took the view that was not serious or substantial, and despite the wider procedural history, I extended time and allowed relief from sanction.

12. Statement from Ms O’Connor . As set out above, this was filed shortly before the hearing. Explaining the delay, D gave a general account of having experienced difficulties due to leave taken by Ms O’Connor and Dr Rupeiks, at different times, from 7 August – end September 2026. Counsel further explained that that primary purpose of the evidence was to answer a query from the judge on 7 August, as to whether an environmental or safety assessment of C’s flat had been conducted. This query was answered by reference to Dr Rupeiks’ inspection in May 2026; in addition, Ms O’Connor added short comments on her own Decision.

13. I refused permission to rely on the evidence. It was seriously out of time, and potentially prejudicial to C (who because of the time, had the burden of seeking to respond to it by filing a Reply and detailed comments on the evidence, immediately before the hearing before me). Furthermore, I am satisfied that I can decide this case fairly, without it. If the question of what inspections of the property have taken place is relevant, it can be addressed by the existing evidence relating to the May inspection (it not being suggested that another material one has taken place). The legality of the Decision should be considered by reference to the Decision letter written at the time, not the later comments.

14. The issue of the costs of both applications will be considered as part of any costs orders at the end of these proceedings. Factual Background

15. C explains in his evidence that he is a professional musician of 17 years' training, and worked in the film industry for approximately 10 years. Since July 2022, he has been an assured tenant resident in a flat within the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“the flat”), after a successful application for social housing made to the Defendant. The Defendant is not his landlord; the landlord is the Peabody Housing Association (“Peabody”). C’s evidence is that since taking up residence in the flat, his ability to work, sleep, and recover has been progressively destroyed by the conditions in the property and the physical and psychiatric harm that these have resulted in.

16. On 31 March 2025, C made an application to the D for Health and Independence points under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 . Such an application would grant him medical priority to move to alternative accommodation. He noted in the application that he had “Autism and Bipolar. Because the flats don’t have insulation, I have been sleep deprived ever since I moved in and I can no longer live like this as this situation has worsened my autism and bipolar symptoms. I have been a victim of domestic abuse.” There was no lift to his fourth floor flat, which made him feel tired, but the primary focus of the application was on his inability to sleep. He added to the conditions that he suffered from “depression, dementia, obsessive compulsive disorder, and other mental health conditions”. He explained further that “damp, mould, unstable flooring, roofing problems where during the summer the entire flat gets over heated, it’s impossible to sleep well.” His initial application was supported by a letter from his GP dated 24 March 2023.

17. The Housing Health and Disability Team carried out an assessment. Amongst other things, they recommended that an Adult Social Care Assessment should be carried out to explore if adaptions such as soundproofing or better insulation could be explored. However, the response of Adult Social Care was that these were environmental and housing issues, and that such changes would not be its responsibility: Decision Letter, para 20. The issue of heat would have been common to many across London in the summer and making adjustments to keep cool was expected.

18. The application was refused by the Defendant on 7 November 2025. On 24 November, the Claimant requested a review of the refusal. In a letter dated 15 January 2026, the Defendant maintained its refusal to grant the Claimant Health and Independence points under its Housing Allocation Scheme. This is the Decision that is under challenge in this claim.

19. By this time (and focussing on the principal documents), C’s application was supported by: i) The application form submitted and dated 12 May 2025, as well as additional submissions from C; ii) A letter from Dr Catherine Cheung, Central London Adult Autism Service, dated 7 March 2023, confirming the Claimant's Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) diagnosis, his sensory sensitivities, and his inherent need for structure and stability. She stated: “[C] reported that he can often hear his neighbours all throughout the day and night which can lead to difficulties sleeping. This means that [C] often feels tired throughout the day and experiences disruptions to his routine. [C] also reported various odours from the vents which he suspects to be from his neighbours cooking and/or smoking habits. [C] shared that the smell cannot be mediated by opening his windows. While he has attempted to inform his neighbours of his difficulties, the situation has not improved or been resolved. Lastly, [C] reported mould throughout the property which he worries may begin to impact on his health if unresolved. [C] reported feeling “overwhelmed” and “distressed” because of his current situation. He is unable to sleep, complete daily tasks and attempt to look for work. As a result, [C] has become more socially isolated and is feeling more anxious and lower in mood due to the lack of changes in his neighbours’ behaviours and difficulties with his housing application. We are aware that [C] has in the past been given a clinical diagnosis of Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder (ICD-10 Code: F41.2). We are concerned that the continuous stressors in his environment will again trigger another episode of Anxiety and Depression. Prior to his current accommodation, [C] reported better mental and physical health.” iii) A Letter of support from C’s GP (Dr El-Shunnar, Newton Medical Centre), dated 1 June 2025. He noted that C suffered from “mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, autism and bipolar effective disorder.” C “reports he feels his autism and bipolar is getting worse due to [the conditions at the flat]”. The GP included the information that “He also needs accommodation with a lift or few steps as his blood pressure increases when going up many steps.” He asked D to offer an appropriate solution to prevent further deterioration in C’s mental health. iv) A further GP support letter from Dr Ismail Yahaya, Newton Medical Centre, dated 19 December 2025. This included details of suspected Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. It noted that C “has an extensive mental health history and has been under the mental health services for bipolar affective disorder, mixed anxiety and depressive disorder and has autism spectrum disorder. [C] takes propranolol, quetiapine and clonazepam for his mental health conditions. The conditions can cause labile mood, depressed mood, ruminating thoughts and can be severe when they are exacerbated. [C] recently informed me in a telephone consultation that his mental health can lead to him having fleeting suicidal ideation, aggression by way of smashing a chair which can injure himself.” He has “ hyperhidrosis and takes oxybutynin to treat this condition, which is characterised by widespread excess sweating which can further compound his mental health issues.” v) A&E attendance record, dated 1 July 2025: C presented at A& E with suicidal thoughts, as well as heatstroke, dizziness, blurred vision and palpitations. He said he was unable to stay at home due to the heat.

20. As noted above, the review application was refused on 15 January 2026. The decision letter is lengthy and detailed. I have set out the relevant passages when considering the arguments raised by C, below.

21. The application for judicial review was filed on 16 April 2026. Permission was refused on the papers, on 17 May 2026. The application was renewed orally on 7 August 2026. By the time of that hearing, substantial further (post-decision) evidence had been filed, including: i) A CNWL Westminster North Community Mental Health Hub assessment, finalised 12 February 2026, recording two documented suicide attempts (2024 and 2025) and ongoing weekly self-harm: “[C] is currently experiencing frequent suicidal thoughts and engages in self-harm almost weekly, including cutting and head-banging. He reports that these thoughts and behaviours are often impulsive and triggered by noise disturbances and sleep deprivation in their current living environment.” There are linked reports of referrals to talking therapies, etc, from about the same period. ii) CNWL Mental Health Crisis Assessment Service triage record, St Charles Hospital, dated 1 May 2026. iii) Community Dermatology letter dated 20 May 2026, recording seborrhoeic dermatitis and the Claimant's reported concern that his water supply was contaminated. iv) Correspondence with the landlords (Peabody Housing Trust) who in May 2026 arranged a temporary hotel ‘decant’ and then offered to supply a fan to C, if that would assist him. There is also further evidence from C that he left the flat at times over the summer, for example checking into hotels for respite, which he found cooler, quieter and far more manageable. v) The feedback and findings of Dr Rene Rupeiks (D’s Senior Housing and Health Practitioner), who carried out a visit to the property on 28 May 2026. He confirmed that the indoor temperature was 30⁰C, but added: (i) there was an unusual heatwave at the time; (i) all the windows were closed, which was not conducive to maintaining appropriate temperature control; and (ii) a ceiling vent in the hallway had been taped shut (the tape should be removed). He did not identify that the roof insulation was inadequate. He noted that he had requested the landlord to renew the water tank and this would be actioned if not completed in a reasonable time. The limited black mould around the window frame should be addressed by cleaning and was not a health hazard. vi) Photographic evidence high of indoor temperatures, water tank contamination, and mould. vii) Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (CNWL)’s Outcome of Referral for trauma/PTSD assessment, finalised 3 July 2026. This was a referral from C’s GP. It recorded that the Claimant presents with possible trauma-related symptoms. It noted recurrent episodes of intense emotional dysregulation characterised by crying, smashing objects, punching walls and feeling overwhelmed by intrusive memories. These matters were linked to the loss of a close friend. However, it is recorded that "His housing situation has significantly worsened his symptoms," with reported persistent sleep disturbance due to neighbour noise, sensory overload linked to ASD, cannabis smells in the property, and lack of lift access.

22. The Defendant’s stance, at the oral permission hearing and before me, is that whilst this is post-decision material, it does not affect its decision. There was no formal objection to its consideration. But there has not been any reconsideration process and formally, what is in issue is the decision of January 2026, with the material available to the decision-maker at that date; it seems to me that the adequacy of the reasons have to be assessed by reference to that material. Legal Background.

23. Under s166 A of the Housing Act 1996 : "(1) Every local housing authority in England shall have a scheme (their 'allocation scheme') for determining priorities, and as to the procedure to be followed, in allocating housing accommodation. For this purpose 'procedure' includes all aspects of the allocation process, including the persons or descriptions of persons by whom decisions are to be taken … (3) As regards priorities, the scheme shall... be framed so as to secure that reasonable preference is given to- people who are homeless (within the meaning of Part 7); people who are owed a duty by any local housing authority under section 190(2), 193(2) or 195(2) (or under section 65(2) or 68(2) of the Housing Act 1985 ) or who are occupying accommodation secured by any such authority under section 192(3); people occupying insanitary or overcrowded housing or otherwise living in unsatisfactory housing conditions; people who need to move on medical or welfare grounds (including any grounds relating to a disability); and people who need to move to a particular locality in the district of the authority, where failure to meet that need would cause hardship (to themselves or to others). …. (14) A local housing authority in England shall not allocate housing accommodation except in accordance with their allocation scheme."

24. The Defendant’s Allocation Scheme (“the Scheme”), developed under those provisions, explains that (para 2.4) that unless an applicant is given a priority or points for rehousing, they will not be able to join the Housing Register, for potential rehousing. “This is because the number of households who need a better, more suitable home is much greater than the number of homes that become available. Therefore, only those households with the greatest need can join.” (Similarly at para 27 – 28, the Decision also sets out “the social housing crisis in Kensington and Chelsea …. [which] is now such that the Council cannot meet everyone’s preferences or expectations with regard to the accommodation it offers” ).

25. The Scheme provides (relevantly) for points to be awarded for those who need to move due to health problems. Those qualifying under the “health and independence priority” would be awarded 900 points (Rehousing Band 2) whereas those who could establish an “Emergency health and independence priority” would be awarded 2000 points (Band 1). Most claims under these headings would relate to physical health difficulties “but it also includes mental health problems and neurodivergences” (para 15.1). C’s claim was assessed as a potential Band 2 claim. Focussing on the criteria for mental health conditions, the Scheme provides: “We will also award health and independence points in relation to mental health conditions or neurodivergent conditions where: • there is substantial evidence from specialist services that you (or a member of your household) have a severe and enduring mental health condition or neurodivergent condition, which substantially impacts on your health and independence in your current home; and • there is substantial evidence from specialist services that you have suffered or will suffer a severe, long-term and detrimental deterioration in this condition as a direct result of your home, and you will not recover from this if you remain in your home; and • all other options to address your difficulties have been explored, including in relation to medical treatment, care, your current home, and other suitable rehousing options; and • it is evidenced that moving to a more suitable home will have a substantial positive impact upon this condition and your independence; and • there are properties available which are likely to meet your needs better than where you are now.” (para 15.2)

26. The policy further provides that: “We will not give you a priority for rehousing simply because you, or a household member, has health problems. We look at how your current home affects you and your independence because of your health problems.” (para 15.3).

27. Under the heading of “assessment” it notes: “We will look at independent reports and information provided by the professional staff who treat you or provide care and support to you. This includes GPs (doctors), consultants, nurses, occupational therapists, and social workers. This information must explain your health problems in full, and the treatment and support you are getting for them. Occasionally, a member of our team may decide that they need to see you in person and assess what you can and cannot do.” (para 15.4).

28. Finally, Para 15.5 states: “Problems due to repair issues • If the health-related problems you are facing are caused by repair issues within your current home and your home would be suitable for you otherwise, it is likely that it will be better to look at fixing the repair issues rather than look to find you another home. We can give you advice about this, as the help you can be given by the Council depends on who your landlord is.”

29. At the hearing, the meaning of the word “ available ” in the last bullet point in para 15.2, (set out above at para 25) was canvassed with D’s Counsel. It was submitted that it was established law that under Part 7 of the Housing Act, a local authority cannot rely on the absence of current properties in its portfolio (or lack of resources); and that therefore, applying the same approach “available” should means “exists” in the sense that it was reasonably possible to achieve housing of the standard in question, rather than that the Council actually had spare accommodation of this type (which would be highly unlikely given the evidence of extreme pressures on its housing stock). I accept that the same approach should be taken in this case. The Grounds and Submissions

30. Before turning to C’s Grounds in detail, I should record my conclusion that when assessing the Decision, some aspects of C’s complaint should be set to one side, and challenges to their potential impact on the application in questions should be rejected.

31. First, C has drawn attention to his contaminated water tank, and there is recent evidence that he has been suffering from a rash (seborrhoiec dermatitis). The inspection in May 2026 established that the tank is unsatisfactory and D’s inspector requested the landlord to take action in respect of it. However: i) This is a post-decision complaint; the issue with the water tank was not part of the material considered by the reviewer in January 2026. ii) In addition, D is reasonably entitled to say that this is a repairs issue, excluded under para 15.5 of the Allocations Policy (set out above). It was referred to C’s landlord. iii) Whilst I appreciate that C says that the issue has not been resolved and continues to affect him badly, he is apparently bringing proceedings against Peabody. I do not have any information about that case, and Peabody is not a party to these proceedings. It would be wrong to comment further.

32. The issue of mould on windows and mouse droppings seem to me to raise similar issues. Further, there is no substantial medical evidence of an impact from mould or mice upon C.

33. Thus, to the extent that the Grounds discussed below raise the legality of D’s treatment of these issues, I have rejected those submissions. Ground 1: ‘Cumulative and Compounding Effects’. The parties’ submissions .

34. C submits that the Decision addressed his conditions in isolated, artificial compartments: rhinitis at paragraph 15, suspected Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) at paragraph 16, mental health and autism at paragraph 17, overheating and A&E at paragraph 18, and stairs at paragraph 21. It nowhere addressed how those conditions interact with one another, or how they are jointly and cumulatively worsened by the physical structure of the flat. He says that this siloed approach was an error of law. The overall picture was one of: medication impairing thermoregulation and alertness, overheating intensifying sensory overload and sleep loss, sleep loss destabilising bipolar regulation, and physical distress worsening overall psychiatric stability. D’s reviewer read the medical evidence but should have had the documents “clinically interpreted” (see C’s Reply at para 18).

35. It is further said that there was a failure to carry out sufficient enquiries, in breach of the duty under Secretary of State for Education v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 . In particular, there was a duty to understand how C’s “compounding disabilities, mental health conditions, and prescribed medication interact with the unsuitability of the flat.” C focusses on the lack of medical qualifications possessed by the decision-maker, which he submits means that she should have sought legal advice on the compounding difficulties and (specifically) the impact of his prescribed medications. He says, in relation to this, that his medication to relax his muscles (he has restless leg syndrome) and to help him sleep, and also to reduce excess sweating, have made managing sleep and temperature regulation significantly more difficult for him.

36. D responds, first, that the legal test applicable to the exercise of the Tameside duty is set out in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673 ; [2019] 1 W.L.R. 4647 at [70] “3. The court should not intervene merely because it considers that further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision.

4. The court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision by the authority not to make further inquiries if no reasonable council possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient.”

37. D acknowledges that its reviewer is not medically qualified, but the reviewer is entitled to rely on the medical evidence submitted. She was not required to make an assessment of the cumulative or interactive effect of C’s conditions, outside of what was described in the medical evidence filed. Her role was to assess the evidence; and she took the view that it did not demonstrate that the Claimant qualified for medical priority under the allocations policy.

38. It is further denied that each condition was considered in isolation. Paras 19 and 22 considered C’s conditions as a whole, and the reviewer also stated (para 29) that she took all of the conditions into consideration when reaching her decision. Conclusions: Ground 1

39. First, it is in my view lawful for D to appoint a decision-maker without medical expertise. That is a common pattern in administrative decision-making, and a key reason for the filing of medical evidence. It is reasonable to have a decision-making scheme which depends on a decision-maker applying the scheme’s criteria to the medical evidence received. This is also consistent with the way in which the assessment process is described in the Allocation Scheme (see para 15.4, reproduced above), which alerts applicants to the importance of supporting evidence.

40. Any decision-maker must be careful to respect the expertise of the medical experts (especially when there is no conflict between any reports or opinions), and also to ensure that if material gaps in that evidence are or should be reasonably apparent, further opinion is sought. Identifying whether or not there is a gap is, however, is primarily a matter of judgement for the decision-maker. I accept that the task for this court, which then examines the assessment made, is to “… establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision by the authority not to make further inquiries if no reasonable council possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient.” (see above, Balajigari ).

41. Applying that test, I cannot accept that it was irrational not to make further inquiries or seek further evidence about the nature of C’s medical conditions. The medical evidence before the decision-maker in January 2026 set out C’s conditions and discussed the overall impact of the condition of the flat on C, in the light of the vulnerabilities created by them. The decision-maker stated that she accepted that C suffered from the conditions relied upon (Decision para 14).

42. The only potential gap that has really been identified by C is the assertion that the impact of C’s medication on his ability to cope should have been better explored and understood (see para 35 above). However, there was nothing in the medical evidence to put the decision-maker on enquiry, i.e., to suggest that further evidence on the impact of C’s medication needed to be obtained. Even now, the submissions made about the compounding effects of the medication on issues such as sleep regulation are not supported by medical evidence.

43. The second submission is that the effects of C’s medical conditions were not considered cumulatively, but in isolation. As to this, it seems to me that in principle a decision-maker may need to assess both the impact of the individual conditions relied on, and the cumulative picture presented. That is: i) The Scheme’s criteria do require assessment of whether an applicant suffers from “a disability or severe and enduring medical condition [or a “severe and enduring mental health condition or neurodivergent condition], which substantially impacts on your health and independence in your current home ”. So the policy is looking for a link between a specific condition or disability, and the ability to cope in a home. Whether or not such a link exists is therefore a relevant question. Specific conditions may also respond to mitigations in different ways. ii) But that said, in my view ultimately the causal impact of the home on C’s health conditions has to be considered in the context of C’s circumstances and health as a whole – including any health conditions which are not directly caused or exacerbated by the issues with the flat, but which may cause additional vulnerability. Even if there is no direct link between the state of a house or flat, and a particular health condition, any underlying health conditions may cause vulnerabilities which exacerbate other conditions and/or affect an applicant’s ability to cope with the situation – just as an elderly resident would have their age, or age-associated frailty, taken into account in an assessment even if this was not formally a “disability”. All these considerations form a relevant part of the background, potentially affecting the ability to cope when considering any other, more directly relevant medical conditions. In other words, it seems to me that the impact of the physical conditions of a flat on C as an individual, with all his evidenced vulnerabilities, has to be considered holistically, taking account of his circumstances as a whole.

44. So both approaches are permissible and both may be required, depending on the circumstances.

45. Applying that approach to this case, it was reasonable to look first at the impact of the various conditions individually, not least given the need to demonstrate a link between “severe, long-term deterioration in the [health] condition” and the flat. In particular: i) Chronic non-allergic rhinitis was reasonably characterised as a matter that had not been shown to be linked to the flat or its conditions (para 15), and might be reasonably be treated as not sufficiently significant, more generally; and ii) The complaint about high blood pressure, and finding the stairs to the fourth floor difficult, raised separate issues to those in relation to the conditions within the flat and I reject criticisms of para 21 of the letter, which seems to me to set out a reasonable assessment of the evidence.

46. However, overall it seems to me that the complaint made by C has merit, for the reasons set out below.

47. First, the potential diagnosis of CFS was dismissed from the assessment as there was no evidence that the current accommodation was causing or exacerbating this condition. See para 16 of the Decision: “16. Your GP also refers to you having suspected chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and being referred to a specialist for assessment. It is noted that CFS can cause widespread pain, brain fog and fatigue. If diagnosed, they would be looking to treat this holistically with psychotherapy alongside medication and regular exercise. I note that, according to the NHS two of the four main symptoms of CFS is feeling extremely tired all of the time and having sleep problems. I note that these symptoms you have attributed to your current accommodation due to poor insulation, however they may in fact be symptoms of CFS and as a result a change in accommodation may not result in improvement. There is not medical evidence to suggest that your current accommodation is causing or exacerbating CFS. If you are diagnosed with this condition then further specialist support would be made available to you to help manage the symptoms.”

48. Whilst it was reasonable to conclude that the medical evidence did not suggest that CFS was (potentially) caused or exacerbated by C’s flat, this reasoning did not consider whether, if C was already suffering from brain fog, fatigue and sleep problems due to CFS, then coping with (additional) challenges from noise and heat might reasonably be thought to be considerably more difficult and increase the impact on his mental health conditions, including anxiety and depression.

49. In addition (although this is a separate point), I am concerned by the statement that: “ I note these symptoms [excessive tiredness] you have attributed to your current accommodation due to poor insulation, however they may in fact be symptoms of CFS and as a result a change in accommodation may not result in improvement.” That was an assessment of the possible causation of the excessive tiredness which had no support in the medical evidence – the letters from Dr Cheung and Dr El-Shunnar had not questioned the link between lack of sleep and noise from neighbours. It is not clear whether this comment from the decision-maker actually had a substantial impact on the decision (see for example the use of the word “may”), but in my view the decision-maker was not reasonably able to dismiss the impact of noise at the flat by reference to suspected CFS in this way.

50. More generally, the reasons do not, in my view, disclose consideration of the relevance of the ASD diagnosis, and its potential role. Dr Cheung had stated: “Because of being autistic, [C] also experiences genuine sensory sensitivities, and certain sensory stimuli (e.g., sounds, touch, smells) that are tolerable for non-autistic individuals can lead to significant distress and pain, which are not experienced by non-autistic people.” This issue overlaps with the irrationality challenge, to which I turn; but Dr Cheung’s evidence on C’s low threshold tolerances was a matter of general relevance to the risk of deterioration in his health which does not appear to have been considered. Ground 3: Irrationality

51. C made a number of submissions under this heading. I have addressed the first, third and fourth together, as they seem to me to relate to the same point, which is the treatment of the medical evidence and the adequacy of the reasons on the same. The second point made by C was on the reliance on potential adaptions, which is a separate point and which I have addressed last, at para 68. (1) A&E medical evidence – parties’ submissions.

52. C criticises the statement at para 18 of the Decision that “ many London homes can become excessively hot in the summer ” and the observation that since 1 July 2025, when the Claimant attended A&E for heatstroke, was the hottest day of that year, it was therefore “unsurprising” that the Claimant struggled on that day. D noted that there are generally only short periods when heat becomes excessive in the United Kingdom. C submits that this was irrational because it fails to engage with the evidence regarding C’s specific vulnerabilities, which put him at added risk. “Specific medical emergency evidence was treated as a generic seasonal inconvenience.”

53. D responds by submitting that the reviewing officer was not dismissing C’s conditions. Should C be awarded medical priority, he would be able to bid for properties on D’s housing register. For that reason, it is extremely relevant that the other properties available on that register may suffer from the same problems, not as a result of disrepair but as a result of the nature of the housing stock in London and increasingly high temperatures in summer. (3), (4) - Failing to take proper account of specialist evidence – parties’ submissions.

54. C further criticises para 23 of the review Decision, where D stated there was not substantial evidence from specialist services that the Claimant had a severe and enduring mental health condition substantially impacting his health and independence in the current home, or that he had suffered or would suffer severe long term deterioration as a direct result of the home. This was to discount, without proper reasons, all the medical evidence relied on, including the evidence of A & E attendances. C says that D’s own summary in the Decision letter demonstrates that there was indeed substantial medical evidence of both the impact of his conditions and the causative impact of his housing conditions upon them.

55. D submits that the reviewing officer did not disagree with the conclusions of the medical professionals who provided medical evidence on the Claimant’s behalf. However, the reviewing officer had to assess whether that medical evidence supported the award of points under the allocation scheme. At para 23 she concluded: “There is not substantial evidence from specialist services that you have a severe and enduring mental health condition, which substantially impacts on your health and independence in your current home, and that you have suffered or will suffer a severe, long-term and detrimental deterioration in this condition as a direct result of your home, and that you will not recover from this if you remain in your home.” (bold added by D)

56. D says that the medical evidence does not say the Claimant’s condition will deteriorate as a direct result of his home nor that he will not recover if he remains in his home. The medical evidence before the reviewing officer reports the Claimant’s view of the inadequacy of his current home and lists it as a stressor for his mental health. Their comments do not reach the high bar set by the allocations scheme. Conclusions – treatment of the medical evidence

57. I accept C’s submissions that, first, the decision-maker did not engage with the medical evidence regarding his specific mental health conditions and potential vulnerability as a result. Consideration of this was clearly required by the Scheme, but the reasoning does not demonstrate that it occurred.

58. Paragraph 17 of the decision letter summarises the mental health diagnoses provided by the medical evidence without comment, before continuing: “… However, again there is not information to suggest that your current accommodation is impacting your diagnosed conditions to such an extent that it is medically unsuitable for your housing needs.

18. I note that you re-attached the A&E report from the 1st July 2025. The HHDT report already referenced the fact that many London homes can become excessively hot in the summer. I would add to that the fact that the 1st July 2025 was on record as being the hottest day of the year, with temperatures reaching 34.7 degrees Celsius in London. As a result, it is unsurprising that you would have struggled on that specific day.”

59. In essence, the complaint about the impact of excessive summer heat was dismissed on the basis that this was common in many London homes and so it was “unsurprising” that C was distressed, etc. However, it seems to me that this failed to consider whether, even if many were adversely affected by heat, still C’s health conditions (ASD, bi-polar disorder and a history of mixed anxiety and depression) made out the case that C was particularly badly affected and/or more vulnerable to suffering adverse effects and deterioration in his health, as a result of the heat. This is what the medical evidence was saying (e.g., “ We are concerned that the continuous stressors in his environment will again trigger another episode of Anxiety and Depression” – Dr Cheung ), but it appears that this perspective was discounted on the basis that the summer heat would be difficult for anyone to manage. There were general words in para 17 purporting to accept the diagnoses, but there was no specific discussion (or recognition) of C’s particular vulnerabilities or the attendant risks, including the evidence of suicidal thoughts or ideation.

60. A similar point arises with regards to the treatment of noise: “19. In regards to the noise and smells that come to your flat. Unfortunately, you have chosen to reside in RBKC, which is one of the most densely populated areas of the UK. As a result, the vast majority of social housing is located in blocks of flats where multiple households reside side by side. This can result in noise and smells that transfer to communal or neighbouring areas. It has been suggested that you can make use of ear plugs. You have stated that you have sensory issues in regards to putting things in your ears and so you could instead consider noise cancelling headphones during the day audio headbands that can be slept in, or alternative noises such as through a white noise machine. You can also use air fresheners sprays or plug-ins of your choice to mask other smells. It is accepted that these options may not be ideal, but they remain available to you.”

61. This adopts the same approach, stating that the vast majority of social housing flats would suffer from the same issues, rather than addressing whether C had established that he would suffer significantly more than others in the same housing, due to his mental health conditions, including sensory overload due to ASD. (I return to the issue of adaptions below).

62. The Scheme required assessment of whether “There is substantial evidence from specialist services that you have suffered or will suffer a severe, long-term and detrimental deterioration in this condition as a direct result of your home, and you will not recover from this if you remain in your home ”. The decision-maker purported to find (see Decision, para 23, where the overall conclusions were set out – text quoted at para 55 above) that these conditions were not met. However, it seems to me that the reasons set out fail to address the issue of how the housing conditions were or would be likely to (“ will suffer ”) exacerbate C’s ill-health, and the relevance of the medical evidence on this, by concentrating instead upon the issue of how others too might find heat or noise difficult.

63. I recognise that D has argued (see para 53 above) that the point of paragraphs 18 and 19 was not to dismiss C’s complaints about heat and noise (or the medical evidence on them), but to point out that he would be unlikely to find better social housing in the borough. It is of course right that the scheme required that “ there are properties available which are likely to meet your needs better than where you are now” and the decision-maker concluded (see, e.g., para 23) that there “there is not evidence that there are properties available which are likely to meet your needs better than where you are now.”

64. However, if that was the purpose of these paragraphs, then the Decision fails to set out proper reasons on the earlier issue under the Scheme, as to why the evidence of risk of deterioration in mood (including the GP’s report of C discussing “ fleeting suicidal ideation, aggression by way of smashing a chair which can injure himself ”) did not reach the threshold of “severe, long-term and detrimental deterioration in this condition” . If that threshold was considered not to have been reached, on the evidence, it seems to me that the decision-maker would have to spell this out clearly, explaining why the evidence of risk was insufficient or not the risks/potential harm were not serious enough. There is a general conclusion to this effect (para 23, on which D relies) but it does no more than recite the conditions of the Scheme and say that they were not satisfied, without further reasons to explain why this was so.

65. For these reasons, I have concluded that the decision-making process was unlawful, in that it failed to demonstrate, in the reasons given, that the medical evidence of vulnerability to the “stressors” in the flat, and of the potential impact and deterioration in health, had been considered and taken into account. Availability of alternative housing?

66. I have considered D’s point, that paras 18 and 19 were intended to address the issue of no other more suitable housing being available, which is a relevant factor in the Scheme. The reasoning on this issue was not specifically challenged in the Grounds, and I have not reached any final conclusions as a result. However, I note that, as set out above at para 29, it was canvassed at the hearing that “available” does not mean “immediately available” - “available” should means “exists” in the sense that it was reasonably possible to achieve housing of the standard in question, rather than that the Council had spare accommodation of this type. The language used in the decision (“ there is not evidence that there are properties available …”) implies that it would be for C to prove that such housing was available, which cannot be right given that this is a matter within D’s knowledge. Again at the hearing, when discussing this issue, Counsel for the Defendant was unable to say (without further instructions) whether or not housing with more effective heat and noise control might be “available”, in this sense (and C asserted that more healthy homes must be a possibility). I also note that – at least in the material put before the Court, including the evidence of the inspection in May 2026 – there appears to have been no real investigation by D of whether, in particular, noise insulation was unusually poor at the flat, although the basis of the decision letter appears to be that the conditions were ‘normal’ for its social housing stock. Finally, it is also the case that the allocation of priority points will not entitle C to accommodation which is better suited to his needs, but only allows him to bid for a flat which may be, if one becomes available.

67. Against that background, and without reaching final conclusions on this issue, it appears to me that if the decision falls to be reconsidered (see below), the issue of ‘availability’ should also be given careful consideration, both to confirm the meaning of ‘available’ and also to ensure that D’s assessment of the conditions at the flat, and any assessment as to whether nothing better could reasonably be expected, was based on a proper assessment or knowledge of the adequacy of noise and heating insulation at the flat. (2) Lifestyle recommendations/adaptions .

68. C submits that it was irrational to suggest adaptions such as fans, screening windows, damp towels, and hydration (against heat); or ear plugs, noise cancelling headphones, audio headbands, white noise machines, and air fresheners (against noise and smells). It is said that those “generic” suggestions (at paras 8 and 19 of the Decision) did not engage with the evidence of ASD sensory issues, medication induced heat intolerance, and the Claimant's documented concerns about contaminated water.

69. D responds that these were relevant issues, under the Scheme.

70. In my view, D was entitled to raise the issue of adaptions. Its policy specifically required that “ all other options to address your difficulties have been explored ”, before an allocation of points. As D submits, its officer did take account of C’s points about his particular difficulties, noting You have stated that you have sensory issues in regards to putting things in your ears”, and continuing “… so you could instead consider noise cancelling headphones during the day, audio headbands that can be slept in, or alternative noises such as through a white noise machine. You can also use air fresheners sprays or plug-ins of your choice to mask other smells.” (para 19).

71. In relation to heat, D’s decision had stated (para 8) that “You would be expected to make reasonable adjustments in the same way as other residents, such as the use of fans, screening windows, using damp towels, and keeping well hydrated etc.” C was later offered a fan by Peabody (in May 2026), but did not take this offer up.

72. When asked about these matters in the hearing, C maintained that these possible means of mitigating the difficulties would not work. He said that a fan would only revolve hot air at the same temperature. Noise cancelling headphones had not been specified by the psychologist, and in any event did not work for him. He still could hear vibrations, e.g. from neighbours’ washing machines or music. However, there was no evidence from C of sustained efforts to at least try these options out, and their effects if so; and no medical evidence that it would be unreasonable to expect him to do at least try to so. For example, fans are commonly used to create breezes in hot conditions.

73. In those circumstances, I reject C’s criticisms of these passages in the Decision; these suggestions were not irrational ones. Conclusions

74. It will be apparent that I have concluded that: i) Under the Scheme and in law, C’s circumstances, including any particular vulnerabilities, needed to be considered holistically as part of the assessment of whether the evidence established a “ severe, long-term and detrimental deterioration in [any specific health] condition as a direct result of your home…”. Specifically, the likelihood of mental health crises or deterioration (anxiety, severe depression and/or fluctuating mood linked to C’s bi-polar condition) being triggered by the conditions in the flat had to be assessed against all the background conditions set out in the medical evidence, whether suspected CFS or the effect of his ASD in reducing his tolerance of noise and smells. In my view, the Decision letter does not demonstrate that any risk assessment was based on that approach. ii) In addition, I accept the decision-making process was unlawful insofar as it failed to demonstrate, in the reasons given, that the medical evidence of C’s vulnerability to the “stressors” in the flat, and of the seriousness of the potential impact and any deterioration in health, had been properly considered and taken into account. I do not consider that the general statement that the evidence did not reach the required threshold, at para 23 of the Decision, was sufficient to demonstrate that the medical evidence had been properly considered. Such reasoning as there is concentrates on why everyone in social housing might be expected to have to cope with the same conditions, rather than whether or not the medical evidence supported that C was seriously more vulnerable than others, and the scale and likelihood of any potential harm (including consideration of the evidence of self-harm and suicidal thoughts or ideation). iii) I have expressed doubts about the basis on which the decision-maker was able to conclude that “there is not evidence that there are properties available which are likely to meet your needs better than where you are now” , particularly without evidence that D made an assessment of the adequacy of the noise and heating insulation at C’s flat, but have not reached final conclusions on this given the scope of the Grounds. iv) I reject the criticisms of the decision-maker’s reliance on the potential effect of mitigations, for noise, smells and excessive heat. The decision that attempts at mitigation had not been properly evidenced by the Claimant was a reasonable one. v) These are conclusions based on the proper approach to the assessment of C’s circumstances and the adequacy of the reasons in the Decision letter, and their engagement with the medical evidence.

75. I have considered whether in those circumstances, the decision should be quashed. In particular, mitigations are an important part of the Scheme and I have not found the assessment of this issue to have been unlawful. However, on balance it seems to me essential that the decision should be approached properly, as a whole, with reasons that show that this has been done. The assessment of what mitigations might reasonably be expected is affected by a proper assessment of the risk of harm to Mr C, from the conditions in the flat. The errors of law identified seem to me sufficiently substantial as to require the quashing, and retaking, of the decision.

76. Accordingly, the decision of 15 January 2026 will be quashed, and should be reconsidered in accordance with the principles set out in this decision. C should be aware, however, that the quashing of this decision for errors of law , and a requirement that any decision should follow the guidance set out in this decision, does not pre-judge the decision which the Defendant may make on the merits, following reconsideration of the evidence.

77. Any reassessment should take account of all the evidence available at the date of the fresh decision. This would require express consideration of the post-decision evidence that C has filed for this Court, as well as anything else which he may choose to submit before the decision is taken, including of course any further evidence relating to the steps that he may have taken to manage the impact of the conditions at the flat on him. D may wish to set out a timetable, but reconsideration must take place within a reasonable period of time of receipt of any further material from C. It would not be right for me to specify a fixed limit, but in view of the importance of these matters for C and the medical evidence filed to date, it should be in a matter of weeks, not months. Costs .

78. Following delivery of a draft judgment, C made an application for his costs of the proceedings, in the sum of £3,931.20 for the substantive hearing, plus £7,968 in respect of the costs of the renewed application for permission heard on 7 August; i.e. £11,899.20 in total. As a litigant in person, the costs are claimed at £24/hour, in accordance with Practice Direction 46 and CPR 46.5(4)(b) ( “(b) where the litigant cannot prove financial loss, an amount for the time reasonably spent on doing the work at the rate set out in Practice Direction 46 ”). In his statement of truth, C adds: “I have worked generally 4-5 hours per day, 4-5 days per week. Because of dyslexia, the amount of time used was greater than shown here, for fairness I have used a conservative overall total.”

79. The Defendant has not responded to the Claimant’s application.

80. Under CPR 46.5(2), the costs to be allowed should not exceed (except in the case of a disbursement) two-thirds of the amount which would have been allowed if the litigant in person had been represented by a legal representative.

81. I bear in mind that these assessments are necessarily made with a fairly broad brush. The objective should be to ensure that litigants in person are neither disadvantaged nor overcompensated by comparison with professionally represented litigants. In Wei v Jingping Long [2025] EWHC 912 (KB) Hill J approved the following approach: "23. Generally, litigants in person may be expected to spend more time than would reasonably be spent by a legal representative. The time allowed to a litigant in person should therefore be measured against the time that would reasonably be spent by a person without legal training or specialist knowledge.

24. However, there is an absolute cap on the amount recoverable by a litigant in person, namely the reasonable costs of disbursements plus two thirds of the amount which would have been allowed if the litigant in person had been legally represented: r.46.5(2). The correct approach is therefore to assess the reasonable costs for the litigant to do the work at the appropriate rate, consider what a legal representative would have been allowed for doing that work, calculate two thirds of that figure, and allow the lower of the two figures."

82. Here, as a very rough comparison, D has filed a costs claim for £12,062.75. VAT brings that claim to £14,475.30 in total; but to the extent that I am looking at D’s costs claim as a comparison to assess what is reasonable and proportionate, I should ignore the VAT element. C would only be awarded VAT on any legal fees if under a legal obligation to pay this; since he is not, it would be a windfall to have regard to a sum inflated by the VAT element. So any comparison is with D’s claim for £12,062.75 - two thirds of which is £8,041.83. C’s claimed costs are in excess of that figure.

83. C has submitted that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis, given D’s failure to abide by Court directions and the additional time / stress caused to C in having to assimilate and respond to documents served at short notice. Despite these failures, I am not persuaded that D’s conduct passes the threshold for an award of costs on an indemnity basis, given that I would need to find that D had not merely acted unreasonably, but “to a high degree”. In addition, the two-thirds cap would apply in any event; that is, if indemnity costs were to be awarded, I should still not award more than two-thirds of what C would have been awarded on an indemnity basis, if legally represented. So the cap would be in the region of £8,000 (again, if I use D’s claim as a parallel). I have, however, taken account of the late service of material from D in my consideration of the time reasonably spent by C in preparing for hearings, in the further assessment below.

84. On a broad-brush basis: C has plainly spent considerably more time on exercises such as marshalling documents than would a legal representative. See the Schedule for the hearing on 7 August, which claims a total of 332 hours of work (which is c.10 weeks work). The claim for the hearing on 29 September was also for approximately 164 hours of work (c. 4-5 weeks of work). It seems to me that I should make particular allowance for C’s disabilities and also for the effect of late service of documents on him by D (leading to additional work). But even so, these hours – and particularly the ones prior to the first hearing - are still substantially in excess of what I consider could reasonably have been spent by a person without legal training or specialist knowledge. I would halve the total hours claimed.

85. That gives an overall figure of £5949.60. I consider that to be a reasonable and proportionate award. It is not out of proportion with the sum of £8,000, which represents two-thirds of the claim made by the Defendant, and which can be considered to be a rough cross check.

MG v THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA [2026] EWHC ADMIN 2592 — UK case law · My AI Judge