UK case law
Michael Fury v The Commissioners for HMRC
[2026] UKFTT TC 1416 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026
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Full judgment
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against: (1) HMRC’s decision, dated 25 March 2022 and varied on 21 July 2022, to issue Discovery Assessments (“DA”) for tax years 2015/16 and 2016/17 under S.29 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”) (together “the Assessments”): (a) 2015/16: A DA in the sum of £19,787.57 (“the 15/16 DA”). (b) 2016/17: A DA in the sum of £31,642.46 (“the 16/17 DA”). (2) HMRC’s decision, dated 22 September 2022, to issue Penalty Assessments (“PA”) for tax years 2015/16 and 2016/17 under Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 (“FA07”) (together “the Penalties”): (a) 2015/16: A PA in the sum of £11,081.03 (“the 15/16 PA”). (b) 2016/17: A PA in the sum of £17,719.77 (“the 16/17 PA”).
2. Mr Fury appeals on the grounds that he: “…never traded as a scrap dealer but delivered scrap to the sorting centre in his capacity as a haulage driver. The Monies collected by him were paid over to the beneficial owner of the scrap. Mr Fury maintains that the only monies that should be assessable on him are the monies received in his capacity as a haulage driver.” The Hearing & the Evidence
3. The hearing was a hybrid hearing with HMRC’s witnesses attending remotely. HMRC were represented by Ms Halfpenny. Mr Fury was represented by Mr Patrick. We are grateful to everyone for their assistance and for the care they took presenting their respective cases.
4. We were provided with (i) a skeleton argument from each party, (ii) a h earing b undle of 954 pages, (iii) an a uthorities b undle of 45 8 pages, and (v) an additional hearing bundle of 42 pages .
5. HMRC had two witnesses; Officer Pickering, who made the discovery, and Officer Patel, who raised the Assessments and Penalties. Both provided a witness statement , gave oral evidence, were cross-examined by the Appellant and answered our questions . We acknowledge that both Officer Pickering and Officer Patel were doing their best to assist the Tribuna l in respect of matters that were around 4-5 years old . On occasion they both became frustrated at the, sometimes repetitive and sometimes aggressive, questions asked during cross-examination. We note that, on occasion, their evidence lacked clarity. In particular, Officer Patel was unable to explain clearly the basis for the 25% expenses allowance which, ultimately, appeared somewhat arbitrary.
6. Mr Fury provided a witness statement, gave oral evidence, was cross-examined by Mr Patrick and answered our questions. In light of Mr Fury’s difficulties with reading and writing, agreed reasonable adjustments were made throughout the hearing. We are entirely satisfied that Mr Fury was an honest witness who told the truth.
7. It is neither necessary nor proportionate to refer in this judgment to everything we have read or even all that we have heard in oral evidence, including the cross-examination of witnesses. To do so would add only to the length of this judgment and the time necessary for its preparation and, as importantly, its absorption by the parties. However, both the parties and their advocates can be assured that we have taken all of their arguments and all relevant matters into account in our decision-making. In making our decision, we have deliberately limited ourselves only to the matters which required adjudication to arrive at our decision. Findings of Fact
8. We make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.
9. As to the Appellant: (1) He is a Romany Gypsy. (2) He had no schooling after the age of 7. His schooling prior to 7 was intermittent. Whilst he can recognise some words, he never learnt to read or write. He is unable to read sentences. (3) He lives in a caravan on a farm. He has no other properties. (4) He is self-employed, his main business activity is breeding and selling gypsy cobs. This is a cash trade, that being the norm in the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller (“GRT”) community. He uses the money obtained from selling a horse to buy another horse, so the money is effectively re-circulated. If he has any money left over, he keeps a float of £5,000 and puts any surplus in the bank. (5) He works as a haulage driver using his own vehicles to supplement his income.
10. On 25 May 2006, the Appellant registered for self-assessment.
11. At a date unknown but approximately a few years before the events with which we are concerned, Mr Fury employed a professionally qualified accountant, recommended by a friend, to assist him with his accounts as he did not know how to do the paperwork.
12. In or around 2015, Mr Fury met Shaun, an Irish Gypsy, on the horse fair circuit. At that time, the horse trade was not doing well. Shaun mentioned the scrap metal trade to Mr Fury as another way to earn money. Shaun explained that, as he was not permanently resident in England, he could not open an account with European Metal Recycling Ltd (“EMR”); a metal recycling and waste management company with a network across England. EMR had a branch conveniently close to Mr Fury’s caravan. It was orally agreed that Mr Fury would open an EMR account, which he did using a utility bill, driving licence and passport for proof of identity. Shaun would bring the metal to Mr Fury and load it onto Mr Fury’s vehicles, Mr Fury would take the metal to EMR where it would be weighed, Mr Fury would cash the cheques received with EMR and give the paperwork and money to Shaun less (roughly) 13% commission which Mr Fury would keep, although sometimes Mr Fury was paid in kind with bags of horse feed. The agreement between Mr Fury and Shaun was not reduced to writing; written contracts not being common in the GRT community. Mr Fury understood that Shaun took the balance of the money and the paperwork to a third party, to show the amount received, and Shaun then took a cut of the balance with the remainder being passed on to the third party.
13. The Appellant’s self-assessment tax returns (“SATR”) for tax years 2015/16 to 2017/18 respectively were filed electronically.
14. On 25 September 2019, HMRC opened a Section 9A enquiry into the Appellant’s 2017/18 SATR which recorded £28,087 turnover, £20,384 expenses and £7,703 net profit. The opening notice included a schedule of information, detailing the information and documents required to assist HMRC, and requested records to support the contents of the 2017/18 SATR.
15. On 21 October 2019, Marlowe & Co, the Appellant’s agent, confirmed that the Appellant’s trade was buying and selling various goods (including horses and plant), that sales invoices were not issued and breeding/stock records not held, that the Appellant worked as an occasional haulage driver on a casual basis and that he accepted cash and cheque payments, banked when convenient. HSBC bank statements and some expenses vouchers were provided. HMRC’s analysis of the bank statements showed credits of £31,361 for the year ending 5 April 2018, compared to the declared turnover of £28,087.
16. On 25 November 2019, HMRC wrote to Marlowe & Co requesting (i) sales records, (ii) in the absence of detailed records, an explanation of turnover, (iii) details of the Appellant’s cash handling process, and (iv) confirmation as to whether a cash chequing service had been used and whether all cheques were paid into HSBC account number ending 1587.
17. On 2 January 2020, Marlowe & Co advised HMRC that sales were taken primarily from bank statements, a sale and purchase often took place on the same day without a horse passport. The agent was unaware of another business bank account, and was unaware of the Appellant using a cheque cashier. He understood that some cash may have paid for expenses.
18. On 22 January 2020, HMRC issued an Information Notice under Schedule 36 of the Finance Act 2008 to Mr Fury and Marlowe & Co.
19. Between 16 April 2020 and 14 July 2020, the compliance check was paused due to the Covid 19 Pandemic.
20. On 6 August 2020, HMRC received information showing that the Appellant had been cashing cheques with EMR relating to scrap metal sales.
21. On 3 September 2020, HMRC advised Marlowe & Co that Mr Fury had received payments from EMR which had not been declared. HMRC sought the Appellant’s authority to approach EMR for transaction details. A third-party Information Notice was issued under Schedule 36 of the Finance Act 2008 .
22. On 19 November 2020, HMRC issued a Schedule 36 Information Notice to EMR along with Mr Fury’s authority, seeking a breakdown of all scrap metal purchases.
23. On 10 December 2020, EMR confirmed that 181 cheque payments were made to Mr Fury over 3 tax years which were then cashed: DATE AMOUNT Y/E 5 April 2016 £79,756 Y/E 5 April 2017 £119,242 Y/E 5 April 2018 £1,177 TOTAL £200,175
24. On 8 January 2021, HMRC provided the details of the EMR payments to Mr Fury. A response was sought by 8 February 2021. Mr Fury was provided with several factsheets, including CC/FS7a – Penalties for inaccuracies in returns or documents. Mr Fury was asked to complete a ‘Certificate of bank accounts operated,’ this being a schedule of all bank accounts operated between April 2015 and April 2018In a telephone call on 15 January 2021, Mark at Marlowe & Co “…made it clear that he is shocked by the EMR income and was completely unaware of this.” HMRC granted an extension of time for a response.
25. On 17 February 2021, a completed certificate of bank accounts was returned, identifying 2 accounts operated by Mr Fury. Following an internal check of Mr Fury’s financial records, 5 more bank accounts were identified. Also and for the first time, Marlowe & Co advised that Mr Fury acted as an agent for a third party who bought scrap metal. Mr Fury’s role was to process the sales financially, thereafter he would receive a commission of 13% and pass the balance to the third party.
26. On 16 March 2021, HMRC issued a Schedule 36 Information Notice to Mr Fury along with bank mandates to be completed by 15 April 2021. HMRC requested evidence of the third-party arrangement.
27. On 23 March 2021, Marlowe & Co told HMRC that following HMRC’s letter Mr Fury had told him about a bank account with Coventry Building Society with money received from Mr Fury’s father. However, the agent was unaware of any other accounts. As to the EMR transactions, the agent was unaware of these. Mr Fury has said that these relate to a family member but he is not willing to provide details as Mr Fury is at risk of threats of violence. HMRC continued to seek evidence of the third-party arrangement.
28. On 9 April 2021, Marlowe & Co responded to HMRC’s letter of 17 February 2021. Marlowe & Co stated that Mr Fury had not understood the term ‘cheque cashier’ and had needed it to be explained to him. The agent confirmed that EMR issued receipts that were handed to the third party along with the balance of the monies. As to the Appellant’s ‘commission’, this was used to pay expenses and the remainder was banked.
29. On 26 April 2021, HMRC received Raja & Co’s authority to act for the Appellant.
30. On 2 June 2021, HMRC received 3 signed bank mandates and, consequently, sought information from Halifax, HSBC and Coventry Building Society. On 28 June 2021, HMRC received bank statements for 4 HSBC accounts held by Mr Fury. On 8 July 2021, HMRC received bank statements for 2 Halifax bank accounts held by Mr Fury. On 6 August 2021, HMRC received bank statements for 2 Coventry Building Society accounts held by Mr Fury. HMRC considered the information received and noted that bank interest had not been declared on Mr Fury’s SATRs.
31. On 13 August 2021, HMRC issued a pre-assessment letter setting out the inaccuracies in the Appellant’s SATRs for 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18, namely underdeclared income including bank deposits in the year 2017/18, EMR income and bank interest. The letter mentioned the potential for penalties under Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 and attached several factsheets.
32. On 22 August 2021, Mr Graeme Patrick, an unauthorised contact, emailed HMRC disputing the pre-assessment.
33. On 17 March 2022, the parties attended ADR. No agreement was reached.
34. On 25 March 2022, HMRC raised assessments for the tax year 2015/16 in the sum of £19,933.17 and tax year 2016/17 in the sum of £31,788.06. The Appellant’s declared expenses plus additional expenses at 25% of the EMR turnover was allowed. (As mentioned in §5 above, the 25% allowance for expenses appeared to us to be somewhat arbitrary; there being no clear basis for this percentage.) A final Closure Notice for 2017/18 was issued, no amendment being required. A decision letter with enquiry calculation and a self-assessment statement was also issued. On 30 March 2022, HMRC informed Mr Fury that if he disagreed with the Assessments he had the right to appeal or ask for a review.
35. On 20 April 2022, the Appellant appealed the Assessments and requested a review.
36. On 26 April 2022, HMRC issued a penalty explanation letter for tax years 2015/16 to 2017/18 in the sum of £28,800.08 on the basis of deliberate behaviour, namely the inaccuracies in Mr Fury’s trading income and expenses claimed.
37. On 8 June 2022, a view of the matter letter reiterated the 25 March 2022 decision.
38. On or around 21 July 2022, a review conclusion letter upheld the assessments but in slightly lower amounts, £19,787.57 for 2015/16 and £31,642.46 for 2016/17.
39. On 24 July 2022, the Appellant issued this appeal.
40. On 22 September 2022, Schedule 24 deliberate penalties were issued for tax years 2015/16 and 2016/17 in the sum of £11,081.03 and of £17,719.77 respectively, totalling £28,800.08, allowing a 40% reduction in respect of telling, helping and giving.
41. On 11 December 2023, the Appellant issued a late appeal against the Schedule 24 penalties. HMRC did not object to the late appeal. The Law i) Discovery Assessment – Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”):
42. Section 9 A(1) TMA 1970 provides, in summary, that HMRC may enquire into a SATR if they give notice of their intention to do so to the tax-payer and they do so within the time allowed.
43. Section 29 TMA 1970 is headed “Assessment where loss of tax discovered” and provides (in relevant part) as follows: “(1) If an officer of the Board or the Board discover, as regards any person (the taxpayer) and a year of assessment— (a) that an amount of income tax … ought to have been assessed but has not been assessed, … the officer or, as the case may be, the Board may, subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, make an assessment in the amount, or the further amount, which ought in his or their opinion to be charged in order to make good to the Crown the loss of tax.”
44. In Anderson (deceased) v Revenue & Customs [2009] UKFTT 258 (TC) , §§ 28 & 30, the First-tier Tax Tribunal (“FTT”) set out the subjective and objective tests required for the making of a discovery assessment under s.29 TMA 1970 : “27… we consider that if it is possible to be aware of something when one does not know all of the relevant facts and one cannot foretell how relevant points of law will be resolved, it cannot be said to be premature for an officer to “discover” that same something even when he knows he is not in possession of all of the relevant facts and does not know how relevant points of law will be resolved. 28…Having reviewed the authorities, we consider that it is helpful to elaborate the test as to the required subjective element for a discovery assessment as follows: “The officer must believe that the information available to him points in the direction of there being an insufficiency of tax.” That formulation, in our judgment, acknowledges both that the discovery must be something more than suspicion of an insufficiency of tax and that it need not go so far as a conclusion that an insufficiency of tax is more probable than not…
30. The officer’s decision to make a discovery assessment is an administrative decision. We consider that the objective controls on the decision making of the officer should be expressed by reference to public law concepts. Accordingly, as regards the requirement for the action to be “reasonable”, this should be expressed as a requirement that the officer’s belief is one which a reasonable officer could form. It is not for a tribunal hearing an appeal in relation to a discovery assessment to form its own belief on the information available to the officer and then to conclude, if it forms a different belief, that the officer’s belief was not reasonable.” (Emphasis added)
45. Further, it is permissible for one officer to make a discovery and for another officer to complete the assessment exercise without the second officer revisiting the opinion of the first officer as to an insufficiency of tax in the return, Tooth , §79.
46. The power to make an assessment is subject to Ss.29 (2) & (3) TMA 1970 . S29 (2) is not relevant to this appeal.
47. S.29 (3) provides as follows: “29(3) Where the taxpayer has made and delivered a return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment, he shall not be assessed under subsection (1) above– (a)in respect of the year of assessment mentioned in that subsection; and (b)in the same capacity as that in which he made and delivered the return, unless one of the two conditions mentioned below is fulfilled.”
48. Accordingly, a taxpayer can only be assessed under s.29 (1) TMA 1970 if one of two conditions is fulfilled; s.29 (3) TMA 1970. The two conditions are set out at Ss.29 (4-5) TMA 1970.
49. The first condition is that “… the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above was brought about carelessly or deliberately by the taxpayers or a person acting on his behalf.”; S. 29 (4) TMA 1970 .
50. The word ‘deliberate’ has been considered by the Supreme Court in Commissioners for HMRC v Tooth [2020] UKSC17 (“ Tooth ”). The Supreme Court held that for behaviour to be deliberate a statement must be shown to have been deliberately inaccurate at the time it was made; Tooth §§ 42-46. Further at §47, the Supreme Court stated: “…that, for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy in a document … there will have to be demonstrated an intention to mislead the Revenue on the part of the taxpayer as to the truth of the relevant statement or, perhaps, (although it need not be decided on this appeal) recklessness as to whether it would do so.”
51. The second condition is that “…….at the time when an officer of the Board ceased to be entitled to give notice of his intention to enquire into the taxpayer’s return............., the officer could not have been reasonably expected, on the basis of the information made available to him before that time, to be aware of the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above.”; S.29 (5) TMA 1970 .
52. The term “…information made available…” is defined in S.29 (6) TMA 1970 as, in summary, (a) information contained in the return or any accounts, statements or documents accompanying the return, (c) : information contained in any documents, accounts or particulars provided during the enquiry or (d) information the existence and relevance of which could have been inferred.
53. Finally, S.29 (7) TMA 1970 provides that: “29(7) In subsection (6) above– (a)any reference to the taxpayer’s return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment includes– (i) a reference to any return of his under that section for either of the two immediately preceding years of assessment;.. (b)any reference in paragraphs (b) to (d) to the taxpayer includes a reference to a person acting on his behalf.”
54. All assessments, including those issued under s.29 TMA 1970, are subject to statutory time limits. S.34 (1) TMA 1970 provides that the normal time limit is 4 years after the end of the years of assessment. S.36(1) TMA 1970 extends the time limit to 6 years where careless behaviour results in the tax loss. Further, where deliberate behaviour results in the tax loss, the time limit is extended to 20 years, s.36 (1A)TMA 1970. ii) Penalties - Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 :
55. Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 (“FA 07”) provides, so far as relevant, as follows.
56. Paragraph 1 Sch 24 FA 07 states: “1(1) A penalty is payable by a person (P) where– (a) P gives HMRC a document of a kind listed in the Table below, and (b) Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. (2) Condition 1 is that the document contains an inaccuracy which amounts to, or leads to– (a) an understatement of a liability to tax,… (3) Condition 2 is that the inaccuracy was careless (within the meaning of paragraph 3) or deliberate on P’s part… Tax Document Income tax or capital gains tax Return under section 8 of TMA 1970 (personal return)… ”
57. Paragraph 3, Sch 24 FA 07 considers ‘Degrees of Culpability’: “3(1) For the purposes of a penalty under paragraph 1, inaccuracy in a document given by P to HMRC is–… “(b)deliberate but not concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate on P's part but P does not make arrangements to conceal it, …”
58. The word ‘deliberate’ has been considered in case law as follows.
59. In Clyne v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 369 (TC) at §§ 84 & 86, the Tribunal held that: “84. On its normal meaning, therefore, the use of the term indicates that for there to be a deliberate inaccuracy on a person's part, the person must some extent have acted consciously, with full intention or set purpose or in a considered way .
86. However, we consider that the term deliberate inaccuracy on a person's part can extend beyond this. Our view is that, depending on the precise circumstances, an inaccuracy may also be held to be deliberate where it is found that the person consciously or intentionally chose not to find out the correct position, in particular, where the circumstances are such that the person knew that he should do so. A person cannot simply escape liability by claiming complete ignorance where the person clearly knew that he should have take steps to ascertain the position. We view the case where a person makes such a conscious choice not to take such steps with the result that an inaccuracy occurs, as no less of a deliberate inaccuracy on that person's. ” (Emphasis added.)
60. In Auxilium Project Management v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 249 (TC) , §63, the FTT considered what is meant by ‘deliberate and not concealed’ behaviour as follows: “In our view, a deliberate inaccuracy occurs when a taxpayer knowingly provides HMRC with a document that contains an error with the intention that HMRC should rely upon it as an accurate document. This is a subjective test. The question is not whether a reasonable taxpayer might have made the same error or whether this taxpayer failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the returns were accurate. It is a question of the knowledge and intention of the particular taxpayer at the time.”
61. In Tooth, the Supreme Court considered the test to establish deliberate behaviour in the context of discovery provisions. However, the Supreme Court noted that “…broadly similar differential treatment of careless and deliberate conduct by the taxpayer is reflected in different levels of penalty which may be imposed. The penalty scheme is contained in Schedule 24 to the ( Finance Act 2007 .” Tooth, §27). Accordingly, the deliberate behaviour test established in Tooth , set out at §36 above, is applicable when considering both discovery assessments and deliberate behaviour under Sch 24 FA 07.
62. Paragraph 4, Sch 24 FA 07 sets out the penalty payable under Paragraph 1, Sch 24 FA 07 as “ …4(2) If the inaccuracy is in category 1, the penalty is– … (b) for deliberate but not concealed action, 70% of the potential lost revenue, …” The inaccuracy in this case is in category 1 as it is a domestic matter within Paragraph 4A (1) (a) & 4A (5), Sch 24 FA 07. The potential lost revenue (“PLR”) is defined by Paragraphs 5-8, Sch 24 FA 07.
63. Paragraphs 9-10, Sch 24 FA 07 sets out reductions for the quality of disclosure, namely reductions for telling, helping and giving. Paragraph 11, Sch 24 FA 07 gives HMRC a discretion to reduce a penalty where there are special circumstances. Paragraph 11 (2), Sch 24 FA 07 states that : “11(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does not include– (a) ability to pay, or (b) the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another. . .”
64. As to a party’s appeal rights and the Tribunals’ powers on appeal, a party may appeal against HMRC’s decision that a penalty is payable (Paragraph 15 (1), Sch 24 FA 07). The Tribunal, on an appeal under Paragraph 15 (1), Sch 24 FA 07, may affirm of cancel HMRC’s decision; Paragraph 17 (1), Sch 24 FA 07. A party may appeal against HMRC’s as to the amount of a penalty (Paragraph 15 (2), Sch 24 FA 07). On an appeal under Paragraph 15 (2), Sch 24 FA 07, may affirm HMRC’s decision or substitute for HMRC’s decision another decision that HMRC had power to make; Paragraph 17 (1), Sch 24 FA 07. iii The Burden and Standard of Proof
65. As to the Discovery Assessments, it is for HMRC to show that they made a discovery and that the Assessments were issued within the statutory time limit. It is for Mr Fury to show that the Assessments are wrong and should be set aside or varied, T Haythornthwaite & Sons v Kelly (HM Inspector of Taxes) (1927) 11 TC 657 @ 667, Johnson v Scott 52 TC 383 and Nicholson v Morris [1977] STC 269 .
66. As to the Penalty, HMRC has the burden of proof to show that the Penalties have been correctly charged.
67. As to the standard of proof, Mr Patrick, on behalf of Mr Fury, argued that the standard of proof should be the criminal standard, being ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. He argued that where dishonesty is alleged the standard of proof should be the criminal standard. He referred to the Theft Act 1968 . He also noted that a penalty constitutes a ‘criminal charge’ for the purpose of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. We do not accept that the standard of proof should be the criminal standard. The Tribunal is not a criminal court. Mr Fury is not charged with a criminal offence. We are not deciding criminal liability. Nothing in the Finance Act 2007 or the Taxes Management Act 1970 elevates the standard of proof to beyond reasonable doubt. As a matter of domestic law, penalties are treated as civil matters. Deliberate behaviour does not require proof of dishonesty, CF Booth Limited v HMRC [2022] UKUT 00217 (TCC) §41. This was confirmed in New Claire Wine Limited v The Commissioners for His Majesty's Revenue & Customs [2026] UKUT 116 (TCC) (" New Claire Wine ") where the Upper Tribunal stated that "We are satisfied that the Upper Tribunal in CF Booth was right to conclude that dishonesty is not an essential element of a deliberate inaccuracy. It is supported by the Court of Appeal decision in Citibank NA and E Buyer UK Ltd v HM Revenue & Customs [2017] EWCA Civ 1416 ( "E Buyer")…" Accordingly, there is no need to prove dishonesty to establish a deliberate inaccuracy. The standard of proof to be applied is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. Analysis & Decision Debarring Application:
68. Mr Fury made a debarring application. Mr Patrick confirmed that this application was brought under Rule 8 (3) (c) & (7) (a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. In summary, Mr Patrick invited us to bar HMRC from taking further part in the proceedings as HMRC have no reasonable prospect of their case, or part of their case, succeeding. At the start of the hearing, it was agreed that we would hear all the evidence and the submissions and then consider both the debarring application and the substantive appeal at the end.
69. We refuse Mr Fury’s application to bar HMRC from taking further part in the proceedings. We are not satisfied that HMRC’s case has no reasonable prospect of succeeding in part or in whole for the reasons detailed below. Discovery Assessments: i) Is there a discovery?:
70. On 25 September 2019, HMRC opened the enquiry into the tax year 2017/18. The 2017/18 SATR was delivered on 21 December 2018. Therefore, HMRC had up to 12 months after the day the return was delivered to open the enquiry; s.9 A(2) (a) TMA 1970 . Accordingly, the enquiry was opened in time.
71. In accordance with Anderson, we are satisfied both that Officer Pickering believed that the information available to her pointed in the direction of an insufficiency of tax and that Officer Pickering’s belief was one which a reasonable officer could form.
72. In reaching this conclusion, we refer to and rely on the following principal points.
73. As to the 2017/18 tax year: (1) Mr Fury declared turnover of £28,087 on his 2017/18 SATR. However, officer Pickering’s review of Mr Fury’s bank statements identified credits of £31,362.00. (2) Mr Fury received bank interest on his 2 accounts with Coventry Building Society, 2 of his accounts with HSBC and his Halifax account, totalling £830.02. This bank interest was not declared in the 2017/18 SATR. (3) Mr Fury received additional income from EMR for two sales of scrap metal; the sales totalled £396.50 on 1 September 2017 and £780.50 on 1 October 2017.
74. As to the 2016/17 and 2015/16 tax years, Mr Fury received bank interest and income from EMR which was not declared.
75. For the avoidance of doubt, we do not accept Mr Patrick’s submission that for the Assessments to be valid Officer Pickering needed to identify a tax loss in the enquiry year; being 2017/18. Mr Patrick did not refer us to any legislation or case law in support of this proposition. We note that this proposition contradicts the Anderson test, which requires a belief that the information points in the direction of an insufficiency of tax and that belief must be more than a suspicions but less than a conclusion. Further, we note that a discovery can be made even when HMRC is not in possession of all of the relevant facts and does not know how relevant points of law will be resolved, Anderson , §27. Therefore, we consider that the fact that, ultimately, there was no tax loss in 2017/18 does not preclude Officer Pickering having made a discovery. ii) Deliberate Behaviour?:
76. In order to make the Assessments, one of two conditions must be satisfied; Ss.29 (3-5) TMA 1970 . HMRC, primarily, relied on the first condition; that the situation was brought about deliberately by Mr Fury, s.29 (4) TMA 1970.
77. We have given anxious scrutiny to the question of whether or not the situation was brought about deliberately by Mr Fury. We have reminded ourselves of the test set down in Tooth , §42-47. We are satisfied that the situation was brought about deliberately by Mr Fury.
78. In reaching this conclusion, we have referred to and relied on the following principal points which apply equally to the 2015/16 and 2016/17 tax years: (1) In total, Mr Fury had 8 bank accounts. He knew that he had 8 bank accounts as he opened them. He knew that some of these bank accounts contained money from his Father. Despite Mr Fury’s knowledge of these 8 bank accounts, he only disclosed one bank account to Marlowe & Co prior to the enquiry, as detailed in §17 above. Accordingly, Mr Fury had chosen not to inform Marlowe & Co about his other bank accounts. The existence of his other bank accounts came to light on a piecemeal basis. On 17 February 2021, Mr Fury completed a Certificate of Bank Accounts and disclosed two bank accounts. On 23 March 2021, Marlowe & Co told HMRC that Mr Fury had informed them about a further account with Coventry Building Society that had money in it from Mr Fury’s father. Marlowe & Co was not aware of any other accounts. Ultimately, internal checks by HMRC revealed 5 more bank accounts, making 8 in total. We have considered Mr Fury’s explanation for not disclosing his bank statements, namely that he didn’t think he had to. We do not accept that explanation. Mr Fury’s evidence was that he had instructed an accountant because he did not know how to do the paperwork. He provided documents to Marlowe & Co in a bag. He also provided information to Marlowe & Co orally. We find that Mr Fury made a conscious decision not to tell Marlowe & Co about all of his bank statements. If he had wanted to ensure that his paperwork was right then he would have told Marlowe & Co about all of his bank statements. He must have known that the figures provided to HMRC were wrong as they did not include the bank interest. It is also notable that, even during the enquiry, Mr Fury failed to provide full information about the bank accounts. HMRC obtained the necessary information directly from the banks. We have given due regard to Mr Fury’s difficulties with reading and writing; however, we do not think that these difficulties would have prevented Mr Fury from telling either his agents or HMRC about the number of bank accounts he had. In all the circumstances, we consider that Mr Fury’s failure to disclose all of his bank accounts was deliberate. (2) As to the EMR income, we accept Mr Fury’s description of the arrangement with Shaun. Specifically, we accept that Mr Fury received only a 13% commission. We understand why, in the absence of any documentary evidence, HMRC were sceptical about this arrangement. However, we have had the benefit of hearing Mr Fury’s oral evidence. He was an entirely credible witness. We believed him. In particular, we accept the following parts of his evidence: (a) He would describe members of the GRT community as relatives. (b) Mr Fury’s agreement with Shaun was an oral agreement. There was no written evidence. (c) Mr Fury could not read the EMR paperwork. Accordingly, he was unaware of the certification on the top right of the Waste Transfer Notes as to ownership of the material. In any event, we find that Mr Fury had full authority from Shaun, who had full authority from those higher up in the chain to sell the materials to EMR. (d) He passed this to Shaun with the balance of the EMR money so that Shaun could prove to the other interested parties in the chain how much EMR had paid for the metal. (e) Mr Fury was unable to get any supporting evidence from Shaun because Shaun ‘did not want to know’ and Mr Fury was susceptible to threats from family members. (f) Mr Fury did not understand the term ‘ cash chequing service , however, he was aware that at EMR he was receiving cheques which were, for a fee, converted into cash. (g) Whilst s.12 B TMA 1970 requires Mr Fury to keep records, Mr Fury, due to his literacy difficulties, mainly operates on oral agreements meaning that he has limited documentation. (3) Mr Fury did not tell Marlowe & Co about the EMR income before it was identified by HMRC. Marlowe & Co were shocked by the EMR income and completely unaware of it, see §24 above. Mr Fury’s explanation for this was that he didn’t think it was necessary because he was just receiving a commission. We do not accept this explanation. We have considered Mr Fury’s literacy difficulties but do not accept that these difficulties prevented Mr Fury telling Marlowe & Co about the EMR income. Again, we find that Mr Fury made a conscious decision not to tell Marlowe & Co. If he had wanted to ensure that his paperwork was right then he would have told Marlowe & Co about this income. Notably, Mr Fury operated, primarily, on a cash basis. The commission he received was in cash. In a letter, dated 9 April 2021, Marlowe & Co confirmed that the commission cash was used to pay expenses and the remainder banked. Therefore, the bank statements would not be a complete record of the commission cash as some of it had been spent on expenses. Mr Fury knew how much EMR was paying for the metal and how much he was receiving in commission. The arrangement was not short lived, lasting 15-16 months, it covered 3 tax years. In all the circumstances, he must have known that the figures provided to HMRC were wrong as they did not include all of the EMR income. We consider that Mr Fury’s failure to disclose the EMR income, being the 13% commission, was deliberate.
79. In light of our finding on deliberate behaviour, we do not need to go on to consider whether or not s.29 (5) TMA 1970 applied. However, in brief, we agree that HMRC could not have reasonably been expected to be aware of the s.29 (1) TMA 1970 situation before the expiry of the relevant time limits as it was not until the enquiry into the 2017/18 SATR that HMRC became aware of the EMR income and the bank interest. iii) Quantum:
80. We find that HMRC has discharged their burden of proof, namely they have shown that they made a discovery and that the Assessments were issued within the statutory time limit. Next, we have considered whether or not Mr Fury has proved, on the balance of probabilities, that the Assessments are wrong and should be set aside or varied.
81. Although Mr Fury provided no documentary evidence of the payments to Shaun, there being none, we have had the benefit of hearing his oral witness evidence and asked him questions thereon. We are therefore satisfied that Mr Fury has proved that the Assessments should be varied.
82. Specifically, the assessments were calculated on the basis that Mr Fury received 100 % of the EMR income, less EMR’s fees. We have found that this is incorrect. Mr Fury received only 13% of the EMR income, after the deduction of EMR’s fees. Accordingly, the Assessments require re-calculation on the basis that Mr Fury received only 13% of the EMR income. Additionally, if Mr Fury was a basic rate taxpayer at the relevant time, then the re-calculation will need to consider the impact of this on the bank interest. Further, the re-calculation will need to take account of Mr Fury’s personal allowance. We were told by Officer Patel that HMRC’s enquiry calculator considers personal allowances but interest adjustments need to be done manually.
83. As to expenses, we are satisfied that HMRC wrote, on a number of occasions, to Mr Fury’s representatives seeking details about his expenses. No or no adequate information was provided. Notably, even at the hearing there was still no information provided as to Mrs Fury’s wages or capital allowances. It was not for HMRC (or us) to do the work of Mr Fury and carry out an exhaustive investigation; Nicholson v Morris [1976] STC 269 and Van Boeckel v C & E QB Dec 1980, [1981] STC 290 . HMRC are required to exercise their judgment as to the amount of the assessment in a reasonable manner and they are entitled to make reasonable inferences. We are satisfied that, in the absence of evidence as to expenses, HMRC’s allowance for an additional 25% in expenses was reasonable, perhaps even generous towards Mr Fury, even though this was a blanket 25%. As to the recalculation of the Assessments, HMRC acknowledged that, in addition to the expenses declared by Mr Fury on his SATRs, additional expenses, being 25% of the 13% EMR income would be allowed. Penalties:
84. There are two components for the payment of a penalty: (1) First, that a person, in this case Mr Fury, gives HMRC a document of a kind listed in the Table in Sch 24 FA07; Paragraph 1 (1) (a) Sch 24 FA 07, and (2) Second, that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied; Paragraph 1 (1) (b) Sch 24 FA 07.
85. As to the first component, Mr Fury, via his agents, filed the SATRs for the tax years 205/16 and 2016/17. Each of these Returns individually is a document listed in the Table in paragraph 1 of Sch 24 FA 07. Accordingly, we find that the entry threshold for a penalty has been crossed.
86. As to the second component, Condition 1 "…is that the document contains an inaccuracy which amounts to, or leads to – ... a) an understatement of a liability to tax,.." . In evidence, Mr Fury accepted that his accounts were incomplete. In the circumstances, we find that the Returns contain inaccuracies, namely the omission of both the 13% EMR income and the bank interest, which amount to / lead to an understatement of a liability to tax. Accordingly, we find that Condition 1 is satisfied.
87. As to Condition 2, "…the inaccuracy was careless (within the meaning of paragraph 3) or deliberate on P's part…" The Penalties total £28,800.20 and are based on deliberate but not concealed behaviour. HMRC maintains that the Appellant's behaviour was deliberate. At the hearing, HMRC accepted that they were not arguing, in the alternative, that Mr Fury’s behaviour was careless. They accepted it was deliberate or nothing. For the avoidance of doubt, HMRC did not argue that Mr Fury’s behaviour was reckless.
88. Again, we have given anxious scrutiny to the question of whether the inaccuracies in the Returns were deliberate on Mr Fury’s part. We reminded ourselves that HMRC bear the burden of proof (on the balance of probabilities). We referred ourselves to the legal tests in Auxilium and Tooth and noted that "…dishonesty is not an essential element of a deliberate inaccuracy…" as per CF Booth and New Claire Wine .
89. For the reasons detailed at §§ 78 (1-3) above, we have concluded that the inaccuracies in the 2015/16 and 2016/17 SATRS were deliberate on Mr Fury’s part. Accordingly, we find that Condition 2 is satisfied and that Mr Fury’s behaviour was deliberate.
90. However, we find that the Penalties have been incorrectly calculated as the PLR is based on Mr Fury receiving 100% of the EMR income as opposed to only 13% of the EMR income. Accordingly, the Penalties need to be re-calculated. For the avoidance of doubt, we agree with the reductions for telling, helping and giving under Paragraphs 9-10, Sch 24 FA 07. We do not consider that there are any special circumstances, none having been argued for by Mr Fury, so Paragraph 11 (1), Sch 24 FA 07 does not apply. Miscellaneous
91. On 1 August 2024, Tribunal Judge Popplewell allowed Mr Fury to amend his grounds of appeal to include a challenge based on the alleged behaviour of HMRC’s Officers. At the start of the hearing, we explained to Mr Fury that the Tax Tribunal is a creature of statute, meaning that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited and, in this appeal, our jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the conditions for the Assessments and/or Penalties were met and whether the quantum is excessive. We are not a supervisory court, meaning that we have no jurisdiction to police the behaviour of HMRC’s officers provided that they are acting within the relevant statutory framework and their conduct has no statutory consequences; HMRC v Abdul Noor [2013] UKUT 071 (TCC) , §73 and Birkett v HMRC [2017] UKUT 89, §§ 30 & 38. Whilst numerous criticisms were levied, arguably with some justification, at the conduct of HMRC, those criticisms either fell outside our jurisdiction and/or did not have relevant statutory consequences. Conclusion:
92. Mr Fury’s appeal against the Assessments and Penalties is allowed in part.
93. Specifically, Mr Fury’s appeal against the amount of the Assessments and the Penalties has succeeded for the reasons detailed above.
94. Both the Assessments and the Penalties require re-calculation in light of our finding that Mr Fury received only 13% of the EMR income.
95. We hope that the parties will be able to agree this re-calculation. If, which we very much hope will not be the case, the parties are unable to agree the re-calculation then the issue of quantum can be referred back to us for a paper determination. Right to apply for permission to appeal
96. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 08 th OCTOBER 2026