UK case law

MKR v Cloudflare Limited & Ors

[2026] EWHC KB 2452 · High Court (King's Bench Division) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Mrs Justice Hill: Introduction

1. By a Part 8 claim form issued on 30 July 2026 the Claimant (“C”) sought an order pursuant to the Court’s Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction to require the Defendants to disclose certain information and provide it for inspection. By orders of Steyn J and Coppel J dated, respectively, 18 and 27 August 2026, the Claimant has been granted anonymity. Steyn J allowed the Claimant’s application for an order that the hearing of the claim be expedited pursuant to CPR 3.1(2)(a).

2. The Claimant’s claim was supported by two witness statements she had provided, both dated 30 July 2026, and further witness statements dated 25 August 2026 and 10 September 2026 with extensive exhibits. She also relied on witness statements from her solicitor, Christopher Whitehouse, dated 11 and 25 August 2026 and 13 September 2026.

3. The First Defendant (“D1”) filed an Acknowledgement of Service and relied on two witness statements from Andrew Barker, its Director of Outreach, Legal Policy and Trust and Safety dated 7 and 11 September 2026. The Second, Third and Fourth Defendants (respectively, “D2”, “D3” and “D4”) did not file Acknowledgements of Service.

4. The claim was heard during court vacation on 15 September 2026. I was greatly assisted by the comprehensive written and oral submission on behalf of C and D1. D2, D3 and D4 did not attend.

5. At the outset of the hearing, I raised with counsel for C and D1 the issue of whether C’s claim against D1 remained suitable for Part 8. This was because substantial disputes of fact had emerged in the evidence about whether D1 had control or possession of the information sought, or whether it was in the hands of its parent company, Cloudflare, Inc., which is based in the United States and not a party to this claim. The parties considered the matter and concluded that C’s claim against D1 should be transferred to Part 7. I made an order for transfer and gave further directions for a trial of the Part 7 claim in early 2027.

6. Accordingly, it was only necessary to hear submissions from C on the claim against D2, D3 and D4. At the end of the hearing I indicated that I would make the order sought against D2, D3 and D4, with C paying costs limited to £200 for each Defendant, for reasons to follow. These are those reasons. The factual background

7. C is a lecturer and academic. Since December 2024, thousands of internet domains have been created in which her full legal name together with random letters has been either embedded in the webpage address (the URL or Uniform Resource Locator) or appears in a search result “snippet”.

8. When those URLs or search results are clicked on, the result is never a genuine content page: instead, the visitor is automatically directed to a different domain and webpage with pornographic or adult content. The second domain tends to be part of a traffic-monetisation network. Reverse proxy services (which sit in front of backend servers, receive client requests, forward them to the appropriate server, and return the response to the client) are relied on to conceal the identity of the manager of the domain.

9. C provided various e xamples of how the domains appear in her evidence. In some, C’s name appears in the URL and next to text beginning “ xXx-Videos! ” or similar. In one, C’s middle initial (which is not commonly known and not used by C in her academic role) is also present.

10. C’s evidence was that the conduct began in December 2024 and is still continuing, though there have been periods when the conduct ceased. She divided the conduct into three phases. Although the conduct in each phase has been similar, it has adapted over the past 20 months.

11. Phase One, from December 2024 to November 2025, consisted of both (i) short-lived “burner” domains which surfaced in search results associated with C’s name, often appearing in clustered bursts of around 10-20 per day, and (ii) more persistent domains where C’s name was embedded into the URL, including hanguowumanhua.com and rakuendoll.jp.

12. The domains in Phase Two, from February to April 2026, were not short-lived burner domains, but were more similar to the persistent domains that appeared in Phase One. Phase Two domains redirected users to pornographic pages, including, for the first time, adult videos. Sometimes C’s name was embedded in the URL; and on other occasions C’s name appeared in the summary of the search results.

13. In Phase Three, from June 2026 onwards, C’s name is embedded into the URLs. Initially the results only appeared in Google Videos and showed videos on the Google search results. Since August 2026, however, the URLs have also included webpages with geo-location restrictions such that they are inaccessible or less frequently accessible from the UK.

14. C has observed that the conduct has changed on several occasions shortly after she or her solicitors have notified internet infrastructure providers of the conduct and either asked that the complaint be forwarded to the customer; or the infrastructure provider has policies in place that they will notify customers of the specific request for disclosure.

15. For example, the conduct ceased in November 2025 within two to three days of C sending complaints to three registrars, two of whom confirmed that they had forwarded the complaint onto the account holder. The conduct did not re-start for over two months, until February 2026. Similarly, certain Phase One domains began producing “521” error responses on 21 July 2026, days after C’s solicitors sent pre-action letters to the Defendants. C’s evidence was that 521 responses could be indicative of a deliberate shutdown of the origin server, a deliberate decision to stop paying for hosting providers for those domains or a result of hosting providers having suspended the account.

16. The conduct re-started in August 2026 with a geo-location restriction in respect of one of the domains which means it cannot be accessed from the UK. Out of the many domains that have been created to date (where C’s legal name has been embedded directly into URL paths, generated page structures, and indexed results), this is the first domain that C has found that has not been accessible from the UK as a result of restrictions set at the domain’s end. This is also the first domain to be created after C’s solicitors sent pre-action correspondence in mid-July 2026. A further domain was created in late August 2026 which was not in English and which Google indicated typically appears for searches outside the UK, suggesting that there is some type of geographical parameter set up on it.

17. Despite the conduct ceasing on multiple occasions, it has always re-started. The association of C’s name with pornographic or adult content is understandably extremely distressing for C. It also has the potential to cause professional and reputational damage to her academic career.

18. C has used publicly available material to try and identify who is responsible for this conduct. She has analysed technical evidence and sought assistance from the police and various internet infrastructure providers. The information provided to C has not enabled C to identify confidently the perpetrator(s) of the conduct or seek any redress in respect of it, such that she has brough this claim. C’s claim concerns a sample of 9 of the domains.

19. D2 is a domain registrar and hosting provider in respect of one of the domains. D3 is its sister company. Companies House material makes clear that D4 is the parent company of D2 and D3. All three are incorporated in the UK. The legal framework

20. The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction provides, in essence, that a person innocently caught up in the wrongdoing of another so that they are more than a mere witness can be compelled to disclose the identity of the wrongdoer so that proceedings may be brought against the proper defendant: Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 at 175.

21. The relevant test was summarised by Saini J in Collier v Bennett [2020] EWHC 1884 (QB) at [35], and approved by the Privy Council in Stanford Asset Holdings Ltd v AfrAsia Bank Ltd [2023] UKPC 35 at [36], thus: “(i) The applicant has to demonstrate a good arguable case that a form of legally recognised wrong has been committed against them by a person (the Arguable Wrong Condition); (ii) The respondent to the application must be mixed up in so as to have facilitated the wrongdoing (the Mixed Up In Condition); (iii) The respondent to the application must be able, or likely to be able, to provide the information or documents necessary to enable the ultimate wrongdoer to be pursued (the Possession Condition); (iv) Requiring disclosure from the respondent is an appropriate and proportionate response in all the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the exceptional but flexible nature of the jurisdiction (the Overall Justice Condition).”

22. The applicant bears the burden of proof throughout: Mircom International Content Management & Consultancy Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 1827 (Ch) at [10].

23. The first three conditions are “threshold hurdles”: Collier at [36]. Only once they are all crossed does the Court reach the Overall Justice Condition.

24. The jurisdiction is exceptional and narrow. It cannot be used for “fishing exercises” or wide-ranging disclosure or gathering of evidence, as opposed to focused disclosure of necessary information: Collier at [39], citing Ramilos Trading Ltd v Buyanovsky [2016] EWHC 3175 (Comm) ; [2016] 2 CLC 896 at [62], per Flaux J. The claim against D2, D3 and D4 (i): The Arguable Wrong Condition

25. As to the Arguable Wrong Condition “[t]he “wrong” may be a crime, tort, breach of contract, equitable wrong or contempt of court. It is not necessary to establish conclusively that a wrong has been carried out; it will be sufficient if it is arguable that a wrong has been carried out”: Orb A.R.L v Fiddler [2016] EWHC 361 (Comm) at [84].

26. Here, I accepted C’s submission that she has a good arguable case of, at least, the “wrongs” of harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“the PHA”) and defamation. (a): Harassment

27. The elements of a claim of harassment were set out by Simon J in Dowson v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) at [142] as follows: (1) there must be conduct which occurs on at least two occasions, (2) which is targeted at the claimant, (3) which is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress, and (4) which is objectively judged to be oppressive and unacceptable. Further, he reiterated that (5) what is oppressive and unacceptable may depend on the social or working context in which the conduct occurs; and (6) a line is to be drawn between conduct which is unattractive and unreasonable, and conduct which has been described in various ways: “torment” of the victim, “of an order which would sustain criminal liability”.

28. In C’s case, far more than two domains have been created over a period of at least 18 months, thus showing that C has a good arguable case on element (1).

29. As to element (2), C contended, and I accepted, that she has a good arguable case that this conduct was deliberately targeted at her, for the following reasons.

30. First , the conduct has persisted for over 18 months, across a range of different domains and in different formats. The process of domain creation in this case over a period of 18 months will have required a substantial commitment of time and money. However the process is unlikely to have been financially motivated: C is not a celebrity, or someone whose name is likely to be searched sufficiently often for the account holder to make any real profit from the “traffic” through the domains. The continued creation of domains including C’s name also makes no commercial sense when the threat of legal proceedings has been made very clear to the perpetrator.

31. Second , as explained at [14]-[16] above, the creation of domains paused when C sent a complaint to three of the registrars, two of whom then confirmed that they forwarded it to the customer, at a time when domains were regularly being created across numerous registrars. When the conduct re-started, it was in a different technical format and most recently, with geo-location restrictions preventing access from the UK after pre-action letters had been sent to the Defendants. The obvious inference to be drawn from this evidence is that someone is going to significant lengths to target C specifically.

32. Third , both these features make it less likely that the conduct is “spam/black hat SEO manipulating” as suggested to C by the police. The police suggested that this process would involve C’s name being included in the domains as a result of bulk keyword lists being used by click-farming systems, which have the intention of generating revenue through large volumes of “ad impressions”. However, if that was behind the conduct here, new domains would appear consistently, rather than the creation of domains ceasing for periods of time, including almost immediately after the complaints were forwarded to registrars.

33. C has identified someone who she believes may be responsible for the conduct, referred to in her evidence as “X”. He is one of a very small number of people who know her middle initial. For around two years, they were close. X pursued C romantically. C made clear that she did not want that sort of relationship and cut off contact with him in October 2024, around two months before the first domain complained of appeared. X is a computer scientist, with 20 years’ experience working in data science and in the software industry. Around the time C cut off contact with him, he was not working and was living with his family. He is therefore someone with the motivation, time and resources to carry out this conduct.

34. It is clearly arguable that alarm and distress is a likely consequence of seeing one’s name associated with adult websites, particularly when they may be seen by colleagues, employers, institutions, family members or other third parties too. Accordingly, C has a good arguable case that the conduct was calculated in an objective sense to cause her alarm or distress, and objectively judged was oppressive and unacceptable, for the purposes of elements (3) and (4).

35. For similar reasons, C has an arguable case that the wrongdoer knew that the course of conduct amounted to harassment or ought to have had that knowledge, applying the test set out in section 1(2) of the PHA.

36. Further, there is evidence that the harassment has caused C alarm and distress: she has described the impact it has had on her physical and mental health. It is also capable of damage to her professional reputation. (b): Defamation

37. A defamation claim requires proof, in essence, of (1) a defamatory statement, namely a statement that would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way in which others would treat the claimant and that causes or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant; (2) that refers to the claimant; (3) that is published, namely communicated to at least one person other than the claimant; and (4) that causes damage to the claimant.

38. As to element (1), the relevant statements are the URLs including C’s name and/or the snippets of text in the search results that include C’s name. C did not contend that the statements were, by themselves, defamatory but argued that they were defamatory by implication, in that “[j]uxtaposition of material about the claimant with other material may make an otherwise innocent statement defamatory”: Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (21 st Edition) at paragraph 19-006. This requires that a reasonable person, seeing the two objects together, would draw from their relative positions an inference that was defamatory of the claimant. In Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671 , for example, the Court of Appeal held that putting a waxwork effigy of someone who had been tried for murder and released on a verdict of “Not Proven” in a room with a representation of the scene of the alleged murder and with a gun was defamatory.

39. Here, I accepted C’s submission that she has a good arguable case that a right-thinking person would construe the juxtaposition of her name in the URLs and/or the search result snippets with the adult content on the websites to which the links redirect and/or the adult text in the search result snippet as defamatory. It is clearly arguable that such statements were defamatory in particular because they would “bring a person into hatred, ridicule or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on his part, or if it tends to make the claimant be shunned and avoided”: Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587, per Slesser LJ.

40. As to (3), the statements were plainly published on the internet. As to (4), the conduct has caused C serious harm. Alternatively, serious harm could be inferred from the facts. (ii): The Mixed Up In Condition

41. In Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29 at [35], Lord Woolf CJ explained that the Mixed Up In Condition distinguishes a person involved in the wrongdoing from a “mere onlooker or witness”. The respondent must therefore have participated in or facilitated the wrongdoing; it is not enough that it merely witnessed the wrongdoing or happens to possess relevant evidence, which may assist in identifying or pursuing the wrongdoer.

42. In NML Capital Ltd v Chapman Freeborn Holdings Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 589 , it was held that the respondent must have been involved “in the furtherance of the transaction identified as the relevant wrongdoing”: [25]. In Davidoff v Google LLC [2024] 4 WLR 6 at [105], Nicklin J described the requirement as being that the respondent must have had “some connection with the circumstances of the wrong which enables the purpose of the wrongdoing to be furthered”. It is therefore necessary to identify with some care the the wrongdoing relied upon before asking whether the particular respondent facilitated it: NML at [26] and Davidoff at [105].

43. In Ashworth Hospital at [35], Lord Woolf observed that “this requirement of involvement or participation on the part of the party from whom discovery is sought is not a stringent requirement” (although it is still a significant one).

44. Applying these principles, a telephone company that held records which might identify a participant in the alleged fraud was “manifestly a mere witness” and had not facilitated the wrongdoing: EUI Ltd v UK Vodaphone Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1771 at [18]. Similarly, where a Gmail email account had facilitated the registering a Trustpilot account from which an allegedly defamatory publication was made, Google as the provider of Gmail services was a mere witness: Davidoff at [107]. Nicklin J indicated that the position might have been different had the wrongful communication itself been transmitted through Gmail: [110].

45. In Davidoff at [102], Nicklin J observed that the operators of a website on which the alleged wrongdoer has posted has conventionally been regarded “ mixed up in the wrongdoing” because “it has, through its platform or service, enabled and facilitated the publication complained of”.

46. Here, I accepted C’s submission that D2, D3 and D4 have had some connection with the circumstances of the wrong which enables the purpose of the wrongdoing to be furthered, for the following reasons.

47. D2 is the domain name registrar and/or hosting provider for one of the domains. Just as a website is clearly mixed up in the wrong of an anonymous poster to that site, where it is the website itself which is the wrong (as in this case) the range of hosting services required for such a website enable and facilitate the wrong complained of. In respect of the particular domain linked with D2-D4, C’s name has been embedded into the script behind the creation of the domain. Accordingly, the domain registration and hosting is “mixed up” in the wrongdoing, applying the principles set out above.

48. D3 is D2’s sister company. In December 2025, D3 responded to the complaint C had made to D2 about this domain, stating that it would “comply with a preservation and information request from the police or NFIB sent to our legal department”. D4 is the parent company for both D2 and D3. It satisfies this condition for similar reasons. (iii): The Possession Condition

49. This condition requires determination of (1) whether the information or documents necessary to enable the ultimate wrongdoer to be pursued exist; and (2) whether the defendants are able or likely to be able to provide it.

50. As to (1), C has explained in detail in her evidence why she believes that the information she seeks ought to exist for all the accounts associated with D1. The same logic applies in relation to D2-D4. As a similar internet infrastructure provider to D1, there is no reason to think that they do not hold the same categories of information.

51. As to (2), p re-action letters were sent to D2 and D3 making requests for voluntary disclosure and seeking confirmation of what the costs of the disclosure process would be for each Defendant. Neither responded. Nor have they, or D4, engaged with any correspondence from C’s solicitors about the claim since it was issued.

52. D2 is the domain registrar and it is therefore likely to be able to provide the information sought about this particular domain. D3’s indication that it would comply with a relevant court order (see [48] above) suggests that it can also do so. Given its role as immediate parent company D4 is likely to be in a similar position. C ertainly D4 has not responded to the claim saying it is impossible for it to obtain the information and it seems to me realistic to envisage that it can: see, by analogy, the approach taken to the Intesa Bank in Credit Suisse Trust v Intesa San Paolo SPA, Banca Montei Dei Pascha Di Siena [2014] EWHC 1446 (Ch) at [14] .

53. In the interests of full and frank disclosure (as to which, see Davidoff (at [43]-[45]), C disclosed correspondence that had been received from GoDaddy, the ultimate parent company of D2-D4. This was in response to service of the claim. GoDaddy suggested that it did not have access to, or jurisdiction over, the content on the site of the information C was requesting. However, this appears to be a standard, “templated” response, as it does not refer to the specific domain in question or any details of the claim. In any event, C’s application is not against GoDaddy.

54. Accordingly, I was satisfied that D2, D3 and D4 are “able, or likely to be able, to provide” the necessary information or documents ( Collier at [35(iii)]) such that this condition is satisfied. (iii): The Overall Justice Condition

55. The Overall Justice Condition imports requirements of necessity and proportionality.

56. The applicant need not show that the application is a “last resort”, but that, in all the circumstances, necessity and proportionality justify an order for disclosure: Burford Capital Ltd v London Stock Exchange Group plc [2021] 2 All ER (Comm) 377 per Andrew Baker J at [40]. That said, the likely utility of the order, available alternatives, privacy, scope and cost remain central: Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012] UKSC 55 , at [16]-[17].

57. Here, C and her solicitors have gone to some lengths to try and secure the information without seeking a court order, to no avail. To that extent the order is necessary. I am satisfied by counsel’s explanation for each of the categories of information sought in the draft order. This showed that the order as against D2, D3 and D4 had been calibrated to bear in mind any differences with D1. It also showed, in my judgment, that the categories included were all proportionate, properly focussed as they were on identifying the wrongdoer.

58. A non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant factors to the Overall Justice Condition was set out by Lord Kerr in Rugby Football Union at [17]. They are inherently fact-specific.

59. As to factor (i), I was satisfied that C has a strong underlying possible cause of action for harassment and defamation, for the reasons set out at [27]-[40] above.

60. As to (ii), there is a strong public interest in allowing C to vindicate her legal rights. While the human rights consideration of the unidentified, presently anonymous party are to be balanced with C’s vindication of her legal rights (see Govdata Ltd v Indeed UK Operations Ltd [2024] EWHC 39 (Comm) at [49]), I accept that the balance falls in C’s favour: this appears to be a case where a person has “used anonymity merely as an expedient by which s/he hopes to avoid identification and the potential consequences of their online activity”, such that I attach “limited weight to the need to protect that anonymity” (per Davidoff at [112]). This also addresses Rugby Football Union factors (vii) and (ix).

61. As to factor (iii), if no order is made, there is no real prospect of any recourse against the wrongdoers and they will have acted with impunity. The order sought is likely to enable redress to be had, preventing the perpetrator from causing further harm and deterring others from doing the same. It is not known whether the perpetrator may have targeted other people with similar conduct too.

62. As to (iv), it does not appear that C can obtain the information from another source.

63. As to (v), there is a good argument that the Defendants knew or ought to have known that their systems are set up in a way that facilitates arguable wrongdoing like this: C provided evidence from Google Community forums to which the police had directed her, showing that using other people’s names in search result snippets in order to attract traffic to adult content is not unprecedented.

64. As to (vi), there is no real risk that disclosure would reveal the names of innocent persons as well as wrongdoers and that such innocent persons would suffer harm. Whoever is responsible for the conduct in question is plainly not innocent; and no-one one else is likely to be named in the disclosure.

65. As to (vii), there has been no relevant delay on the part of C in this case, still less sufficient delay to displace the other factors set out above which point strongly in favour of the relief sought. She first learned about the domains in mid-2025 and has taken repeated action since then both with the police and the various Defendants to try and address it.

66. For these reasons, I was satisfied that this condition was met and militated in favour of making the order C sought. Further points on the terms of the order

67. The order requires D2, D3 and D4 to disclose a series of carefully defined categories of information about the person(s) behind the domain in question within 7 days.

68. As is usual, the order contained a collateral use undertaking. This made clear that C undertook that she will not, without the permission of the court, use any documents or information obtained as a result of this Order, except for the purposes of (i) pursuing civil proceedings or other civil relief against the person(s) responsible; (ii) reporting the matter to the competent law-enforcement or regulatory authorities including with a view to a public prosecution; and/or (iii) seeking further Norwich Pharmacal or other relief if necessary to confirm the ultimate person(s) responsible for the creation of domains.

69. C explained her very difficult financial circumstances. In essence she is medically unfit to work and undergoing treatment for her medical condition. She is receiving Universal Credit. She is being assisted on a pro bono basis by her solicitors and counsel. She also contended, and I accept, that the information covered by the order should be straightforward and quick for the Defendants to obtain. It is hard to see how the Defendants will suffer any loss by the order sought. In those circumstances I acceded to C’s request that she not be required to give a cross-undertaking in damages.

70. As to costs, t he ordinary starting point is that the applicant for Norwich Pharmacal relief pays the respondent’s reasonable costs of the application and compliance: Filatona Trading Ltd v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan UK LLP [2024] EWHC 2751 (Comm) at [8]–[10]. Indeed, it is “hard to envisage circumstances in which it would be just to award costs against a respondent” which has merely required the applicant to satisfy the Court that an order is appropriate: Jofa Ltd v Benherst Finance Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 899 , [2020] 1 All ER 849 at [31], per Leggatt LJ (as he then was). Unsuccessful opposition does not itself displace that protection: Filatona at [19] and [24].

71. I did not consider that there was any sufficiently powerful reason in this case to depart from that general principle. Accordingly, I concluded that it was appropriate to order that C paid the Defendants’ costs of complying with the order. However, I was persuaded to limit these costs to £200 per Defendant because (i) D2, D3 and D4 had failed to engage substantively or at all with the pre-action and claim correspondence; (ii) this included their failure to give any indication of what their likely costs would be; (iii) the costs are likely to be modest; and (iv) C’s financial circumstances are currently very challenging, as noted at [69] above. Conclusion

72. For all these reasons I allowed C’s claim against D2, D3 and D4 and made the order she sought against them, albeit requiring her to pay their costs of complying, capped at £200 per Defendant. Amendment made under the slip rule to correct abbreviated descriptions of the Defendants in [3].

MKR v Cloudflare Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC KB 2452 — UK case law · My AI Judge