UK case law
P (Children) (Recusal Application), Re
[2026] EWFC B 270 · Family Court (B - district and circuit judges) · 2026
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Full judgment
DJ BLACKMORE:
1. Before the Court, at the commencement of the final hearing today, are two applications made just three working days before the final hearing was due to start; those applications being made by the father: (a) a renewed application that I recuse myself from further involvement in these proceedings and; (b) an application that the mother be called to give oral evidence at the final hearing, contrary to the case management directions already made in this case.
2. I am considering the applications as a preliminary matter on day one of the final hearing. I have considered the father’s written application, his detailed statement that he presented to me at the outset of this hearing, oral submissions and the history of these proceedings in their entirety when determining both applications.
3. For the reasons I now set out, the recusal application is refused. The application that the mother be called to give oral evidence at the final hearing is allowed in part. I note, however, the mother’s position that she does not wish to give evidence. The Recusal Application and the Legal Test
4. The applicable principles are well-established. The basis of the father’s application is that he considers that the decisions I have taken in this case have been biased in favour of the mother and against him.
5. The test for apparent bias arises from the case of Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 and is whether: “the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased”.
6. Subsequent authorities have provided clarity on this test. Those cases are as follows: Helow v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 62 , Harb v His Royal Highness Price Abdul bin Fahd Abdul Aziz [2016] EWCA Civ 556 , Sengupta & Anor v The General Medical Council [ 2002] EWCA Civ 1104, Resolution Chemicals Ltd v H Lundbeck A/C [2013] EWCA Civ 1515 , Lawal v Northern Spirit [2003] UKHL 35 , Virdi v The Law Society of England and Wales [2010] EWCA Civ 100 , Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield [2000] QB 451 and Oktritie International Investment Management Ltd & Ors v Urumov [2014] EWCA Civ 1315 . The clarity that has arisen from those cases can be summarised as follows: (a) the fair-minded and informed observer is neither complacent nor unduly suspicious. Such an observer is aware of the relevant background and circumstances and understands the judicial oath and the professional obligations imposed upon judges. (b) the authorities further make it clear that: i) a judge’s previous involvement in a case does not, without more, give rise to apparent bias. ii) the mere fact that a judge has previously made findings adverse to a party, or found that a party’s evidence is unreliable, is not a sustainable basis for recusal. iii) disagreement with a judgment is properly addressed by way of appeal and not by seeking the recusal of the judge who made the findings. iv) A litigant cannot effectively select a different judge merely because they are dissatisfied with previous decisions. (c) In particular, the authorities I have referred to make clear that prior adverse findings against a party do not themselves justify recusal, and that a judge may continue to determine subsequent stages of the same litigation unless the fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there is a real possibility that the judge cannot approach the remaining issues fairly. Application of the Test to this Case
7. The father’s primary complaint is that he disagrees with the findings I made following the fact-finding hearing. In addition, he questions the reasons given by me at the hearing on 15 May for refusing his application initially, (which application had been made at the door of the Court without warning to either the Court or the mother and her legal representatives.)
8. The findings I made over five months ago, on 16 February 2026, were only arrived at after an exceptionally thorough process.
9. The fact-finding hearing occupied multiple days over a lengthy period. Evidence was heard from the mother, the father, the school Safeguarding Liaison Officer, the maternal aunt and the maternal grandmother, together with consideration of extensive documentary, audio and video evidence contained within the trial bundle.
10. Significant steps were taken throughout the proceedings to ensure procedural fairness. These included: (a) the appointment of a qualified legal representative to conduct cross-examination on behalf of the father; (b) the discharge and replacement of a QLR when the originally appointed representative became unwell; (c) repeated adjournments to ensure the father could properly participate and present his case; (d) permission for the father to provide questions and make submissions; (e) special measures were put in place for vulnerable witnesses, and; (f) extensive opportunities were provided to the father to both give evidence and to challenge the evidence of others.
11. Indeed, when the original QLR became unexpectedly unavailable, the hearing was adjourned precisely because the Court concluded that it would not be fair for the matter to proceed without appropriate arrangements for the father’s participation.
12. Similarly, when judicial illness interrupted the hearing, the case was relisted and completed over a number of additional hearing dates to ensure all parties had a full opportunity to be heard.
13. My judgment for the fact-finding exercise was reserved and delivered following consideration of all of the evidence and all of the submissions.
14. The father’s current application, in my judgment, identifies no actual bias, no personal interest, no procedural irregularity capable of giving rise to apparent bias, and no statement or conduct on the part of the Court suggesting a closed mind in relation to the issues for determination at this final hearing.
15. What the father relies upon is his continuing disagreement with the findings themselves and his inability to accept that the Court, in short, preferred the evidence of the mother over his evidence. To repeat, the reasons for the findings are set out in full in my judgment, of 16 February 2026 of which there is a transcript.
16. The fair-minded and informed observer would understand that judges routinely make findings that one party accepts and the other rejects.
17. The fair-minded and informed observer would also recognise that a judge who has conducted a fact-finding hearing is ordinarily well-placed to conduct the welfare stage of the same proceedings.
18. The observer would, in my judgment, further note that despite repeatedly expressing disagreement with the findings, the father did not seek permission to appeal the findings made on 16 February nor has any Appellate Court set aside or questioned those findings. The findings, therefore, stand and remain binding for the purpose of these proceedings. A litigant’s refusal to accept findings of fact does not create a real possibility of bias.
19. Having considered all matters raised individually and cumulatively, I am entirely satisfied that a fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude that there is a real possibility that I am biased against the father or incapable of determining the welfare issues fairly and impartially.
20. The application for recusal is accordingly refused. Application for the Mother to Give Evidence
21. I then turn to consider the father’s application that the mother should be called to give evidence at this final hearing.
22. At the hearing on 15 May, clear directions were made regarding the conduct of the final hearing.
23. The Court directed that the witnesses for that hearing would be the allocated social worker, the father and the author of any statement provided by the children’s school, if available. The Court expressly recorded that ‘the mother is not required to give evidence’.
24. Having considered the father’s application, together with the mother’s statement dated 15 July 2026, I am satisfied that there is some limited benefit in the Court receiving a short amount of evidence from the mother directed solely towards events arising since the conclusion of the fact-finding process, and the welfare issues that now fall to be determined at this final hearing.
25. I emphasise, however, that the purpose of allowing the mother to give evidence is not to reopen, revisit or relitigate findings already made following the fact-finding hearing.
26. The findings, which include findings in respect of allegations of alienating behaviours contained within the judgment of 16 February 2026, stand.
27. No application for permission to appeal those findings was made or has been made by the father, and no Appellate Court has set them aside.
28. The scope of the mother’s evidence will, therefore, be confined to the contents of her statement dated 15 July 2026, and such welfare matters as have arisen since the fact-finding hearing. It would not be permissible for either party to use that evidence as a vehicle for challenging or revisiting factual findings already determined by the Court.
29. That decision is made in the full knowledge that the mother, through her counsel, Ms Harrison, has made it clear that she does not wish to give any further evidence, understanding that if she does not, then the weight that the Court will give to the evidence contained in her July statement is likely to be very limited indeed.
30. For completeness, however, I make the following observations as to how any questioning of the mother should occur to enable her to make a final decision on this issue. To be clear, I am not seeking to compel the mother to give evidence, but simply setting out how, if she chooses to, that evidence would be managed.
31. Ordinarily, where the statutory prohibition on direct cross-examination applies, the Court would consider whether the appointment of a QLR is required. However, these proceedings have already experienced substantial delay. The children have been the subject of ongoing litigation since January 2025. The fact-finding hearing itself occupied numerous hearing dates over an extended period. The welfare issues concerning the children’s future arrangements require final determination without further unnecessary delay.
32. I am satisfied that adjourning this final hearing for the appointment of a further QLR would be contrary to the welfare interests of the children and inconsistent with the overriding objective.
33. The Court must balance procedural fairness with the need to determine proceedings within a timescale that is appropriate for the children. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a fair hearing can be achieved by the Court itself putting questions to the mother on the father’s behalf.
34. In the event the mother considers that she does wish to go into the witness box, I will allow the father the opportunity to identify the questions he wishes to be asked of the mother. I will then consider those questions and will put such questions to the mother as are relevant, necessary and proportionate for determination of the welfare matters before the Court.
35. This approach will ensure that the father is enabled to challenge the relevant welfare evidence, the mother remains protected from inappropriate direct questioning, the statutory safeguards remain respected, and the proceedings can proceed to final determination without further delay.
36. Accordingly, the father’s application is granted in part.
37. The mother is permitted, if she chooses to do so, to give short oral evidence limited to the contents of her statement of 15 July and matters relevant to the welfare issues before the Court.
38. Any questioning of the mother will be conducted by the Court itself on behalf of the father using questions identified by him and approved by me.
39. There should be no adjournment for the appointment of a QLR. The final hearing will therefore proceed, the first witness being the social worker. It is, in my judgment, clearly in the best interests of these children that the proceedings now be finally determined. Conclusion
40. In conclusion, therefore, applying the test in Porter v Magill , I am satisfied that no fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there is a real possibility of bias. The renewed application for recusal is refused. The application to require the mother to attend for unrestricted oral evidence is refused. The mother shall, however, have permission to give limited oral evidence in accordance with the directions I have already given. There is to be no adjournment for the appointment of a QLR, and the final hearing shall proceed before me and be concluded in accordance with the welfare interests of the children and the overriding objective. End of Judgment.