UK case law

Paul Joseph Bryan v The Commissioners for HMRC

[2026] UKFTT TC 1149 · First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

Introduction

1. This is an application by the Respondents (“HMRC”) to strike out the Appellant’s application for a closure notice pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Rules”), on the basis that the Appellant’s application has no reasonable prospect of success.

2. The underlying application is brought by the Appellant under section 28 A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”), seeking a direction requiring HMRC to issue closure notices in respect of their enquiries into his self-assessment returns for the years ended 5 April 2017 and 5 April 2018.

3. This is the fourth such application brought by the Appellant in relation to these enquiries. The previous three applications have been refused by the Tribunal.

4. Of particular significance is the third such refusal, determined by Tribunal Judge Popplewell following a hearing on 27 November 2024 and released on 17 December 2024 (“the Third decision”). That decision is not published. However, both parties were party to those proceedings, have had the benefit of its reasoning and rely upon it in this case. I therefore consider it appropriate to refer to and rely upon that decision. No prejudice arises from the fact that it is unpublished. The legal framework

5. There is no dispute about the relevant law.

6. Section 28 A(6) TMA provides that the Tribunal shall direct HMRC to issue a closure notice unless satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for not issuing such a notice within a specified period.

7. Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules provides that the Tribunal may strike out proceedings if it considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the Appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.

8. The Tribunal must therefore determine whether, in light of all the material before it and the relevant procedural history, the Appellant’s present application has any realistic prospect of success.

9. It is well established that, on an application under s28 A TMA, HMRC are entitled to obtain the information reasonably required to determine a taxpayer’s position before issuing a closure notice. The Tribunal must undertake an objective assessment of the adequacy of the information provided and the extent to which further enquiry may affect the taxpayer’s liability. HMRC are not required to issue a closure notice in the absence of material necessary to establish the full facts, nor to make speculative assessments where that material is available. Those principles are reflected in decisions such as Estate 4 Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 269 (TC) , Price v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 624 (TC) and Michael v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 0577 (TC) , which I adopt. HMRC’s application

10. HMRC’s application to strike out the Appellant’s closure notice application is advanced on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success within Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules. In doing so, HMRC rely heavily on the procedural history of the matter, the findings made in the Third decision and the absence of any material change in the factual or evidential position since that decision.

11. HMRC submit, first, that this is the fourth application made by the Appellant in relation to the same underlying enquiries into his tax returns for the years in question. Each of the previous applications has been refused by the Tribunal, including most recently by Judge Popplewell in the Third decision. That decision was detailed and comprehensive and addressed precisely the same areas of dispute that arise in the present application. HMRC contend that the Appellant’s current application does not raise any new issues of substance but instead seeks to revisit matters that have already been fully considered and determined.

12. Secondly, the Third decision identified clear and specific evidential deficiencies which justified the continuation of the enquiry. Those deficiencies were not general or exploratory in nature but related to discrete and well‑defined matters, namely: the interaction between the client account and the office account; the nature and composition of disbursements; the methodology applied to the calculation of work in progress; and anomalies in the claimed expenses. HMRC emphasise that these matters go directly to the reliability and completeness of the Appellant’s declared turnover and, by extension, his taxable income.

13. Thirdly, those same deficiencies remain outstanding. Despite the Appellant having provided further material and explanations, he has not addressed the core concerns identified by the Tribunal in the Third decision. In particular, HMRC point to the continued absence of client account bank statements, which they say are necessary to reconcile cash flows and to verify whether all income has been correctly recorded through the office account. HMRC note that the Tribunal in the third decision expressly rejected the Appellant’s contention that such material was privileged, particularly if redacted, yet the Appellant continues to deny access to it.

14. Fourthly, the Appellant’s position has not materially changed since the Third decision. While additional narrative explanation has been provided, the substance of his position remains unchanged: he continues to assert that HMRC already possess sufficient information and that further enquiry is unnecessary. HMRC say that these arguments were considered and rejected in the Third decision and are now being repeated without any substantive new basis.

15. Fifthly, the Appellant has not appealed the Third decision. Accordingly, its findings stand and remain directly relevant to the present application. HMRC submit that it is not open to the Appellant, absent a material change in circumstances, to seek effectively to re‑argue the same matters by means of a further application under s28 A TMA.

16. Finally, the practical consequence of the Appellant’s continued refusal to provide the outstanding information is that HMRC are not in a position to issue a closure notice that properly reflects his tax position. To require them to do so would oblige them to reach conclusions in the absence of the full facts, potentially resulting in an inaccurate or speculative assessment and further downstream dispute. In those circumstances, HMRC maintain that the continuation of the enquiry remains justified and that the Appellant’s application cannot realistically succeed.

17. For these reasons, HMRC submit that the present application is bound to fail and should be struck out without the need for a substantive hearing. The Appellant’s submissions

18. The Appellant resists the Respondents’ strike‑out application and maintains that his closure notice application is properly brought and should proceed to determination on its merits. His submissions are set out in his written submissions and his witness statement dated 17 October 2025.

19. The submissions advanced by the Appellant are not presented in a structured format but are expressed in a narrative and discursive form. Taken as a whole, however, I understand them to comprise the following principal contentions.

20. First, the Appellant places considerable emphasis on the extent of the information and documentation which he states he has provided to HMRC during the course of the enquiry. He asserts that, between 2018 and 2023, he supplied all material requested, including: (1) all office bank records; (2) paying-in books and cheque stubs; (3) fee notes and invoices; (4) correspondence and documentation from his accountants; (5) records of drawings and associated explanations; and (6) and documentation relating to business expenses and insurance.

21. He states that the preparation and production of this material has required a significant investment of time, including individual letters taking several days to compile, and that HMRC have been provided with detailed explanations of his accounts over a number of years.

22. Secondly, the Appellant describes the manner in which his legal practice is conducted and his records maintained. He explains that he operates as a sole practitioner with minimal assistance, maintains manual accounting records and relies upon professional accountants to prepare year-end accounts and extract figures such as debtors and control accounts.

23. His records consist of fee notes raised, monies received, disbursements paid and recovered and client ledger cards maintained on a real-time basis. These records are subject to annual audit for regulatory purposes and have consistently received unqualified reports.

24. Thirdly, the Appellant advances submissions regarding the nature of the figures in his accounts. He states that: (1) trade debtors represent unpaid invoices; (2) disbursements are monies paid out and subsequently recovered and are cost neutral; (3) all income is recorded through his books; and (4) tax is paid on invoiced income even where payment has not yet been received.

25. Some clients do not pay their bills, that chasing such debts is time-consuming and often uneconomic, and that this accounts for the level of debtors reflected in his accounts.

26. Fourthly, HMRC’s enquiry has become excessive and disproportionate. He describes it as an “open ended fishing expedition” and “microscopic” and asserts that it has continued for nearly seven years with increasing levels of detail being requested.

27. The time required to respond to HMRC’s enquiries is unpaid and has placed him under significant pressure as a sole practitioner, affecting his ability to conduct his practice and serve his clients. He also refers to the broader economic pressures on small legal practices and the impact of the enquiry on his livelihood and proposed retirement.

28. Fifthly, the Appellant objects to HMRC’s request for access to client account records. He states that client account monies are not his own funds, are held for clients and do not form part of his income. He further states that those records are not required to reconcile his office account and would not assist in determining his tax liability.

29. He also raises concerns regarding client confidentiality and refers generally to legal professional privilege although no detailed legal analysis is provided.

30. Sixthly, the Appellant advances a number of complaints regarding HMRC’s conduct of the enquiry. These include allegations of delay in responding to correspondence, failure to engage with material supplied, and the making of what he describes as false or misleading statements by HMRC officers.

31. He submits that HMRC have failed to comply with Tribunal directions, including the provision of documents and evidence and that their application to strike out is an attempt to avoid the consequences of that non-compliance.

32. The Appellant further relies on particular matters arising during the enquiry, including the need to obtain historic accountant records at cost and that a number of HMRC’s lines of enquiry have ultimately led to no substantive outcome.

33. Taken together, the Appellant’s submissions amount to the contention that he has provided full and accurate information regarding his tax affairs, that HMRC already possess all material necessary to determine his position and that the continuation of the enquiry, and the further material sought, are unnecessary, disproportionate and unjustified.

34. The Appellant referred to a number of authorities concerning relief from sanctions and case management. Those authorities do not assist in determining the present application. This application is concerned with whether the Appellant’s closure notice application has a reasonable prospect of success, not with whether any party has complied with directions or is entitled to relief from sanctions. DISCUSSION

35. HMRC’s application is made pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules on the basis that the Appellant’s application has no reasonable prospect of success. I must consider that application in light of the material before me, including the Appellant’s submissions and witness statement, the Respondents’ grounds, and the procedural history of the matter, in particular the Third decision.

36. The test under Rule 8(3)(c) is whether the Appellant’s case has a realistic, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success. It is not necessary to conduct a full fact‑finding exercise, but it is necessary to consider whether, taking the Appellant’s case at its highest, he could succeed in persuading the Tribunal that HMRC do not have reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice within the meaning of s28 A(6) TMA.

37. It is well established that, on an application under s28 A TMA, HMRC are entitled to obtain the information reasonably required to determine a taxpayer’s position before issuing a closure notice. The Tribunal must undertake an objective assessment of the adequacy of the information provided and the extent to which further enquiry may affect the taxpayer’s liability. HMRC are not required to issue a closure notice in the absence of material necessary to establish the full facts, nor to make speculative assessments where that material is available. Those principles are reflected in decisions such as Estate 4 Ltd v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 269 (TC) , Stephen Price v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 624 (TC) and Andreas Michael v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 0577 (TC) which I adopt.

38. The question for me is whether, on an objective assessment, HMRC’s stated grounds for continuing the enquiry remain reasonable. Where information reasonably required to resolve identified issues remains outstanding, it follows from the authorities referred to above that HMRC will ordinarily have reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice.

39. Those grounds must be considered by reference to the information they hold and the information they reasonably require in order to complete their enquiries. Where such information remains outstanding, and is reasonably required, HMRC will by definition have reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice.

40. I have first considered the substance of HMRC’s application, secondly the Appellant’s response and thirdly the effect of the Third decision and the extent to which the present application departs from, or merely repeats, the matters previously determined.

41. HMRC’s position is clear: the present closure notice application cannot succeed because the issues which prevented the issue of a closure notice in the Third decision remain unresolved. Those issues are not merely general dissatisfaction with the state of the accounts but are specific and relevant matters requiring further information, namely: the interaction between the Appellant’s client account and office account, the composition and evidential basis of disbursements, the methodology for calculating work in progress and certain discrepancies or anomalies in expenses.

42. I accept that this is a legitimate basis upon which HMRC may resist a closure notice application. As recognised in Price and Michael , HMRC are entitled to verify the full factual position before bringing an enquiry to a conclusion and are not required to issue a closure notice where reasonably required information remains outstanding.

43. The statutory scheme permits HMRC to continue enquiries where they reasonably require information in order properly to determine the taxpayer’s position. It is inherent in that scheme that HMRC are not required to reach a conclusion in the absence of information which is reasonably necessary.

44. HMRC further rely upon the fact that those exact same matters were considered in the Third decision and were found to justify the continuation of the enquiry. Their case is that the Appellant has not addressed the matters identified, and in particular continues to refuse to provide client account material which they say is necessary to understand the full flow of funds and to reconcile turnover.

45. In my judgment, this aspect of HMRC’s application is central. If it is correct that the documentary and information deficiencies identified in the Third decision remain substantially unchanged, then the present application is, in substance, asking the Tribunal to reach a different conclusion on the same material.

46. I have considered carefully the Appellant’s submissions and witness statement which are extensive and detailed. As set out in the summary above, the Appellant’s primary contentions are that he has provided all relevant information, that his accounts accurately record his income, that HMRC’s enquiry is excessive and disproportionate, and that certain information sought, in particular client account material, is not relevant to his tax liability.

47. I accept that the Appellant has provided a significant volume of information to HMRC. I also accept that the enquiry has been of long duration and that it has imposed a burden upon the Appellant. These matters are not in dispute and are supported by the material before the Tribunal.

48. However, the question is not whether the Appellant has provided a large quantity of information but whether he has provided the specific information reasonably required to address the concerns identified by HMRC. The Appellant’s submissions do not engage directly with that question. Rather, they proceed on the basis that the information already provided is sufficient.

49. I note the Appellant’s explanation of his accounting practices, including his reliance on an accruals basis and his description of debtors and disbursements. These explanations are clearly and repeatedly advanced. However, they do not, of themselves, answer HMRC’s enquiries. HMRC’s enquiries are not limited to the theoretical treatment of such items but extends to the verification of the figures and the underlying transactions.

50. The Appellant’s objection to the provision of client account material is also clearly expressed. He maintains that such material is not relevant and does not affect his taxable income. However, this is a matter of disagreement between the parties, and the Tribunal must determine whether HMRC are entitled to that information in order to complete their enquiry.

51. The Appellant also advances a range of submissions concerning HMRC’s conduct, including delay, non‑compliance with directions and alleged misconduct by individual officers. I acknowledge those submissions. However, it must be emphasised that the function of a closure notice application is not to determine complaints about conduct but to assess whether HMRC have reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice. To the extent that the Appellant’s submissions relate to complaints about conduct rather than that question, they are not matters which I am required nor able to determine in this application.

52. Similarly, the Appellant’s submissions regarding the pressure on his practice, his personal circumstances, and the economic realities of running a small legal practice are understandable and have been noted. However, while they provide context, they do not determine whether HMRC’s continued enquiry is justified under s28 A TMA. The Third decision

53. I turn to the Third decision. That decision is of central importance. The Third decision is the most recent judicial consideration of the same enquiry and of an earlier application by the Appellant for a closure notice.

54. In the Third decision, the Tribunal refused the Appellant’s third application for a closure notice after having conducted a detailed evaluation of the material then available, including substantial information provided by the Appellant, and identified a number of specific areas in which further information was required. It concluded that HMRC’s concerns in those areas were justified and that HMRC were not in a position to issue a closure notice in the absence of further information.

55. Judge Popplewell summarised the context in clear terms: “This is the third time that the applicant has made an application for such a direction … On both occasions his applications were refused…”

56. The Tribunal then made detailed findings as to the outstanding areas of concern, including: (1) the interaction between client account and office account; (2) the nature and scale of disbursements; (3) the calculation of work in progress; and (4) unexplained fluctuations in expenses.

57. These matters were expressly identified as issues which still required explanation despite the extensive provision of material by the Appellant.

58. Of particular importance, Judge Popplewell addressed the position regarding client account bank statements. He concluded at [51] that HMRC’s concerns were justified: “There are money movements between the applicant’s office account and client account, which justifies their concern that the applicant’s turnover may not be exclusively evidenced by the former.”

59. In circumstances where there is a reasonable basis to conclude that relevant receipts may not be fully evidenced by the office account alone, HMRC are entitled, in accordance with the authorities referred to above, to require access to the underlying material before being required to complete their enquiries.

60. Judge Popplewell held at [60] that HMRC were entitled to the material: “I agree with HMRC that the information sought by them in relation to the applicant’s client account bank statements is not privileged and is certainly not privileged if it is redacted.”

61. The Tribunal at [51] also accepted HMRC’s concerns about disbursements: “It is clear from the accountant’s letter that the disbursements figure is simply a balancing figure and does not appear to reflect specific disbursements…”

62. In such circumstances, where figures may operate as balancing entries rather than reflecting identified transactions, HMRC are entitled to seek verification of those figures before being required to issue a closure notice.

63. In relation to work in progress, the Tribunal recorded at [55]: “HMRC have no handle on how that has now been done … and thus [it is] all the more important … for the applicant to explain…”

64. As recognised in the authorities referred to above, HMRC are entitled to understand and test the methodology by which such figures are derived where they have a direct bearing on the computation of taxable profits.

65. The Tribunal’s central conclusion at [50] is unequivocal: “HMRC’s misgivings … concerning the applicant’s client account, disbursements, expenses, and work in progress methodology are wholly justifiable.”

66. The Tribunal concluded at [61]: “I appreciate the applicant’s position that HMRC are being too microscopic and drilling down to a disproportionate level of detail. But I disagree with it. Whilst it is true that HMRC can properly issue a closure notice without being absolutely certain that the facts are wholly correct, in this case all HMRC are asking for is information without which they are in no position to issue a closure notice as they are not in possession of a number of important facts. Those will be revealed by the provision of the information which has been sought. And without that information, it would be premature for me to direct that HMRC issue a closure notice.”

67. The Appellant did not appeal the third decision. It therefore remains as the most recent judicial consideration of what information had been provided and what information remained outstanding. Whether there has been any material change

68. The critical question is whether there has been any material change in circumstances since the Third decision such that a different conclusion might now be reached.

69. The Appellant asserts that “a great deal has changed” since his previous application. However, when examined closely, the matters relied upon do not amount to a material change of the kind required.

70. The Appellant refers to the cost of obtaining confirmation of insurance expenses, but this does not address the issues identified by HMRC in relation to the structure and verification of his accounts.

71. He also refers to the continued provision of information and to the burden of the enquiry. As already noted, those matters were inherent in the earlier proceedings and do not alter the underlying evidential position.

72. I have looked carefully for any evidence that the specific matters identified in the Third decision have now been remedied. I find that they have not. In particular: (1) The Appellant has not provided client account bank statements. His position remains that they are unnecessary. That position is the same in substance as that considered and rejected in the Third decision. (2) The explanation of disbursements remains at the level of general description. There is no detailed breakdown or supporting material demonstrating that those figures correspond to actual and identified payments. (3) The methodology for calculating work in progress is described in general terms but it has not been demonstrated in a way that would enable HMRC to test and verify it. (4) The concerns regarding expenses have not been resolved by the provision of additional material which answers the issues identified.

73. I have concluded that the factual and evidential position is not materially different from that which existed at the time of the Third decision. Abuse of process

74. In light of the above findings, I have considered whether the present application amounts to an abuse of process.

75. I am mindful that a party is not prevented from making a further application under s28 A TMA merely because an earlier application has failed. However, where a party seeks the same relief on the same facts, without addressing the matters previously identified as determinative, the position is different.

76. In the present case, the Appellant has not complied with the substance of the Third decision by providing the information identified as necessary. Nor has he sought to challenge that decision by appeal. Instead, he has brought a further application which invites the Tribunal to reach a different conclusion on materially the same evidential basis.

77. In those circumstances, I consider that the application for a closure notice does amount to an abuse of process. It seeks to re‑open issues which have already been determined without any material change in the underlying position. Conclusion

78. For the reason set out above, I have concluded that: (1) the issues identified in the Third decision remain unresolved; (2) the Appellant has not provided the information required to address those issues; (3) there has been no material change in circumstances since the Third decision; and (4) the present application seeks to obtain a closure notice on substantially the same basis.

79. In those circumstances, and applying the principles derived from Estate 4 Ltd , Price and Michael , there is plainly no realistic prospect that the Tribunal could be satisfied that HMRC lack reasonable grounds for not issuing a closure notice.

80. The application therefore has no reasonable prospect of success within the meaning of Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules and should properly be struck out on that basis.

81. Further, I consider that the Appellant’s application for a closure notice amounts to an abuse of process for the reasons given above. Decision

82. For the reasons set out above, HMRC’s application is GRANTED and the application for a closure notice is struck out under Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules. Right to apply for permission to appeal

83. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 19 May 2026