UK case law
Peter David Hall v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs
[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2623 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026
The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Full judgment
Clare Padley (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) :
1. This claim concerns decisions relating to the categorisation of Hereford cattle.
2. This judgment follows a 1-day hearing on 10 September 2026. It was listed for determination of the following issues, by an Order of Lang J on 17 March 2026: (a) the Claimant’s application for permission to apply for judicial review. (b) whether the claim was filed in time, and if not, whether the Claimant should be granted an extension of time. (c) whether the Claimant has standing to bring the claim. (d) in regard to the Claimant’s application for a costs limit order under CPR 46.24 – 46.25, whether the Claimant requires an extension of time to file his statement of financial resources and if so, whether an extension should be granted; whether this is an Aarhus Convention claim; and if so, whether the standard costs limit should be varied. Parties
3. The Claimant, Mr Peter Hall, is a breeder of purebred Hereford (Original Population) (“HOP”) cattle in both England and Australia. He contends that this sub-population should be regarded as a distinct breed of Hereford cattle.
4. The Defendant (Defra) is responsible for making decisions under the Agriculture Act 2020 in relation to agri-environment support payments and is the Competent Authority under the Animal Breeding Regulation.
5. The Interested Party (HCS) is an agricultural charity which is the breed society for Hereford cattle recognised by Defra. The objects clause of its memorandum of association provides that it is “ to maintain unimpaired the purity of and improve the breed of cattle known as Herefords, and to promote impartially the breeding of all the various tribes, families and strains of such cattle ”. The Claimant is a member of HCS. Claim
6. The Claimant seeks permission to challenge two decisions made by the Defendant, which are described in section 3.1 of the claim form as follows: i) a decision to determine native breed agri-environment payments in accordance with the UK native breeds support list dated 2 June 2025 for which limited reasons were provided on 5 August and later on 26 September 2025 (“the First Decision”); ii) the decision, recorded in a letter from the Government Legal Department dated 26 September 2025, not to exercise her investigative and/or enforcement functions in respect of the Hereford Cattle Society (“the Second Decision”). Procedural history
7. This claim was issued for service on 13 October 2025. In the claim form, the Claimant declared in section 7 that it was an Aarhus Convention claim and provided the following reasons: “The claim concerns a challenge arising in respect to the Defendant's contraventions of the legislative schemes under section 1(1) (g) Agriculture Act 2020 , art. 47 of the Animal Breeding Regulation and reg.6 Zootechnical Standards (England) Regulations 2018 - national laws relating to the environment: see art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. See further summary of Facts and Grounds.”
8. However, the Claimant did not file a schedule of his financial resources in accordance with the requirements set down in CPR 46.25(1)(b). Instead, the Claimant sought an extension of time to file the schedule “until 14 days after the Defendant's position is clarified as to the characterisation of the claim as an Aarhus Convention claim and the application of the default limits in r.46.26(2) and (3).” The Claimant also made a protective application for an extension of time in respect of the First Decision. The reasons for both applications were set out in the Statement of Facts and Grounds. I will return to these applications in due course.
9. On 24 October 2025, the Claimant then filed and served two lay witness statements from Andrew Sykes and Serena Brownlie dated 22 and 23 October 2025 respectively. On 5 November 2025, the Claimant filed and served his second witness statement dated 4 November 2025, which included the details of his financial resources required by CPR 46.25(1)(b) and was verified by a signed statement of truth.
10. On 7 November 2025 the Claimant filed a signed consent order providing for an extension of time (EOT) for service of any Acknowledgement of Service “to 21 days after the date upon which the Claimant has provided (i) any further evidence upon which he seeks to rely and (ii) a schedule of his financial resources pursuant to CPR 46.25(1).”
11. That consent order was considered and approved in an order dated 17 November 2025 made by DHCJ Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC, by which he granted an EOT for service of any Acknowledgement of Service to 26 November 2025, being “21 days after the date on which Claimant has provided (i) any further evidence on which he seeks to rely and (ii) a schedule of his financial resources pursuant to CPR 46.25(1).”
12. The approved consent order included a recital recording the service of the Claimant’s further evidence on 24 October 2025 and a schedule of financial resources on 5 November 2025. The order also included an express provision ‘for the avoidance of doubt’ granting permission to the Claimant to rely on the written evidence filed on 24 October 2025 but made no express mention of the schedule filed on 5 November 2025. In his reasons, Mr Pilgerstorfer stated that the consent order had proceeded on the basis that the Claimant was entitled to rely on ‘the further written evidence served’, which was filed after the claim form, and that for the avoidance of doubt, given CPR PD 54A, para. 4.4 he was also granting permission to the Claimant to rely on that evidence. It is unfortunate that despite the apparent intention of the judge to clarify the position in relation to the further evidence filed by the Claimant, the wording of the order itself left open the question as to whether the Claimant was granted permission to rely on his CPR 46.25(1) schedule or still required an EOT. I will return to that issue in due course. For completeness in terms of the chronology, I was advised that following service of the 5 November 2025 Schedule, solicitors for HCS sought further financial information from the Claimant in a letter dated 13 November 2025 to which the Claimant’s solicitors responded on 19 November 2025.
13. The Defendant and HCS each then filed an Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence on 26 November 2025. On 3 December 2025, the Claimant filed an Application Notice for permission to rely on a Reply in excess of 5 pages. On 17 March 2026, Lang J made an order on the papers granting the Claimant’s application for a longer Reply and directed that the matters I have already set out be listed for determination at an oral hearing. Thereafter, the initial date for a hearing in July 2026 was vacated and the hearing was re-listed following an order on 14 July 2026 by MacDonald J.
14. Finally, on 19 August 2026, the Claimant sought permission to vary the order made by Lang J in relation to the filing of documents for this hearing, following liaison between the parties. I will allow that application.
15. I have received the following papers for this hearing: i) A core bundle ii) A two volume 1781-page permission bundle (including over 300 pages of inter-partes correspondence, the relevance of much of which to this hearing is unclear) iii) A 1101-page authorities bundle iv) Skeleton arguments from each party.
16. I have also heard submissions from counsel for all the parties, and I am grateful to them all for their oral and written arguments. Terminology
17. For the purposes of this judgment, and without reaching any conclusions on the accuracy of the claimed distinctions between these categorisations, which are disputed by the Defendant and HCS, I will adopt the terms used in the claim document to describe Hereford (Original Population) (‘HOP’) and Hereford (North American Derived) (‘NAD’) purely for the purposes of accurately summarising the way in which this claim is put by the Claimant.
18. In the claim, HOP is described by the Claimant as a purebred cattle breed which has existed in the UK since the 18th century and been a recognised breed since at least the mid-1800s, with the first herdbook for Hereford cattle being published in 1846. He submits that the pedigree of all HOP cattle can be established by tracing their unbroken lineage to animals listed in the 15 th volume of the Hereford herdbook which was published in 1885.
19. NADs are described by the Claimant as having been developed in North America from around 1890, largely from crossing exported breeding stock of the HOP breed with other breeds in a process of alleged “hybridisation”.
20. The Claimant contends that there are in their genotype (i.e. their genetic constitution) and phenotype (i.e. their observable traits and characteristics) genetic differences between these two sub-populations of Hereford cattle.
21. For the purposes of this permission judgment, I do not need to outline in full the details of those claimed genetic differences which are set out in full in the Claimant’s claim documents and supporting witness statements and exhibits. Suffice to say that, for the reasons which I shall explain in more detail later in this judgment, the evidence relied on by the Claimant in support of his contentions is disputed by the other parties.
22. It is common ground that HOPs and NADs are now both part of the overall population of Hereford cattle in the UK. As I have mentioned, the terms HOP and NAD used by the Claimant are not recognised by HCS, which recognises only the terms ‘Original Population’ and ‘Traditional Herefords’ as a description of a very small sub-population (but not a separate breed) of Hereford cattle. HCS regards the cattle described by the Claimant as NADs as one example of Non-Traditional Herefords within the overall Hereford breed. HCS’s position is that all the cattle in its breeding book are purebred Hereford cattle, but they are not all Original Population (or HOP) cattle.
23. HCS includes cattle from HOP and NAD and other sub-populations of Hereford cattle in its breeding book, although it has also set out in its Summary Grounds of Defence how it maintains a special sub-register in the Hereford Herd Book of Traditional or Original Population Herefords. Statutory framework
24. Before setting out the factual background and grounds of claim, I will outline the relevant statutory framework for the two decisions under challenge. Agriculture Act 2020 (‘AA 2020’)
25. Section 1 of the Act provides: “(1) The Secretary of State may give financial assistance for or in connection with any one or more of the following purposes – … (g) conserving native livestock, native equines or genetic resources relating to any such animal; … (4) In framing any financial assistance scheme the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to encourage the production of food by producers in England and its production by them in an environmentally sustainable way. (5) For the purposes of this section – … “conserving” includes restoring or enhancing – (a) a population of a relevant species; – (b) in the case of animals or plants in the wild, a habitat; … “livestock” includes any creature kept for the production of food, drink, oils, fibres or leathers, or for the purpose of its use in the farming of land;”
26. Under s.2(2) of the AA 2020, financial assistance given under s.1 powers may be made subject to such conditions as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
27. The term “native” in s.1(1) (g) is not defined in the AA 2020, nor is it expressly incorporated from a different legislative scheme. The UK’s Native Breeds at Risk (‘NBAR’) list
28. The NBAR list was first created in 2005 under the Environmental Stewardship (England) Regulations 2005 and was developed under the Rural Development Programme for England. The Defendant states that it has played a dual role in not only highlighting the vulnerability of native breeds at risk in the UK but also determining payment eligibility for agri-environment support payments. The court was advised that prior to 2025 it was reviewed annually.
29. The data to inform the NBAR list was drawn from the UK National Breed Inventory (NBI), which is an inventory of national breeds, including native breeds at risk, maintained by Defra, which records the size of their populations and is used to determine if breeds are ‘at risk’ or not having regard to specific criteria in relation to their female breeding population size. I have not seen any information as to when this NBI inventory was first developed, but it appears to have been used in conjunction with NBAR for many years.
30. The terms ‘breed’, ‘National breed’ and ‘Native breed at risk’ are defined for the purposes of the NBI in the “ Definitions for use in the UK National Breed Inventory ” document (‘NBI Definitions’). I will return to those definitions in due course. I have not been provided with any information as to when this document was first published, but the version which was in use by Defra in June 2025 was in the bundle. Regulation (EU) 2016/1012 - the Animal Breeding Regulation (‘ABR’)
31. The ABR was introduced to facilitate equivalent trade in pedigree breeding animals across the EU. It is at the discretion of each Competent Authority to approve breeding programmes within their geographical location. Defra is the Competent Authority for England under the ABR.
32. I was advised by the Defendant that, subject to some operability amendments made by EU Exit regulations, since Brexit this regime has remained essentially the same as the EU’s regulation under their version of 2016/1012. The UK’s duties under ABR are now set down in the Zootechnical Standards (England) Regulations 2018 ( ZSER 2018).
33. Article 2 of the ABR provides the following relevant definitions for the purposes of the ABR: ‘breed’ means a population of animals sufficiently uniform to be considered to be distinct from other animals of the same species by one or more groups of breeders which have agreed to enter those animals in breeding books with details of their known ascendants for the purpose of reproducing their inherited characteristics by way of reproduction, exchange and selection within the framework of a breeding programme. ‘breed society’ means any breeders’ association, breeding organisation, or public body, other than competent authorities, which is recognised by the competent authority of a constituent territory of the United Kingdom in accordance with Article 4(3) for the purpose of carrying out a breeding programme on purebred breeding animals entered in the breeding book(s) it maintains or establishes; ‘competent authorities’ means the authorities of a constituent territory of the United Kingdom which are responsible, pursuant to this Regulation, for: (a) the recognition of breed societies and breeding operations and the approval of the breeding programmes they carry out on breeding animals; (b) official controls on operators; (c) the provision of assistance to other competent authorities in the United Kingdom and third countries in case of detected non-compliances; (d) official activities other than those referred to in points (a) and (c); ‘purebred breeding animal’ means an animal which is entered or registered and eligible for entry in the main section of a breeding book. ‘breeding book’ means: (a) Any herd-book, flock-book, stud-book, file or data medium which is maintained by a breed society consisting of a main section, and where the breed society so decides, of one or more supplementary sections for animals of the same species that are not eligible for entry in the main section. (b) ..”
34. Article 4 of the ABR provides for the recognition of breed societies and breeding operations by the Competent Authority, with Article 47 providing for actions in case of established non-compliance.
35. Article 18 and Annex 1, Part 1 of the ABR detail the general circumstances in which breed societies are required to enter purebred breeding animals into the main section of the breeding book, including the pedigree requirements.
36. The ZSER 2018 implement and enforce the ABR across the UK, by designating the Defendant as the Competent Authority for the purposes of the ABR (under Regulation 2) and its enforcement (under Regulations 3 and 6), by reference back to Article 47(1) of the ABR. This includes enforcement powers for established non-compliance by breed societies.
37. HCS is the only breed society for the Hereford breed recognised by Defra under Article 4 of the ABR, and has a single breeding programme for Hereford cattle (which does not distinguish between any sub-populations) approved under Article 8 of the ABR. Factual background to this claim
38. Under the NBAR list, ‘Hereford (Orig)’ (which I understand to be equivalent to the Claimant’s term ‘HOP’) was listed in the part of the list titled ‘Native breed of cattle at risk’, with a note clarifying that ‘Orig’ means “ pedigree-registered animals listed as being part of an ‘Original population’ of that breed, usually in a separate ‘closed’ sub-register within the relevant breed society’s herdbook .” The term ‘Orig’ was also used in relation to other cattle breeds on that list, including Aberdeen Angus. It did not describe the HOP as a separate breed of Hereford cattle but provided for this small sub-population of ‘Original Population’ animals to be included in the ‘at risk’ part of the NBAR list.
39. It appears to be common ground that as the HOP were listed in the part of the NBAR list under the heading “Native breed at risk” this meant that breeders of such cattle, including the Claimant, were eligible for agri-environment support payments, previously under the Environmental Stewardship (England) Regulations 2005 and now under AA 2020.
40. Following our exit from the European Union in 2020, the Defendant commenced a review of its approach to such support payments and it is apparent from the papers in the bundle, and in particular the correspondence between the parties which goes back some years, that consideration was being given for some time to a new approach to the conservation of livestock in light of developing international evidence.
41. Between 13 May 2024 and 24 June 2024, Defra conducted a targeted call for evidence on proposed changes to the NBAR list (the ‘Call for Evidence’). The Call for Evidence invited the views of relevant stakeholders on proposals to create a new list called the ‘Native Breed Support List’ (NBS list), which would better align with international thresholds in line with advice from The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (‘UNFAO’) and the UK’s own Genetics for Livestock and Equines (‘UKGLE’) Committee. The Call for Evidence was shared with 175 breed societies and 15 organisations and stakeholder groups. 2 June 2025 decision
42. On 2 June 2025, the Defendant published the UKGLE Committee advice on native breed conservation, drawing on international best practice, including UNFAO guidelines, information and evidence relating to native breed conservation. The key recommendations included: i) whole-breed conservation; ii) merging of Original Populations; iii) determination of ‘at risk’ breeds; and iv) the protection of heritage semi-feral populations.
43. On the same date, the Defendant also circulated a ‘Summary of responses and government response’ (‘Government Response’) to the same group of relevant stakeholders. This included a decision to introduce a new Native Breeds Support List (‘NBS list’) (which was published on that date marked ‘for information only’) in place of the NBAR list. The NBS list included the following key changes when compared to the NBAR list: i) amended population threshold levels that aligned with international UNFAO thresholds; ii) original populations merged with their main breed; and iii) a new section listing recognised heritage semi-feral populations.
44. The Government Response stated that the decision that original populations would be merged with their main breed was taken in line with UKGLE Committee evidence-based advice drawing on UNFAO guidelines that advise that conservation policy should be based on whole breeds. It also stated " UKGLE advice reflects that the protection of original populations is the responsibility of the breed society as part of their conservation of the genetic diversity of the whole breed. This change will help to ensure that conservation support is focused on conserving the widest genetic diversity among those native breeds at greatest risk of extinction. Defra will engage with breed societies during the grace period and encourage breed societies to include original population conservation measures within their breeding programmes and genebanking .”
45. The Defendant also published an updated version of the NBI definitions document. In that document, reference is made to the UNFAO definition of breed, and then it states: “ In the UK context, this is an interbreeding population of husbanded or formerly husbanded domesticated animals of consistent genotype and phenotype with a recognised history and administrative framework. Within a given breed, it is not appropriate to split that breed on the basis of minor trait differences. Therefore, separate breed recognition will not be granted for subpopulations of the same breed where different phenotypes are attributable to a single or minor trait difference, for example, different coat or fleece colours or patterns, polled versus horned. Individual breed societies must decide whether or not they wish to register such different phenotypes as separate subpopulations within their breeding book. ”
46. These 2 June 2025 documents expressly stated that the NBAR would remain in force until March 2026 when it would be replaced by the new NBS list following a nine-month ‘grace period’. The NBS list stated in its introduction that ‘at risk native breeds’ in that list would be eligible for native breed agri-environmental supplements in England, whereas breeds categorised as ‘not at risk’ or ‘uncategorised’ would not be so eligible. The document set out the ‘rules for inclusion’ in the NBS list and referred to the updated NBI Definitions document.
47. In the NBS list, ‘Hereford’ was included in section 1 .2 as a ‘not at risk’ cattle breed on the basis of the estimated breeding female population level being above the UNFAO level of 6,000 detailed in the document. It is common ground that this categorisation was based on a ‘whole breed’ approach, so that it included HOP, NAD and other Hereford breeding female sub-populations in the UK. The same approach was taken to other breeds such as Aberdeen Angus, which had also previously been included in the NBAR ‘at risk’ list on the basis of an ‘Original Population’ sub-population being listed separately.
48. The Defendant’s decision on 2 June 2025 to create a new NBS list to replace the NBAR list as the basis for determining eligibility for agri-environmental supplements under AA 2020 is, in substance, the First Decision under challenge (subject to arguments about the provision of further reasons, to which I will return in due course).
49. This change then took effect from 1 April 2026 so that the NBS list is now the relevant list for determining financial support for native livestock under s.1(1) (g) AA 2020. The parties agree that the introduction of the NBS list in place of the NBAR list means that the HOP sub-population is no longer listed separately from the main Hereford breed as being an ‘at risk’ sub-population. This also means that breeders of such HOP cattle, like the Claimant, are no longer eligible for agri-environment support payments under the AA 2020. Pre-action correspondence
50. I have not been invited to read it all, but it is apparent from a brief review of the voluminous bundle of correspondence in this case, that the Claimant’s solicitors had been in correspondence with HCS about the same issue of the correct categorisation of HOP and NAD cattle for many years prior to the June 2025 decision. They were acting at that time on behalf of the Claimant and the late Mr David Fenton, who were members of the Traditional Hereford Breeders' Club. This correspondence included repeated threats to bring charity proceedings against HCS pursuant to Section 115 of the Charities Act 2011 in relation to its alleged failure to address what is described in the Claimant’s correspondence as “very serious and significant problem of breed impurity that has arisen in Hereford cattle which has led to the Society recognising as Herefords, animals which should not be classified as such. Specifically, the NAD so-called Herefords are a genetically distinct breed from the OP Herefords .” The ‘problem’ is referred to as having existed for many years. I was advised that no Charities Act proceedings have been commenced against HCS to date.
51. On 3 June 2025, the Claimant’s solicitors wrote to Defra seeking clarification of a number of issues arising out of earlier correspondence in relation to the categorisation of HOP and NAD cattle. It is plain from a full reading of this letter that it was not written in response to the set of documents, including the full UKGLE report, Government response and proposed NBS list which had been published on 2 June 2025. Indeed, no mention was made in that letter of the Defendant’s ‘First Decision’ in relation to agri-environmental payments. Further chaser letters followed on 23 June and 15 and 23 July 2025, but the Defendant did not respond until 5 August 2025 when a letter in response was sent to the Claimant’s solicitors responding to the evidential issues raised about HOP and sharing a link to the full UKGLE report published on 2 June 2025.
52. The Claimant's solicitors then sent a pre-action protocol (PAP) letter dated 5 September 2025. This letter did reference the 2 June 2025 documents, including the Government response and proposed NBS list, which had plainly been seen by the Claimant by that date. However, paragraph 2 of that PAP letter stated that the proposed judicial review claim was a challenge in respect of the Defendant's response letter of 5 August 2025 and in particular challenging the Defendant’s decision in that response “to treat the Hereford (original population) and the crossbred North American Derived cattle as a single “not at risk” native breed, and the reasons provided by the Ministerial Contact Unit in support of that decision.” In the same letter, the Claimant also formally requested the Defendant to exercise his enforcement powers under art. 47(1) of the ABR in relation to HCS.
53. Following further correspondence between the parties, the Defendant provided a PAP response dated 26 September 2025. It is plain that this correspondence was based on the Defendant’s understanding that the decision being challenged was the response dated 5 August 2025, in respect of which the three-month period for a judicial review would have expired on 5 November 2025.
54. The Defendant strongly resisted the proposed judicial review claim in the PAP response and also refused to exercise any enforcement powers under ABR against HCS. The Defendant referred in the PAP response letter to the Call for Evidence and the 2 June 2025 decision and the supporting documents published on that date and confirmed in a footnote that “t he NBS list was created using the Secretary of State’s powers under the Agriculture Act 2020 , s.1 ”. The Defendant’s decision, expressed in that 26 September 2025 PAP response, refusing to exercise any enforcement powers against HCS, is the Second Decision under challenge. Challenge to the First Decision
55. The Claimant’s statement of facts and grounds contain a long factual background section about the history of Hereford cattle, the decisions under challenge and the parties’ communications, the key parts of which I have already summarised. Under the heading “Grounds of challenge to the First Decision,” the Claimant stated that: “The Defendant erred in treating the HOP breed and the NAD breed as a single breed in the First Decision. Further to s.1(1) (g) AA 2020 and the NBI Definitions (which the Claimant had a legitimate expectation would be applied on the facts), the Defendant was required to consider whether those were distinct breeds with reference to whether they had a consistent genotype and phenotype. There is no evidence that the Defendant turned his mind to the genetic pedigree of the HOP breed or the NAD breed, let alone whether they were properly to be regarded as the same breed. Instead, the Defendant has, in substance, delegated the question of the identification of the Hereford breed to the HCS, despite (i) the HCS’ breeding book not being based on any genetic testing of listed cattle at all, and (ii) there being a considerable body of expert scientific opinion, including that of Defra itself, that the HOP breed and the NAD breed were distinct breeds, as opposed to variants within a single breed.”
56. The Claimant then relies on four subsidiary grounds, which I have carefully considered but do not propose to set out in full in this permission judgment. They provide more detail of the reasons why the Claimant believes that the Defendant’s decision not to treat the HOP and NAD cattle as separate breeds was unlawful and breached his legitimate expectation. In particular, he relies on the definition of ‘native livestock’ in s.1(1) (g) AA 2020 and on the five cumulative criteria in the ‘Definition of a Native Breed’ in section 3 of NBI Definitions document which he says are not met in relation to all the cattle in the HCS breed book.
57. The Claimant also relies on his own witness evidence and that from Mr Sykes and Ms Brownlie and the various scientific papers referenced in the claim documents in support of this primary contention about the two Hereford sub-populations. In particular, he has provided detailed information about the genetic make-up of some individual animals, including a bull called Fabb 1 Pure Force, which the Claimant contends should not be included in the HCS breeding book (which records cattle falling within the Hereford breed of cattle for the purposes of the ABR). He relies on this example as evidence of the Defendant’s unlawful failure to either determine HOP to be a separate breed of cattle, or to take enforcement action against HCS for failing to so determine. Position of Defendant and Interested Party
58. I have reviewed the summary grounds of defence filed by the Defendant and HCS in full. In summary, the Defendant disputes what it says is "the core fallacy that lies at the heart of the claim"; namely that the “Original Populations” (or HOP) and what the Claimant describes as NADs or so-called “Crossbreds” must be treated as two distinct breeds of cattle for the purposes of AA 2020. The Defendant accepts that creation of the NBS list was done under ss. 1 and 2 of the AA 2020 and submits that those powers are broad and permissive, which should be reflected in the court’s review of the Defendant’s discretion.
59. The Defendant contends that it has properly considered relevant matters, and been guided by independent expert advice, in order to reach reasonable and rational conclusions to adopt a ‘whole-breed’ approach. The Defendant contends that b oth the UNFAO and UKGLE support a whole-breed conservation approach for livestock and that it is not arguable that it was irrational to follow this expert guidance. Overall, the Defendant contends the claim is nothing more than a disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Defendant and that the grounds relied on fail to advance any proper basis for considering that the First Decision was irrational.
60. In its response to the claim, HCS has outlined its approach to its breeding book or Herd Book and how it regards the Claimant’s stance as a ‘fringe’ view. HCS position is that the Court should not decide for itself, and indeed would not be competent to decide, whether a sub-population of cattle such as Traditional Hereford or HOP, is a separate breed or a native breed. Such a decision is an evaluative question with no clear-cut answers entrusted to an expert decision maker, as described in the case o f Ali v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 72 (Admin) .
61. Furthermore, HCS asserts that the Defendant properly decided in line with the UNFAO recommendations and UKGLE advice, that subpopulations like HOP should not be treated as a separate breed, and that the Defendant explicitly turned its mind to the NBI definitions. HCS maintains that there was no delegation of discretion in that the NBS list was not dictated by HCS, but that in any event the Defendant was entitled to give weight to the views of an expert industry body like HCS. HCS contends that there is nothing in the wording of the AA 2020 which advances the Claimant’s arguments, as the wording of s.1(1) (g) is broad and permissive. Challenge to the Second Decision
62. In the Statement of Facts and Grounds, the Claimant set out the relevant statutory provisions outlined above relating to the Defendant’s powers under the ZSER 2018 and ABR and then summarised his two grounds of challenge to the Second Decision on 26 September 2025 as follows: “First…. by the Second Decision, the Defendant erroneously regarded the HCS, following its recognition as a breeding society, as unconstrained in its determination of “ what a breed is or how that breed is verified ” such that HCS was “ compliant with the ABR requirements ” provided that it entered “ into the main section of the breeding book, those Hereford cattle whose parents and grandparents are already in the main section of the breeding book … ” The Defendant thereby misdirected herself as to the proper approach to the Animal Breeding Regulation, including (i) the nature of the ongoing obligation on the HCS to maintain a breeding book confined to purebred breeding animals of a single “ breed ” in accordance with its memorandum of association and (ii) the scope of her investigatory and enforcement functions under the ZSER 2018 and the Animal Breeding Regulation to investigate and/or take enforcement action against the HCS’ non-compliance with its ongoing obligation thereunder, see by analogy R (World Uygher Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] 1 WLR 4532 at 58. That was a clear legal error, by reason of which the Second Decision should be quashed. Secondly, the Defendant irrationally (i) relied on the UKGLE's advice that “the categorisation and management of a breed should remain the responsibility of the relevant breed society which sets the breed standard” (September letter, para.22) and so (ii) failed to exercise her investigatory and/or enforcement powers in circumstances in which the Defendant had been put on notice that the HCS’ breeding book is not confined to a list of purebred breeding animals of a single “breed”, alternatively of compelling evidence triggering a new obligation to investigate the same: see paragraphs 3-9 and 40 above.” Position of Defendant and Interested Party
63. The Defendant’s position in response to the Second Decision is essentially the same as in relation to the First Decision, namely that it is lawful for the HOP and NAD breed to be treated as part of the same Hereford breed of cattle, an approach supported by the expert advice of the UKGLE Committee and the UNFAO. In those circumstances, the claim of a failure by the Defendant to use investigatory powers under the ABR must fail. Short of irrationality, the Defendant contends that the Administrative Court is not the appropriate forum to resolve any residual dispute in relation to the categorisation of the HOP cattle. In summary, the Defendant’s position is that both parts of the claim are based on a disagreement on the merits of the exercise of a broad discretion but do not come near identifying an error of law or the high threshold required of a rationality challenge.
64. In its response in relation to the Second Decision, HCS confirms that a breeding society must, under the ABR, keep a record of animals of a single “breed”. However, it submits that there is nothing in the ABR to suggest that Defra, as the competent authority, can or ought to interfere with the exercise of judgment by a breeding society about that exercise. It is a fundamental part of the ABR that breeding societies have freedom to determine controversial questions about breed composition for themselves. Furthermore, art. 47(1) of the ABR confers a discretion on Defra to take regulatory action as a competent body exercising investigative or enforcement powers, not a duty to do so. HCS relies on R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60 and submits that given the scientific nature of issues, the Defendant should be afforded a substantial margin of appreciation. Overall, HCS also contends that none of the grounds relied on by the Claimant indicate that the exceptionally high threshold of irrationality is met in this context.
65. The Claimant responded to all these points in his Reply which I have considered in full.
66. In their skeleton arguments and oral submissions, Mr Kosmin, Mr Darby and Mr Loveday all expanded on the key points relied on in their respective parties’ statements of case. I do not propose to set all their further submissions out in full in this permission judgment, but I have taken them all into account in reaching my conclusions. Final remedies sought in the claim
67. In the claim form, the Claimant stated that the final remedies he is seeking are: “(c) As to the First Decision: (i) a quashing order; and (ii) a declaration that, for the purposes of s. 1(1) (g) AA 2020 and the NBI Definitions, the native HOP breed is to be treated as a separate breed to the NAD breed. (d) As to the Second Decision: (i) a quashing order; and (ii) an order directing the Defendant to take action to determine the extent of non-compliance by the HCS and to ensure non-compliance is remedied.”
68. I note that despite the Claimant stating in the Statement of Facts and Grounds at paragraph 29 that “For the avoidance of doubt, this claim does not require the Court to descend into the detail of competing scientific evidence or seek to resolve questions as to the weight to be given to expert advice”, the final declaration sought would have involved the court being asked to reach its own expert decision on the correct categorisation of HOP and NAD cattle.
69. During the course of the hearing, following a question from the court about this apparent inconsistency, Mr Kosmin confirmed that the Claimant was no longer seeking a declaration by the court as to the categorisation of HOP and NAD cattle as part of his remedy in relation to the First Decision. He recognised that the court should not be asked to reach what would amount to an expert decision as to the correct categorisation of these sub-populations of cattle. The Claimant still wished to pursue a quashing order in relation to the First Decision and a quashing order and mandatory order against the Defendant directing action under art. 47 ABR, in relation to the Second Decision. Standing
70. Both the Defendant and Interested Party in their respective summary grounds questioned the Claimant’s standing to bring the claim. I was advised that this issue was not being pursued at the permission hearing and the hearing proceeded on the basis that the Claimant has standing to bring the claim. Discussion and conclusions
71. I will set out my conclusions on the extension of time issue first and then turn to my decisions on permission and in relation to the Aarhus Convention claim. Claimant's protective application for extension of time for bringing the claim.
72. This claim was issued on 13 October 2025. The First Decision under challenge was made by the Defendant on 2 June 2025. The Defendant raised a possible time bar defence in respect of the First Decision in the PAP response and the Claimant then included a protective application for extension of time in section 9 of the claim form.
73. The Claimant submits in the alternative, either: i) that the Defendant only provided sufficient reasons for the 2 June 2025 decision in its 5 August and 26 September 2025 letters (including confirmation in the latter that the NBS list was created using powers under s.1 , AA 2020) and that the claim was made within three months of those further reasons being provided, so was not out of time, or ii) that an extension of time should be granted in those circumstances.
74. Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. The procedural rules that apply are set out in Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Rule 54.5 states as follows: "(1) The claim form must be filed – (a) promptly; and (b) in any event, not later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. (2) The time limits in this rule may not be extended by agreement between the parties."
75. The proper judicial approach to these time limits and applications for extension of time is helpfully summarised in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 at section 6.4. At 6.4.2.2 it states that “ Where the claim challenges a decision, the time limit begins to run from the date the decision to be challenged was made (not the date when the claimant was informed about the decision). ” This reflects the decision in R v Department of Transport ex parte Presvac Engineering (1992) 4 Admin LR 121 referred to in the footnote.
76. When considering whether to grant an application for an extension of time for bringing the claim, the Court must first determine the date from which the relevant time period started to run so that the period of delay can be calculated correctly. The Court must then consider all of the circumstances, including whether an adequate explanation has been given for the delay, the importance of the issues, the prospects of success, and whether an extension will cause hardship or prejudice to the defendant or any other party or be detrimental to good administration.
77. As was made clear in the case of Maharaj v. the National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago [2019] UKPC 5 , at 38: "Here it is important to emphasise that the statutory test is not one of good reason for delay, but the broader test of good reason for extending time. This will be likely to bring in many considerations beyond those relevant to an objectively good reason for the delay, including the importance of the issues, the prospects of success, the presence or absence of prejudice or detriment to good administration, and the public interest."
78. In this case, the First Decision under challenge was made by the Defendant on 2 June 2025, when the Government Response following the Call for Evidence and the new NBS list, excluding HOP from the list of ‘native cattle breeds at risk’, was published. Whilst I accept that further explanations were given by the Defendant in correspondence with the Claimant’s solicitors after that date, I do not consider that they can be treated as fresh decisions by the Defendant. It follows that, for the purposes of CPR 54.5, time for bringing a claim to challenge the Defendant’s 2 June 2025 decision started to run from that date and should have been made promptly thereafter, and in any event no later than three months later, by 2 September 2025. I am also satisfied having reviewed the correspondence, that the Claimant was aware of the substance of the First Decision by 5 August 2025 at the latest, which was within that three-month period. For these reasons, I consider the Claimant’s protective application for an extension of time was necessary and I will address it now.
79. In considering whether the Claimant has established a good reason for extending time, I have considered the Defendant’s further explanations in the letters dated 5 August and 26 September 2025. These letters are relied on by the Claimant, applying the principles set down in the case of R (Macrae) v Herefordshire DC [2012] EWCA Civ 457 . In fact, as I have already summarised, the position in this case is rather different, in that it is apparent that the Claimant’s PAP letter dated 5 September 2025 was put forward as a challenge to the 5 August response rather than the 2 June 2025 decision itself. It is this stance which then led the Defendant to refer to the 3-month time limit expiring in early November 2025. It is not clear from the correspondence that the Claimant had been ‘left in the dark’ as to the basis of the Defendant’s decision to introduce the new NBS list changing the listing of the HOP, given all the supporting documents and expert evidence published at the same time explaining the basis for that decision. The only relevant additional information received in the 26 September 2025 PAP response letter was the confirmation by the Defendant that the new NBS list was issued using statutory powers under AA 2020, but this position was the same as the NBAR list it replaced, with which the Claimant was familiar. I have taken into account the significant delay by the Defendant in responding to the Claimant’s solicitors’ initial June correspondence. However, at no stage was a challenge to the 2 June 2025 decision intimated, or indeed a request made for clarification of the statutory power relied on by the Defendant. Furthermore, no steps were taken by the Claimant to initiate this claim, or even send a PAP letter, until 5 September, which was after the 3-month period following the 2 June 2025 decision had expired. The further delay by the Defendant in responding to that PAP letter (which was expressly based on a challenge to the 5 August 2025 response) cannot provide a good reason for the Claimant’s initial delay.
80. I have had careful regard to the case of Macrae relied on by the Claimant. For the reasons I have outlined, this was not a case in which the Claimant did not understand the basis of the decision which had been reached, although he plainly disagreed with it, and I do not consider that it assists the Claimant in relation to the significant period of delay in this case. The Claimant was represented by experienced solicitors throughout this period and has provided no good explanation as to why a claim in relation to the 2 June 2025 decision could not have been commenced in time. I have also taken into account my view on the merits of this claim in relation to the First Decision, which I will set out shortly. Taking all these factors into account, together with the general principle of the need for procedural rigour in judicial review cases, I am not persuaded that the court should grant an extension of time in this case, as I am not satisfied that the Claimant has established a good reason for doing so. Permission in relation to First Decision
81. Notwithstanding my decision in relation to the extension of time, as I have considered the merits of the claim in reaching that decision, I will now set out my conclusions on the Claimant’s application for permission in relation to the First Decision.
82. Although the papers before the court for this 1-day hearing were voluminous, and included a 1101-page authorities bundle, the test for permission to be applied by the court at this stage is clear, namely whether the Claimant has an arguable case, that is a case with a real rather than a fanciful prospect of success.
83. At the heart of that test is whether there are arguable public law grounds for challenging the lawfulness of the decisions made by the Defendant in this case.
84. As the Defendant and HCS emphasised in their response documents, skeleton arguments and submissions, and Mr Kosmin accepted on behalf of the Claimant, the court must consider the grounds raised in relation to the lawfulness, and not the correctness, of the Defendant’s decisions.
85. In short, despite the length and apparent complexity of the Statement of Facts and Grounds, witness evidence and exhibits and the Claimant’s skeleton argument, the Claimant's primary ground for challenge in relation to the First Decision is simply that it is irrational given the Claimant's views on the proper distinction to be made between HOP and NADs. Although the Claimant also relies on an alleged breach of legitimate expectation in failing to follow the UK NBI definitions of ‘native breed at risk’ and the 'unlawful treatment' of ‘the NAD breed as the same ‘native’ breed as the HOP breed’, this submission again depends on the same key point of substantive dispute raised by the Claimant. It was also the reason for the declaration from the court about the proper categorisation of HOPs sought by the Claimant in the claim form and only withdrawn during the hearing.
86. I have carefully reviewed the case law relied on by the parties about the appropriate approach to take in judicial review claims involving multi-faceted scientific and technical judgments and expert evidence, including R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2019] 1 W.L.R. 1649 , R (Mott) v Environment Agency [2016] 1 WLR 4338 at [68-77] and R (Ross) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWHC 226 (Admin) at [43-44]; [76-77]. This approach to technical regulation was recently reviewed and applied by Chamberlain J in the case of R (Bayswater Support Group) v Health Research Authority [2026] EWHC 2043 (Admin) at [88-91], and can be succinctly summarised by the statement from Beatson LJ in Mott at [77] that “ A reviewing court should be very slow to conclude that the expert and experienced decision-maker assigned the task by statute has reached a perverse scientific conclusion .”
87. It follows that a court must proceed with caution in such cases and the threshold for a rationality challenge is a high one. Furthermore, as was also highlighted by Chamberlain J in the Bayswater case at [107-107], the relevant arguability test at the permission stage is undiluted by voluminous papers, multiple points, or detailed submissions at a full hearing.
88. It is plain from the structure of s. 1(1) of the AA 2020, that any decision made by the Defendant using the powers in that section to allocate payments for the many and various purposes outlined, including ‘conserving native livestock, native equines or genetic resources relating to any such animal’ in s.1(1) (g), is a policy decision. I agree with the Defendant’s description that such a policy decision requires the balancing of various multi-faceted factors, including fiscal issues and compliance with international standards, as informed by scientific and technical advice. It is also clear from the statutory language that the award of any such payments is discretionary.
89. The Defendant’s powers under s.1(1) are broad and are not directly or expressly linked to definitions of ‘breed’ as set out in ABR. The term used in relation to cattle is ‘native livestock’ and it is apparent from the terms of the AA 2020 itself (supported by wording in the Explanatory Notes) that it can serve a number of purposes relating to conservation, genetic diversity and food production as well as environmental factors.
90. In any event, prior to the 2 June 2025 decision, it is apparent from all the documentation in this case, and indeed the correspondence between the Claimant’s solicitors and HCS going back to at least 2021, that for the purposes of the ABR and the NBAR list used for AA 2020 payments, there was only one recognised native breed of Hereford cattle in the UK, albeit with a number of different sub-populations, including an ‘Original Population’.
91. The approach taken by the Defendant was to undertake a Call for Evidence before arriving at a new policy position and then to follow international expert evidence, as supported by UKGLE which advocated a whole-breed approach to ensure genetic diversity and support conservation. I note from the Defendant’s documentation that UKGLE comprised members with a broad range of expertise, including geneticists, animal breeding and production experts, a veterinary surgeon and sector experts. UKGLE’s expert advice was published alongside the Government’s response to the Call for Evidence, and the new NBS List on 2 June 2025. It is also clear from the evidence provided by the Claimant in this case, that most of the expert evidence now relied on by the Claimant, (including the first Hegarty report, and two previous Defra reports about genetic testing of beef products) was seen and considered by UKGLE in reaching their expert recommendations.
92. Against this factual background, I do not consider it to be arguable that the decision reached by the Defendant in introducing the NBS list was irrational. Whilst the Claimant may be able to establish genetic differences between sub-populations of Hereford cattle (as acknowledged by the Defendant), it was plainly open to the Defendant to adopt the recommendation made by UNFAO and UKGLE of a ‘whole breed’ approach, for the purpose of payments under the AA 2020, whilst also acknowledging and supporting work being done by breeding societies such as HCS to support ‘sub-populations'.
93. I note that if the Claimant’s position had been adopted by the Defendant, the probable result, as explained by HCS, would have been to remove over 90% of the cattle in the UK currently categorised as Hereford cattle from the remit of HCS and possibly from being called Hereford cattle at all, given that all parties appear to agree that under the ABR there can only be one recognised breed society per breed. A decision reached by the Defendant which rejected that conclusion and was in line with an expert approach recommended by independent advisers cannot be argued as being irrational with any real prospect of success.
94. Furthermore, I have considered the published report from the UKGLE which formed part of the Call for Evidence and on which the Defendant relied. That report has a distinct section on Original Populations and clearly sets out the authors’ views on the challenges for genetic diversity and welfare of supporting small sub-populations rather than adopting a whole-breed approach.
95. Whilst the Claimant has sought to argue that the expert evidence relied on by the Defendant did not engage with the issue of HOPs and the evidence of genetic diversity amongst the different sub-populations of the Hereford breed relied on by the Claimant, the contents of the UKGLE report makes clear that was not the case. UKGLE advice stated clearly: “while breed societies may choose to record subpopulations separately in herd books, it is critical to avoid creating subpopulations with very low effective population sizes. Such populations are more vulnerable to inbreeding, health and welfare concerns, and loss of genetic diversity”.
96. I recognise that the proposals in relation to merging Original Populations with the main breed were not agreed with by 54% of responses to the Call for Evidence on the grounds of genetic preservation and financial impact. This does not in itself constitute a basis for the final decision made by the Defendant being irrational or unlawful.
97. Furthermore, I do not regard this case as one which turns on a clear error of law, as was the case in R (World Uygher Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] 1 WLR 4532 or a conspicuous factual or scientific error, such as a clear incontrovertible mathematical error, which plainly invalidated the expert advice informing the Defendant’s decision-making. The expert material available to the Defendant demonstrates that a body of expert support existed in the UK and internationally for a ‘whole-breed’ approach which necessarily involved subsuming original populations like HOP into the main breed. Whilst the Claimant clearly disagrees with the merits of this approach, not least due to the potential financial impact on original population breeders like him, I am not satisfied that this gives rise to any arguable basis for this claim.
98. I have also compared the previous NBAR list and the new NBS List. The definition of ‘Orig’ in the NBAR list, which referred to an original population “of that breed” indicates that prior to June 2025, HOPs were not treated as a separate or distinct breed, only that determination of HOP’s place on the ‘at risk’ list was done at that sub-population level. In reaching the 2 June 2025 decision, the Defendant was not therefore making any new decision in relation to the overall nature of the Hereford breed, only in relation to the adoption of a ‘whole-breed’ approach, for which there was ample expert evidence to support that policy decision. In order to succeed in this claim, the Claimant would have to establish that it was unlawful for the Defendant not to have made a separate new decision to treat HOP as a separate breed of Hereford cattle from that date and it is plain from the way that the claim was pleaded, that the Claimant was effectively inviting the court to step into the Defendant’s shoes and make that declaration. Although the remedy of a declaration by the court has now been withdrawn, it remains the case that in reality this claim is a clear example of a pure merits challenge which goes beyond the proper scope of any judicial review.
99. Standing back, for all these reasons, I am not satisfied that there is any arguable basis for concluding that the Defendant’s decision of 2 June 2025 to introduce the NBS list was either irrational or unlawful on any other grounds. In those circumstances, even if an extension of time had been granted, I would have refused permission for the Claimant to bring a claim for judicial review in relation to the First Decision. Permission in relation to the Second Decision
100. In relation to the Second Decision, I can take matters more shortly. As Mr Kosmin accepted, the duty on the Defendant as the competent authority under art. 47 ABR (as applied by the ZSER 2018) arises where “non-compliance is established”. In this case, the alleged ‘non-compliance’ by HCS relied on by the Claimant in relation to the Second Decision, depends on the same alleged distinction between separate breeds and distinct sub-populations. There has been no determination, in charity proceedings or otherwise, that HCS is acting outside its own objects, so any claim in relation to the Second Decision would require the Claimant to establish that the Defendant acted unlawfully in September 2025 in not concluding that non-compliance by HCS had been established solely on the basis of the contested expert evidence put forward by the Claimant’s solicitors in correspondence.
101. For the same reasons I have outlined in relation to the First Decision, it is not arguable with any real prospect of success that the Defendant acted irrationally in refusing to take action under art. 47 ABR, in light of the expert evidence available to support the whole-breed approach, adopted by HCS. Indeed, HCS is obliged by its own objects “to promote impartially the breeding of all the various tribes, families and strains of such cattle”.
102. The issue of an alternative remedy in the form of a claim under s. 115 Charities Act 2011 was not pursued at the hearing and does not directly arise in relation to the current claims brought against the Defendant. However, it is right to note that the Claimant’s real dispute, which underlies his original claim for a declaration, concerns the refusal of HCS to accept his longstanding arguments about the distinct position of HOP. That is a decision which is not amenable to judicial review for the reasons I have already outlined and dressing it up as a refusal by the Defendant to take action under art. 47 ABR does not make it an arguable claim with a real prospect of success.
103. Permission f or the Claimant to bring a claim for judicial review in relation to the Second Decision is also refused. Whether this is an Aarhus Convention claim
104. The Claimant says that this claim relates to contraventions of provisions of national law relating to the environment and so falls within art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In the claim form, at box 7.1, the Claimant stated: " The claim concerns a challenge arising in respect of the defendant's contraventions of the legislative schemes under s. 1(1) (g) Agriculture Act 2020 , Art 47 of the Animal Breeding Regulation and Reg 6 of the Zootechnical Standards (England) Regulations 2018 - national laws relating to the environment: see art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. See further Summary of facts and grounds ."
105. In his skeleton, Mr Kosmin said that the purpose of the identified provisions form “the scheme for conservation of at-risk native breeds of Hereford cattle”. Given the purpose of that legislative scheme directly concerns the protection and regulation of domestic native breeds, the Claimant says that this challenge is to the Defendant’s decision-making that quintessentially “relates to the environment.”
106. The Defendant initially stated in the PAP correspondence: “We are prepared to accept for present purposes that the proposed claim is an ‘Aarhus claim’, with reference to Article 9(3)” but now seeks to challenge its application.
107. HCS’s solicitors asserted in correspondence on 29 October 2025: “Our client does not agree that the Aarhus Convention applies in these proceedings” and had maintained that position in its Summary Grounds of Defence. Legal principles
108. The definition of an “Aarhus Convention claim” under CPR r.46.24(2)(a) is: “a claim brought by one or more members of the public by judicial review or review under statute which challenges the legality of any decision, act or omission of a body exercising public functions, and which is within the scope of Article 9(1), 9(2) or 9(3) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention).”
109. Guidance can be found in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025 at 25.15 - Environmental law claims - in relation to the cost capping regime which applies in such cases, so as to limit the amount of costs that a party may be ordered to pay.
110. A claimant who believes that their claim is an Aarhus Convention claim and wishes to apply for a costs cap under these provisions must note that fact in Part 7 of the Claim Form and file and serve with the Claim Form a schedule of their financial resources which is verified by a statement of truth. Provided those requirements are met (including provision of the verified financial statement) cost capping applies subject to any other application.
111. Where a defendant intends to challenge the assertion that the Aarhus Convention applies and, therefore, that the costs limit does not apply, the challenge should be made in the Acknowledgment of Service. The Court will then determine the issue at the earliest opportunity.
112. In accordance with the order of Lang J, the application of the Aarhus Convention to this case was left for determination at this hearing.
113. The scope of this type of claim was considered recently by the Court of Appeal in R (Global Feedback Ltd) v HM Treasury & Anr [2025] EWCA Civ 624 . The appeal from that decision has recently been heard by UKSC (under the name of Foodrise (formerly Global Feedback Ltd) v HMT) and judgment is expected this term.
114. In the Court of Appeal decision, which is binding on this court at present, the court emphasised that Article 9(3) of the Convention required contracting states to ensure that members of the public had access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities "which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment". Article 9(4) required those procedures to provide adequate and effective remedies and not to be prohibitively expensive.
115. The Implementation Guide to the Aarhus Convention provides some guidance as to what is meant by the expression "national law relating to the environment": " National laws relating to the environment are neither limited to the information or public participation rights guaranteed by the convention, nor to legislation where the environment is mentioned in the title or heading. Rather, the decisive issue is if the provision in question somehow relates to the environment. Thus, also acts and omissions that may contravene provisions on, among other things, city planning, environmental taxes, control of chemicals or wastes, exploitation of natural resources and pollution from ships are covered by paragraph 3, regardless of whether the provisions in question are planning laws, taxation laws, or maritime laws."
116. In the Global Feedback case, the challenge involved allegations of breaches of public law principles in relation to tax legislation and not any breach of national law relating to the environment or environmental law. It therefore fell outside the scope of article 9(3). The court held that it was insufficient for a claimant merely to say that their claim related to the environment, or to the protection of the environment or to an effect on the environment – a narrower interpretation was preferred.
117. In this case, I am satisfied that the claim is brought on the basis of an alleged unlawful exercise by the Defendant of her statutory powers under national law relating to the environment. Although the AA 2020 may have a broad range of purposes, it is clear from section 1(1) and section 1(4) (which I have set out above) that one of the primary purposes of providing financial assistance for various conservation purposes, is to promote environmental sustainability.
118. Furthermore, the Defendant has asserted that the NBAR was issued under the Environmental Stewardship (England) Regulations 2005, which would plainly fall within the scope of the Aarhus Convention. This is not a case, like Global Feedback, where the environmental impact is tangential and the public law challenge does not arise under such a national law relating to the environment.
119. I am therefore satisfied that this is a claim to which the Aarhus Convention still applies, despite the narrower approach taken to other types of Aarhus claims by the Court of Appeal.
120. I now turn to the requirements under CPR 46.26 and consideration of whether to v ary or refuse the Claimant's application for costs limits. Costs protection under CPR 46.26
121. Under CPR 46.25(1)(b) a claimant seeking costs protection has to file and serve with the Claim Form a schedule of their financial resources which is verified by a statement of truth and provides details of: (i) the claimant’s significant assets, liabilities, income and expenditure; and (ii) in relation to any financial support which any person has provided or is likely to provide to the claimant, the aggregate amount which has been provided and which is likely to be provided.
122. Where a claimant complies with that requirement, the costs limit is automatically in place. The current costs limit in CPR 46.26(2) is £5,000 where the claimant is claiming only as an individual and not as, or on behalf of, a business or other legal person. In all other cases the limit is £10,000. Where a defendant is ordered to pay costs, the limit is £35,000.
123. The Court may vary or remove the limits outlined but only on an application made in accordance with CPR 46.27 (5)-(7), and only if satisfied that: (a) to do so would not make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive for the claimant; and (b) in the case of a variation which would reduce a claimant’s maximum costs liability or increase that of a defendant, without the variation the costs of the proceedings would be prohibitively expensive for the claimant.
124. ‘Prohibitively expensive’ is then explained in CPR 46.27(3), as summarised in section 25.15.8 in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2025.
125. I have already set out the procedural history of this case. As I mentioned, there appears to be an outstanding issue over the Claimant’s compliance with CPR 46.25, which was one of the issues listed by Lang J for determination at this hearing. The Claimant sought an extension of time for filing a Schedule of Financial Resources under CPR 46.25(1)(b) until 14 days after the Defendant’s position on the Aarhus Convention was clarified. The Claimant then filed a Second Witness Statement dated 4 November 2025, with exhibits, on 5 November 2025 which was referred to as the statement of financial means under 46.25 (1) in the signed consent order approved by Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC .
126. That consent order arguably should have resolved matters, but if it did not, in the interests of time and the overriding objective, I indicated to the parties that I would proceed on the basis that an extension of time for service by the Claimant of the statement of financial means either had already been granted or would be granted, if required. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate course as an ‘in-time’ application for an extension of time was made in the claim form and the consent order allowed for an extension of time for service of the Acknowledgments of Service, so there was no prejudice to the other parties.
127. The Court has power to vary or remove the limits outlined but only on an application made in accordance with CPR 46.27 (5)-(7). CPR 46.27(5)(b) states: “(5) Subject to paragraph (6), an application to vary must— (b) if made by the defendant, be made in the acknowledgment of service and provide the defendant's reasons why, if the variation were made, the costs of the proceedings would not be prohibitively expensive for the claimant;..”
128. The Defendant did not make an application to vary or remove the costs limit in the Acknowledgment of Service and only included very general observations about the Claimant’s means in the Summary Grounds of Defence. No subsequent application has been made nor amended grounds in response filed in support of any such application. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Defendant has made any application in accordance with CPR 46.27(5). Notwithstanding the very general wording of the directions order made by Lang J, I do not consider that the wording of that order serves to remove the need for compliance with the CPR.
129. HCS did tick the box in section 5.2 of the Acknowledgment of Service indicating that it was making an application to vary or remove the standard costs limit (previously provided under CPR 45.43(2) but now under CPR 46.26) but did not include any suggested variation, or provide any reasons why, if a variation was made, the costs of the proceedings would not be prohibitively expensive for the Claimant in the Summary Grounds of Defence. Instead HCS relied solely on the Claimant’s delay in filing the Statement of Means.
130. Even once all these Aarhus-related issues had been listed for hearing, and the Claimant’s solicitors specifically sought confirmation from the other parties as to their positions in relation to the costs limits in a letter dated 14 April 2026, no application or amended response was filed by HCS, setting out their reasons in line with CPR 46.27(5). The first detailed reasons addressing the relevant criteria appeared in the skeleton arguments.
131. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Defendant or HCS have made a compliant application to remove or vary the costs limits in accordance with CPR 46.27(5) so as to give the court power to make such an order.
132. It follows that the standard Aarhus costs limits set down in CPR 46.26(2)(a) and 46.26(3) will apply to all the parties in this case. Any further application to vary these limits will have to comply with CPR 46.27(6)-(7).
133. Finally, as the papers in this case included confidential information (including information relating to the health of a member of the Claimant’s close family and other personal financial matters), in line with the approach outlined in the White Book, I invited the parties to consider whether any order was required restricting access to, or reporting of, that information. A suitable order was drawn up and approved at the end of the hearing. Summary of decisions
134. The court has made the following decisions: i) Extension of time to bring the claim in relation to the First Decision refused. ii) Permission to bring a claim for judicial review refused on all grounds. iii) Declaration that the claim is an Aarhus Convention claim and that the standard costs limits in CPR 46.26 should apply. Costs
135. Following circulation of the draft judgment for corrections, I invited the parties to prepare a draft order and file any written submissions on costs.
136. The Claimant appears to accept that in principle he is liable to pay the other party’s costs in relation to the permission and EOT decisions but submits that he is entitled to the sum of £7,111.67 in respect of his costs in defending the applicability of the Aarhus Convention (“Aarhus”) in accordance with CPR 46.28(3) and that this sum ought only to be reduced by his overall Aarhus cap of £5,000 so that there is a net order for costs to be paid to the Claimant.
137. I am satisfied that the Claimant is the losing party in relation to the permission and EOT applications and must pay the costs incurred by the Defendant and HCS in preparing their Acknowledgments of Service and Summary Grounds in accordance with the usual approach to costs orders at the permission stage, as set out in CPR 44.2, CPR 54A PD 8.5 and R (Mount Cook Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 . They are not seeking their costs of attending the hearing.
138. The costs of each other party significantly exceed the Claimant’s overall Aarhus costs limit of £5,000 and I agree with the submission of the Claimant and HCS that the cap must be apportioned and I consider it appropriate that the cap is apportioned equally between the Defendant and HCS.
139. The Claimant relies on CPR 46.28(3)(b) which states: “(3) In any proceedings to determine whether the claim is an Aarhus Convention claim—” … (b) if the court holds that the claim is an Aarhus Convention claim, it shall, except for good reason, order the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs of those proceedings to be assessed on the standard basis, and that order may be enforced even if this would increase the costs payable by the defendant beyond the amount stated in rule 46.26(3) or any variation of that amount.”
140. I accept that if this case had been listed immediately for determination of the Aarhus Convention issue (as is envisaged by CPR 46.28 (2)) then the Claimant would have been entitled to his costs of those proceedings from the Defendant, even if they had exceeded the Defendant’s standard costs cap of £35,000. That is the effect of this provision.
141. However, the hearing was listed at the direction of the court in order to deal with permission, extension of time, and Aarhus convention issues. The Claimant succeeded on the Aarhus Convention point but lost on the extension of time and substantive permission issues, and is liable for the costs outlined above subject to any overall cap.
142. In those circumstances, I consider that the only proportionate and appropriate order in this case is that the amount claimed by the Claimant of defending the Aarhus issue should be set off against the costs payable to the other parties in relation to the permission and extension of time issues on which they succeeded, and then the overall Aarhus cap of £5,000 should be applied.
143. The effect of such an approach is that the order will provide that the Claimant is to pay costs in the sum of £2,500 each to the Defendant and HCS.