UK case law

Peter Marshall v The Information Commissioner

[2026] UKFTT GRC 1337 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Information Rights · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. This appeal is brought by reg 18 Environmental Information Regulations 2004 ("EIR") and section 57 Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA"). It relates to a decision notice ("the DN") issued by the Information Commissioner ("the IC") on 12 February 2026 with reference number IC-399520-N4Y2. It concerns a request for information ("the Request") made to Westminster City Council ("WCC") on 29 April 2025 which WCC considered to be manifestly unreasonable.

2. We had a bundle of 100 pages. There was no witness evidence. What follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and the law. It does not seek to provide every step of the reasoning. The absence of a reference to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered. In this decision any page numbers indicated by their inclusion in brackets refer to pages of the Bundle.

3. The appeal was decided without a hearing. The consent of the parties was confirmed in case management questionnaires and at para 2 of the Directions of 19 May 2026. Having considered the issues and available evidence the Tribunal was satisfied that it could properly determine the issues without a hearing. Background

4. We understand that an EV pillar ("EVP") is an outdoor hub located in a cabinet that distributes electrical power from the grid to multiple electric vehicle charging points. The Request relates to an EVP located in Lisson Grove in Westminster. It appears that the EVP in question, when initially installed, was placed against or very close to a wall. This can be seen in a photograph on page 38 of the Bundle. In about August 2022 it was subsequently moved away from the wall and further into the pavement as can be seen in the photograph at page 40. We were told (and it appears from the photographs) that when being moved it was also enlarged.

5. The Request (dated 29 April 2025 and given ref 39868825) asked WCC about this EVP as follows: - “…as a consequence of information you have just provided. It is self-evident that the original cabinet designed by your consultant was not fit for purpose. In those circumstances the following questions arise:

1. When and by whom was the Council informed that the installed cabinet was not appropriate:

2. What was the additional cost incurred (a) for the replacement cabinet and (b) its relocation;

3. Who was liable for those additional costs; and

4. Please provide any documentation supporting your answers.”

6. WCC say that the Request is manifestly unreasonable by reference, for example, to previous requests made by the Appellant about the same EVP, the existence of a stage 2 complaint, previous requests made more generally by the Appellant to WCC, the lack of adequate value or serious and a concern that the Request is motivated by the Appellant's private interests rather than any wider public interest. The Appellant disagrees because, in his view, WCC should have consulted before installing the EVP and due to negligent failures by WCC and its professional advisors public money has been unnecessarily incurred. He is also concerned about the new position of the EVP and on 4 September 2022 the raised this issue with a ward councillor saying, "Surely this is an unacceptable pavement hazard that needs to be moved – perhaps directly adjacent to the EV chargers?"

7. WCC responded to the Request on 2 June 2025. It indicated that it was not going to provide disclosure because it had concluded that the Request was manifestly unreasonable. On the same day the Appellant asked for an internal review.

8. The outcome of WCC's internal review was reported to the Appellant on 30 June 2025. WCC maintained its position. The Appellant responded to this refusal and complained to the IC. In the subsequent DN, of 12 February 2026, the IC gave notice that he had decided that the Request was manifestly unreasonable. He did so partly on the basis of the analysis in the earlier DN of 28 January 2026 with ref IC-388828-J1V7 upon which he also relied.

9. On 27 February 2026 the Appellant appealed. The outcome sought is for the Tribunal to "substitute a notice that orders the public authority to take steps in relation to the request for information." The Grounds are: - "The Information Commissioner's decision is biased insofar as the Commissioner accepted without question the veracity the answers provided by Westminster City Council (the third-party) in relation to its handling of the Appellant's complaint namely the ludicrous selection of a totally inappropriate site for the installation of a piece of electrical equipment associated with two rapid changing units for electric vehicles and proceeding with the installation without any consultation with the owner. The third-party proceeded with the installation against the perimeter wall of a Critical National Infrastructure namely a highly sensitive electrical substation owned and operated by National Grid Group plc situated on Lisson Grove NW8. Because of the failure to consult prior to the commencement of work once National Grid became aware of the situation the third-party was contacted and requested to remove the cabinet. The third-party party being determined to retain the location of the charging stations decided to relocate the cabinet to the centre of the pedestrian walkway. At the same time it took the opportunity to enlarge the cubic capacity of the cabinet because it alleged the original cabinet was inadequate. The third-party had the benefit of professional advice in relation to the entire project. The Appellant asserts the third-party and its professional advisors were negligent: (a) in the selection of the site (b) failing to seek permission for the installation against the wall of a Critical National Infrastructure (c) failing to note the presence of an electrified Power-fence and (d) failing to properly assess the requisite cubic capacity of the required pillar feeder cabinet. As a direct result of these egregious failures unnecessary public funds have been incurred. The appellant asserts the entire issue is for very obvious reasons a matter of public interest and not as the third-party suggests – and the Commissioner concurs – is a personal campaign."

10. The IC, who opposes the appeal, has provided a response. WCC is not a party. Law

11. Environmental Information is defined by reg 2(1) EIR. Reg 5 EIR states "Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request"

12. This obligation is subject to a number of exceptions such as reg 12(1) and 12(4)(b) EIR which provide that: - "(1) Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if— (a) an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. (4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that...(b)the request for information is manifestly unreasonable" Manifestly unreasonable

13. The FOIA test of "vexatious" and the EIR test of "manifestly unreasonable" are two tests with one meaning (see Dransfield-v- (1) Information Commissioner and (2) Devon County Council and Craven -v-(1) The Information Commissioner and (2) The Department for Energy and Climate Change [2015] EWCA Civ 454 at para 7.) The EIR and FOIA tests are however different in that when assessing reg 12(4)(b) EIR there is, in addition, the need to consider the public interest balance test ("PIBT") in reg 12(1)(b) EIR and have in mind reg 12(2) EIR which requires a public authority to apply a presumption in favour of disclosure. Dransfield

14. The Upper Tribunal ("UT") in Information Commissioner vs Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) , (28 January 2013) said that "vexatious” connotes manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a formal procedure.” In Dransfield four broad illustrative non-exhaustive issues were identified for consideration namely (1) the burden on the public authority and its staff (2) the motive of the requester (3) the value or serious purpose of the request, and (4) any harassment or distress of or to the public authority. As was said in Dransfield: - “...the observations that follow should not be taken as imposing any prescriptive and all encompassing definition upon an inherently flexible concept which can take many different forms.”…“There is no magic formula – all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA”.

15. In Dransfield in the Court of Appeal it was held that (para 68):- "...the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious." The PIBT (reg 12(1)(b) EIR)

16. Reg 12(1)(b) EIR provides that a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if an exception to disclosure applies and "(b)in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information."

17. The relevant date for considering the PIBT is the date the Request was received which in this case was on or about 29 April 2025 (see The Information Commissioner & Anor v Patricia O'Hanlon [2026] EWCA Civ 838 ).

18. On the PIBT the UT in Vesco -v- the Information Commissioner & the Government Legal Department [2019] UKUT 247 AAC said: - "18...The public interest test requires the decision maker to analyse the public interest, which is a fact specific test turning on the particular circumstances of a case. The starting point is the content of the information in question, and it is relevant to consider what specific harm might result from the disclosure.... Once the public interests in disclosing and withholding the information have been identified, then a balancing exercise must be carried out. If relevant factors are ignored, or irrelevant ones are wrongly taken into account, then the decision about where the balance lies may be open to challenge... If the public interest in disclosing is stronger than the public interest in withholding the information, then the information should be disclosed." The Presumption (reg 12(2) EIR)

19. Reg 12 (2) EIR provides that " A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure. " It was held in Vesco that: - “ 19... If application of the first two stages has not resulted in disclosure, a public authority should go on to consider the presumption in favour of disclosure under Regulation 12(2) of the EIRs. It was “common ground” ....that the presumption serves two purposes: (1) to provide the default position in the event that the interests are equally balanced and (2) to inform any decision that may be taken under the regulations." Tribunal's role

20. Reg 18 EIR and section 57(1) FOIA provides that “ Where a decision notice has been served, the complainant or the public authority may appeal to the Tribunal against the notice.” Section 58 FOIA provides that: - "(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers (a)that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based."

21. In Peter Wilson -v- The Information Commissioner [2022] UKFTT 0149 the First-tier Tribunal ("FtT") said that it was not the role of the Tribunal to " 30...conduct a procedural review of the Information Commissioner’s decision making process or to correct the drafting of the Decision Notice.”

22. We also had regard to Information Commissioner v Malnick and Advisory Committee on Business Appointments [2018] UKUT 72 (AAC) (see para 90) and NHS England -v- Information Commissioner and Dean [2019] UKUT 145 (ACC) (see para 10) where the UT said that the FtT exercises a full merits appellate jurisdiction and stands in the shoes of the IC and decides which (if any) exemptions apply. In Forstater v Information Commissioner and others [2023] UKUT 303 (AAC) the UT at para 40 said: - "(1) ...the FTT is required under section 58 of FOIA to decide independently whether the Information Commissioner’s decision was in accordance with the law. In doing so the FTT “must apply the law afresh to the request taking account of the issues presented at the hearing or identified by the First-tier Tribunal..." (2) the “ordinary presumption” is that it is for an appellant to prove their case. The burden will rest with the appellant except where statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise... (3) however, the concept of the burden of proof is of secondary importance in tribunal proceedings which involve a full merits review, since to apply strict burdens of proof may prevent the tribunal from properly discharging its responsibility to decide the facts for itself and/or exercise any discretion afresh..." Issue

23. The issue was for the Tribunal to determine whether the Request was manifestly unreasonable. On the question of whether the Request was for environmental information, as defined, although there appeared to be no dispute in this appeal between the parties on this question, we did consider it and concluded that it was.

24. In the Grounds the Appellant says that the IC's decision was " biased" insofar as the IC "accepted without question the veracity the answers provided by" WCC . C onsideration of this assertion was not part of the role of the Tribunal as set out above and in any event the right to a full rehearing by the Tribunal cures any alleged procedural defect or breach of natural justice in the IC's investigation.

25. It was also not the role of the Tribunal to consider or reach conclusions on any issues such as: - (a) how the initial site of the EVP was chosen and whether or not WCC and/or its advisors had been negligent; (b) whether or not any acts or omissions by WCC and/or its advisors had resulted in the unnecessary loss of public money; (c) whether or not the EVP in question is now the appropriate size or appropriately located; and (d) whether or not the EVP complies with relevant statutory obligations.

26. In considering the issue we reviewed the four non- exhaustive Dransfield tests (also taking a holistic approach), the PIBT and the presumption as at the relevant date. Burden

27. We do not consider the Request on its own terms to be burdensome. Burden by course of dealing

28. In Dransfield the UT said: - “29...the present or future burden on the public authority may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings. Thus the context and history of the particular request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious.”

29. There is evidence of a substantial previous course of dealing by the time the Request was received consisting of previous requests about this EVP, a stage 2 complaint, previous requests more generally and at least one appeal.

30. We saw reference to four requests about the EVP. First in February 2023 r equest 30258719 asked “In or about August 2022 the said installation was relocated to its present position mid-pavement. Why was it relocated…” and for information about consultations with the National Grid about the installation of the EVP such as reasons and costs of relocation, details of planning or other permissions required with documentation. WCC disclosed "99 pages of information in response" .

31. Then in June 2023 request 32276457 asked how and why the original location of the EVP was chosen and the basis for relocation to which WCC responded.

32. On 5 March 2025 a 3rd request was made by the Appellant to WCC. It involved the same EVP and asked: - "Westminster City Council was instrumental in the siting of a feeder pillar for two electric vehicle charging units adjacent to the National Grid substation site on Lisson Grove NW8 Attached is a photograph of the interior. It is apparent the components could have been positioned differently thereby enabling a cabinet of much reduced height to be employed. My question is why was a cabinet of such excessive cubic capacity installed in the centre of the pedestrian pavement."

33. WCC replied on 1 April 2025 and relied on reg 12(4)(b) EIR because "it was considered to be a repeat of a previous request that the council had responded to" . This was upheld on review on 29 April 2025 when WCC also said: - “There is space between the components inside the feeder pillar cabinet, but this is a requirement with regards to having enough space around the equipment for cooling and to allow air to flow. Furthermore, UKPN have requirements in terms of mounting height of the cut-out and separation space around this so what appears to be free space inside the cabinet is actually needed for the safe operation of the feeder pillar and the charge point it serves.”

34. This appeal being determined by this decision relates to the (4th) Request of 29 April 2025 .

35. We also saw reference to a stage 2 complaint. We are aware that local authorities have complaints policies that involve a number of stages. Typically stage 1 is the making of the complaint and stage 2 is an appeal to a senior official if a complainant is not satisfied after stage 1. If then not satisfied the issue can be referred to the Local Government Ombudsman. The evidence provides little insight into this stage 2 complaint. However, what we were told is that: - (a) it was about various aspects of the EVP; (b) in August 2023 WCC decided not to uphold it; and (c) the stage 2 response said, “the location of the pillar does not cause an obstruction to the public, who can easily move past it without any impact or risk" and “ the charging units have seen high levels of usage” and “each statutory party was consulted, in accordance with the Local Authorities Traffic Orders Regulations Act 1996.”

36. Turning to the requests more generally, when responding to the Request WCC referred to it being: - "One of 4 currently open requests from you on a number of subjects, and One of the 9 total received from you in 2025 to date One of 21 total received in the past 12 months"

37. In its internal review these numbers were updated to 5, 13 and 24 respectively but these additions have not been taken into account (see O'Hanlon).

38. Apart from being told the number the parties did not provide evidence on the content, pattern, duration, breadth or outcome of these other requests. While we were aware of four published FtT decisions which involved the Appellant and WCC only Peter Marshall v The Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 251 (GRC) of 25 February 2025 predated the Request being received and by which the Appellant's appeal against WCC's reliance on section 14(1) FOIA was allowed but no further steps ordered.

39. In the DN the IC concludes that: - "28...there is very little difference between the position at the time of this request as when he considered the previous request investigated under IC-388828-J1V7. Indeed, the only real difference is numerical in nature with variations in the numbers of total requests received from the Council and live at the time of the requests.

29. He does not therefore intend to reproduce these arguments here other than to reiterate that this matter has been exhaustively explored and answered by way of previous FOIA/EIR requests and the Stage 2 complaint. He would also reiterate that: “In light of the pattern of requests and correspondence from the complainant about the subject matter, the Commissioner agrees with the Council that it is unlikely that responding to this request would resolve the situation to the complainant’s satisfaction. Rather, it seems likely that requests would continue to be made, adding an additional burden to that already incurred by the Council.

30. As with case ref: IC-388828-J1V7 the Commissioner’s view is that compliance with this request would not be a good use of Council time or resources.."

40. In the previous decision notice relied upon the IC had said: - "34. The Commissioner is also mindful that this is one of seven requests in the period from 1 January 2025 up to the date of the internal review, and that the complainant has submitted a total of 28 requests on a range of topics in the period from 1 October 2023 to 29 April 2025.

35. Given the length of time over which requests and correspondence have been made, the number of requests for the same, or similar, information, and the amount of time the Council has already spent addressing the various requests and queries, it is the opinion of the Commissioner that to respond to the request being considered here, would cause significant disruption to the Council, which would negatively impact on its ability to carry out its statutory duties. The Commissioner’s view is that this is not a good use of Council time or resources. The Commissioner’s decision is that the request is manifestly unreasonable..."

41. When considering this question, we remained unclear as to what the Appellant's case was on the question of burden by course of dealing. We were however particularly mindful of the requests of February and June 2023 and the request of 5 March 2025 . We accept that by close analysis of the first 2 requests which were answered, the 3rd which was not and the Request (which has not been) it may be possible to show that some elements of the Request are not exact repeats of earlier questions. However, all four are about the same EVP and how it came initially to be installed against a wall then moved and enlarged in the process, whose fault that was and what public funds this involved.

42. In reaching this conclusion we had regard to and gave some weight to the existence and outcome of the stage 2 complaint because we had some if limited, evidence about what had been decided.

43. We accept that prior to the Request the Appellant had made many other requests to WCC. We agree with the IC's guidance that "s imply counting up the number of previous requests will not reveal the full story. You also have to take into account how you dealt with those requests." As regards the published FtT decisions WCC could only have been aware of one when it received the Request and, as can be seen it was allowed. In the absence of being provided by the parties with evidence as to the dates of these other requests, what they asked, how WCC responded and how they concluded we only had them in mind as part of our broad assessment of burden.

44. From the above we are satisfied that WCC has demonstrated that the Request, whilst not being a burden, is part of a considerably burdensome course of dealing that does make it potentially manifestly unreasonable subject to the further assessment that follows. Motive

45. The UT in Dransfield said: - “34...the motive of the requester may well be a relevant and indeed significant factor in assessing whether the request itself is vexatious. The FOIA mantra is that the Act is both “motive blind” and “applicant blind” …., the proper application of section 14 cannot side-step the question of the underlying rationale or justification for the request...”

46. At para 33 of the decision notice IC-388828-J1V7 the IC said that he accepts WCC's view that "...the request is motivated primarily by the complainant’s own private interests rather than any wider public interest." In the Grounds the Appellant said that this is not a " personal campaign "and this was not refuted in the IC's response.

47. It is not suggested (and we do not find) that the Appellant's real motive is not to obtain information but, for example, to attack or disrupt WCC. In our view the evidence shows that the question of the installation, size, repositioning and cost of the EVP is the subject of a personal campaign for the Appellant. However, campaigns are not in themselves manifestly unreasonable. As the IC's guidance says, " the existence of a campaign may be the result of a legitimate public concern about an issue and so reflect a weighty public interest in the disclosure of the information." Value

48. The UT in Dransfield said: - "38. Third, and usually bound up to some degree with the question of the requester’s motive, is the inherent value of the request. Does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought? In some cases the value or serious purpose will be obvious... On the other hand, the weight to be attached to that value or serious purpose may diminish over time. For example, if it is truly the case that the underlying grievance has been exhaustively considered and addressed, then subsequent requests (especially where there is “vexatiousness by drift”) may not have a continuing justification. In other cases, the value or serious purpose may be less obvious from the outset. Of course, a lack of apparent objective value cannot alone provide a basis for refusal under section 14, unless there are other factors present which raise the question of vexatiousness. In any case, given that the legislative policy is one of openness, public authorities should be wary of jumping to conclusions about there being a lack of any value or serious purpose behind a request simply because it is not immediately self-evident."

49. There was little said directly on this element of the Dransfield test itself however for example: - (a) in the DN (and IC-388828-J1V7) the IC referred to WCC's conclusion that "In terms of the value or serious purpose of the request, the Council considers this request is motivated primarily by the complainant’s own private interests rather than any wider public interest" (b) in the Grounds the Appellant said that "As a direct result of these egregious failures unnecessary public funds have been incurred. The appellant asserts the entire issue is for very obvious reasons a matter of public interest and not as the third-party suggests – and the Commissioner concurs – is a personal campaign."

50. We accept that the Request does seek to enquire about matters which may have some value or serious purpose beyond satisfying the Appellant's desire to obtain the information. However, we concluded that the level of serious value or purpose is low because: - (a) it appears that the installation, reinstallation and enlargement of this one EVP occurred in August 2022 some three years prior to the Request; (b) by the time of the Request three previous requests had been submitted and answers provided for two; (c) in the February 2023 request (in response to which WCC provided 99 pages of information) the Appellant had asked about "reasons for relocation and costs" ; (d) in the June 2023 request the Appellant had asked about "why the original location of the pillar was chosen and the basis for relocation" ; and (e) if the installation of the EVP had in some way gone wrong (about which we make no judgment) we accept that it might be right for there to have been a review of what had occurred but it appears that this has, at least to some degree, been satisfied by the as a result of the Appellant's stage 2 complaint. Harassment and distress

51. In the earlier connected decision notice IC-388828-J1V7 the IC said: - "25 The Council considers that this issue has been exhaustively explored and answered by way of previous FOIA/EIR requests and the Stage 2 complaint. It therefore considers that any additional time spent on this issue would be a waste of public resources, and cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress to the Council."

52. As regards the DN itself we noted it said: - "The Council confirmed to the Commissioner, that as with the previous request, it considers that this issue has been exhaustively explored and answered by way of previous FOIA/EIR requests and the Stage 2 complaint. It therefore considers that any additional time spent on this issue would be a waste of public resources, and cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress to the Council."

53. We are satisfied that harassment and distress is not a feature of this appeal because we saw no evidence of it, there was for example no mention of it by WCC when responding to the Request or after internal review and the DN, on this question, appears to us to be somewhat speculative, fails to explain how the distress might arise and lacks adequate specificity. Overview

54. Having considered all these elements holistically, despite it being a high hurdle, it was our conclusion that the burden in the course of dealing described above did considerably outweigh the existing but relatively minimal value and serious purpose. Due to this clear imbalance our conclusion is that the Request was manifestly unreasonable. The PIBT

55. The Appellant says, in the Grounds, that the whole issue is very obviously in the public interest as it involves "egregious failures" and the unnecessary waste of public funds. Reasons for disclosure set out in the IC's and WCC's submissions include: - (a) the public interest in environmental information being disclosed; (b) because in support of the public interest disclosure could result in a better understanding of environmental matters which could result in a better-informed public debate; (c) because of the public interest in holding WCC to account for its decisions and how it spends public money; (d) because of the public interest in there being better understanding about how WCC decides where to place EVP and charging stations; and (e) because of the inherent public interest in WCC's operations and the impact on the local community,

56. The reasons against disclosure included that: - (a) WCC has already sought to be transparent; (b) there is no finding of wrongdoing; (c) further disclosure about this EVP will have limited value and public interest; and (d) requiring WCC to respond will cause a disproportionate and unjustified level of disruption to the Council, and that this will divert time and resources from fulfilling its statutory functions distracting WCC's resource from the (59) "... provision of services to the borough and communities within it" which is not in the public interest."

57. Firstly, we accept that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of environmental information which includes for example where EVP are to be sited and the development of electric charging facilities. In our view responding to the Request will not serve this particular public interest to any meaningful extent because the information sought relates to how, as alleged, the EVP came to be inappropriately installed initially, the resulting cost, who might be blame and liable for that cost.

58. It is asserted that as a result of mismanagement by WCC, a costly series of negligent errors and the failure to consult properly the wrong size EVP was initially installed in the wrong place and had to be moved and enlarged. The Request is directed to this. We accept that this gives rise to a significant public interest in disclosure of the requested information, so that it can be established whether anything went wrong and, if so, what costs were incurred. However, in our view this public interest is diminished (but not extinguished) due to: - (a) the carrying out of an investigation into the stage 2 complaint; (b) the outcome of the stage 2 complaint (and the ability to challenge it if so advised) including that the statutory parties were consulted and that WCC had complied with The Local Authorities Traffic Orders Regulations Act 1996; and (c) the limited but unchallenged evidence (in the Grounds) that the February and June requests, to which WCC did respond, involved the installation of the EVP, the reasons for its relocation and costs and "how and why the original location of the pillar was chosen and the basis for relocation" such topics being substantially similar to parts of the Request.

59. Turning to the reasons to maintain the exception we accept that: - (a) in responding to both the 2023 requests WCC had already provided transparency on the subject of this EVP; (b) the stage 2 investigation provided additional transparency; (c) the Request is at least in part, substantially similar to those of February and June 2023 to which WCC did respond; (d) although it would have been of assistance if the stage 2 complaint and outcome had been provided, we accept that there is no evidence from either party of there having been a finding of any wrongdoing by WCC; (e) there is public interest in seeking to ensure that WCC is not needlessly and inappropriately diminished in its ability to carry out its other public functions and discharge its other obligations. While there was no witness statement, we did note that WCC in its initial response and after review said that the PIBT favoured maintaining the exception because "the continuation of dealing with requests on this subject serves to distract resource from provision of services to the borough and communities within it." We accept that requiring WCC to respond carries this risk which would be against the public interest in this case due to our earlier conclusions and gave this a reasonable level of weight; and (f) while it does not mean that the PIBT will inexorably favour maintenance of the exception there is public interest in seeking to prevent WCC from having to respond to a request which we have found to be manifestly unreasonable due to there being considerable burden in the course of dealing which in our view considerably outweighed the value/serious purpose of the Request.

60. When balancing the public interest for and against disclosure of the information sought by the Request, we accept that there is public interest in holding WCC to account for its decisions and use of public funds. We also accept that this public interest is enhanced due to the underlying concerns raised (about which we make no judgment) not least because the concerns include that it may have involved the unnecessary use of public money.

61. However, (while keeping in mind the presumption in favour of disclosure) the public interest reasons for disclosure are in our view clearly outweighed by it being more strongly in the public interest for WCC not to be required to spend time and public funds to answer this Request which we have concluded is manifestly unreasonable. In our view the additional matters set out at para 58(a)-(c) and 59 add some further weight to the balance being clearly in favour of non-disclosure. The Presumption

62. We kept the presumption in mind as we considered the appeal. Our conclusion on the PIBT was not that it was balanced but that that the public interest in non-disclosure clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure. Accordingly, the presumption does not change the conclusion. Decision

63. As set out above we have concluded that the Request was manifestly unreasonable and that the PIBT favoured the maintenance of the relevant exception. We are therefore satisfied that the DN was in accordance with the law.

64. The appeal is dismissed. Signed Judge Heald Date: 21 September 20 26