UK case law

Piers Richard Connor & Anor v Dawn Alice Moore-Elphick & Anor

[2026] UKFTT PC 1355 · Land Registration Division (Property Chamber) · 2026

Get your free legal insight →Email to a colleague
Get your free legal insight on this case →

The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

(1) PIERS RICHARD CONNOR (2) CHRISTINE LOUISE PASQUIRE Applicants -and- (1) DAWN ALICE MOORE-ELPHICK (2) RICHARD MOORE-ELPHICK Respondents Property: Land at 10 Hunters Rise, Kirby Bellars, Melton Mowbray Title Number: LT542658 Before Judge Ewan Paton, sitting at Leicester Tribunals, 5A New Walk, Leicester LE1 On 2nd to 4th September 2026 (site visit 1st September) The Applicants represented themselves For the Respondents: Mr. Christopher Hudson (counsel, instructed by Oldham Marsh Page Flavell Solicitors, Melton Mowbray) _________________________________________________________________________ DECISION ___________________________________________________________________________ Key words: Adverse possession – Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 – area forming part of access strip – factual possession – intention to possess – reasonable mistaken belief that land belonged to Applicant and predecessor Key cases referred to: Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30 Brown v Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 Thorpe v Frank [2019] EWCA Civ 150 Pilford v Greenmanor Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 756 Kirkman v Bradshaw Pub Company Ltd [2025] UKUT 110 (LC) Dobson v Unsted [2026] UKUT 93 (LC) Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19 (CA) Amirtharaja v White [2021] EWHC 330 (Ch) William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 WLR 1016 Introduction: background

1. By an application on form ADV1, dated 8th December 2022 by HM Land Registry, the Applicants applied under Schedule 6 paragraph 1 Land Registration Act 2002 for title by adverse possession to an approximately triangular strip of land, adjacent to their title to 7 Hunters Rise, Kirby Bellars.

2. This, as are all Schedule 6 applications, was premised on the subject land currently being within another registered title. That title belongs to the Applicants’ neighbours, the Respondents, who are the registered proprietors of 10 Hunters Rise.

3. It is another consistent feature of Schedule 6 applications that there has previously been no determination of the exact boundary between the two titles. Further, if successful, the Schedule 6 applicant will be registered with a new title whose plan depicts general boundaries only.

4. This being so, in this and many such cases, it is not necessary to decide – and the parties may disagree over – precisely where on the ground the applicant’s existing title ends and the ‘adverse possession land’ begins. It is only possible to depict the general location of the disputed land, both on HM Land Registry’s illustrative plan accompanying the notice given to the registered proprietors, and consequently on any resulting new registered title. In this case, HM Land Registry depicted the land as shown coloured blue on the illustrative plan below: Land Registry illustrative plan

5. A later plan on which the Applicants relied, depicting more clearly in yellow the land they claimed, relative to their estimation of the existing title boundaries, is also shown below. Applicants’ plan The disputed land and the existing titles: history

6. The Applicants have been the registered proprietors of 7 Hunters Rise since 6 th December 2012. They purchased it on 29 th November 2012 from a Mr. John Startin and Mrs. Yvonne Diane Startin, both now deceased. Although a full title and conveyancing history is not available, the title (LT 222395) was first registered on 13 th September 1989. It comprises two distinct parts:- i) the original plot of the house and garden of number 7, first conveyed off by the original developer of Hunters Rise [George Calverley & Sons (Contractors) Ltd.: “Calverley”] on 9 th November 1960, to one Philip Arthur Stevens; and ii) an adjacent field or paddock, which had a separate title history from the Hunters Rise development. It was conveyed to one Robert Stanley Green on 5 th October 1966 by a Mr. Enever and Ms. Baxter, who had themselves (then as Mr. and Mrs. Enever) purchased it from Lloyds Bank Limited on 20 th September 1960.

7. The Applicants’ case and evidence was that Mr. and Mrs. Startin acquired this field at the same time as they purchased number 7, resulting in first registration of the single title including both in 1989. This is supported by documentary evidence of a planning permission granted to Mr. Startin in 1990, following an application made by him on 16 th February 1990 for “proposed stables”. This included a condition that such use was to be non-commercial, and solely incidental to the use of number 7 as a residential dwelling. It was also a condition that details of the proposed means of storage and removal of manure and waste straw be approved. An extract from the filed plan, showing the above areas tinted blue and pink respectively, is below. Number 7 title filed plan

8. The Respondents have been the registered proprietors of the title (LT 235352) to number 10 since 16 th July 2014. Like the title to number 7, it comprises two parts with separate title histories:- i) the original house and garden plot of number 10, conveyed off by the developer (Calverley) referred to above by a conveyance of 2 nd December 1960 to one Derek Perrie; and ii) an additional parcel of land, which had previously been retained by Calverley, but was then conveyed by it and its receiver on 20 th November 1974 to one George Leonard Bell and Vera Bumpus, who I presume to have been the then owners of number 10. This looks to have been the same parcel of land, then coloured green, over which Calverley granted the then owner of number 7 (Philip Arthur Stevens) a revocable licence to “use” in connection with that property, by a deed dated 7 th November 1961. An extract from the filed plan, showing the above areas coloured (respectively) pink and blue, is below. Number 10 title filed plan

9. The first registered proprietors of the title to number 10 were Mr. Graeme Stevens and his wife (whose name was not in evidence), who owned it between 1990 and (Mr. Stevens recalled) around 2005 or 2006. They then sold it to a Mr. and Mrs. Williamson, who sold to the Respondents in 2014.

10. It can be seen from the above plans that the now disputed land – the triangular strip which is the subject of this application – lies immediately to the east of the ‘hammerhead’ of the Hunters Rise public highway, and on the Applicants’ conceded case forms part of the northern extent of the title to number 10: within the part tinted blue on its title plan above. Give or take minor differences about where the precise current title boundary lies (which is not the subject of these proceedings), the strip is approximately 1.4m wide where it meets Hunters Rise, before tapering eastwards to a point (again, not to be precisely determined in these proceedings) where it meets the undisputed remainder of the number 10 title. The disputed land ‘then and now’

11. As in many such cases, the current configuration and ‘lie of the land’, while useful to have inspected on the site visit, is of less importance than the position in the relatively recent past. Two significant and undisputed events have occurred in the last nine years which:- i) have transformed how the land looks on the ground; but ii) cannot significantly affect the merits of the Applicants’ application either way, for reasons which will be explained further below.

12. In 2017, the Applicants (through contractors) excavated most of the previous surface of the now disputed land, along with a larger portion of what is indisputably their own land, and laid a large block paved accessway, to improve the access to the field/paddock part of their title. This paved accessway can be seen below in the photograph taken on the Land Registry survey requisition. Block paved accessway

13. A blue tarpaulin held down with stones can be seen to the right (south) of the paved accessway above. This covers the root line of a former substantial leylandii hedge which previously stood in that location. The Respondents, through contractors, cut that hedge down in 2021. The hedge root line position relative to the paved accessway can be better seen in the photograph below, produced by the Applicants at the hearing, from 12 th October 2021. Block paved accessway and tree stumps after hedge removal

14. The Applicants’ application for title therefore extends over at least a ‘wedge’ of the now paved accessway abutting Hunters Rise, narrowing to the point further east described above. The Applicants’ own plan, attached under paragraph 5 above, appeared to extend the scope of the application also to the unpaved area between the paving and the hedge root line, shown white on that plan in contrast to the shaded grey area showing the paving: In a photograph taken by the Applicants in 2022 at the inception of this dispute, they sought to demonstrate the extent of their claim at the Hunters Rise pavement end with a chalk marking of a measurement of “1.4m” at that point (below). Applicants’ chalk marking of extent of their claim Position prior to 2017

15. Prior to the dates of the paving and the hedge removal, the following matters were either common ground, unchallenged or clear from a number of undisputed photographs:- i) the former leylandii hedge was planted by the previous owner of number 10 between 1990 and 2005, Mr. Graham Stevens. He provided a witness statement, and attended the hearing to give oral evidence, but the Respondents’ counsel had no questions for him. His evidence was that he planted it shortly after he and his wife purchased number 10, so in about 1990. It clearly grew to a substantial size prior to its removal. It did not extend all the way down to Hunters Rise. There was a clearly visible and distinct area of grass and shrubs between it and the pavement. ii) prior to the 2017 block paving, there was a clearly visible and obviously used accessway into the field/paddock part of the number 7 title, via a then metal gate. Photographs (including some Google Street View images) of this were available from various dates, from both during and prior to the Applicants’ ownership. These showed clearly worn vehicle tyre tracks in this location, with grass strips in between and on either side. The photographs which best demonstrate the above position – and which are of central significance to the application - are below. Google Street View c. 2004 Google Street View c. 2009 From c. 2012, at time of Applicants’ purchase (from field end) From c. 2017, prior to block paving The evidence, and matters in dispute

16. In this as in many such apparently acrimonious neighbour disputes:- i) the most recent events, including the confrontations and mutual allegations dating from the dispute’s inception, are generally of the least and probably no relevance. ii) on closer examination, and particularly having regard to indisputable evidence such as the photographs above, there was relatively little factual evidence of relevance which was in dispute, or historical evidence to which any party or witness could speak from their own personal knowledge (as opposed to commentary, opinion or speculation). Mr. Graham Stevens

17. As stated above, this gentleman, who provided a witness statement for the Applicants, was tendered for cross-examination but did not face any. His witness statement therefore stands unchallenged. In addition to his evidence, already referred to, that it was he who planted the leylandii conifer hedge in about 1990, I take the following evidence of relevance from his statement:- He confirmed that he planted the hedge, and that he did so “along the number 10 side of the edging”. He also stated that neither this nor the boundary position generally was discussed with Mr. Startin at the time. He gave no evidence as to Mr. Startin at all, save for confirming (when asked a question by me) that Mr. Startin had used the accessway to reach his field. Mr. John Spence and Mr. Derek Overfield

18. Mr. Spence has been the joint owner of number 5 Hunters Drive since 1999. He said that what he called a “stoned driveway” and the former hedge were in place when he and his wife bought number 5. He also stated that he had seen a Mr. Derek Overfield trimming the hedge on behalf of the Applicants. Mr. Overfield gave evidence as to his trimming of the hedge, on the Applicants’ side, from about 2013 to 2019. He was cross-examined briefly on the extent to which his financial records actually demonstrated that he had trimmed this particular hedge. I consider that the evidence of these witnesses was straightforward and honest, but does not really take matters much further. As will be explored further below, the trimming of the hedge is of limited significance in relation to the Applicants’ adverse possession application. Dr. Piers Connor (the First Applicant)

19. Dr. Connor relied on the contents of the Applicants’ Statement of Case as evidence, and was then subjected to a prolonged cross-examination by Mr. Hudson. Much of this appeared to relate to the manner in which the application and proceedings had been pursued, his use of different plans and photographs, matters of conduct, or matters of commentary and opinion (occasionally even legal commentary or opinion, such as the significance or otherwise of an owner of number 10 having planted the hedge). Some of the cross-examination appeared to be an attempt to paint the Applicants as opportunists or ‘land grabbers’, re-constructing evidence to improve their case. At other times, Mr. Hudson appeared to be putting to Dr. Connor, for his commentary or opinion, a somewhat speculative case (for which the Respondents later advanced no positive evidence) that the accessway was physically in existence from 1960, and may have been intended as an access for an additional house not built by the developer. So far as concerns any relevant issues of fact , to which Dr. Connor could speak from his own personal knowledge (having only owned and lived at the property since 2012), I drew the following from his evidence.

20. He accepted that it was not until the Applicants’ Amended Statement of Case, dated 9 th July 2025, that he had first alleged that the former owner Mr. Startin had orally told him of the construction of the stoned accessway. The original application, and subsequent iterations of the Applicants’ case, had simply relied on the access having existed and been used. He denied, however, that he had simply invented this detail to improve their case, and repeated that such a conversation had indeed taken place.

21. He also stated for the first time, in answer to questions about the appearance of the accessway in the photographs (wheel paths, with grass between and to the sides), that in their time of ownership they had periodically cut those grassed areas and “re-stoned” the track. Although he was not giving evidence as an expert, his opinion was that the track was formed of “mill waste” rubble, which occasionally came loose through frost or moisture ingress, which they therefore had to maintain from time to time. He also said that there had been such stone rubble under the whole of the accessway, not just the wheel track parts, when it was excavated in 2017, including under the grass areas and going close to the bottom of the hedge.

22. He was asked about the Applicants’ undoubted use of the accessway with vehicles to reach the field forming part of their title. It was put to him that he could not be saying that to do so, vehicles had traversed the area formerly located under the outgrowth of the hedge, up to its root line. It was also put to him that he had no evidence as to the exact areas over which vehicles had passed, and how much (if any) of this included the now disputed land. It was suggested to him that the visible wheel tracks in the photograph showed the likely extent of vehicular use, which he did not accept; referring to the need for vehicles to turn into the accessway with space for their sides and wing mirrors too.

23. I note here that there was no expert evidence before me as to the precise areas over which vehicles of certain sizes would have to manoeuvre to enter the accessway and field from Hunters Rise, and the extent (if any) to which such areas did or might embrace part of the application land. There was no evidence from Mr. or Mrs. Startin (both now deceased), or anyone else who could speak to their period of ownership, as to precisely where they drove vehicles. A 2006 aerial Google Earth image (below) shows what appear to be a number of horse box or similar vehicles in the field (and one entering it), but there is no evidence of precisely which parts of the access they passed over to get there. 2006 aerial view showing vehicles in field The same point applies to the access of electricity company vehicles in connection with the wayleave granted for their benefit in relation to electrical poles in the field.

24. Dr. Connor was also asked, relevant to one legal issue to be discussed below, about his and the Second Applicants’ beliefs as to ownership of the now disputed land. His evidence was that they had always believed that they owned the whole of the accessway right up to the hedge, which they understood was a boundary feature. His evidence was that they only ceased to hold this belief when they investigated the title position, with reference to the title plans but also the original 1960 conveyance plan.

25. As to exactly when that was, there was a detailed email exchange between the parties between November 2021 and January 2022. The Respondents initially claimed that the block paving “..may have encroached up to 1.4m on our land” (4 th November 2021). They followed up on that (on 3 rd January 2022) by proposing that works be done to delineate the boundary as they saw it. The Applicants did not accept that proposal. They suggested that “The reasonable solution is for us to buy that piece of land from you”, but in the alternative offered a joint survey “..to establish exactly where the boundary is”. On 20 th January 2022 they stated that they did not agree with the Respondents’ view as to the boundary location. On 20 th May 2022, however, after stating that they had taken legal advice, they then intimated an application for title “to acquire the land to the north of the hedge by adverse possession” under the Land Registration Act 2002 , the application which they eventually made. The Respondents’ evidence

26. Both Respondents gave evidence and were briefly cross-examined by Dr. Pasquire. Again, as in relation to counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Connor, some of the cross-examination was effectively on matters of commentary or opinion on photographs. The only significant factual issue on which both Respondents gave evidence, and on which there is (or may be) a dispute, was that of hedge trimming. Both Respondents said that Mr. Moore-Elphick trimmed the hedge on both sides – including, therefore, the accessway side – a few times each year. Mr. Moore-Elphick said that when he did so, he would always go around to the Applicants’ house, and tell them as a matter of courtesy that he was doing this and would be putting a ladder up on their side of it. He did not ask “permission” to do this. Neither of them could recall seeing Mr. Overfield also trimming this hedge. Mr. Moore-Elphick said that he did this between 2014 and the eventual removal of the hedge in 2021.

27. Dr. Moore-Elphick (the First Respondent) was asked where she had thought the boundary of their property was. She accepted, as was stated in their Statement of Case, that they had when they purchased thought that the hedge was the boundary. When the block paving was laid in 2017, they discussed between themselves the possibility that some of it was in the wrong place and on their land, but said nothing about it to the Applicants at that time. It was not until 2021 that they clearly formed the view that the paving was partly on their land. She was taken to the email correspondence from that time, referred to above. She confirmed that in their initial exchanges, the Applicants had first referred to having an “easement” over part of their land, a term she had not heard until then (she referred in one of the 3 rd January 2022 emails to the Applicants to “the potential easement mentioned by you both”). She thought that it was possible (“maybe”) that they had occasionally mowed the small strip of grass closest to the western end of the hedge, next to the distinct shrubs and flowers in the vicinity of the former fire hydrant in that area (visible in the extract below from the 2009 Google Street View photo).

28. In general, and despite the strenuous efforts made (particularly in relation to the Applicants) to demonstrate otherwise, I consider that all parties and witnesses were essentially honest and straightforward in their evidence as to matters of fact within their knowledge. I do not consider that any party has been devious or untruthful in anything they have said or written, or have “reconstructed” evidence to suit their case. As with many such disputes, the real issues are ones of law, and the application of law to largely clear facts. The law, and legal framework for the Applicants’ application i) statutory framework

29. Although originally made as an ADV1 application under Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 , it has been made clear via directions and the Applicants’ Amended Statement of Case that their application is also being treated as one made in the alternative under the transitional provisions of Schedule 12 paragraph 18 of that Act .

30. Their initial case, chronologically, is therefore that Mr. and Mrs. Startin were in adverse possession of the disputed land from “on or around 1990” for a period in excess of 12 years prior to the coming into force of the Land Registration Act 2002 on 13 th October 2003. If established, that would have given rise, by the operation of sections 15 and 18 Limitation Act 1980 and section 75 Land Registration 1925, to the barring of any registered title to the contrary, and it being held on a statutory trust for the Startins. The Applicants say that they succeeded to the Startins’ possession and title, and so are entitled now to be registered as proprietors of this land on that basis.

31. Only if that case does not succeed would it then be necessary for the Applicants to rely separately on Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 . They purchased number 7 on 29 th November 2012. They claim to likewise have been in adverse possession of the disputed land since then. Their own time in alleged possession includes the block paving of the accessway in 2017.

32. When the application was made on form ADV1 dated 1 st December 2022 (received and dated by HM Land Registry as 8 th December 2022), the Respondents as registered proprietors served form NAP under Schedule 6 paragraph 3(1), requiring the application to be dealt with under paragraph 5. This means that an applicant for title by adverse possession under paragraph 1 cannot succeed, even if they establish that they have “been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten years ending on the date of the application”, unless they can then also establish one of the three exceptional ‘conditions’ in paragraph 5.

33. The Applicants rely, and relied at the hearing, on the conditions in paragraph 5(2) and 5(4). Paragraph 5(2) (“the first condition”) is that: “(a) it would be unconscionable because of an equity by estoppel for the registered proprietor to seek to dispossess the applicant, and (b) the circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered as the proprietor.”

34. Paragraph 5(4) (“the third condition”) is that:- “(a) the land to which the application relates is adjacent to land belonging to the applicant, (b) the exact line of the boundary between the two has not been determined under rules under section 60, (c) for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him, and (d) the estate to which the application relates was registered more than one year prior to the date of the application.”

35. Paragraph 5(4) was the subject of the recent appeal to the Supreme Court in Brown v. Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 , in which the Court confirmed that the requisite “reasonable belief” that the land belonged to the applicant can have existed during any ten year period of the period of adverse possession relied upon, and did not have to have been held right up to (or until very shortly before) the date of the application, as had previously been thought to be the case after Zarb v. Parry [2011] EWCA Civ. 1306 . It was clear before that case, and remains the position, that the sub-paragraph requires both a genuine and “reasonable” belief on the part of the applicant (and if joint applicants, that it was held by them both). ii) Adverse possession: general

36. The principles as to what constitutes adverse possession are the same under either statutory regime. There is little dispute as to their essential content.

37. Adverse possession has two elements:- i) Factual possession, namely a “sufficient degree of exclusive physical control” of the land in question. ii) An intention to possess or “animus possidendi”, namely “the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.” (see Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452 at 470-471, per Slade J., as later approved by the House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30 .)

38. What constitutes a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control depends on the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. What must be shown is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so: see Powell (ibid), and also Thorpe v. Frank [2019] EWCA Civ. 150 , paragraph 40 per McCombe LJ “ ...the sort of actions that one would expect an occupying owner to do in dealing with this land.” (in that case digging up and re-laying an open forecourt area).

39. Physical enclosure by a fence or other barrier is amongst the strongest possible evidence of possession, but is not necessary in every case (see e.g. Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168, and more recently in Pilford v Greenmanor Limited [2012] EWCA Civ 756 , at paragraph 27, per Etherton LJ). See also Kirkman v. Bradshaw Pub Company Limited [2025] UKUT 110 (LC) , paragraph 33: “If the characteristics of the land are such that an occupying owner would not have been expected to enclose it, the failure of the applicant to enclose it is unlikely to be crucial and may even simply be irrelevant.”

40. In the recent Upper Tribunal case of Dobson v. Unsted [2026] UKUT 93 (LC) , adverse possession of a small unenclosed patch of grass abutting the road verge was established. This was on the basis that the applicants and their predecessors had done what an occupying owner of such land would have done: mowing it, keeping it tidy and treating it as part of their wider garden; which (it was held on appeal) is how it would have appeared to anyone looking at it from the roadside. This, and Kirkman above, also confirm the further principle that possession of part or parts of an area may be treated as possession of the larger whole area if there is:- “such a common character of locality as would raise a reasonable inference that, if a person were possessed of one part of it as owner, then he would possess the whole of it”: ( Roberts v Swangrove Estates Ltd [2007] EWHC 513 (Ch) at [63], per Lindsay J. at first instance). If the acts of factual possession are sufficient, it is irrelevant to ask whether the possessor could have done more: see Purbrick v Hackney LBC [2004] 1 P & CR 34 at [20] et seq per Neuberger LJ.

41. The “intention to possess”: “simply means an intention to exercise such custody and control on one’s own behalf and for one’s own benefit i.e. to use the land “as one’s own”: JA Pye Limited v. Graham , paragraphs [40], [71]. It is not necessary to prove a deliberate intention to oust or exclude the paper title owner or registered proprietor, or any particular belief in ownership or entitlement. In many cases, however, the possessor may in fact believe that they already own the land. That would more than suffice to establish the lesser intention to possess. Conversely, even a person who knows that they do not own the land in question, and would leave if asked to do so, may still intend to possess it for as long as possible.

42. While the possessor is not required to advertise their intentions to the world, their intention to possess should be sufficiently manifested from their actions so as to make their intention clear. Slade J. in Powell said (at p472) that the possessor must have made their intention to possess unequivocal and “perfectly plain” from their actions: “..where the question is whether a trespasser has acquired possession….. the courts will, in my judgment, require clear and affirmative evidence that the trespasser, claiming that he has acquired possession, not only had the requisite intention to possess, but made such intention clear to the world. If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner.”

43. Where the subject land consists of an open track, road, path or similar, or part of one, particular issues may arise as to the sufficiency as adverse possession of what has been done on or to it.

44. First, if such land is unenclosed and has been used by others, it may be difficult for the applicant to establish that he has had sufficient exclusive physical control of it amounting to factual possession: see e.g. Simpson v. Fergus (2000) 79 P&CR 318 (CA), per Waller LJ at p402.

45. Second, the would-be adverse possessor of such a lane or road may have exercised acts of use and passage over it, and carried out acts ancillary to such use and passage, which are equally explicable as and referable to him having simply a right of way over it i.e. an easement rather than possession. Such acts may therefore be “equivocal” so far as manifesting any intention to possess the land, as opposed to simply using it. See, in particular Littledale v. Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch. 19 (CA) (even where the way was gated), and more recently per Michael Green J. in Amirtharaja v. White [2021] EWHC 330 (Ch.) (upheld on appeal on a different point at [2022] EWCA Civ. 11 ). Discussion, findings of fact, and application of law

46. The first clear conclusion I reach is that the Applicants’ case stands or falls on the sufficiency as adverse possession, or otherwise, of the acts of their predecessors Mr. and Mrs. Startin. The Applicants have to rely on such acts, because they cannot ‘get home’ simply on their own alleged possession in support of their Schedule 6 ADV1 application. That being so, the Applicants’ own actions since 2012, and the beliefs or intentions which have accompanied them, are largely irrelevant. In fact, the case stands or falls entirely on the Schedule 12 paragraph 18 transitional provisions claim. The ADV1/Schedule 6 case cannot succeed. This is for the following reasons.

47. The maximum period of adverse possession in their own right which the Applicants could assert, prior to their application on 1 st December 2022, was fractionally over ten years (they purchased number 7 on 29 th November 2012). The Applicants had, however, ceased to hold any genuine or reasonable belief that the disputed land already belonged to them by 20 th May 2022 at the latest. That was when, referring to legal advice they had received, they intimated what became their Schedule 6 adverse possession application.

48. So the Applicants cannot establish the condition in Schedule 6 paragraph 5(4)(c) [that “for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to [them]..”] solely by their own period of possession accompanied by that belief. They have to go back to the Startins, and aggregate or ‘tag on’ a portion of a) their possession and b) a genuine and reasonable belief, held by them both (Mr. and Mrs. Startin) that the now disputed land belonged to them.

49. For what it is worth, I accept that both of the Applicants genuinely believed until 20 th May 2022 (at the latest) that they owned all the land on ‘their’ side of the hedge. I also accept that it was reasonable so to believe, given the absence of any indication or claim to the contrary until 2021. It is also telling that this was the same belief which the Respondents possessed following their own purchase in 2014.

50. There is, however, no evidence at all from or on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Startin as to what, if anything, they may have believed as to the small portion of land now in dispute. Their 2012 Sellers’ Property Information Form does not provide it. Their answers to questions 1.1 and 1.2 on “boundary features”, and whether any have been moved in the last 20 years, do not assist in identifying whether they regarded the leylandii hedge as such a “boundary feature”. Question 1.1 refers only to boundaries at the “left…right…rear…[and] front”, which more usually identifies the four sides of a house or similar more conventionally shaped plot. It is of little use where there is also a large field/paddock, and a portion of an accessway.

51. The Applicants, even if they could establish ten years of adverse possession, cannot therefore establish that it was accompanied by the requisite belief for the purposes of the third condition in paragraph 5(4).

52. Taking the very last of Mr. Hudson’s submissions somewhat out of sequence, nor is there any basis upon which the Applicants could establish the first condition, namely paragraph 5(2): an “equity by estoppel” and “unconscionability”.

53. Estoppel requires some representation or encouragement as to proprietary entitlement, reliance on it, then consequential detriment. The Applicants cannot begin to establish any of these. There is no evidence or suggestion that the Respondents or any of their predecessors ever made any representation or assurance relating to this land, to the Applicants or to Mr. and Mrs. Startin. Further, far from relying on any assurance made by someone else, the Applicants’ case and evidence is that they simply assumed that this land was theirs. Any expenditure which they may have incurred specifically in relation to this land (which, on their own case, would be a small fraction of their overall outlay on the block paving and any maintenance) has not been quantified, but was their own choice. The mere presence of a hedge, unaccompanied by any other conduct or assurance by anyone, cannot amount to any sort of representation that land on the other side of it is someone else’s. Nor can the Applicants cite as “detriment” simply not having the land which they are claiming.

54. The Schedule 6 aspect of the application cannot therefore succeed. This is, however, somewhat immaterial to the Applicants’ purposes, for this reason. They have to rely on the prior alleged adverse possession of the Startins in any event. On their own case, nothing which the Startins did significantly changed after about 1990. There was not, for example, some alleged ‘stepping up’ of the Startins’ activities later in their period of ownership, such as additional acts of possession over and above the initial alleged construction of the accessway.

55. So either what the Startins are said to have done on or to the land in 1990 was sufficient as adverse possession, or it was not. If it was, then the Schedule 12 paragraph 18 application succeeds, on the basis that such a state of affairs must have existed for at least 12 years prior to 13 th October 2003. If it was not, then it could not support either that application, or be added to the Applicants’ own later alleged possession for the purposes of Schedule 6. It is therefore necessary to consider such evidence as there is relating to the Startins’ period of ownership. Did the Startins adversely possess the disputed land?

56. The first finding of fact I make, on any matter which was disputed, is that on the balance of probabilities, in 1990 Mr. and Mrs. Startin laid down a relatively coarse and rough surface, consisting of loose stone and (as both parties referred to it as) “mill waste” to link the two portions of land – number 7 and the field to the east – which they had just acquired.

57. As set out above, the field had a separate title history, having been conveyed by Lloyds Bank Limited first to a Mr. and Mrs. Enever in 1960, then by them to Robert Green in 1974. There is no evidence, despite the speculative case put to Dr. Connor by Mr. Hudson, that:- i) this field was ever in the ownership of the Hunters Rise developer (Calverley), so that e.g. it may have been retained by them as a plot for further development; or that ii) there was, until the Startins’ ownership of both, any sort of physical access, or right of access, between it and number 7 or any other part of Hunters Rise. I reject any suggestion, as made by Mr. Hudson, that any such “access” can be identified from a 1972 monochrome aerial photograph which was in evidence. If anything at all can be seen from this (which is not clear), it might be said that the field actually looks to be enclosed from Hunters Rise. 1972 aerial view (‘X’ marks the field)

58. Dr. Connor’s understanding, albeit hearsay, was that the Startins had acquired both parcels at the same time, for the purpose of having stables and a paddock to use with their house. This is, however, corroborated by the 1990 planning application seeking permission to construct stables, which can obviously only have been on the field. The conditions attached to that planning permission required proposals for the removal of manure and waste, which would have been likely to require vehicular access. In any event, however, as a matter of inference and common sense, if the Startins were going to keep horses in the field, they would have wanted to have adequate vehicular access for cars, trailers and probably horseboxes too. They were, I find, the first owners who ever needed to get between these two parcels of land with vehicles.

59. The vast majority of the stone or mill waste which they laid down for this purpose was on what was indisputably their own land. I find however that a small portion of it was also laid on what is now the disputed land. It is, however, very difficult now to say precisely to what extent this was. Mr. Graham Stevens’ evidence as to the existence of a “sunken edging kerb beyond which was a vehicular driveway made from crushed stone” was unchallenged, as was his evidence that he then planted the hedge on the “number 10 side” of that edging. He did not say, however, what the distance between the two was, nor would I have expected him to remember this.

60. As to the planting of the hedge, there is no principle of “adverse possession in reverse”, whereby an owner who plants a hedge or erects a fence within his existing boundaries in some way dispossesses himself, or cedes the land on the other side of it to a neighbouring owner. There must still be sufficient acts of possession of such land by another person if they are to claim and bar title to it. So absent some specific boundary agreement (which was not alleged here), it is not enough simply to say that the hedge in this case became a “boundary feature” and generated adverse possession on the other side of it.

61. Nor did any evidence or trace of the “edging kerb” survive by the time the Applicants’ contractors carried out excavation works in 2017 in advance of laying the block paving. The highest the Applicants’ case could be put in relation to this, relying principally on the photograph below, was that:- i) the excavation uncovered lots of loose stone, which is consistent with my finding above; and ii) the contractors laid a string line alongside the hedge to mark the edge of the intended block paving, and so did not cut back the hedge to lay it. The string line is visible beside the hedge. The further white line has been superimposed on the photograph electronically by the Applicants, to indicate their estimation of where the existing title boundary runs (and so, as a consequence, where the disputed land lies). 2017 photograph showing excavated accessway, string line, and Applicants’ estimation of now disputed triangle of land

62. Allowing for what are therefore the twin uncertainties of i) there having been no precise title boundary determination and ii) precisely where, and how close to where the hedge was later planted, Mr. Startin laid down stone, I nevertheless consider that the case largely boils down to whether Mr. and Mrs. Startin could be said to have been in factual possession, with an intention to possess, what is mostly the grassed area – between the wheel track and the hedge – visible in particular in the 2009 photograph of which a magnified extract is attached below.

63. Beyond that point, and moving eastwards, the disputed land tapers to its ultimate end point, but on the balance of probabilities must then have consisted almost wholly of a thin portion of the grassed area beside the hedge visible in the extract from the 2012 photograph below.

64. The next finding of fact which I make, which is a matter of obvious inference from ownership (but supported by the existence of the gate, and the evidence of vehicles in the 2006 aerial Google photograph) is that for the remaining period of their ownership, Mr. and Mrs. Startin will have passed and repassed over the accessway they created in 1990, to and from their field, with and without vehicles.

65. All that can be said with any certainty, or probability, about this is that:- i) the wheels of such vehicles will have passed over the wheel tracks visible in all of the photographs; ii) such vehicles could not have passed through or under any part of the hedge; and iii) nor would they have ploughed over the shrub, flower bed and fire hydrant visible in the first photograph above. It is possible that the wing mirrors of vehicles may have passed over (but not on) the grassed area immediately beside the hedge, but as stated there is no detailed evidence, from that time or the present, as to the precise dimensions of vehicles or their likely arc or route when passing and repassing to and from the field.

66. That is all the evidence of what the Startins actually did. Essentially, they laid a rough accessway and drove over it. Most of it was within their own title. Some of the stone and waste which they laid down was later overgrown with grass on top, and at least some portion of that land is now the disputed land. At most, it is possible that some parts of vehicles may have passed over those grassed parts.

67. As to their neighbours – the owners of number 10 during their ownership – Graham Stevens planted the hedge. He did not, however, discuss or agree its position with the Startins. Nor is there any evidence that he was ever physically excluded from the land on the other side of his hedge, or regarded himself as so excluded. Nothing at all is known, or has been heard from, his successors (and the Respondents’ vendors) Mr. and Mrs. Williamson, but I note that in the 2012 photograph a large wooden shed is visible immediately beside the accessway, which I presume to have been erected by the owners of number 10, and to have been accessible from the accessway side.

68. The only evidence of hedge trimming came from more recent years. For what it is worth – which in the end, is very little – I accept the evidence from both sides on this issue. I accept that Mr. Overfield trimmed the number 7 hedge at the request of the Applicants, in addition to doing other works for them, in the period 2013 to 2019; although this may only have been on a handful of occasions, none of them witnessed by the Respondents. I also accept the Respondents’ evidence that they themselves trimmed the hedge on that side, and in particular I accept Mr. Moore-Elphick’s evidence that he would inform the Applicants that he was doing this, as a matter of courtesy.

69. I nevertheless infer from that more recent evidence that it is likely – although again, he did not give evidence and was not asked about this – that Mr. Graham Stevens will himself have trimmed the hedge which he himself planted, and in any event was not prevented or excluded from doing so. Conclusion on possession

70. When one looks at those grassed areas, and the small open area beside the shrubs and fire hydrant, and asks “was that factual possession?”, I consider that the answer is “No”.

71. First, the person or persons who are now assumed to have been the paper owners of those areas at that time were never physically excluded from them, as stated above. Those areas were wholly accessible to them. All they would have had to was step around the hedge e.g. to trim it or pull up weeds.

72. In this respect, this distinguishes this case significantly from those cases in which the disputed land has been enclosed (e.g. by a hedge or fence) onto the rest of the applicant’s garden, with the garden (including the later disputed land) then being enjoyed as a single indivisible whole. It also distinguishes it from those cases such as Dobson v. Unsted where there is no enclosure, but there is nevertheless an obvious single indivisible whole in the possession of one party.

73. What a reasonable person would have seen here, had they looked at the land in the photographs above, was a track with a grass strip separating it from a hedge. It would not have been obvious whether the strip went with the track or the hedge. In particular, in what is perhaps the most significant (and widest) part of the disputed land – the ‘wedge’ at the Hunters Rise end, said to be 1.4m wide – this was wholly unenclosed, most of it lay beyond the hedge line, and a large number of shrubs and flowers grew in that vicinity.

74. I do not consider that the Startins could be said to have been in exclusive physical control of any of these areas. I further consider that what they actually did was equivocal so far as any intention to possess was concerned.

75. What they did, as summarised above in paragraph 62, was to create and use an access almost entirely on their own land, but (unknowingly) very slightly extend the area of their use so as to pass and repass over part of someone else’s land. To that small extent, their actions were equally consistent with those of a person exercising and potentially acquiring a right of way over such additional land. As is stated by the editors of Ruoff & Roper’s Registered Conveyancing , at paragraph 33-15: “It may be that a squatter owns neighbouring land which does not have the benefit of any right or easement over the land in question, but the nature of his use of the land is in the nature of an easement. In such a case, the squatter will not have manifested the necessary intention to possess for the purposes of adverse possession, his acts instead being attributable to the exercise of a prescriptive or other right in the nature of an easement.” (citing William Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1016 , in which Hoffmann LJ said at p1024: “Use of land as a right of way, for example, does not become an act of possession because no one else goes upon the land.”) I consider that this principle applies squarely to this case.

76. Even acts of surfacing and making up the route of a way over someone else’s land are ancillary rights which the holder of a right of way enjoys: see e.g. Gale on Easements , 22 nd edition, paragraph 9-110, and e.g. Nationwide Building Society v James Beauchamp (A Firm) [2001] EWCA Civ 275 . They are not necessarily acts of ownership. I would place the Startins’ initial 1990 stone surfacing, so far as it extended to any areas not within their title, in this category.

77. I agree, and the Respondents conceded (on the authority of Thorpe v. Frank in particular) that the Applicants’ 2017 acts in completely excavating the ground, and laying a brand new block paved driveway, go beyond that and amount to an act of factual possession of all the areas it covered. I do not consider that the initial basic stone laying of the Startins, as visible in the various photographs above, went this far.

78. The same applies, with greater force, to acts consisting merely of passing over (e.g. with parts of vehicles, such as their wing mirrors) someone else’s land. As stated, there is no evidence that the Startins did anything else during their time of ownership – not even hedge trimming, grass cutting, maintenance or anything similar.

79. I consider that this case is really a dispute about access , masquerading as one about title; and that the Applicants have – unfortunately - probably made the wrong application to meet their immediate concerns.

80. It is telling that, as I find, this is how the Applicants initially intimated their claim to the Respondents. I accept the evidence of Dr. Moore-Elphick, as corroborated by her contemporaneous email of 3 rd January 2022, that the Applicants first referred to a “potential easement” over part of the Respondents’ land.

81. The Applicants clearly wish to have a slightly wider berth and entrance arc for vehicles passing and repassing to and from their field. The relatively small (maximum 1.4m wide) ‘wedge’ abutting Hunters Rise is the key element of this. That is the part of the block paving which the Respondents threatened to diagonally cut through and remove from use by the Applicants. While there is no evidence either way (expert or otherwise) as to whether the loss of that ‘wedge’ would make vehicular access more difficult, merely less convenient, or wholly impossible, I can see why the Applicants would want to have that area available for such use.

82. If the Applicants’ case were that they and their predecessors had passed and repassed over that exact patch of ground (and or any other areas), with and without vehicles, for a period in excess of 20 years, then this would have normally been the subject of a claim for a prescriptive easement on that basis. On one view, that would be enough to meet their concerns, as they initially appeared to have intimated to the Respondents.

83. That is not, however, the application which they eventually made. They went further and sought to claim outright title to such land, by adverse possession. For the reasons set out above, I do not consider that such a claim can be made out.

84. The Applicants have, I find, only been in factual possession of, with an intention to possess, such part of the disputed land as is block paved since 2017, as conceded by the Respondents. Prior to that, neither they nor their predecessors the Startins were in such possession of it.

85. I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to reject their application. Costs

86. The Applicants have therefore been unsuccessful, and the Respondents successful. The usual costs order which would follow from that is that the Applicants pay the Respondents’ costs of these proceedings, from 29 th January 2025 (the date on which the proceedings commenced following the reference from HM Land Registry).

87. I will nevertheless consider any representations made on liability for costs by the date stated in the order. After that date I will make any necessary order, and give directions for the assessment of any costs ordered to be paid. Judge Ewan Paton Dated this 17 th day of September 2026 By Order of The Tribunal