UK case law
Q & M (Care Proceedings: Unconscionable Delay), Re
[2026] EWFC 292 · Family Court · 2026
The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Full judgment
Ms Justice Henke DBE : Introduction and Background:
1. This court has been concerned with two children: Q and M. They are two of the six children of the mother. Their siblings are N, A, O, and P. Collectively, all six children have been the subject of public law proceedings brought by Surrey County Council. On 8 June 2026, I handed down a written judgment in relation to the threshold conditions applicable to all six children and the final welfare determinations in relation to N, A, O and P. The welfare determination for M had to be adjourned because the paternal grandmother, who seeks to care for her, had not had the disclosure she ought to have had. Further, between the close of evidence and the handing down of judgment, FB, who, by agreement of all parties, was to have been Q's long-term carer, was diagnosed with cancer and considered herself no longer able to care for Q. In those circumstances, Q's care plan had to be revised, and that revised plan is in dispute. Of necessity, the welfare determination in relation to Q was also adjourned.
2. A relatively brief factual background to the applications for public law orders in relation to all six children is set out at paragraphs 23 to 73 of my first judgment.
3. I have already found threshold proved in relation to all six children, including Q and M, on the basis that, as at the relevant date, namely 14 October 2024, Q, A, O, P and M were suffering, and were likely to suffer, significant harm attributable to the care given to them by the mother and by FD, and likely to be given to them if the child protection process had not intervened, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. I have already found that, as at that date, the significant harm the children were suffering, and were likely to continue to suffer, was physical harm and impairment of their emotional, social and psychological development by reason of the following: a. The mother's relationship with FD was toxic and highly volatile. The children have been exposed, both directly and indirectly, to that volatility and to both verbal and physical abuse between their mother and FD. b. On 12 October 2024, their mother and FD were involved in an incident in which the mother caused criminal damage to the neighbours' home, including smashing a window and damaging their car. Q, O, P and M were at home during this incident, which would have been frightening. The mother received a caution for criminal damage. I find as a fact that, on that occasion, the children were unsafely transported by the mother and FD in his van and left in the care of the maternal grandmother. c. FD has an extensive criminal history, which exposed the children to risk of criminality. He has 39 convictions for 79 offences between 2005 and 2024. This includes offences against previous partners, criminal damage and drug use. d. The mother had misused substances, including cocaine, whilst being the primary carer for the children, which negatively impacted upon her ability to provide consistent care and placed them at risk of emotional harm and neglect. e. The children's basic care needs were not met in the care of the mother and FD in that the children were left unattended, in the care of their 14-year-old cousin, placing them at risk of physical harm and neglect. f. The mother and FD have neglected the children's health needs. i. P has a disability for which he requires specialist equipment. The mother missed or cancelled appointments with, or contact from, P’s occupational therapist on 2.12.21, 15.6.22, 23.8.22, 20.9.22, 25.10.22, 29.11.22, 13.2.23, 23.8.23, 17.1.24, 28.2.24, placing him at risk of physical harm and neglect by way of his unmet health needs. For example, in or around February 2024, P was being propped up in a washing basket to watch television. ii. Further, P's oral hygiene was neglected, causing him to suffer dental decay and requiring him to have surgery under general anaesthetic to remove four teeth and cap eight teeth. iii. Q's oral hygiene was neglected, causing her to suffer dental decay. Q missed multiple dental appointments and is at risk of losing a number of teeth as an adult. g. The mother and FD have neglected the children's educational needs in that A’s school attendance was 82% in 2024. She was classed as persistently absent and fitted the criteria for educational neglect. In the academic year 2023/2024, O's school attendance was 55%. There has been a deterioration in her academic ability due to her low attendance. P's attendance at school was 72.2% during the same school year.
4. I remind myself that the threshold criteria are gateway conditions. Where, as here, the court is satisfied that the threshold conditions within s.31(2) CA 1989 are met, the statutory gateway is opened and the court has jurisdiction to make a care or supervision order if satisfied that it is in the best interests of the subject child to do so. The welfare of the child is paramount and must be evaluated, as mandated by s.1(4) CA 1989 , in accordance with the checklist under s.1(3) CA 1989 . Section 1(3) (g) CA 1989 requires the court to have regard to the range of powers available to it under the Act in the proceedings in question. Where, as here in relation to M, the local authority's plan is adoption, I must undertake a rigorous comparative evaluation of the realistic options for her, applying the lifelong welfare test under s.1 Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the proportionality requirements of Article 8 ECHR.
5. The hearing before me to determine the future welfare outcomes for Q and M began on 23 June 2026. It was listed for four days. After listing, the witness list expanded. The hearing concluded with written submissions submitted on 8 July 2026. Unfortunately, and for reasons which are not immediately apparent, those on behalf of FD did not reach me until 20 July 2026. I make no criticism of anyone. I set this out simply to explain that the judgment could not be concluded before the end of term and has had to be finalised in the Summer Vacation.
6. Before me the parties have been represented as follows: a. Ms Niamh Daly appeared for the local authority. b. Mr Anthony Forde appeared on behalf of the mother. c. Mr David Sharpe of Counsel appeared on behalf of FD, M’s father. d. Ms Amanda Meusz appeared on behalf of FE, M’s paternal grandmother. e. Ms Carter-Birch appeared for the Guardian. f. Ms Lavelle on behalf of Q. Q has been separately represented since 15 June 2026. I have met Q over a video link. I have received and read a letter from her.
7. During the hearing I heard evidence from the following witnesses: a. Ms Kate Nolan b. Ms L c. Ms Wright d. Mrs Wilkinson who assessed the paternal grandmother of M, FE e. FG f. FR g. The mother h. FD i. FE j. The Guardian In the paragraphs that follow, I set out a summary of their respective evidence and my assessment of them as witnesses. The Witnesses
8. Ms Kate Nolan is a Team Manager working in the social services department of the local authority. She filed a statement dated 3 June 2026. Within it she referred to and relied upon Ms Wilkinson’s assessment of FE. Whilst she acknowledged the positives if M were to be placed with her grandmother and the support that would be offered to FE if a Special Guardianship Order were made, she emphasised that (i) FE’s own children had suffered significant harm in her care during their childhoods and (ii) FE’s failure to acknowledge FD’s violent tendencies during the assessment and her expressed need to appease him were both risk factors which pointed away from her as a future carer for M. She said that whilst supports can be put in place, insight and reflection are not something that can be taught. She agrees with Mrs Wilkinson’s conclusion that these factors, alongside FD's history of criminality, increase the risk of FD destabilising the placement. Even with a court order in place to prevent him from coming near M's home, his past behaviours do not allow confidence that he would abide by them. In chief, Ms Nolan told me that she did not change her overall recommendation to the court for M, but if I decided that M should be placed with FE the local authority would want to have a transition plan over 6-7 weeks and share parental responsibility. When cross-examined on behalf of FE by Ms Meusz, Ms Nolan accepted that Ms Speers, the social worker, had failed to include her client in her Re B-S analysis although she was a realistic option for M. However, she denied the local authority had a closed mind. She had reviewed the case and based her decision making on Ms Wilkinson’s assessment. Ms Nolan had not known of FE’s vulnerabilities until she read her recent statement. If the social worker had been aware of those vulnerabilities, the assessment should have been adapted to meet her needs. Without adaptations there is difficulty in the assessment, although she caveated that answer saying that she had not heard Ms Wilkinson’s evidence yet. Ms Nolan conducted the relevant Re B-S analysis in the witness box. She had previously observed contact between FE and M and accepted that she should have acknowledged it was positive in her own statement. Whilst she had not written the positives down, she had included the positives when making her assessment.
9. The case of R was a private law case but R was open to the local authority. She had not heard of any problems with FD keeping to the rules when having contact with R and she would expect to have been told if there had been problems. It would have been helpful if Ms Speers had factored in R and the continuing contact with FD when making the Re B-S analysis; however, she cautioned that R and M’s circumstances are different, as are their needs. Ms Nolan agreed that it would not be unreasonable for FE to ask for support when promoting contact if M were placed with her. However, she stated that Special Guardians are given support and training to manage contact themselves.
10. In her written evidence Ms Nolan told the court that she had attended a strategy meeting on 28 May 2026 in relation to the mother’ niece, S, who is 16 years old and is placed in a residential children’s home by the local authority under a care order. During the strategy meeting, concerns were raised that S was not in her placement over the Bank Holiday weekend (22-24 May 2026). The Home Manager confirmed in the meeting that the mother and S were in contact by phone prior to the weekend. She advised that two adult family members raised concerns that S was possibly with the mother whilst missing, breaching the CAWN which was served on the mother on 20 April 2026 prohibiting her from allowing, causing or inducing the child (S) to enter or stay at any address at which she is present. The family reported that when S returned to her mother's address on 24 May 2026, she was observed by her mother to be under the influence of illicit substances. During the meeting the mother’s probation officer confirmed that on Friday 22 May 2026 they had met with the mother to reiterate the requirements of a CAWN and shared that there had been an alert from the mother’s tag that alcohol had been consumed over the weekend in question. The mother, when challenged by a social worker on 29 May 2026, had denied knowing of the CAWN until 29 May 2026 and dismissed the concerns of the children’s home or that there was a valid reason for the CAWN. S later confirmed to the children’s home Regional Manager that she had been with the mother during the relevant period. The issues for Ms Nolan were the risks that the mother would pose to M given her continued excessive alcohol use, her use of illicit drugs and her lack of respect for authority and boundaries. In chief, Ms Nolan told me that the relevance of the alleged breach of the CAWN was that, if proved, the mother was actively undermining another child’s placement in care. When cross-examined by Mr Forde on behalf of the mother, Ms Nolan accepted that it was only one alleged breach that they were relying on and that on 23 May 2026 the police had found Q at the mother’ address, not S. On previous occasions the mother has contacted the police and ambulance service when S has absconded. However, she stated that the mother had not always done so consistently.
11. The care plan for M is placement for adoption. In cross-examination by Mr Forde, Ms Nolan confirmed that the pool of potential adopters was small and even smaller if looking for an ethnic match. The recent DofE statistics were put to Ms Nolan, who accepted that there was a national shortage of potential adopters. She did not challenge the statistic that, on average, a child waits 645 days to be adopted. However, when cross-examined on behalf of the Guardian, Ms Nolan told me that she would expect a quick match for M given her age – a very popular age for adoption.
12. As to contact between the mother and M, Ms Nolan, in writing, acknowledged the mother’s love for her daughter and the long-term positive impact of direct contact between an adopted child and birth parent. She accepted that (i) the mother has completed work with her Domestic Abuse Worker, (ii) has refrained from contact with FD and (iii) completed four talking therapy sessions with Mind Matters. In writing, the local authority was of the view that no direct contact was in M's best interests. The mother had not yet completed the 12 months of psychotherapy that is considered necessary to bring about permanent change and had not taken up the direct parenting support the ISW and the FSW considered necessary. Despite a strong motivation to maintain links with M, there is no confidence that the mother would put M's needs before her own. She continues to drink alcohol despite a tag and uses illicit drugs. The local authority does not feel able to trust the mother not to ask M questions about her adoptive life. The breach(es) of the CAWN alleged by the local authority, together with the mother’s lack of honesty with the local authority, prevent the local authority from being confident that the mother will abide by rules and boundaries in the future. Ms Nolan considers it noteworthy that the alcohol consumption admitted in the mother’s most recent statement differs from the alcohol readings provided by Probation and obtained through her tag. In chief, Ms Nolan told me that she had reflected on the issue of contact for M with her mother. If the mother would accept support and continue with therapy and refrain from alcohol misuse and illicit drug use, then there is a possibility of direct contact between her and M in the future. We have to be open to it. She is a loving mother and ......[acknowledge] the benefits of direct contact. When cross-examined by Mr Forde, Ms Nolan told me that the mother continuing to use drugs was an issue for direct contact because it reflected the mother’s lack of openness and honesty with the local authority. However, she did accept, when it was put to her, that the mother to date has not sought to disrupt or undermine M’s placement. In cross-examination of Ms Nolan by Mr Forde, Ms Nolan agreed that the mother’s current position in relation to M demonstrated insight and an ability to reflect on her own parenting.
13. Further, in cross-examination, Ms Nolan told me that M had already had five moves in foster care and one had been an immediate removal because of an issue within the foster home that was emotionally harmful to her. M adores her foster carer, and they are willing to keep her throughout her minority. Foster care with them is a realistic option for M. It was, however, omitted from the social worker’s analysis and her own statement. Conducting the balance in the witness box, Ms Nolan told me that the positive for M staying where she was is that she keeps a relationship with her mother, her father and her siblings. The negative is that it does not provide permanence and, on balance, Ms Nolan considered that M, given her age, required permanence.
14. Mr Forde cross-examined Ms Nolan on the photographs that had been produced by the local authority the day before, although they had been referenced in the evidence 13 months earlier. She could not say with certainty who sent the images as that had not been investigated, nor had the local authority ascertained who FH was, but she accepted that regardless of what the photographs did or did not prove, there was no evidence of a currently continuing relationship between the mother and FD.
15. In her written evidence, Ms Nolan told me that the plan for M was that she should have indirect contact with her siblings post-adoption. However, if Q and N, as the older children, could be supported by the social workers and their carers to reach a level of understanding of adoption, direct sibling contact may be safe for M. What the local authority must avoid, according to Ms Nolan, is M experiencing face-to-face contact with a sibling who struggles to accept her with her adoptive family. Equally, there must be no risk that the siblings feel compelled to ask M questions to uncover her whereabouts, in order to pass them on to the mother or members of the family. Ms Nolan, in answering questions from Mr Sharpe, told me that the children’s views are, in part, reflective of the adults’ views. If a placement order is made, the children need the adults to show some acceptance. Ms Nolan was specifically cross-examined on behalf of Q about the contact Q would want if the plan for M was adoption. It was put that Q would want more than once a year. In answer, Ms Nolan expanded upon the direct work that will need to be done with Q before direct contact could take place. If direct contact went well, then she would hope that the adopters would review the regularity of contact to meet M’s best interests; hence she suggested a minimum of once a year. In cross-examination by Mr Sharpe, Ms Nolan told me that direct sibling contact would reduce the pool of prospective adopters for M.
16. As to direct contact between M and her father, FD, the local authority remained of the view that the level of criminality and violence perpetrated by FD in the past and his breach of the non-molestation order mean that the risks to M, if adopted, and her adoptive parents would be too high. Indirect contact would maintain her link with her birth father in a safe way. In cross-examination by Mr Sharpe on behalf of FD, Ms Nolan accepted that contact between M and her father is lovely . Ms Nolan was taken to the contact notes by Mr Sharpe and agreed the positives he extracted from them. If no contact is ordered, M will lose a loving relationship with her father and that is a negative. Mr Sharpe asked Ms Nolan about R, the other child of FD. Her understanding was that FD had occasional contact with R and accepted that no concerns about that contact had been brought to her attention. Ms Nolan accepted that that should be factored into the analysis of what, if any, future contact FD should have with M and accepted that it had been omitted from her analysis. She accepted that the fact that ongoing contact worked was relevant to FD’s ability to keep to the rules and thus to the issue of his contact and the paternal grandmother’s application to care for M.
17. When cross-examined by Mr Sharpe, Ms Nolan agreed that a family placement would allow M to grow up within her own heritage. Prospective adopters who were culturally appropriate for M were unlikely. However, she told me that if a placement order were granted, life story work would assist M to understand her heritage and her identity. The local authority has a number of charities and organisations which work with the relevant community of her X heritage and would support FD to participate in life story work for M.
18. Ms Nolan told me that the mother was the source of the allegation that FD had threatened to kill a social worker, the mother and FA if M were adopted, and had threatened to find M wherever she is placed. If there was direct post-adoption contact between M and her father, the pool of potential adopters for M would be small indeed. He is clear he does not accept adoption as he identifies as a loving father. He has an extensive criminal record.
19. I consider that Ms Nolan was an honest professional who was giving evidence because the social worker, Ms Speer, was no longer available to give evidence in this case, being signed off work on the grounds of ill health. I consider that Ms Nolan did her best to assist the court and, where deficits in the local authority evidence were illuminated in cross-examination, made frank and appropriate admissions whilst, where she could, rectifying those deficits.
20. FG is the daughter of FE and was called on her behalf. She had filed one statement, which she corrected in her oral evidence. FG told me that FD had not hurt her but had hurt one of her brothers, FN. Their mother was not, in her view, scared of FD but, in her words, finds him a bit intimidating ... He puts pressure on her . Nevertheless, she was sure that their mother would go down the right pathway if she needed to .
21. Ms Daly cross-examined FG on behalf of the local authority. In cross-examination FG told me she has two children – one with autism and another under assessment for ADHD. FG accepted that they required a lot of attention; one child is home schooled. In addition, she works 25 hours a week. Her supports are her own mother and the children's father. FG told me that she has nothing against her mother caring for M but stated her mother would need support. FG would happily have M to stay, including overnight.
22. FG described her relationship with FD as up and down ... all this started when he hit their brother. They were not speaking in December 2025 because of what happened at M's first birthday party. She had last seen FD when he came to visit R at Christmas/New Year. They did not speak, but he came into her home and played with R for 1½ to 2 hours. The first time she had seen him be violent was when he hit their brother. She probably found it intimidating because she does not argue. She does not recall him hurting their mother. FE will just ignore him if he gets angry. FG agreed that she had probably said it was important that FD did not have their mother's address – less pressure and stuff – M would be safe . I note that in December 2025 FG told her mother's assessor that she does not feel that she could leave her children unsupervised with FD now. She described FD at that time as 'he is not a monster; his priorities are just wrong.'
23. In cross-examination by Mr Sharpe on behalf of FD, FG told me she had no problem with FD having her address or him being at her home. FL likes being around him.
24. As FG gave her evidence, I formed the view that she wanted to be supportive of her mother's application to care for M. I find that, in the witness box, she trod a narrow line between providing that support and being realistic about FD's behaviours and the risk he posed. The records capture that, in May 2025, FG told the social worker that all paternal family members had withdrawn due to the risks that having M may bring from her father FD. FG advised that FD has been violent to family members previously and that this is an ongoing concern for them . When giving oral evidence, she tried to moderate what she had said, telling me she had not withdrawn because of FD. I find that the contemporaneous record did capture what she said at the time and reflects the degree of risk that FD is considered by his family to pose.
25. Overall, I consider that FG did her best to assist the court. It is noteworthy that she told the court that FE may feel pressured by FD and that neither she nor FG would “say boo to a goose”.
26. FR is another of FE’s five children. He gave brief evidence before me. I formed the impression that he was an honest witness who had rebuilt his life after addiction and was rightly proud of his achievements. He had distanced himself from his family geographically but was available to provide support by telephone to his mother if M were to be placed with her.
27. Ms L is the manager of the residential children’s home where S is placed. In her statement to this court, she set out the evidence upon which she drew when forming her opinion that the mother was the common theme relating to safeguarding concerns regarding S. These concerns related to S’s missing-from-home episodes, substance misuse and damage inside the home. When cross-examined by Mr Forde on behalf of the mother, it was put that the home should be keeping S safe, yet she had been able to abscond on a number of occasions. In that context, it was later put that Ms L was blaming the mother to deflect blame from the home and its inability to keep S safe. She categorically denied that.
28. In cross-examination, Ms L told me that when S was found she had been with the mother, but also on occasion with other members of her family. She had never said that the mother had breached the CAWN multiple times and she did not know where the local authority had got that impression. In relation to the one alleged breach of the CAWN, S had not been found with the mother, but S had said that is where she had been. Ms L accepted that S’s own circumstances were problematic, with substance misuse in the family background. It was put that the home had taken what S said at face value when the reality was that this was a far more complex situation with tensions between S’s family and the mother of which S would be aware.
29. I found Ms L to be an honest and straightforward professional witness. She was not scapegoating the mother to deflect from the inadequacies of the home she managed. She gave balanced evidence, accepting that it was only one alleged breach of the CAWN and that S was the sole source of evidence of that alleged breach.
30. Ms Wilkinson is the author of the Special Guardianship Assessment dated 11 December 2025. I note that on the face of the assessment the existence of R is acknowledged. He was then 8 years old. In chief, Ms Wilkinson stood by her assessment and supplemented it with information about R and his contact with FD, which has been twice in the park since Christmas/New Year. Ms Wilkinson had conducted the addendum Special Guardianship assessment for FL.
31. Ms Wilkinson was extensively and expertly cross-examined by Ms Meusz on behalf of the paternal grandmother. In cross-examination, she accepted that she could now see the relevance of R and the ability to manage any risk FD posed to him to this assessment, but she had not appreciated it at the time. Ms Wilkinson told me that she had not had an intermediary’s assessment before assessing FE herself. She did make some adjustments, such as asking FE to repeat what she said. Ms Wilkinson described how as she picked up her vulnerabilities, she made adjustments. In her second assessment session, FE had told her, my brain is thick . She had made further adjustments and used scenarios to explore issues with her. They had planned the next session and, when it came, FE could tell her what the plan for that session was. When challenged by Ms Meusz, however, she could not say why she had not set out the adaptations in her assessment report. She had sent FE documents, but she said she had no Wi-Fi so would go to FG’s, who would help her. Ms Wilkinson had also said she would go through the documents with her herself. FE had told her of her dyslexia. Having now read the assessment of FE, she can see the deficits in the adaptations she made, including the use of scenario-based questioning. She told me that she had no evidence to suggest that FE was anything but open and honest when assessing her.
32. Ms Wilkinson had observed contact between M and her grandmother and, despite a year's absence, there was immediate recognition. However, she caveated that by telling me the foster carers had prepared M carefully for the contact session. FE was very appropriate in her responses to M in that contact session and child-focused. All of FE’s children support M’s placement with her FG and one of her other brothers will provide FE with support. An FGC would have been useful. FE struggles, in her view, when things become difficult. She had noted in her assessment that all FE’s children had had mental health challenges in adulthood. She could see that the passage at M169 was misleading and acknowledged that FE did not minimise her own mental health condition. However, she denied case building or being selective in what she wrote. Ms Wilkinson accepted that FE had gained emotional resilience through adverse life experiences. Ultimately, however, Ms Wilkinson remained concerned that FE struggled around risk and avoiding conflict with FD to keep the peace. FD’s sporadic contact with R is not a direct comparator. FE did not phone the police when FD assaulted one of her other sons. When discussing future contact with FE, she had failed to tell her that contact could be professionally supervised for a period. She denied being wilfully blind to the implications of contact for FD with R and asserted that R's circumstances were different.
33. To Mr Forde, Ms Wilkinson agreed that the risks posed by FD and the mother are different. The mother’ behaviours are not a barrier to placement with FE.
34. In conclusion, Ms Carter-Birch put to Ms Wilkinson the Guardian’s concerns about any placement for M with FE. Ms Wilkinson agreed that she was concerned that FE may avoid difficult conversations. She had discussed FG and what had happened to her with FE a number of times, but she avoided talking about it, telling Ms Wilkinson not my story. Ms Wilkinson was concerned that when asked about the events of M's first birthday party, she said she would not do things differently. FE was asked about FD’s criminal convictions; to Ms Wilkinson her answers were vague: she didn’t want to tell me.
35. Ms Wilkinson was an honest professional witness who I consider was reflective on her assessment in the witness box, making concessions where appropriate but ultimately not departing from her overall assessment.
36. Ms Wright is a senior social worker who in chief confirmed the truth of her statements to this court. In chief she told me that the local authority will facilitate contact for Q with her mother once a month in line with my first judgment in relation to the other siblings with the sibling group joining in bi-monthly. She proposed supervised contact for FA and Q; later telling me that she recommended supervision in the first place as Q has a lot to process.
37. Given FB’s ill health, the plan was to move Q to a residential placement on Friday that week. She had spoken to Q the day before after court. Q at that point was very engaged and positive about the move, with the placement meeting many of her requirements. FA had then joined Qand her on a visit to the placement; FA was very supportive . Ms Lavelle cross-examined Ms Wright on behalf of Q. She expressed sympathy for Q and did not underestimate the impact upon her of a move from FB and the reason why the move was necessary. She had read FA’s statement, and it did appear that she accepted my findings in the first judgment. Q clearly wants to live with her but the risk assessment that enables N to live with her is for one child and there are challenges in placing Q there as well. Both N and Q are neurodiverse; they do not always attend education and their individual additional needs will need to be met. N and Q have a bond and are quite close. However, they have not ever really lived together. Both can be dysregulated. Placing Q with her grandmother could destabilise the placement and lead to breakdown. Q needs certainty and stability. It is not in her best interests for a further assessment to see if she can be placed with her grandmother and N. Looking at the balance of harm, Q is under CAMHS, and school is therapeutic and important to her. In her conversations with Q, she was feeling positive about the move to the residential children’s home and that placement meets a lot of her needs. Q is mature and is aware that N is placed with her grandmother as a single placement. Q absconded from FB’s home last week and there is a risk that she will from the residential placement, but that can be managed. There is a risk that the residential placement will break down. The placement enables Q to continue at her school, which is very important to her. It was put to Ms Wright, by Mr Forde, that Q's wishes and feelings were to live with FA, to which she responded that her wishes and feelings were not solely determinative. Ms Wright accepted that Q may find a solo placement difficult and that there is no knowing how she will react. There is a risk of placement breakdown but the placement is trauma-informed and aware of her neurodivergence. Given Q’s needs she finds it difficult to make relationships. She did not know if she would settle in foster care. Ms Wright told Ms Carter-Birch for the Guardian that she considered that Q's contact with her mother, FA and N should be reviewed in three months after placement to allow Q time to settle.
38. When cross-examined by Mr Forde, Ms Wright explained why photographs which had been initially referenced by Ms Copeland 13 months earlier had only just been disclosed. She accepted that some of the images may be from social media but some may not. It was put that FD had a motive for retribution and she accepted that was possible. It was suggested that late disclosure and a failure to analyse the potential sources of the photographs demonstrated a closed mind. Ms Wright refuted that suggestion, stating simply that she had noted they were missing and thought it important that they were before the court. To Mr Sharpe, Ms Wright agreed that the local authority did not know FH’s relationship with FD and that ultimately that was an issue for the lay parties to give evidence about.
39. In relation to M, Ms Wright accepted there was no written Re B-S analysis in her work but told me that she had returned to work in June after the plan had been settled. She relied on Ms Nolan’s analysis. She had asked the mother to come into the office to talk about post-adoption contact the previous week. The mother did not attend. In relation to the mother and ongoing contact with the mother, Ms Wright told me she continued to weigh intention as stated against action. The mother was still using alcohol, using illicit drugs and her mental health was a concern. In relation to M being placed with FG, FG was seen as a protective factor but she remained concerned: when FD assaulted his brother at M’s first birthday party no one called the police.
40. When cross-examined by Mr Sharpe, Ms Wright told me that she did not doubt FD’s love for M. She did not think he would ever intentionally harm her but he is volatile, reactive and impulsive. He had told Ms Wright that his daughter had changed everything about his life but he did so whilst in custody. In effect, she told me that his intentions were good but he struggled to maintain control and, when he lost control, he was a risk to others, including M. Ms Wright agreed he had adhered to boundaries around R's contact and is very good in contact with M, but that is not in the context of an adoption with which he does not agree. Post-adoption contact for FD cannot, in her view, be managed safely.
41. Ms Wright, in my judgment, gave clear and honest professional evidence. She was an impressive witness who was both reliable and credible.
42. FD gave evidence before me in person. FD is M's father. In my first judgment I stated:
17. FD’s cognitive ability was assessed to be within the borderline range (FSIQ70). His verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning abilities were both in the borderline range. His ability to sustain attention, concentration and exert mental control was assessed in the extremely low range. His ability to process simple or routine visual material without making errors was assessed to be in the borderline range. His ability to retrieve new information assessed to be in the extremely low ability range. FD was assessed to be functionally illiterate with an estimated reading age of 6 years. The assessment outlined recommendations to enable FD to participate in these proceedings including regular breaks.
43. Participation directions have been in place throughout this hearing to ensure that FD could participate fully. There were frequent breaks to accommodate his functioning and the heat in court, which at times was excessive. Whilst he attended remotely with his counsel and intermediary for much of the hearing, he wished to give evidence in person before me. Arrangements were made to accommodate his wishes while ensuring that he could continue to participate fully and that other vulnerable parties were not placed at a disadvantage.
44. In chief, FD confirmed the content of his written evidence, which had been read to him. He was adamant that he had not made any threats against the social worker or anyone else. The source was the mother, the mother, and she was lying. He did not agree that the non-molestation order needed to be extended to protect the mother. The photographs which had been disclosed as being sent to him in prison had been sent to him by the mother whilst he was serving the sentence for breaching the non-molestation order. He denied that FH was his girlfriend; she is his cousin. The mother is lying when she says he lives with FH. The police and probation have his registered address and he lives alone. When in prison, he had spoken on the phone to the mother, who identified herself as Mary-Lou to evade the authorities, and he used an illicit phone in his cell. He agreed he had breached the non-molestation order whilst in prison. In cross-examination on behalf of the local authority, he asserted that the mother had rung him 30 times whilst he was in prison. He told me that their relationship was complicated but over. He showed some insight: look at the jam it got us into.
45. FD told me he had contact with R every two weeks and that they talk on the phone every day. The maternal grandmother supervises it and, if R does not want to come to contact because of clubs or sport, he understands.
46. Ms Daly, on behalf of the local authority, cross-examined FD about his behaviour during M’s first birthday party. He accepted that he had hit one of his brothers over what I judge to be a trivial matter which had angered him. As he described what had happened, it was obvious that he did not see the inappropriateness of his behaviour at his daughter’s first birthday party. Despite the context, FD could not control himself or put his daughter first. FD told me that after the assault, he had left the party, taking his children with him. He denied taking illicit drugs but admitted drinking alcohol.
47. FD’s love for M was evident in his evidence. He described her as smart and kind. He denied that his own mother was scared of him. When cross-examined by Ms Daly on behalf of the local authority, he told me he could not recall making threats against the paternal grandmother in March 2024. He accepted in cross-examination that his mother would not tell him her address but did not seem to understand the significance of that, or of his mother withholding her address from her own son. In cross-examination by Ms Daly, he denied making threats to kill the mother and FA and said the mother had made that up. In cross-examination by Ms Carter-Birch, FD accepted that his mouth ran away with him when he was angry but told me he would not disrespect his own daughter. He did not seem to me to consider the impact on others to whom he was abusive.
48. FD told me that he is part of the X Community and that, as a community, they do not have babies adopted. M should be safe but see him and her siblings.
49. At the conclusion of his evidence, when answering questions on behalf of the Guardian, FD told me, I know what I am. That was, in my judgment, a rare and true moment of insight. Having heard FD give evidence, I find that he was a witness who gave evidence very much from his own perspective to serve his own purpose , on occasion he was not understanding the implications of what he said. I find that when he gave evidence against his self-interest, he was a credible witness.
50. Having given his evidence, FD did not attend the last day of the hearing, on which the mother gave evidence. Despite the mother having participation directions and a non-molestation order, she chose to sit in court when FD gave his evidence. I watched her listening to him and observed her gestures and facial expressions as he gave his evidence. I formed the impression that the parties were engaged in a complicated dance, with the mother at times appearing to goad him and at others, demonstrating her view of his credibility.
51. FE has been assessed by an Intermediary for the purposes of this hearing. The ground rules recommended by her Intermediary have been implemented throughout this hearing and whilst she was giving evidence. The intermediary concludes that: 2.1.3 FE does not have any formal diagnosis of learning difficulty; however, she reports longstanding and significant challenges with learning and memory, which have adversely affected her throughout her life. She presents with very low self-confidence, frequently denigrating her own abilities by referring to herself as "thick" and "stupid". 2.1.4 She demonstrates clear processing difficulties which were not identified during her schooling, likely due to limited awareness at that time, and consequently she has not received appropriate support to assist her functioning. 2.1.5 Her presentation is further impacted by stress and anxiety, particularly when discussing her family, past experiences, and recent events relating to care planning for M. This emotional dysregulation is likely to further impair any existing cognitive difficulties and is expected to present significant challenges in the pressured and emotionally demanding court environment. This has been observed during previous hearings. 2.1.6 FE and her counsel report that she became extremely distressed and overwhelmed during previous court proceedings, which significantly impaired her ability to understand discussions. She also has difficulty comprehending legal terminology and low frequency vocabulary, further limiting her understanding. 2.1.7 She describes feeling negatively judged by others in court, particularly when upset or tearful, and expresses a marked fear of giving evidence. She anticipates that she will panic and struggle to provide a coherent account, leading to inaccuracies in her responses.
52. FE had the benefit of an intermediary throughout the hearing. She together with her counsel and her intermediary observed the hearing via remote link from her counsel’s chambers.
53. In chief FE confirmed the truth of her two witness statements in chief. She had moved in November 2024 and had not given FD her address. He had never tried to find her. Her assessment for Special Guardianship was very personal and had made her feel uncomfortable. She had met with the Guardian on 19 June 2026 and answered her questions about M’s first birthday party. She accepted that it had been made to look as if she did not protect the children, but after the assault happened she had been looking after the other children when FD left with his. She accepts she did not call the police, but no one did. FE denied ever saying that she had not wanted to care for M. FE told me in chief that FH was FD’s girlfriend but he had told her to say she was his cousin. When she said no, he kept calling her, but she blocked him. When cross-examined by Mr Sharpe on his behalf, she said she did not know all the cousins on the paternal side of the family.
54. FE was cross-examined extensively by Ms Daly on behalf of the local authority. She had received the documents from the local authority on 17 October on her phone and in the post. She had been told by the mother when M was originally taken into care. At that time she had regular contact with M but had not put herself forward to care for her granddaughter at that time.
55. In cross-examination, FE told me that she was aware that FD had been abusive to girlfriends prior to the mother, including R’s mother. She had known about it after the relationship broke down but not during it. She accepted that she had known of the incident in March 2024 involving FD and the mother at the time but had not done anything to protect M because she was not there. She had not contacted social services but had spoken to FG about the smashed windows. FE told me that FD is very verbal when angry and says nasty words but denied he had ever been aggressive to her or anyone else. She would not want him to know where she was living if M was with her, just in case he tried to take her, but might not tell him even if M was not with her. As the cross-examination continued about her son, FE told me, it’s all too much, I can’t do it. Her anxiety was obvious. I rose to enable her to compose herself and, to her credit, she returned to the witness box in due course and was able to carry on. In cross-examination, FE accepted that FD, when a child, had not stuck to the rules but told me he had in relation to R. FE told me she did not like confrontation and did not like FD kicking off, finding it easier to agree with him sometimes. The mother had told her of the plan for adoption and FD had asked FE to put herself forward to care for M as he did not want his daughter to go into care. She had felt a little pressurised by him. FE acknowledged that she had made mistakes when parenting her own children but her circumstances now are very different from how they were when she had five children to care for.
56. The mother is 33 years old. Her cognitive ability is assessed as being in the extremely low range of intellectual functioning (FSIQ65). Her verbal and non-verbal reasoning abilities are in the extremely low range. Her ability to sustain attention, concentrate and exert mental control is in the borderline range. Her memory falls in the borderline range. Her ability to process simple or routine visual material without errors is in the borderline range. Her ability to attend to and retrieve new information is in the extremely low range. It was assessed that she was illiterate, with an estimated reading age of 8 years and 1 month. The Communicourt assessment before me outlined recommendations to enable the mother to participate in the proceedings, including regular breaks and appropriate questioning. As at the previous hearing, this court directed that advocates were to question the mother in line with the Advocates’ Toolkit and the 20 principles of the FLBA vulnerable witness training. The ground rules were revisited before the mother entered the witness box. They have been complied with at all times.
57. The mother has disclosed within these proceedings that she has struggled with her mental health. Before the public law proceedings began, she had seen a psychiatrist privately and been prescribed antidepressants. By January 2025, the mother was being prescribed an antidepressant through her GP. A psychiatric report obtained within these proceedings and provided by Dr McDermott, based on an assessment on 11 February 2025, found that the mother was not clinically depressed although she continued to be prescribed sertraline by her GP. Dr McDermott has not been required to give evidence before me.
58. Since 4 December 2025, the mother has been convicted of one offence against the person, four public order offences, one offence relating to resisting or obstructing the police, and another relating to the wilful obstruction of a highway. She is currently the subject of a community order imposed by the Magistrates' Court on 14 April 2026, which includes an alcohol abstinence requirement. The order expires on 13 April 2027.
59. Hair Strand Tests conducted by Cansford Laboratories on a sample collected from the mother on 11 November 2024 detected cocaine and alcohol in all sections of her hair covering the period May 2024 until November 2024. Further tests conducted by Cansford Laboratories on a sample collected from the mother on 25 February 2025 were consistent with the use by the mother of cocaine and alcohol during the period 21 October 2024 to 18 February 2025. However, the overall findings suggested a decrease, and possible cessation of use, of cocaine by the mother within the overall investigated time period. The mother was resistant to any further HST for the purposes of this hearing. However, I ordered the same and a sample was collected from her on 18 June 2026. Cocaine was detected in the sample as having been used in each of the three months running from 13 March 2026 to 11 June 2026. Chronic excessive alcohol use was detected during the same period.
60. Since the conclusion of this second hearing, I have received an email informing me that the mother has been diagnosed with an illness. I am told that the prognosis is terminal with a prognosis of 2-12 months.
61. During the second hearing the mother gave evidence before me with the same participation directions in place as she had on the last occasion. In chief, she told me that FD had given her a black eye in January 2026 when he assaulted her outside the shop. She had not said anything earlier as she was trying to get M back and it would go against me. M knows who her mother and father are. The mother said that she had not sent photographs to FD when he was in prison and she did not know who had. The mother wanted Q to be placed with FA. N and Q are two different children. Q is very unhappy and wants to be with her grandmother. M is a lovely little girl who is thriving where she is. They will foster her until she is 18 but do not want to adopt her. The mother has no faith in social services and their ability to keep M safe. They have already exposed her to emotional harm in foster care.
62. In cross-examination, the mother denied continuing a relationship with FD whilst he was in prison, although at one point she told me that it had been hard to break up and he would keep ringing her. She told me that FD’s girlfriend, FH, had sent the photographs of her to FD in prison to discredit the mother. She was clear in her evidence that FD had told her that he would find M if she were adopted and, given his connections, she believed he would. He has threatened to kill her, her mother and the social worker if M is adopted. She thought M was best placed with FE because she is her nan.
63. Mr Sharpe cross-examined the mother and suggested that she was lying about FD, the photographs, FH and the attack in January 2026. She maintained her accounts.
64. Having listened carefully to the mother and considered all the evidence before me, I formed the view that she was selective with the truth in her evidence, only admitting that which served her purpose or when caught out, as with the recent HST.
65. For the reasons I set out later in this judgment, I find that the mother is the source of the photographs of her which were sent to FD in prison and the Valentine's Day card. I find that the mother has lied about her drug use and sought to resist further drug testing. Similarly, I find that she has minimised her alcohol usage and find that Probation have accurately reported to the Strategy meeting the readings from her tag, which was, I find, not defective. I find that she has lied because she wished to care for M and knew that the truth would harm the prospects of her case succeeding.
66. On the Friday of the first week, FD, during his evidence, alleged that the mother had approached him outside of court and said, “you might be laughing now, but when they find out you are having a baby with FH, they’ll take it”. It was suggested this was said to provoke him. That was denied by the mother. On the Monday, when the final hearing resumed, the mother alleged that FD had physically assaulted her in January 2026. This was the first time this allegation had been made. The mother was confident that she had the CCTV footage both on her device, in the care and control of her friend, and from the shop. It transpired that there was no such footage, it being asserted that a friend had wiped her phone and the shop had not retained the footage. The mother told me that she had not reported it because she was frightened it would go against her then case that M should return to her care. There is a logic to that, but the timing of the allegation has caused me concern. It was made in direct response to an allegation FD had made against her. I have stood back and looked at the evidence as a whole. I consider that it is likely that FD’s allegation against the mother is, on the balance of probabilities, true. FD would have no reason to make that up and it is behaviour consistent with her presentation in court during his evidence. I also consider that the core allegation made by the mother against FD is likely to be true. The timing has been dictated by her need to get back at FD overriding her need to keep the assault secret for fear that it would damage her ability to care for M and to have contact with her, if she could not care for her. I consider that the mother did not report the assault at the time and that the video footage was not produced, having been recently wiped, because it is likely to have reflected badly on both FD and her.
67. The Guardian confirmed the content of her three reports in chief. She supported a final care order in relation to Q, who over the last two days had, in her opinion, begun to settle. When cross-examined by Mr Forde, the Guardian recognised that she should have spoken to FE before 17 June 2026. M knows that the mother is her mother and, although contact can be chaotic at times, it is of good quality. She fully recognises the positives of post-adoption contact, provided it is safe and in the child’s best interests. The Guardian agreed that supervised contact may manage the risk of the mother disrupting contact but expressed concern about the lack of transparency and her ability to work openly with the local authority. The primary risk is that she remains in contact with FD. The Guardian told me that the safer way to ensure contact took place was a s.26 order, but I was concerned from the context that she did not fully understand what that meant. Later, she said that she did not consider an order was needed. Contact for M and her siblings will be as set out in the care plan. The Guardian accepted all the negatives that she and Mr Sharpe put to her. She did not agree that she was just a rubber stamp. The Guardian told me that she had considered the foster carers as a realistic option but had not mentioned it in her analysis. The Guardian told me that, for the foster carer, caring for children was a job and that she was not interested in Special Guardianship or adoption for M. It was finely balanced but, on balance, the Guardian’s view was that a placement order was in M’s best interests. She does not know what the future holds for the foster carer. M is her first placement. The placement would meet M’s needs but comes with complications which point away from it.
68. To Ms Meusz, the Guardian conceded that she should have done her own investigations and not relied upon Ms Wilkinson’s assessment. There is no Re B-S analysis including a placement with FE in her first report because the viability assessment had been negative. She denied having a closed mind and only contacting the paternal grandmother as an afterthought. In cross-examination, she accepted the positives of placement with FE but ultimately concluded that adoption was in M’s best interests.
69. Ms Lavelle cross-examined the Guardian on behalf of Q. In cross-examination, she admitted that she had initially considered Q could be placed with FA, but that was before she had read my judgment after the first hearing. Having done so, she did not now consider that an assessment was warranted but suggested that it could be looked at in a few months’ time. She did not want the placement to break down. The risk assessment in relation to FA was recently conducted by the court.
70. Ultimately despite cross-examination by all lay parties, the Guardian stuck to her final recommendations for which she provided sound reasons. The Parties Positions in Closing in relation to M
71. The parties' positions in closing were as follows: a. The local authority, supported by the Guardian, invite the court to make a care and placement order and endorse the revised care plan (date 26 June 2026) .The local authority opposes a s26 order but have amended their care plans to include: 1) A commitment to direct sibling contact, once per year, that commitment includes a commitment to supporting M’s siblings, and their respective carers to be able to understand M’s care plan and to be able to safely support that contact. The search for an adoptive placement will be to search for those who will promote and agree to direct sibling contact . 2) A commitment to work with the mother and any prospective adopters to try to achieve ongoing direct contact between her and M. 3) Recommendations for indirect contact between FE and M, twice per year . b. At the beginning of this part of the hearing, the mother made a difficult and child-focused decision. Through counsel, she accepted that she could not provide future care for either Q or M. In relation to Q, she supported a further assessment of FA as a potential carer within proceedings under an interim care order or outside proceedings under a final care order. I am told in the closing submissions on her behalf that she will support whatever submissions are made on behalf of Q. As to M, the mother strongly opposes adoption. Her first choice would be for M to be placed with FE, whether under a special guardianship order or a care order. If M is placed with her grandmother, the mother seeks monthly contact. Her second choice is long-term foster care. The mother seeks ongoing contact with M. If I make a placement order, I am asked to make a contact order under s.26 ACA 2002 to ensure M continues to have contact with her siblings and with her mother. I have been referred to Re B-A (Placement Order and Contact Order) [2026] EWCA Civ 356 in this regard. c. FD submits that the best outcome for his daughter is the making of a special guardianship order in favour of his mother. In the alternative, he too submits that M should remain in long-term foster care. He strongly opposes M’s adoption. d. FE opposes the local authority’s plan for adoption. She seeks for M to be transitioned to her care over a two-three-month period and that she should live with FE for a minimum of three months before a Special Guardianship order is made. She will support any legal framework which enables M to live with her. She would support the making of a 12-month supervision order. My Analysis and Decision in relation to M
72. Where, in order to make my analysis, I have made findings of fact, I have reminded myself that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of the party who seeks the finding and that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. A respondent to an allegation has nothing to prove, and the Court must be careful to ensure that it does not reverse the burden of proof. As Mostyn J said in Lancashire v R [2013] EWHC 3064 (Fam) , there is no pseudo-burden to come up with alternative explanations.
73. Findings of fact must be based on evidence, and the inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence, and not on speculation or suspicion. The dividing line between the drawing of inferences and speculation may not be a clear one; it is essentially a matter of judgment as to what is a legitimate inference and what is insupportable speculation: Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation [2011] EWCA Civ 12 [2011] and Re A [2015] (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11 .
74. A party/witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, and distress. They may lie because they are desperate to have a family or keep a child who they regard as theirs within their family. The fact that a party/witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: R v Lucas [1982] QB 720 . Within the context of family proceedings, the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the application of the principle articulated in Lucas in family cases should go beyond the Court merely reminding itself of the broad principle. In Re H-C (Children) [2016] 4 WLR 85 , McFarlane LJ (as he then was) stated as follows: “[100] One highly important aspect of the Lucas decision, and indeed the approach to lies generally in the criminal jurisdiction, needs to be borne fully in mind by family judges. It is this: in the criminal jurisdiction the ‘lie’ is never taken, of itself, as direct proof of guilt. As is plain from the passage quoted from Lord Lane's judgment in Lucas, where the relevant conditions are satisfied the lie is "capable of amounting to a corroboration". In recent times the point has been most clearly made in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251. In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
75. The four relevant conditions which must be satisfied before a lie is capable of amounting to corroboration are set out by Lord Lane CJ in Lucas as follows : “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
76. In the Family Court, even where the Court is satisfied that a lie is capable of amounting to corroboration, the Court must weigh that lie against any evidence that points away from the allegation being made out: H v City and Council of Swansea and Others [2011] EWCA Civ 195 .
77. In Re F (A Child)(Placement Order) [2018] EWCA Civ 7261 para 25 Jackson LJ said this “[25] Similarly, close attention must be paid to the true significance of lies deplorable, are significant only to the extent that they affect the welfare of the child, and in particular to the extent that they undermine systems of protection designed to keep the child safe. However, as noted by Macur LJ in Re Y (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1337 , they cannot be allowed to hijack the case. See also Sir James Munby P in Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11 , [2016] 1 FLR 1 , at para [12 ]: ‘The second fundamentally important point is the need to link the facts relied upon by the local authority with its case on threshold, the need to demonstrate why, as the local authority asserts, facts A + B + C justify the conclusion that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, significant harm of types X, Y or Z. Sometimes the linkage will be obvious, as where the facts proved establish physical harm. But the linkage may be very much less obvious where the allegation is only that the child is at risk of suffering emotional harm or, as in the present case, at risk of suffering neglect. In the present case, as we shall see, an important element of the local authority’s case was that the father “lacks honesty with professionals”, “minimises matters of importance” and “is immature and lacks insight of issues of importance”. Maybe. But how does this feed through into a conclusion that A is at risk of neglect? The conclusion does not follow naturally from the premise. The local authority’s evidence and submissions must set out the argument and explain explicitly why it is said that, in the particular case, the conclusion indeed follows from the facts.’ Although these observations about lies and lack of insight are directed to proof of the threshold, they can equally be applied to the welfare evaluation”
78. In Re K (children) (placement orders) [2020] EWCA Civ 1503 Jackson LJ who said at paragraph 29 “The next general matter concerns the significance of lies. The correct approach to lies in relation to fact-finding is well known and the Judge appropriately gave himself a Lucas direction in that context. Here the more pertinent matter for our purpose concerns lies in the context of welfare. Lies, however disgraceful and dispiriting, must be strictly assessed for their likely effect on the child, and the same can be said for disobedience to authority. In some cases, the conclusion will simply be that the child unfortunately has dishonest or disobedient parents. In others, parental dishonesty and inability to co-operate with authority may decisively affect the welfare assessment. But in all cases the link between lies and welfare must be spelled out. That did not happen in Re Y (A Child) EWCA Civ 1337, where Macur LJ said this at [7(4)]: "… I consider the case appears to have been hijacked by the issue of the mother's dishonesty. Much of the local authority's evidence is devoted to it. The Children's Guardian adopts much the same perspective. It cannot be the sole issue in a case devoid of context. There was very little attention given to context in this case. No analysis appears to have been made by any of the professionals as to why the mother's particular lies created the likelihood of significant harm to these children and what weight should reasonably be afforded to the fact of her deceit in the overall balance."
79. Those principles have recently restated by Cobb LJ in the case of Re M (Care Order: Risk: Family Placement) [2025] EWCA Civ 163 , where he said at paragraphs 89 and 90: “There is one final contextual point to make. The Judge placed great weight on the mother’s lies and dishonesty as illustrative of her lack of protective capability, but in my judgment she failed to have proper regard to the observations of Peter Jackson LJ in Re F at [25] and Sir James Munby P in Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11 , [2016] 1 FLR 1 , at para [12]: “Lies, however deplorable, are significant only to the extent that they affect the welfare of the child, and in particular to the extent that they undermine systems of protection designed to keep the child safe”.
80. Where the plan, as here, is adoption, I must apply s.1 ACA 2002 . Section 1 states: “ Considerations applying to the exercise of powers (1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child. (2) The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life. (3) The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare. (4) The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among others)— (a) the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding), (b) the child’s particular needs, (c) the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person, (d) the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant, (e) any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41)) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, (f) the relationship which the child has with relatives, with any person who is a prospective adopter with whom the child is placed, ] and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including— (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child. (5) In placing a child for adoption, an adoption agency in Wales must give due consideration to the child’s religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. (6) In coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child, a court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989 ); and the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so. (7) In this section, “coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child”, in relation to a court, includes— (a) coming to a decision in any proceedings where the orders that might be made by the court include an adoption order (or the revocation of such an order), a placement order (or the revocation of such an order) or an order under section 26 or 51A (or the revocation or variation of such an order), (b) coming to a decision about granting leave in respect of any action (other than the initiation of proceedings in any court) which may be taken by an adoption agency or individual under this Act , but does not include coming to a decision about granting leave in any other circumstances. (8) For the purposes of this section— (a) references to relationships are not confined to legal relationships, (b) references to a relative, in relation to a child, include the child’s mother and father. (9) In this section “adoption agency in Wales” means an adoption agency that is— (a) a local authority in Wales, or (b) a registered adoption society whose principal office is in Wales. ]
81. In W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 793 , McFarlane LJ (as he then was) stated:
68. Since the phrase "nothing else will do" was first coined in the context of public law orders for the protection of children by the Supreme Court in Re B, judges in both the High Court and Court of Appeal have cautioned professionals and courts to ensure that the phrase is applied so that it is tied to the welfare of the child as described by Baroness Hale in paragraph 215 of her judgment: "We all agree that an order compulsorily severing the ties between a child and her parents can only be made if "justified by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests". In other words, the test is one of necessity. Nothing else will do." The phrase is meaningless, and potentially dangerous, if it is applied as some freestanding, shortcut test divorced from, or even in place of, an overall evaluation of the child's welfare. Used properly, as Baroness Hale explained, the phrase "nothing else will do" is no more, nor no less, than a useful distillation of the proportionality and necessity test as embodied in the ECHR and reflected in the need to afford paramount consideration to the welfare of the child throughout her lifetime ( ACA 2002 s 1 ). The phrase "nothing else will do" is not some sort of hyperlink providing a direct route to the outcome of a case so as to bypass the need to undertake a full, comprehensive welfare evaluation of all of the relevant pros and cons (see Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 , Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 715 and other cases).
69. Once the comprehensive, full welfare analysis has been undertaken of the pros and cons it is then, and only then, that the overall proportionality of any plan for adoption falls to be evaluated and the phrase "nothing else will do" can properly be deployed. If the ultimate outcome of the case is to favour placement for adoption or the making of an adoption order it is that outcome that falls to be evaluated against the yardstick of necessity, proportionality and "nothing else will do". […]
71. The repeated reference to a 'right' for a child to be brought up by his or her natural family, or the assumption that there is a presumption to that effect, needs to be firmly and clearly laid to rest. No such 'right' or presumption exists. The only 'right' is for the arrangements for the child to be determined by affording paramount consideration to her welfare throughout her life (in an adoption case) in a manner which is proportionate and compatible with the need to respect any ECHR Art 8 rights which are engaged. In Re H (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1284 this court clearly stated that there is no presumption in favour of parents or the natural family in public law adoption cases at paragraphs 89 to 94 of the judgment of McFarlane LJ […] ”
82. Section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 states: “(1) A placement order is an order made by the court authorising a local authority to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority. (2) The court may not make a placement order in respect of a child unless— (a)the child is subject to a care order, (b)the court is satisfied that the conditions in section 31(2) of the 1989 Act (conditions for making a care order) are met, or (c)the child has no parent or guardian. (3) The court may only make a placement order if, in the case of each parent or guardian of the child, the court is satisfied— (a)that the parent or guardian has consented to the child being placed for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the local authority and has not withdrawn the consent, or (b)that the parent’s or guardian’s consent should be dispensed with. This subsection is subject to section 52 (parental etc. consent). (4)A placement order continues in force until— (a)it is revoked under section 24, (b)an adoption order is made in respect of the child, or (c)the child marries or attains the age of 18 years. ”
83. Section 52 states as follows: “(1) The court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent or guardian of a child to the child being placed for adoption or to the making of an adoption order in respect of the child unless the court is satisfied that— (a)the parent or guardian cannot be found or lacks capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 ) to give consent, or (b)the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with. ”
84. In relation to the dispensing with consent, In P (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 5351 , Wall LJ stated: “ In our judgment, the answer to this question is self-evident, and is to be found in section 1 of the 2002 Act , which we have set out in full at paragraph 37 of this judgment. Section 1(1) plainly applies when the court is deciding whether or not to dispense with parental consent to a placement order. In these circumstances, section 1(2) of the 2002 Act requires the court (the word is the mandatory "must") in these circumstances to treat "the child's welfare throughout his life" as its "paramount consideration". "Paramount consideration" as Lord MacDermott classically held in J v C [1970] AC 668 at 711 means a consideration which "rules upon and determines the course to be followed" […] In our judgment, similar considerations apply to applications under section 52(1) (b) of the 2002 Act . The guidance is, we think, simple enough. The judge must, of course, be aware of the importance to the child of the decision being taken. There is, perhaps, no more important or far-reaching decision for a child than to be adopted by strangers. However, the word "requires" in section 52(1) (b) is a perfectly ordinary English word. Judges approaching the question of dispensation under the section must, it seems to us, ask themselves the question to which section 52(1) (b) of the 2002 gives rise, and answer it by reference to section 1 of the same Act, and in particular by a careful consideration of all the matters identified in section 1(4) .” “In summary, therefore, the best guidance which in our judgment this court can give is to advise judges to apply the statutory language with care to the facts of the particular case. The message is, no doubt, prosaic, but the best guidance, we think, is as simple and as straightforward as that .”
85. As to the assessment of risk and the removal of a child from a family , I have re-read Re T (Children)[2025] EWCA Civ 93 wherein Peter Jackson LJ in the lead judgment stated as follows; 30 The separation of a child from a family can only be approved after a process of rigorous reasoning. That is essential where there is a plan for adoption, but it is also necessary for any significant decision where the outcome is not obvious. A structured process is of real benefit for these important and often difficult decisions, as without it there is a greater chance of error, leading to children living unsafely at home or being kept unnecessarily in care. The fact that the underlying principles are well-known to specialist judges does not relieve the court of its duty to the child, to the family and to society, to explain and justify its decision. 31 This court’s recent decision in In re L-G (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 60 ; [2025] 1FCR 695, reiterates the guidance given in Inre F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 ; [2019] 1 FLR 779 . The risk of harm, important as it is, is one of a number of factors in the welfare checklist and it has to be carefully assessed, particularly where it may be decisive. 32 The Children Act 1989 provides a framework within which the court assesses whether a child has suffered or is likely to suffer “significant harm” for the purposes of the threshold for intervention, and “harm” for the purposes of the welfare assessment. Section 31(9) defines harm in this way: “‘harm’ means ill-treatment orthe impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another; “‘development’ means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development; “‘health’ means physical or mental health; and “‘ill-treatment’ includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.” 33 Accordingly, the court had to address these questions in relation to each of these children: (1) What type of harm has arisen and might arise? (2) How likely is it to arise? (3) What would be the consequences for the child if it did? (4) To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed? (5) What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account? (6) In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare? (7) If the preferred plan involves interference with the article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate? 34 A structured analysis of this kind, adapted to the facts of the individual case, is of benefit to those who make decisions and to those who are affected by them. The analysis need not be lengthy, but it ensures that undue weight is not given to one factor, however notable, and that other important factors are not overlooked. It must be remembered that risk assessment is about the realistic assessment of risk, not about the elimination of all risks. Likewise, the assessment of actual or likely harm is not the same thing as an all-round welfare assessment
86. Further, I am rightly reminded of the judgment of Dame Siobhan Keegan in the decision of the Supreme Court in H-W (Children) [2022] UKSC 172 :
45. The effect of a care order is to vest parental responsibility for the child in the local authority: section 33 Children Act 1989 . Thereafter, the parents can exercise their parental responsibility only to the extent that the local authority determines. As this court explained in In re B, that intrusive power clearly engages the article 8 rights of the parents and children. It follows that a care order can only be made, even if the statutory threshold criteria under section 31(2) are met, if such an order is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the child(ren)'s right to grow up free from harm. That means that the order can be made only if it is proportionate to the needs of the situation. See especially Lord Wilson at paras 32- 34, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury at paras 73-79 and Baroness Hale of Richmond at paras 194-198. And it follows also that, as Lord Wilson put it at para 45, a judge considering a care order has an obligation not to act incompatibly with the article 8 rights involved. In truth, the obligation under article 8 ECHR, so clearly recognised in In re B does no more than re-state the longstanding proposition of English childcare law that the aim must be to make the least interventionist possible order, but the emphasis given to the issue in In re B was overdue.
46. In In re B the care order under consideration was one with a care plan for adoption of the children, so that if made it would result in a complete legal severance of the family relationship between natural parent and child. That is, no doubt, the most intrusive form of care order which our law knows. But a care order of the kind in question here has consequences almost as far-reaching. It will break up the existing family and indefinitely so; it can be expected to last throughout the minority of the children. It will separate them from their parents and also from each other. The principles set out in In re B as to necessity and proportionality clearly apply, mutatis mutandis, also to this kind of case.
47. All this has been common ground between all the parties in this appeal. Common ground also has been the acknowledgement of the very valuable guidance which has been given since In re B by several highly experienced family judges who have addressed what is involved in the third or disposal stage of consideration of a care order and how a judge goes about ensuring that the obligation to intervene only when necessary and proportionate is discharged. The repeated concerns of, inter alia, Sir James Munby P, Sir Andrew McFarlane P and Lady Black are well set out in the former's judgment in In re B-S (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 ; [2014] 1 WLR 563 , The precise context of that case was a parent's application for leave to oppose adoption despite the previous making of a care and placement order, but observations about the approach to decisions on necessity and proportionality are of general application. They were most conveniently summarised at para 44, adopting a passage derived from the judgment of McFarlane LJ (as he then was) in In re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 ; [2013] 3 FCR 293; "The judicial task is to evaluate all the options, undertaking a global, holistic and ... multi-faceted evaluation of the child's welfare which takes into account all the negatives and the positives, all the pros and cons, of each option ... "What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options." This is now rightly the accepted standard for the manner in which a contemplated child protection order must be tested against the requirement that it be necessary and proportionate.'
87. I begin my global, holistic and ... multi-faceted evaluation of M's future welfare with consideration of M herself. M is very nearly three years old. She is adored by her mother and her father. Whilst she was removed from parental care in October 2024, she has maintained a relationship with both her parents and knows who her mother and father are. Until removal, she lived with most of her siblings. Since removal under an interim care order, she has continued to have contact with her siblings. They too adore her. M is meeting all her developmental milestones and has a good vocabulary for her age. She is learning a second language in her current foster home. She is now settled. Her current foster home is her fifth foster placement. Since removal into foster care, she has experienced an unsettled existence and on one occasion, was emotionally harmed in a placement. Those adverse experiences build on those she experienced in parental care which include those which establish the threshold condition in relation to her. I consider that M needs a settled placement which will provide her with the stability and security she needs. Within that placement she will need reparative parenting given her previous adverse life experiences. She will need help to come to terms to make sense of her past and the traumas she has suffered.
88. M is too young to express an informed view regarding the decisions I must make about her future welfare. However, I factor into my decision making that if asked her directly, she would be likely to say that she would wish to be brought up amongst the love and affection of her natural family. She would want to be safe and to have her needs (physical, emotional and psychological) met.
89. M’s mother and father have each made the decisions that they cannot met her future needs. Those decisions are realistic and show a degree of insight, which I factor into my decision making.
90. The realistic options for M's future welfare are placement with FE under such order as I consider necessary and proportionate; long-term foster care with her continued placement with her current carers and adoption outside her natural family.
91. I turn to consider the option of M remaining in her current foster home. Her carer is willing to keep her throughout her minority. The carer was previously a professional nanny and can provide for all M's needs, including reparative care. It is agreed by all that M is thriving in her current placement. The placement is supported by the family, including both her parents. The foster carer has been able to facilitate professionally supervised contact with her mother, father and siblings. There has been no attempt by either the mother or FD to undermine that placement to date. I consider the risk of the mother undermining it in the future to be slim. FD is, however, impulsive. Currently the placement meets his needs. Should he decide in the future that it does not, then the risks outlined at paragraph ..... above are relevant. I have already found at paragraph ......... that FD does not abide by rules when they do not suit him. Should the risk arise, then M could be protected from him by a s.34(4) order and other protective orders designed to keep him away if her address became known. The other protective feature would be to ensure throughout her minority that the placement address, her school location etc. was not known. That can be done, but it places a heavy burden on a child not to reveal their location during contact, which becomes more onerous as the child becomes more verbal and interactive. A placement with her current foster carers would have the benefit of maintaining direct family links and that will enable M to continue to have real-life experience of her dual heritage, which will be important for her identity needs. M remaining in foster care with her current carers has the benefit of not requiring M to move again. She has already had five placements.
92. On behalf of FE, it is robustly argued that the assessment process has been unfair and that when care planning other social workers and the Guardian have simply relied upon a Special Guardianship Assessment which did not take into account her vulnerabilities and was not adapted to enable her participate; was akin to gathering a case against her rather than an impartial assessment; omitted consideration of R and the implications of continued contact with him for M’s assessment and was inaccurate. In evidence Ms Wilkinson, the assessor, accepted the flaws put to her by Ms Meusz on behalf of FE. I agree with Ms Meusz that it is not for the person being assessed to identify their own vulnerabilities, it is part of the assessor's role to identify vulnerabilities and adapt the assessment to meet the needs of the person being assessed. Ms Wilkinson says that she did make adaptations as she went along but accepts that she did not state the adaptations explicitly in her written work. On behalf of FE, it is submitted that if adaptions had been made, they would have been referenced. The inference being that Mrs Wilkinson is lying. I reject that inference. I find that whilst Mrs Wilkinson did not have the assessment of FE’s needs as I do, she made adaptations to meet the needs that were apparent to her as she told me in her oral evidence which I accept. Ms Wilkinson made several admissions about the deficits in her written assessment. The Special Guardianship Assessment as written could have been written better. However, having heard Ms Wilkinson’s oral evidence and considered the assessment, I do not consider that the acknowledged deficits render the whole assessment worthless or necessitate a re-assessment. I have the benefit of considering the evidence as a whole of which the assessment is but one part.
93. I accept and factor in that the difficulties that FE experienced in raising her own children must be set in time and place. FE’s circumstances are now different. She holds down steady employment. She has the support of her own children to care for M, and she would be looking after one child rather than five as a single parent. However, I also have to factor in that FR’s support will be offered from a distance by telephone and that FG has an extremely busy life and relies on FE for support.
94. If M were to be placed with her paternal grandmother, then M would have the benefit of growing up in her own family and their love. She could have continued contact with her mother; her father and her siblings provided it is safe to do so. In her grandmother's care, M would have direct access to her dual heritage. Specifically in her grandmother's care, M would grow up knowing of her heritage and culture.
95. I accept and factor into my assessment of FE’s ability to care for M that FE can meet M’s day-to-day physical needs. Whilst she has a one-bedroom home, if M were to be placed with her that could be rectified with the help and support of the local authority. I find that FE has found the court process difficult to navigate but, despite that, has continued to show commitment to her and is likely to do so in the future. However, having heard her give evidence, I find that FE is likely to struggle in the future to provide the reparative parenting that M will need. Historically, she has not discussed her own children’s adverse life experiences with them, e.g. FR’s drug addiction and FG’s sexual exploitation as a child. In the witness box FE could not reflect on those issues even with the benefit of the passage of time. FE told me that she does not like confrontation. I find that is pertinent to her ability to manage the risk FD poses, but it is also relevant to the challenges M will face in the future as she addresses her adverse life experiences. I consider, based on the evidence as a whole, that FE is unlikely to be able to provide the reflective, reparative parenting M is likely to need. The ability to reflect is likely to improve over time with targeted support from the local authority but, ultimately, I do not consider that any support will alter her inability to challenge or confront difficult issues.
96. As submitted by the local authority central to this case is the risk FD poses to M in the future and the ability of others to manage that risk.
97. FD has an extensive criminal history including fraud and kindred offences (2015-2024), 25 theft and kindred offences (2005-2020), public disorder offences (2014), 8 offences relating to police/courts/prisons (2006-2015), 1 drug offence (2020), firearms/shotguns/offensive weapons (2006-2015), 16 miscellaneous offences (2011-2024) and 1 non-recordable offence (2013). However, having numerous convictions does not of itself mean that one poses a risk to one’s children. Context is everything.
98. In this case I consider that it is pertinent that the threshold conditions relate in part to the domestically abusive relationship between him and the mother. Such behaviours are not isolated. Some of the offences of which FD has been convicted relate to violence against previous partners and his convictions stand as proof of the same.
99. I find that FD did assault his brother at M’s first birthday party. Having heard evidence about it, I find that the trigger was a relatively minor disagreement to which the reaction was immediate violence. The fact that he took it outside and his daughter was not an eyewitness does not mean that she was not exposed to the violence. She will have heard the commotion as the adults present dealt with the incident and its aftermath. She was directly exposed to her father’s uncontrolled behaviour when he took her and R from the party. At the time FD was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There is a dispute in the evidence whether he had drunk alcohol or taken drugs. From my perspective it matters not; when out of control and having taken a substance, he took his two children with him and exposed them to his behaviours and the risks of his intemperate behaviour. On this occasion, I find that he self-evidently did not prioritise M’s best interests. I also find that on that occasion it is pertinent that (i) the special nature of the occasion did not act as an inhibitor and (ii) no member of his family who was present, including FE, intervened to stop him or protect either M or FL.
100. I do not consider that FD would ever deliberately harm M. I accept that he is devoted to her. However, as the events of her first birthday show, when he loses control, he has put her at risk of physical, psychological and emotional harm. I set against that his behaviour towards R and the contact he has with him. The contact is controlled and managed by R’s maternal grandmother and FG has been able to facilitate it. Within those sessions, FD has behaved appropriately. There is however I consider a difference between facilitating supervised contact for FD with R which FE assists with and providing care to his daughter throughout her minority. However I also have to factor in that the maternal grandmother with whom R is placed manages FD and there have been no known instances which have destabilised or threatened that placement.
101. I also take into consideration that FD has also behaved appropriately in supervised contact with M. I also factor in that that contact is of good quality. The mother told Mrs Wilkinson that as long as FD is having contact, he would not cause trouble. Having regard to all the evidence, I find that the reality is that as long as FD is not crossed, as long as he gets his own way, he poses no risk to M or to anyone. However, the incident on M’s first birthday demonstrates that when slighted, regardless of where he is or who he is with, he is likely to lose control and cause others physical harm. The incident on M’s first birthday is not an isolated incident of loss of control. As several of his previous convictions demonstrate, especially those against his previous partners, when he loses control, he is violent. As already stated, I do not consider he would intentionally harm M but in the moment, when he has lost control, I consider that he will not be inhibited by her presence or the presence of anyone else. There is thus a real risk that M will witness his violence and aggression, and , potentially she will inadvertently get caught in the crossfire. The risk of harm to her is therefore of physical, emotional and psychological harm. Given his impulsivity and total loss of control, it is significant.
102. FE considers that she can manage the risk that FD poses to M if M is placed in her care. I accept that orders can be put in place to protect M in her care - prohibited steps orders to keep him away from M, her school and where she lives, or orders that FD’s contact must be supervised professionally. However, I find that when rules and boundaries do not suit FD, he breaks them. I accept his evidence, which was contrary to his self-interest, that whilst in prison for breach of the non-molestation order he had (i) an unauthorised mobile phone in his cell to speak to others, including the mother, and (ii) created an alias, Mary Lou, so that he could speak to the mother on the prison phone. Accordingly, I reject the mother’s evidence that save for when he contacted her in May 2025, she had no contact with him in prison. Both FD and the mother accepted in evidence that their separation had been complicated, and neither were able to give me a clear date of separation in evidence. I find that it is likely that the mother did send him the photographs which she says FH sent. I consider her evidence that they originate from FH to frame the mother is far-fetched. One of the images is of the mother in her underwear. It has the messages I miss you, call me. The Valentines card for 14 th February 2025 is unsigned but the front page mocks FD’s poor behaviour in his relationship with the mother. I find the card is likely to have been sent by her. She is the likely source of the photographs. I find that in July 2025 FD breached the non-molestation order and the terms of the licence upon which he had been released from prison, when he was again in contact with the mother.
103. I factor in that FE could call the police if necessary to protect herself or M but set against that (i) that she did not call the police after he took M and R from the birthday party and (ii) calling the police is likely to be reactive to an incident that has happened rather than preventative. Thus, M would still be likely to be exposed to his uncontrolled behaviour. Further, having heard FE’s evidence, I accept that she does not like confrontation and tries to avoid it. Whilst that is an understandable trait for which I do not criticise her, it seems to me that I also have to factor in that if M were in her care, she would be unlikely to challenge FD in order to keep the peace and thus her parenting of her granddaughter is likely to be inhibited. I could make a supervision order under which the local authority could advise, befriend and assist FE and stipulate that it should be backed by a robust contract of expectations, but ultimately for that to work, FD would have to adhere to the contract and, as already found, he is only likely to do that when it suits him. I have considered whether a care order would help manage that, given the impact of s.33 CA 1989 . However, whilst a care order would give the local authority overriding parental responsibility, the reality is that it does not provide on-the-ground practical protection 24 hours a day, each day of the week. It would mean that the local authority could intervene and remove M without returning to court if she were at immediate risk of significant harm, but such a power is in reality reactive, not preventative.
104. Ultimately, I have also to factor into my analysis that FE appears to me to be fearful of her own son. She has not given him her address since moving in November 2024 and may not do so, even if M is not placed with her. I note that she did not apply to care for M until the summer of 2025 and I find , on balance, that her withholding of her address is directly related to her own fear of her son regardless of whether M is placed with her or not.
105. The mother herself poses a continued risk to M. The mother continues to use illicit drugs and alcohol and is dishonest about her usage. However, FE is not fearful of the mother. The mother has cooperated with her supervised contact with M and her other children. Despite wishing to care for M herself until recently, there is no evidence that she has not stuck to the parameters of supervised contact or sought to undermine the children’s placements. I set against that that the mother is subject to a CAWN in relation to S and I find that she breached that CAWN over the May bank holiday weekend. Despite the mother’ denials, that is the conclusion established on all the evidence I have heard. However, the risk of the mother similarly undermining M’s placement with FE is mitigated by the mother’ positive support of M’s placement with FE and knowledge of the alternative. It is in the mother’ self-interest to maintain the placement and, given her prognosis, the risk of her replicating her behaviour with S with M is low. I thus consider that the risk that the mother is likely to pose to M whilst in FE’s care is likely to be minimised and contained by professionally supervised contact, which will prevent M being exposed to her mother’s alcohol and drug usage.
106. I also have to factor in that FE has not had contact with M since October 2025. Any move to her care would have to be subject to a transition plan. Whilst that can be carefully handled and FE is likely to work with social services to meet her granddaughter’s need, there can be no certainty that M will settle there . However, against that I factor in that unless M stays where she is, there is no certainty she will settle in any new placement.
107. In summary, therefore, I factor into my analysis the many positives that flow from placing M with her grandmother, which include a family placement, being surrounded with natural love and affection, maintaining contact with her mother, her father and her siblings, and growing up with knowledge of her heritage, which will only assist her identity. However, there are also negatives on the other side of the balance sheet, particularly my conclusion that FE, even with support, is unlikely to be able to manage the risks FD poses to M and that she is unlikely to be able to provide her granddaughter with the reparative care she needs.
108. I turn to consider the option of M remaining in her current foster home. Her carer is willing to keep her throughout her minority. The carer was previously a professional nanny and can provide for all M's needs, including reparative care. It is agreed by all that M is thriving in her current placement. The placement is supported by the family, including both her parents. The foster carer has been able to facilitate professionally supervised contact with her mother, father and siblings. There has been no attempt by either the mother or FD to undermine that placement to date. I consider the risk of the mother undermining it in the future to be slim. FD is however impulsive. Currently the placement meets his needs. Should he decide in the future that it does not, then the risks outlined when considering placement with FE are relevant and M would need to be safeguarded from them. The foster carer, a s a professional carer would be able to provide the protection but the strain, if any, on the placement that would cause is a risk which I have to factor into my analysis.
109. I have already found that FD does not abide by rules when they do not suit him. Should the risk arise, then M could be protected from him by a s.34(4) order and other protective orders designed to keep him away if her address became known. The other protective feature would be to ensure throughout her minority that the placement address, her school location etc. was not known. That can be done, but it places a heavy burden on a child not to reveal their location during contact, which becomes more onerous as the child becomes older, more verbal and interactive.
110. A placement with her current foster carers would have the benefit of maintaining direct family links. However, contact would not be at its current level as it would be for identity purposes only. Nevertheless, that would enable M to continue to have real-life experience of her dual heritage, which will be important for her identity needs. M remaining in foster care with her current carers has the benefit of not requiring M to move again. She has already had five placements. However, I also have to factor in that whilst the foster carer currently expresses an intention to care for M to her majority, even good, committed placements, such as this, do break down.
111. Balanced against the many positives outlined in the previous paragraph, M will under this option remain under a care order. Her foster carer does not wish to seek a permanent arrangement via adoption or Special Guardianship. That means that M will be a looked-after child for the next 15 years, during which time she will be subject to the intrusions of the looked-after system, e.g. medicals; checks before she can stay over at a friend’s for a sleepover; twice-yearly Child in Care Reviews; regular social work visits etc. M will be a looked-after child throughout her minority with the stigma that attaches to that. I am sure she will be loved by her foster carer but the carer, like all of us, does not know what the future holds for her or M. However committed, however well-intentioned, there is always a risk of placement breakdown. Long-term foster care does not provide security or permanence. As Pauffley J said in Re LRP [2013] EWHC 3974 (Fam) in respect of a guardian’s recommendation for long-term foster care in respect of a 10-week-old baby: 39 .Ms Gorbutt’s report suggests that long term foster care would be a “means by which permanency can be achieved”; and that “a long term foster home can offer … commitment, security and stability within a new family…” I profoundly disagree with those contentions. Long term foster care is an extraordinarily precarious legal framework for any child, particularly one a young as LRP. Foster placements, long or short term, do not provide legal security. They can and often do come to an end. Children in long term care may find themselves moved from one home to another sometimes for seemingly inexplicable reasons. Long term foster parents are not expected to be fully committed to a child in the same way as adoptive parents. Most importantly of all in the current context, a long term foster child does not have the same and enduring sense of belonging within a family as does a child who has been adopted. There is no way in which a long term foster child can count on the permanency, predictability and enduring quality of his placement as can a child who has been adopted.
43. The advantages of a placement order are many and obvious. Prospective adopters are required to submit themselves to a rigorous and very thorough assessment process over many months. Those who satisfy the selection criteria are ordinarily of the highest calibre. They may be confidently expected to provide extremely good parenting to any child who is matched with them in all areas of his / her development. They will protect LRP from harm of whatever kind. The overwhelming probability is that they will be able to provide her with the priceless gift of a happy, secure and stable childhood from which she will derive life-long advantages.
112. In summary, a long-term foster placement has advantages for M, including that she would be able to stay where she is thriving and maintain family links, albeit contact would be reduced. Against that, however, I have to balance the disadvantages of foster care which I have set out in the previous paragraph and which are so eloquently stated by Pauffley J. [25. That sense of belonging is not 'transactional' but arises from the mutual commitment between adoptive parents and children in those cases where adoption is appropriate. Here, the Judge was absolutely entitled to regard it as a factor of critical importance.
113. The third realistic option is to make a final care order with a plan for adoption and make a placement order. Adoption provides M with permanence. It provides her with the ability to become a full and enduring part of another family throughout her life. Both in practice and legally . It will enable her to put down roots. Her adopters will have been vetted and trained. They will, it is expected, be able to provide her with the reparative care she will need throughout her minority and beyond. Prospective adopters are however not plentiful. Mr Forde has cited data which underscore the paucity of potential prospective adopters. The figures he cites encompass a wide age group and thus when considering them and factoring them into this analysis I also factor in that M is still relatively young, nearly three, and that she is meeting her developmental milestones. The statistics for a child with her specific profile are unknown but are likely, in my judgment, to be better than the global figure cited. The unchallenged evidence of Ms Archer, the family finder, which I accept , is that there are 51 adopters nationwide for a child of M’s age, who would support face-face staying in touch arrangements. The nationwide availability of adopters indicates 87 adopter profiles who can be considered for a single child of M’s age where there is a plan for ongoing face to face staying in touch arrangements with siblings only. ASE’s target timeframe for matching is 185 days. Ms Archer told the court in writing that Ms Archer, the chances of “ identifying suitable prospective adopters for M would likely be better supported without additional legislative requirements such s a s.26 ( Adoption and Children Act 2002 ) contact order…..well- informed final statement and care plan, which takes into account the circumstances of all the family members and the analysis of their need for ongoing face to face connections, would better support M achieving permanency through adoption with adopters who are committed to fulfilling a Keeping in Touch plan that includes face to face meet ups with her family members, once or twice a yea r”
114. Adoption as an option has disadvantages. It means the lifelong severing of legal ties with the natural family and a fracturing of relationships. That is significant in any case. It is significant in M's case because she knows who her parents and siblings are. There is a risk that M will suffer a sense of loss. Her mother, father, paternal and maternal grandmothers do not support her adoption; indeed, they positively oppose it. M would lose regular interaction with a wide sibling group with whom she identifies. Her sibling group are likely to suffer a sense of loss and N and Q are likely to experience that loss keenly. Maintaining her birth-ties enables M to grow up with firsthand knowledge of her dual heritage. Her adopters will, I am sure . conduct life story work with her and take such advice as needs be to be able to help M understand her heritage but that is not the same as experiencing something first hand, warts and all.
115. The final care plan for M is dated 26 June 2026. It details under paragraph 3 the contact the local authority proposes M should have with her parents and siblings if I make a care and placement order.
116. I factor into my decision making that the reality is that FD wholeheartedly opposes M's adoption. I do not consider that the risks he poses to M, as set out earlier in my judgment, can be safely managed for M if she were to be adopted. I accept the mother’ evidence that FD has threatened to kill her and FA if M is adopted and to find M wherever she is placed. Whilst FD strongly denies these allegations, I consider that the mother is being truthful about this issue. The allegations are contrary to her interests as she is a potential conduit, wittingly or not, for FD to his daughter if she were to be adopted. That potential points away from the mother having continued contact and yet she has told the court of the threats. I consider that she has done so because she is frightened that he will act on his threats. This means that, if M were to be adopted, realistically she would lose all contact with her father. Whilst the care plan for M is that she will continue to have some direct contact with her mother and siblings post-adoption, I have to be realistic and factor in that there is a possibility that her older siblings will not come to terms with their sister’s adoption and that her mother, despite the work needed, may seek to undermine the placement. I base that latter finding on my finding of fact that the mother has in the past actively undermined S’s placement and breached the CAWN in relation to S over the May bank holiday. There is therefore a risk which I must factor in that, if the mother does not accept M’s adoption, she may undermine the placement with devastating consequences for M if it led to placement breakdown, but also a significant loss for M if it meant her contact with her mother had to be stopped. However, having heard the mother give evidence and now knowing of her recent diagnosis, I consider that she is unlikely to pose a risk to M if adopted.
117. Hence, in summary, adoption has many advantages for M, including a chance of permanence and lifelong belonging, but against that I must balance the negatives which I acknowledge.
118. Having considered all three realistic options, I stand back and make my holistic welfare evaluation of M’s lifelong best interests. Having balanced all the factors for and against each of the options, I consider that an adoptive placement outside her family is in M’s lifelong best interests. M is nearly three. She has suffered many adverse life experiences. Her current foster placement is her fifth placement. M needs reparative care and she needs permanence. However good the foster placement is and however committed the foster carer is to her, long-term foster care does not provide that legal permanence and lifelong sense of belonging which I consider M, at nearly three, needs. Whilst adoption has its disadvantages, which I frankly acknowledge, they are significantly outweighed by the advantages. Placement with FE has its advantages, which I have set out, but it is unlikely to meet her needs for reparative care or safety for the reasons I have already stated. Long-term foster care has a number of advantages for M, all of which I have acknowledged, but it does not provide lifelong permanence and a sense of belonging. M, at nearly three, requires permanence and long-term foster care does not provide that security and permanence, however good the placement is. I factor in that the Article 8 rights of M and her parents and siblings are engaged. I consider, on the facts of this case and given M’s particular needs and circumstances, a care plan for adoption is in her best interests throughout her life and that that is a necessary and proportionate interference with their respective rights to family life.
119. I find that M’s welfare requires that I dispense with her mother’s and her father’s consent to her adoption. Having done so, I make the care and placement orders sought in relation to M.
120. I have considered whether I should make a S26 order in relation to parental or sibling contact. S26 (2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 states that: While an adoption agency is so authorised or a child is placed for adoption— (a)no application may be made for (i)a child arrangements order under section 8 of the 1989 Act containing contact provision, or (ii)an order under section 34 of that Act , but (b)the court may make an order under this section requiring the person with whom the child lives, or is to live, to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in the order, or for the person named in the order and the child otherwise to have contact with each other.
121. In R & C (Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 1302 the Court of Appeal considered the provisions of ss.26 and 27 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 . It noted: “ In Re D-S (A Child: Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 948 , this Court allowed an appeal against a judge's refusal to make a placement order and made the placement order itself. In his judgment with which the other members of the Court agreed, Peter Jackson LJ concluded that the child's relationships with her birth family were "not of such importance that they can outweigh the predominant need for her to have a family of her own". He described this as a factor which spoke "in favour of contact taking place, if it can be arranged, after C is placed for adoption and later adopted." He recorded that the local authority could be "expected to honour its care plan for current contact, and for a 3-month search for adopters who will accommodate meetings with family members." But he concluded that "overall, it would not be better for us to make a contact order, in fact it might be detrimental to the greater priority of finding an adoptive family for C." […]
66. In these observations, the judge overlooked the fact that it was his duty to "set the template for contact going forward". This case seems to fall four square within the words used by Wall LJ in Re P at paragraph 151. As in that case, there is a "universal recognition" that the relationship between the siblings needs to be preserved. It is "on this basis that the local authority / adoption agency is seeking the placement of the children …. [T]his means that the question of contact between the two children is not a matter for agreement between the local authority / adoption agency and the adopters: it is a matter which, ultimately, is for the court". In those circumstances, "it is the court which has the responsibility to make orders for contact if they are required in the interests of the two children".
67. In reaching his conclusion, the judge quoted passages from my judgment in Re T and R. It does not follow, however, that in every case where the court concludes that it is strongly in the interests of the children to continue to have sibling contact the option of adoption should be ruled out. Each case turns on its own facts. In Re T and R¸ the crucial importance of contact to the psychological wellbeing of the subject children and their older siblings, the importance of maintaining the children's sense of their cultural and community heritage, which could only be achieved through contact, coupled with the community's antipathy to adoption which made contact unfeasible, led to a conclusion that adoption was not in the interests of the children's welfare. In other cases, the evidence will clearly demonstrate not only that ongoing sibling contact is in the children's interests but also that it is likely to be achievable in an adoptive placement. In my view, this is just such a case.
68. Under the current law, as the President said in Re B, "it will only be in an extremely unusual case that a court will make an order stipulating contact arrangement to which the adopters do not agree". But that does not obviate the court's responsibility to set the template for contact at the placement order stage. In this case, the local authority was committed to search only for adopters willing to accommodate sibling contact and invited the court to make an order for contact under s.26 , both to meet the children's short-term needs and to set the template. There was of course a possibility that the search for such adopters might be unsuccessful or that adopters might subsequently refuse to agree to contact. But in the circumstances of this case, that possibility was not a sufficient reason to refuse to make the placement order. ’
122. In Re S (Placement Order Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823 McFarlane P emphasised the role of the court in setting the arrangements for future contact as follows: “74..... difficult though the issue may be, it would be wrong for the risk of deterring potential adopters to be the determining factor in each and every case. That this is so is demonstrated by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in both Re P and Re R [and C]. Wall LJ and, nearly two decades later, Baker LJ were both right to hold that it is the responsibility of the court to make orders for contact if they are required to meet the child’s welfare needs, as determined under ACA 2002 , section 1 . The position of potential adopters should not, to use Baker LJ’s words, obviate the court’s responsibility to set the template for contact at the placement order stage ”.
123. In Re A-B (placement and contact order) [2026] EWCA Civ 356 , the Court of Appeal undertook a further review of the authorities following Re S (above)] and what was described as the ‘tension’ between the importance of maximising the options for permanent (adoptive) placement as against the maintenance of contact, as follows:
32. “Standing back from these three authorities, there is a distinction to be drawn between those cases where continuing direct sibling contact is considered to be necessary for the child’s future welfare, and cases where the achievement of an adoptive home is the overarching goal, with future sibling contact being desirable as opposed to a pre-requisite. In the former circumstances (as in Re P and Re R [and C]) the court has ‘a responsibility’ to make a section 26 contact order”. .....................................................................................................................................
44. “In some cases the need to preserve contact will be a preference, in others it may be essential. In all cases it will be necessary to take account of the impact on family finding of a care plan that includes ongoing contact and/or proposals for a section 26 order for contact. There will be some cases where the priority to be given to preserving the sibling relationship will be such that the court should make a contact order, notwithstanding that to do so may make the task of finding an adoptive family more challenging”
124. Having made the findings I have about FD, I do not consider that a s.26 contact order is in M's best interests. M will need to be protected from the risks he poses, which are likely to be aggravated by the making of the placement order. M’s contact with her father therefore should be left to the local authority and promoted in accordance with the care plan I have endorsed.
125. In relation to the mother, I am asked to make a s.26 contact order and set the template for contact. On the evidence I have heard, I factor in that the mother’s contact with M is of good quality and that the mother has shown a commitment to contact. There are significant benefits of ongoing contact acknowledged by the PLWG and there would be a benefit to M in this case in having a continuing relationship with the mother insofar as her mother’s circumstances allow. I consider the risk of the mother disrupting an adoptive placement is low, although she does not have a positive attitude to her daughter’s adoption. I am told on the mother’ behalf that she seeks only to preserve a relationship which is already established with M. M is aware of who her mother is. I am told her mother is dying. I have therefore balanced all the factors for and against making an order. I have reminded myself of s.1(6) ACA 2002 . I have also borne in mind the difficulty the local authority has had until recently in articulating contact proposals. Hence, in all the circumstances, I do consider an order necessary and, in relation to the mother, I order that there should be one annual direct visit between M and her mother, which should be professionally supervised. Given the mother’s prognosis, that should be organised sympathetically to enable M to have positive memories of her mother. It will need to be carefully managed to ensure that FD does not use it as a route to trace M.
126. However, I do not consider that making a s.26 order in relation to sibling contact is in M’s best interests. Whilst the sibling bond is an important factor in this case, I also have to factor in the harm that M would suffer if she came face-to-face with her siblings who were not accepting of her adoption. In the circumstances, I consider that the care plan makes provision for contact which is in M's best interests, providing as it does for work with her siblings who are in care to receive support and work to come to terms with her adoption and hopefully have contact with her in the future. However, that hope is very much built on their acceptance of M’s adoption. If they are able to accept her adoption, then they could, if circumstances permit, join the contact I have ordered in relation to their mother.
127. That is my judgment in relation to M and I now turn to consider Q's case. The Parties' Positions in relation to Q
128. The local authority supported by the Guardian invite the court to make a final care order and endorse the amended care plan for Q. Q is now separately represented and, on her behalf, I am asked to adjourn final decision making to enable FA to be assessed as a carer for Q. The mother supports her daughter’s position. Q's father FJ has been given notice of the hearing before me. He has chosen not to participate in it and has no contact with his daughter. My Analysis and Decision in relation to Q.
129. Q is 13 ½ year old. She is neurodiverse. She has suffered adverse life experiences in the care of her mother. From 18 February 2025 until the end of June 2026 with her aunt FB. Sadly FB, as previously explained, could no longer care for her. Q was placed in residential care on 26 June 2026. In closing on Q I am told that she has settled well. However, since rising to consider judgment, I have received emails describing some challenging behaviours from Q since her movement into residential care. Whilst these emails are (i) not evidence and (ii) come with no analysis, I have read them.
130. Q is competent to give instructions and is separately represented before me. As at 22 June 2026 Q's position as properly set out in a position statement was that she wished to return to her mother’s care. At that time the mother was seeking to have Q returned to her care. However on the first day of the hearing the mother accepted that she could not care for either Q or M. As at 23 June 2026 if Q could not return to her mother, her preference was a family placement but failing that then she would prefer to go a residential home over foster care. She says she doesn't like being around children younger than her. She would be happy to be around children her age or older. Within her closing submissions, dated 8 July 2026, I am told that on 6 July 2026 Q told her solicitor that the placement is alright and the staff are nice, but she doesn’t want to stay there because it is not home and it is not family. She said that if she lives there she will have a breakdown and she still definitely wants to go to grans with N. Nan , in that context is FA.
131. FA, Q's maternal grandmother, provided a statement to this court dated 24 June 2026. Her statement of 24 June 2026 was solely about M. I have however read a second statement prepared by the mother and sent to the solicitors for Q within it she expresses a commitment to care for Q.
132. On 25 June 2026, an application was made on Q's behalf for FA to be assessed as a carer for her. At paragraph 6 of the application it is stated that : Q has been clear that she does not wish to go in to care, and wishes to be placed with her grandmother and full sibling N. FA has confirmed that she would like to be considered as carer to Q given the recent change in circumstances around Q's placement with her maternal great aunt FB who sadly has been diagnosed with breast cancer and will soon be undergoing treatment.
133. The application on behalf of Q is for an adjournment to enable an assessment of FA as a carer for N and her. The assessment itself will take about 10 weeks. I consider that that delay must be looked at in the context of the reality of adjourning this case. If the assessment is directed, there will be the need for all parties to react to it and provide final evidence, a further Guardian’s analysis and then at least a further EFH/IRH and possibly a contested hearing thereafter. The delay, in reality, is likely to be 16-20 weeks, possibly longer depending on when it can be listed.
134. The application as originally made on behalf of Q ignored this court’s judgment of 8 June 2026, in which I had analysed the risk of placing any child in the care of FA. It is now accepted in closing that the assessment could include consideration of FAin the light of my judgment.
135. FA is Q's maternal grandmother. FA was a represented party who played a full part in the hearing before me in May 2026. N was removed from FA care on 25 May 2025. As at that date, I found that N was suffering and was likely to continue to suffer significant harm in FA’s care. The basis upon which threshold was crossed in relation to N was that: N was suffering and was at continuing risk of suffering is the impairment of her emotional, social and psychological development. The harm and likelihood of harm arises because: a. The maternal grandmother has a history of poor mental health and has attempted to take her life on two occasions, once in 2019 and once in 2025. b. On 25 May 2025: The maternal grandmother left the children unsupervised and in the care of the mother during family time, despite her knowledge of the concerns of the local authority and in breach of the agreement to supervise contact. In doing so, she placed them at risk of emotional, physical harm and neglect the maternal grandmother was classed as a missing person and was later found by the police having taken an intentional overdose of paracetamol and unable to care for the children. c. The maternal grandmother engaged in substance misuse, including the use of cocaine, placing children in her care at risk of emotional harm and neglect
136. At paragraph 207 of my judgment dated 8 June 2026 , I put the threshold findings in context before proceeding to determine the risk of future harm in her care which, as at 8 June 2026. I made specific findings about FA at paragraphs 208-217. At paragraphs 218-228 I made an analysis of risk before making a holistic evaluation of the two realistic options for N. Ultimately I considered that N should live with her grandmother subject to the making of a supervision order stating at paragraph 231- 232 :
231. I find that there needs to be continued support to N to enable her to be placed with and stay with her grandmother. A straightforward and firm contract of expectation needs to be drawn up and signed by all participants. Should it be breached, it should be made clear that the local authority will consider removing N again. The contract of expectation should cover, as a minimum: a. Regular drug testing every three months. b. A specific agreement to allow N to be seen by social workers on her own and away from the home. c. Continuation of her work with Mrs C and engagement with CBT. d. Adherence to the arrangements for contact and no informal arrangements with family members. e. Clear guidance on what would lead the local authority to take steps to remove N.
137. As set out in my judgment of 8 June 2026 I identified a number of risks to any child placed in FA’s care. The paragraphs of my first judgment, as identified above, are relevant to Q's application. They should be read into this judgment. The decision to place N with FA was finely balanced. It was made on the basis that N would be the sole child placed with her. That decision was made in the knowledge that Q could not remain with FB. No party, including FA, who was a party before me in the first hearing, has sought to appeal my findings or decision. N has now been placed with FA by the local authority who accepted my risk assessment. There is a contract in place as required by me and set out above. Against that background it is submitted on behalf of Q that there is a gap in the evidence. Although it is accepted on behalf of Q that FA has never been positively assessed by the local authority, it is submitted that she has not at any stage of these proceedings to specifically assessed to consider her ability to care for Q (and N). There was no such analysis as part of the together and apart assessment. It is argued that only evidence in these proceedings currently in respect of the current final care plan for Q is the updated care plans. Although the court considered N should only be placed with FA as a single child, by the time the assessment is filed N would have been living with FA for nearly 3 months or more. It is accepted, on Q's behalf that this is not a long period of time, but I am asked to direct an assessment to consider the updated position.
138. Pursuant to S32(1) (a) CA 1989 , public law applications must be disposed of without delay and in any event within 26 weeks of the day on which the application is issued. That legislative mandate is subject to one caveat, namely S32(5) A 1989 under which a court may extend that period if it is necessary to do so to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly. As Pauffley J stated in Re NL (Appeal: Interim Care Order: Facts and Reasons) [2014] 1 FLR 1384 , justice must never be sacrificed upon the altar of speed. However, it is only the imperative demands of justice, namely fair process, or the child’s welfare which will justify an extension as necessary – Re M-F (children) [2014] EWCA Civ 991 .
139. In considering an application to extend proceedings for further assessment, the Court of Appeal in Re P (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 1483 approved the words of Mumby P (as he then was) in Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCC B44 Fam , concerning a case in FDAC: “There must be a robust and realistic appraisal at the outset of what is possible within the child's timescales and an equally robust and realistic ongoing appraisal throughout of whether what is needed is, indeed, being achieved or not within the child's timescale. These appraisals must be evidence-based with a solid foundation, not driven by sentiment or a hope that something may turn up. Typically, three questions will have to be addressed: a. First, is there some solid, evidence-based reason to believe that the parent is committed to making the necessary changes? b. If so, secondly, is there some solid evidence-based reason to believe that the parent will be able to maintain that commitment? c. If so, thirdly, is there some solid evidence-based reason to believe that the parent will be able to make the necessary changes within the child's timescale?”.
140. I have e considerable sympathy for Q and the circumstances in which she finds herself through no fault of her own. I have considered her application for an adjournment and further assessment of FA carefully. As matters stand there is no solid-evidenced based reason to consider that the risk assessment I made in my previous judgment has changed and the risks lessened. That may be the case with the passage of time, but it is still early days. I note, for instance, that the drug testing required of FA under the contract of expectations is due this month. Hopefully, it will confirm abstinence, but the result is unknown. It remains to be seen whether FA is cooperating with the local authority and taking up the CBT she requires to make and sustain change. All these requirements in the contract of expectation are in place to mitigate and reduce risk which in my previous judgment I assessed as high. It will only be with the passage of time that change will be seen and can be measured. Until there is evidence of change on the ground, in terms of risk there is nothing new to be assessed. Even now, in September, the application for assessment is premature. There is no solid evidential basis. The assessment sought on behalf of Q is not required by the court to determine Q's case justly. The delay for further assessment would not be purposeful.
141. I thus turn to consider Q's future welfare. Q's welfare is my paramount consideration. I factor into my consideration of her best interests, her strong wish to be placed with family. Q is competent to give instruction and thus her wishes and feelings are informed and weigh heavily in the balance. However, they are not determinative. I have recently assessed the risks in FA’s care. Such are the risks that no party, including Q, suggests she could be safely placed with FA now. Sadly, her mother cannot care for her nor, at the moment, can FB. It is submitted on Q's behalf that if FB could care for her in the future that would best serve Q’s welfare. If not, then, if FA, remains committed to caring for Q and if there is sold evidence that the risks in her care for any child have diminished, then in the future placement with her maternal grandmother may be a possibility. However, at this stage , the reality is that Q is placed in a residential placement which meets her stated requirements and her needs. The staff are attuned to her neurodiversity and the placement is near her school which for Q provides stability and is important to her. I have to factor in that a placement in residential care comes with its own risk of harm. There is the risk of placement breakdown. There is also the risk that Q feels and continues to feel a sense of loss of her family.
142. The care plan I am asked by the local authority to approve is at Z133-149 in the bundle. The plan provide for regular monthly contact with her mother. I am told in teh closing submissions on behalf of Q that Q is content with that. FA may attend that contact. However, she may also attend contact between FB and Q, if FB agrees. What the contact with FB will look like depends upon her ability to facilitate and participate in contact as she undergoes treatment. At present paragraph 1.12 of the plan suggests that this contact could be monthly. It is proposed within the care plan that Q will have supervised contact with her full sibling group on alternate months, with the mother. It is also proposed that Q's sister, N, may attend the monthly contact alongside FA, should Q wish.
143. Having considered all the evidence in this case , I consider that it will be in Q’s best interests for the care plan in relation to her to be amended to include a commitment to regular professionally supervised contact with FA and N. Given the other contact Q is to have with her mother, her siblings and FB, I consider a frequency of bi-monthly is appropriate. Viewing teh contact proposals as a whole, I consider that subject to those amendments, they meet her contact needs .
144. In my judgment he local authority should also amend their care plan to include the date of the next Child in Care Review (which from the papers should be in about January 2027) and to explicitly state that at that review there will be consideration of the possibility of Q being placed with family members including FB and FA.
145. Subject to the above amendments being made to Q's care plan, I consider that a care order is in Q's best interest and accordingly make a final care order in relation to her. The Application to extend the Non-Molestation order
146. I have already found that FD has threatened to kill the mother if M is to be adopted. He has a history which I have already outlined of impulsive, violent and aggressive behaviour which can be easily triggered, as it was at M's first birthday party. Given I have made care and placement orders for M, I consider that he poses a real risk of harm to the mother. However, I do not consider an indeterminate order is either necessary or proportionate. In my judgment, an extension of 12 months is necessary . That will cover the immediate aftermath of my decisions in relation to M and should cover the period during which M is matched and then placed for adoption. Delay and Case Management
147. This judgment concludes public law applications which are now nearly 2 years old. To put that delay in context, M has been the subject of public law proceedings for two-thirds of her life. The statutory time-limit has been honoured in the breach rather than its observance. It is there for a reason. It is there because it is accepted that delay is contrary to the best interests of children. Delay is inimical to the welfare of all children It has been harmful to these children who have had to experience uncertainty about their future. It has added to the stress and anxiety of the adults who have sought to care.
148. The reasons for the delay are multi-factorial. There has been a lack of judicial continuity. There has been linear care planning on the ground by the local authority . There was a failure to take proceedings in relation to N until almost six months after her siblings’ case had begun. There have been twelve case management hearings. There have been delayed assessments. On the ground there have been four or five allocated social workers during the lifetime of the proceeding.
149. In my judgment, there has been a lack of focus on the issues and, probably consequently, a lack of focus on the evidence which should be before the court and disclosed to others . There have been failures on the part of the local authority to ensure all parties had relevant disclosure within the timescales of the court and, despite being giving time during the first hearing before me, the social worker on behalf of the local authority entered the witness box in that hearing ill-prepared needing further time to prepare to give evidence. She did not return to give evidence before me at this hearing.
150. I consider that the issues in the case have become lost in the myriad of papers filed online. Having now experienced this case, it would have benefitted from a properly focused PD27A bundle. PD27A is not just about bundles and limiting the documents the court must read. In my judgment, the preparation of such a bundle would have ensured that all the relevant information and evidence was before the court in proper order. It would also have ensured that all those working the case, including the advocates, would have had to consider in a timely fashion what was forensically necessary and whether all the relevant evidence was properly disclosed and before the court. In my judgment PD27A should have been observed throughout. Had it been, there would have been better focus. Had it been the social worker in the first hearing would have had the material she needed to prepare for giving evidence rather than being faced with a wall of virtual paper going into 1000s of pages.
151. I have highlighted these issues in the hope that other cases will learn from them. I am told by Ms Daly that the local authority has taken the opportunity to use this case as a basis for future learning and to improve practice. I am glad they have taken it seriously and I hope that it does indeed bring about change. Change is necessary.