UK case law

RMD v General Medical Council

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2684 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

HHJ KAREN WALDEN-SMITH: Introduction

1. The claimant is a consultant nephrologist who is currently the subject of fitness to practice proceedings brought by the GMC. After referral to the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) on 3 December 2025, pursuant to the provisions of section 35 C(8) of the Medical Act 1983 ( MA 1983 ), as to whether there should be an interim restriction on the claimant by the imposition of suspension or conditions, on 18 December 2025 the Interim Orders Tribunal (IOT) imposed conditions of notification on the claimant. On 7 May 2026, the claimant initiated a part 8 statutory application pursuant to the provisions of section 41A(10)(b) of the Medical Act 1983 for revocation of the interim order of conditions imposed on him.

2. The challenge was brought, on the grounds set out in the original Grounds of Challenge dated 6 May 2026, that the IOT was wrong to consider an order was necessary to protect the public; the IOT was wrong to consider an order was needed in the public interest; and that the order of conditions was disproportionate.

3. Prior to that application being listed, on 17 June 2025 the IOT reviewed the decision dated 18 December 2025 and upheld the conditions of notification and imposed a further condition (condition 4) that: a. Except in life-threatening emergencies, he must not carry out face-to-face consultations with female patients. b. He must inform the GMC within seven calendar days of any occasion he carries out a face-to-face consultation with a female patient in a life-threatening emergency.

4. The original Grounds of Challenge have been maintained by the claimant and have been supplemented by additional Grounds of Challenge and submissions made in September 2026. Those additional Grounds of Challenge focus on the additional condition and submit that the IOT was wrong to consider that the additional condition was necessary to protect the public, and that the additional condition is disproportionate.

5. While there had been some initial concern, expressed in the skeleton argument submitted on behalf of the GMC, that there was a continuing challenge to the December 2025 order, it was clear that the challenge was to the extant order of 17 June 2026 and that the statutory application before the Court is with respect to that order on the grounds set out both in the Original Grounds of Challenge and in the Supplementary Grounds of Challenge.

6. I am grateful to both Ms Barnfather, acting on behalf of the claimant, and Mr Hare KC, on behalf of the GMC, for their comprehensive and helpful oral and written submissions. Preliminary Issues Anonymity

7. Prior to the hearing, the claimant brought an application pursuant to the provisions of CPR 39.2(4) for anonymisation of himself, his children and his current partner. I dealt with that application at the start of the hearing and have granted an order in terms withholding the identities of those individuals and the complainants and restricting the reporting of details that could lead to their identity.

8. The defendant, the General Medical Council (GMC) took a neutral stance with respect to the application. There were no representatives from the press in court to make submissions, but the order contains a provision for any interested party (which would include the press) to make an application to vary or set aside the order.

9. The application for anonymity was made on the basis that the underlying facts of this case, and the allegations made against the claimant, are of a nature that they have a very real prospect of causing long term emotional and/or psychological harm to the claimant’s teenage children and to the claimant’s relationship with them; and that, without reporting restrictions, there would be an adverse impact on the other individuals involved, as the two complainants and the claimant’s current partner would be damaged by the very intimate details of their private lives being in the public domain.

10. CPR Part 39.2 (4) provides that: “ The court must order that the identity of any person shall not be disclosed if, and only if, it considers non-disclosure necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and in order to protect the interests of that person.” The starting point for this Court is that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice, with a clear presumption in its favour, unless it is outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. As was set out in PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126 , cases will be heard in public and without restriction on reporting unless there is a strict necessity to depart from that rule (see Scott v Scott [1913] AC 917 ), but there is, as was explored in PMC , an inherent power in the court derived from the common law to derogate from the principle of open justice in civil proceedings by the making of withholding and reporting restrictions orders where such an order is strictly necessary in the interests of justice.

11. I considered the application for anonymity in accordance with the guidance given by Dingemans LJ in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 and Steyn J in Dr MXM v GMC [2022] EWHC 817: balancing the article 8 rights to private and family life against the article 10 rights of the press and the public, bearing in mind the fundamental importance of open justice and the interest that the press would have in the names of the individuals in this case, particularly the claimant. In balancing those competing rights, Lord Steyn in S (A child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47 , helpfully set the following principles: “First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Second, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balance test.”

12. The restrictions on reporting I have ordered in this case do not prohibit the details of the case being in the public domain. It prohibits the names of the individuals, who would all be impacted by the factual issues in this case, being in the public domain.

13. The complainants in this matter would be entitled to life-long anonymity in the context of criminal proceedings pursuant to the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 and have, in the course of the IOT hearings, been referred to as Ms A and Ms B respectively in recognition of the highly sensitive nature of the allegations being made by them against the claimant. There has, however, not yet been a formal order that they should not be named. I have no hesitation in stating, particularly given the statutory protection that would be available in the criminal sphere, together with the issues relating to the children as set out below, that it is entirely appropriate that the identity of both complainants is anonymised. For consistency, they are referred to in this judgment as Ms A and Ms B.

14. The claimant has provided a witness statement in support of the application for anonymity. The substance of the allegations against the claimant relate to his sexual practices in his private life. He accepts that he has engaged in sadomasochism and that his sexual behaviour might be considered “extreme”. He denies all the allegations made against him that there was any non-consensual or coercive behaviour on his part, but highlights that there is likely to be an interest in his sexual behaviour. If reported freely, then not only would he, the two complainants (his former wife and a former partner) and his current partner, be exposed to such interest, but his children would be exposed to those details which would undoubtedly be damaging to their well-being and education, and could be extremely damaging to their relationship with their father and their relationships with others – including their mother and their peers. The evidence I have seen indicates that the children, particularly the older child, have suffered (at least in part) from the fall-out from the highly acrimonious divorce. Both children are vulnerable and are at a sensitive time for both their education and their development. The additional concern is that identification of any of the adults, including the claimant, would lead to a “jigsaw identification” of the children.

15. Insofar as the claimant seeks anonymity for himself and his current partner because of the potential for reputational damage arising from the salacious nature of the sexual allegations, those concerns are not in themselves sufficient to order anonymity as they do not justify an interference with open justice: “The hearing of cases in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or deterring both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect.” ( Scott v Scott ).

16. As I made clear in the hearing, my principal concern is that the naming of the claimant and/or his current partner would inevitably result in the claimant’s children being exposed to information they should be shielded from and would also lead to a “jigsaw” identification of the children, and at least one of the complainants and, in all the circumstances of this matter, it is appropriate for there to be an anonymity order. The balance of the article 8 and article 10 rights falls clearly in favour of anonymity of the claimant, the complainants, the claimant’s current partner and the two children. Additional Evidence

17. The GMC seek to rely upon a further witness statement provided by Mr Turner, of GMC legal, dated 28 August 2026, where he exhibits a lengthy and detailed witness statement, together with lengthy exhibits, dated 5 August 2026 provided by Ms B, the claimant’s former wife. This statement was not before the IOT, as it had not been drafted by the time of the review hearing.

18. The Court is not limited in its consideration of the evidence to only that evidence which was provided to the IOT in June 2026, and the Court can consider additional evidence where it is appropriate to do so (see Sandler v GMC [2010] 1029 (Admin.) per Nicol J.) as the Court is obliged to consider all the relevant evidence and arguments (see Steyn J in Dr MXM v GMC at [37] referring to both Sandler and GMC v Anyam-Osigwe [2012] EWHC 3884 (Admin) ).

19. The evidence of Ms B is plainly relevant to the issues that this Court must consider, and it was compiled in the context of the GMC’s investigation into the behaviour of the claimant. It is signed, dated and has appended to it a statement of truth. It provides Ms B’s account of her sexual relationship with the claimant during their marriage, including acts of sado-masochism, bondage and asphyxiation during sex in their marriage, which she says she did not consent to and that he could not reasonably have believed she consented to. In addition to the allegations of non-consensual asphyxiation and strangulation during sex, Ms B alleged three specific incidents: the first specific incident she alleges was in 2004, the third was at the end of the marriage in September 2014, after they had separated.

20. The claimant comments that this recent statement is self-serving and plainly adduced for the purpose of bolstering Ms B’s credibility. While the claimant does not seek to suggest that the Court cannot consider evidence that was not available to the IOT, it is submitted that the statement fails to support a finding that the conditions imposed are necessary for public protection or in the public interest. Further, it is denied that the new statement undermines the claimant’s contention that the conditions imposed are not proportionate.

21. While the IOT is “entitled to discount evidence that is inconsistent with objective or undisputed evidence or which is manifestly unreliable” (see Perry v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 145 ), it is not for the IOT, or this Court, to reach findings of fact on the evidence presented. While there are challenges to Ms B’s evidence, it cannot be said that her recent statement is “manifestly unreliable” . She has, for example, supported the allegation that she made to the police in February 2024. about the alleged incident of sexual violence in September 2014, with the fact that she made a complaint to her family lawyers at the time. Undermining her account is that, after making the initial complaint, she retracted the allegation on the basis that what had happened between her and the claimant was consensual.

22. In all the circumstances, given the relevance of the evidence contained in the August 2026 statement by Ms B, the statement will be admitted for the purpose of this application. The Law The Legislative Framework The Medical Act 1983

23. Section 41 A of the MA 1983 provides as follows: Interim orders (A1) Where a matter is referred under section 35 C(8) to the MPTS, the MPTS must arrange for an Interim Orders Tribunal or a Medical Practitioners Tribunal to decide whether to make an order as mentioned in that provision. (1) Where an Interim Orders Tribunal or a Medical Practitioners Tribunal in arrangements made under subsection (A1), or a Medical Practitioners Tribunal on their consideration of a matter, are satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of a fully registered person, for the registration of that person to be suspended or to be made subject to conditions, the Tribunal may make an order— (a) that his registration in the register shall be suspended (that is to say, shall not have effect) during such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order (an “interim suspension order”); or (b) that his registration shall be conditional on his compliance, during such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order, with such requirements so specified as the Tribunal think fit to impose (an “order for interim conditional registration”)”.

24. With respect to a statutory challenge to the decision of the IOT to impose an order of suspension or conditions, section 41 A(10) sets out the powers of the Court: Where an order has effect under any provision of this section, the relevant court may— (a) in the case of an interim suspension order, terminate the suspension; (b) in the case of an order for interim conditional registration, revoke or vary any condition imposed by the order; (c) in either case, substitute for the period specified in the order (or in the order extending it) some other period which could have been specified in the order when it was made (or in the order extending it), and the decision of the relevant court under any application under this subsection shall be final. The Court’s Function

25. The power of the court, when considering a statutory application pursuant to the provisions of section 41 A(10), is not merely supervisory but is original. In GMC v Hiew [2007] 1 WLR 2007 , Arden LJ (as she then was) set out that: “Parliament has not provided that the [IOT]… should in this respect simply operate in the shadow of judicial-review… the exercise in decision-making is to be performed by the court as the primary decision-maker”

26. While Hiew was specifically dealing with the power to extend an interim suspension order under section 41 A(7) of the MA 1993, it is common ground between the parties that the court is exercising original powers and is not confined to exercising a judicial review function. The court will, however, only intervene in overturning a decision of a specialist disciplinary tribunal if it considers it to be wrong. In Cook v General Medical Council [2024] EWHC 1663 (Admin) (cited in the original Grounds of Challenge) it is set out that: “the High Court has historically recognised that it is being asked to overturn the decision of a specialist disciplinary panel, which is ordinarily entitled to be afforded considerable respect (Harry v GMC [2012] EWHC 2762 (QB) at [2], per Burnett J (as he then was)). The test this court must apply may be formulated in different ways: Whether the court should exercise its discretion ("may" vary/revoke) differently to the Tribunal, while affording the expert tribunal's decision due respect; or Determining what is the "appropriate" order in the case, a matter for this court to determine itself on all the evidence now available to it, again respecting but not being subservient to the Tribunal's decision, and only disturbing it if it is wrong.”

27. Consequently, in considering the claimant’s application to revoke (or, in the alternative, to vary so as to remove the additional condition imposed in June 2026) pursuant to the provisions of section 41 A(1)(b) of the MA 1983 , this court must afford the IOT “due respect”, while not being subservient to the IOT’s decision. Counsel for the claimant submitted that, in light of what is set out in the decision, the deference to the IOT should be limited. I will deal with those submissions below. However, what remains clear is that this court should not interfere with the determination of the IOT unless it is considered to be wrong. In this context “wrong” does not mean “wrong in law”. The public interest in showing respect or deference to the IOT as a specialist independent statutory panel is that it has, and is assumed to have, expertise in “issues of public perception and public confidence” in the medical profession: Davis J. (as he then was) in R(Sheikh) v General Dental Council [2007] EWHC 2972. In Howells v GMC [2015] EWHC 348 (Admin) , Laing J. (as she then was) referred to the need for deference in these terms: “The panel is an expert body which is in a better position to assess the requirements of the profession and issues of public perception and of public confidence than is the court.”

28. I carefully bear all of this in mind when considering the claimant’s challenge to the decision of the IOT to impose conditions on the three grounds that the conditions are (i) not necessary to protect the public; (ii) the conditions are not needed in the public interest; and (iii) the conditions imposed are not proportionate. The Factual Background

29. In considering the allegations in this matter, and the rebuttal of those allegations by the claimant, neither the IOT nor this court are carrying out a fact-finding exercise. The allegations need to be considered, the context in which the allegations are made, and the potential seriousness of those allegations. It is not for the IOT or this court to resolve the dispute between the claimant and those who make allegations against him: see Crane J. in GMC v Sheill [2006] EWHC 3025 (Admin) .

30. The claimant is a consultant nephrologist and transplant surgeon and physician. He has held full registration with the GMC since 9 August 2002. He has provided numerous testimonials from both patients and colleagues that speak extremely highly of his qualities as a medic and the care and skill that he has exercised in his treatment of patients. There is nothing to suggest that, throughout the period that the allegations cover, the claimant has either been, or perceived to have been, a risk to his patients (male or female). On the contrary, he is extremely highly rated as an excellent renal physician with no suggestion of inappropriate behaviour. His practice has most recently been almost entirely as an independent self-employed consultant working for private organisations and for insurers. He had been carrying out some work for a NHS Foundation Trust. As a consequence of the IOT interim orders, the claimant’s practice has been very severely impacted.

31. The claimant met his first wife, referred to as Ms B, in or about 2003. They commenced a relationship in 2004 and married in 2008. As referred to above, there are two children of that marriage. The claimant and Ms B separated in 2014 and the consequential family proceedings, with respect to care of the two children, have been extremely fraught.

32. The claimant met Ms A on a dating app. in or about August 2019, and they started living together in mid-2020. Their relationship continued until an acrimonious ending in February 2024. At the end of the relationship, Ms A reported to the police that she had been subjected to severe sexual violence at the hands of the claimant over the previous four years, including rape, strangulation, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and coercive and controlling behaviour. Ms A was interviewed by the police on 10 February 2024 and she alleged numerous incidents of non-consensual behaviour and that he had coerced her into behaviour that was for his own sexual gratification.

33. The claimant says that the allegations made by Ms A were within hours of the end of the relationship and were untrue. He believes that the allegations were made as a consequence of the break up of their relationship.

34. The claimant was arrested for questioning on 9 February 2024 and released on bail without charge. The claimant immediately self-reported to both the GMC and to his various employers on 12 February 2024.

35. Upon the complaints being made by Ms A, the police contacted Ms B to ask if she had been subjected to any violent behaviour by the claimant. Ms B was also interviewed by the police on 10 February 2024 and informed them that she had, at the end of her relationship with the claimant in 2014, reported to her solicitors what had happened in her relationship with the claimant and that he had raped her. With her solicitors’ encouragement at that time, she made a complaint but she promptly dropped that allegation on the basis that she was then saying that there had in fact been consensual sex which she had initiated on their wedding anniversary.

36. The claimant was interviewed by the police on 19 March 2024. He denied all the allegations made against him that he had engaged in non-consensual sexual behaviour, including the allegations of rape, assault and non-consensual strangulation. He admitted to partaking in BDSM (bondage, discipline and sado-masochism) but said that was all consensual. Certain of the allegations made against him were denied by him as having taken place at all or as having taken place in the way alleged.

37. In the course of their investigations, the police found telephone messages between the claimant and Ms A where rape, masturbation and children’s underwear had been discussed and a message from Ms A to the claimant where she had said “CHOKE ME, MARK ME, CANE ME. I WANT YOU TO RAPE ME.”

38. At the culmination of their investigations in November 2024 the police decided to take no further action, with the case being kept under review. The claimant was not charged and has still not been charged. While the complaints made by Ms A and Ms B were similar, it was determined that without corroboration, it was difficult to establish that consent was not given at the relevant time and consequentially the evidential threshold had not been met. Additionally, the police investigation revealed evidence which undermined Ms A’s contention that she had not consented.

39. The IOT had initially imposed an interim order of conditions of notification on 15 April 2024. These conditions of notification had been maintained on 1 October 2024. Subsequent to the notification to the GMC on 3 December 2024 of the decision of the police to take no further action, the IOT revoked the interim order of conditions. Prior to that determination, the GMC had received an email from Ms B which attached a letter from her (referring to a request from the claimant’s lawyers) and saying: ‘ I am [the claimant’s] ex-wife and first victim; I lived in an abusive marriage. The nature and context were physical, psychological, sexual and financial. My concerns with this urgent legal request are two-fold, [the claimant] seeks to cherry pick two specific documents, one of which is a statement made some 5 years ago by his second victim, [Ms A] whom he was arrested in February 2024 for serious sexual offences. [Ms A] was in a controlling and abusive relationship when she made that statement. The second issue is that there have been three previous child arrangement proceeding[s], … with much evidence therein about [the claimant].’ At the time of receiving that email, the GMC took the view that it contained too limited information to be added to the case.

40. The statement referred to in Ms B’s letter is the statement written by Ms A on 2 March 2021 in the context of the family proceedings between the claimant and Ms B. Ms A said in 2021 that the claimant was a wonderful father who was devoted to his children. She went on to allege that following an assault on the claimant’s son by Ms B’s new partner, Ms B was wrongly saying that the claimant was abusing Ms A. Ms A denied the allegations that the claimant was “violent and manipulative” and said: “To clarify, I am not in an abusive relationship, this is flatly denied. I am not scared or under the control of [the claimant] nor did he write my statement for me. Should there be any doubt about his serious and libellous allegation the court may cross examine me…”

41. At the hearing on 18 December 2025, the IOT took into an account an email sent to the GMC by Ms A on 26 March 2025 where she stated: ‘ I am concerned because I have been contacted by [the claimant’s] solicitors who are representing him in his GMC investigation. They informed me that they have requested a letter that I wrote in 2021 to be released from the family courts and that he is seeing to rely on this letter in relation to his investigation. My worry is that he and he alone will present his version of events around this letter, but that, as the author, I am not able to give an opportunity to provide an explanation and I do not feel this is right, fair or balanced. There is a particular reason that I wrote this letter but it will not be for the reasons he is seeking to rely on, equally, it is historic, it was written in 2021, he was arrested in 2024.’

42. On 18 December 2025, the IOT accepted the submissions made by counsel on behalf of the GMC that, in light of the nature and seriousness of the allegations against the claimant made by both Ms B and Ms A, an interim order of conditions was appropriate. That interim order was for a period of 12 months with a review at 6 months.

43. That review took place on 17 June 2026. Prior to that review hearing the GMC had received a statement from Ms A setting out detailed allegations of her relationship with the claimant between August 2019 and February 2024. That statement alleges that within her relationship she was subjected to extreme sexual violence over a period of over 4 years. The claimant strenuously denies any non-consensual sexual behaviour in their relationship. The statement of Ms A was supported by a statement from Ms A’s mother and a friend of Ms A. Those statements did not provide any useful independent evidence, save that Ms A’s mother referred to her daughter appearing withdrawn. The claimant sought to have the interim order of conditions lifted given what he says has been a devastating impact on his ability to practise.

44. The GMC invited the IOT to keep the conditions as they were. A member of the tribunal independently picked up on a short police entry dated 19 June 2024 with reference to a female doctor, who was junior to the claimant, and who had a relationship with the claimant while he was still married. The entry in the police log says “Also called [Ms C] she has [to] alleged a rape by the claimant but not 100% on committal yet.” There was no statement from Ms C and the short police entry gives no evidential support to any assertion that Ms C was a third victim of the claimant. Ms A did give some evidence about the claimant’s relationship with Ms C in these terms: “ Around this time, [the claimant] also began to show me porn videos whilst having sex with me and would show me videos he had taken of his ex-girlfriends in similar sexual situations to what he would do to me. I am unsure if [the claimant’s] ex-girlfriends gave consent for these videos to be shown to others. [The claimant] showed me many videos of his ex-girlfriend, [Ms C] who was a junior doctor, in the same department as [the claimant] when he was a consultant at the Hospital. [The claimant] began having an affair with [Ms C] whilst he was married. [The claimant] told me that they would have sex in the hospital, both in his office and in the on call room and also told me that he had sex with other doctors in the on call room. …

45. On 17 June 2026, contrary to the request of the GMC to keep the conditions as they were and the submissions on behalf of the claimant that the appropriate outcome was to remove the order and allow the claimant to return to unrestricted practice as there was no immediate risk to patients and no proportionate order that could be made, the IOT decided to both maintain the conditions from December 2025 and impose the fourth condition that the Claimant was not to carry out face-to-face consultations with female patients other than in a life-threatening emergency.

46. Subsequent to the hearing on 17 June 2026, Ms B has provided the witness statement dated 5 August 2026 referred to above, where she alleges non-consensual acts of strangulation and asphyxiation during sex together with three specific incidents – including rape in 2014, which allegation she withdrew when she first made it, on the basis that she said it was consensual. Analysis

47. In determining the challenge to the IOT’s decision in June 2026, it is necessary for this Court – as a primary decision-maker – to give appropriate due respect to the specialised body but to intervene if the decision of the IOT is wrong (see GMC v Hiew; Cook v GMC; and Howells v CMC , referred to above.) As is set out in Cook v GMC: “ The point of – and I would add public interest in - showing respect to the Tribunal’s decision is that this is an independent statutory panel that has and is assumed to have expertise in “issues of public perception and public confidence” in the medical profession ( R (Sheik) v General Dental Council [2007] EWHC 2972 (Admin) at [34], per Davis J). In Howells v GMC [2015] EWHC 348 (Admin) (“Howells”), Laing J (as she then was) said at [35] that “The panel is an expert body which is in a better position to assess the requirements of the profession and issues of public perception and of public confidence than is the court.” Such a body has been authorised by Parliament to take the prime responsibility for making certain important decisions about the regulation of doctors. This is separate to the prime statutory duty of the GMC, which has its multifaceted protective duty also conferred by statute ( the Act , s.1 (1B))”

48. All the evidence that is available must be considered, but it is not for this Court, in the same way that it was not for the IOT, to reach conclusions on the disputed evidence ( Dr MXM v GMC and GMC v Sheill , also referred to above).

49. Section 41 A of the MA 1983 provides, inter alia, that where an IOT is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of a fully registered person, to be suspended or make registration conditional on compliance of conditions. It is not suggested that the conditions imposed in December 2025, and then continued and added to in June 2026, were imposed in the interests of the claimant. The two grounds upon which the IOT imposed the conditions is that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is otherwise in the public interest.

50. The claimant challenges the imposition of the conditions, including the fourth condition not to carry out face-to-face consultations with female patients, except in life-threatening emergencies, on three grounds: (1) That it was wrong to find that the conditions are necessary to protect the public; (2) That it was wrong to find that the conditions in the interim orders are necessary in the public interest; (3) That the conditions imposed are not proportionate.

51. The MPTS Guidance provides that the test for imposing an interim order is whether it is necessary for the protection of the public or otherwise desirable in the interests of the public (my emphasis) (para. 4). In the context of protection of the public, an order may be necessary for the protection of the public where the concern about the doctor’s fitness to practice indicates there is a real and immediate risk to patient safety which will often arise from concerns about the doctor’s behaviour or performance (para. 5). In the context of an interim order being desirable in the interests of the public, the Guidance sets out three elements: the protection of patients and the public generally from a doctor whose fitness to practise may be impaired; the maintenance and promotion of public confidence in the profession, and/or the maintenance and promotion of proper professional standards and conduct for doctors (para. 6). As is set out in paragraph 8 of the Guidance, where an interim order is needed for the protection of the public because there is a real and immediate risk to patient safety, then it is likely that imposing it will also be in the interests of the public.

52. As the IOT is not resolving disputes of fact or making findings of fact, the IOT has to consider the nature of the concern or allegation, the extent of any departure from professional standards and any factors increasing seriousness.

53. The allegations made against the claimant are with respect to his sexual behaviour in his private life. They are extremely serious allegations. Referred to by claimant’s counsel as “truly offensive and horrible” . The dispute between the two complainants, Ms A and Ms B, and the claimant are whether all the acts alleged took place and whether any of them were non-consensual. There has been no suggestion on the part of the complainants that his behaviour has involved his patients, albeit the most recent evidence from Ms B suggests that the claimant had told her that he had sexual liaisons with colleagues while at hospital in the “on-call” room.

54. Helpful guidance is provided by Mr David Lock KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in NMC v Persand [2023] EWHC 3356 (Admin) , where he set out: “… in every case, the NMC committee and the Court, has to ask itself precisely why it is said to be “necessary” to impose an interim sanction on the nurse. If the case is that it is necessary to protect the patients, then there needs to be an intense focus on how and why the evidence demonstrates that patients may be at risk from the nurse and how serious that risk is … Simply saying that, if a nurse was free to practise without being subject to conditions, such a circumstance would raise concerns in the minds of a member of the public is, in my judgment, wholly insufficient. Equally, saying that there is some limited risk to patient’s from a nurse’s clinical practise if he or she is allowed to continue to practice without restrictions is equally insufficient. It seems to me that the necessity test requires the NMC to show that, on the particular facts of a case, there are features of the case which mean that matters are so serious that it is justifiable to restrain the exercise of professional skills by a nurse at a stage when the allegations were unproven. The test is something close to saying that an interim order is essential, in the sense that a responsible regulator would not be acting properly in failing to act on a proven risk to the public.”

55. When the IOT revoked the interim order of conditions on 14 January 2025, subsequent to the notification from the police that they had determined that there was no further action to be taken, the IOT already had the email from Ms B raising her concerns and alleging that she was the claimant’s “first victim” and that her marriage to the claimant had been “abusive …The nature and context were physical, psychological, sexual and financial.” That information from Ms B alone cannot, therefore, have been the justification for the imposition of the conditions in December 2025, as that information had been with the IOT for a year and there was no evidence of any change to his behaviour towards patients and no real and immediate risk to patient safety. The testimonials provided by the claimant continue during this period to be in glowing terms, and there were no concerns expressed about his interactions with patients or with colleagues. There has been neither behaviour nor poor performance giving rise to any identifiable risk to the claimant’s patients throughout his time of registration, including during the time of his relationships with both Ms B (2004 to 2014) and Ms A (2019 to 2024).

56. By the date of the review in June 2026, the IOT was furnished with further information. There was no full statement from Ms B. As is set out above, that was not adduced by the GMC until 28 August 2026. The IOT did, however, have the extremely detailed statement of Ms A dated 25 February 2026 and the supportive statements of Ms A’s mother and friend. Ms A’s statement provides a graphic account of a highly abusive relationship over a period of 4 years. While accepting that they did consensually engage in acts of BDSM during sex, the claimant denies all the allegations of assault and rape.

57. The only other information available to the IOT in June 2026 was the entry in the redacted police records of a call to “Ms C” in June 2024. Despite that entry being two years ago, there is no statement from Ms C and no evidence that she is making an allegation of rape. It appears that it was a member of the IOT who raised the issue of this entry with the representative of the GMC who confirmed that there was no further material available. The GMC made clear at the review hearing that they were relying on the evidence of Ms A and Ms B, there having been no reliance on the police entry relating to Ms C – despite the GMC having that police log available to them before the imposition of conditions in December 2025. The claimant was not given any notice of there being reliance on an allegation from a third source and I have no hesitation in finding that, insofar as the IOT relied upon that entry, the IOT was wrong to do so.

58. Consequently, the evidence before the IOT on 17 June 2026, when undertaking their fresh assessment as to whether they should continue the reporting conditions imposed in December 2025, and the decision to add the condition not to undertake face-to-face consultations with female patients other than in a life saving emergency, was that Ms A alleged that she had been in a highly abusive relationship between 2014 and 2019, where the claimant had committed acts of sexual and physical violence upon her without her consent, including rape, and that Ms B alleged that she had been in an abusive marriage from 2004 to 2014. Ms B had made an allegation of rape at the end of the marriage, which she withdrew shortly afterwards saying that it was a consensual act. Ms A wrote a statement in the family proceedings between Ms B and the claimant in 2021 setting out that Ms B’s contentions that the claimant was abusing Ms A were untrue. Of course, as I said in the hearing, it is necessary to be careful with respect to both the allegations made and the contrary evidence, given that the allegations against the claimant include coercive behaviour, but it is not for the IOT or the Court to make findings of fact. The IOT further knew that the police had closed their case against the claimant in November 2024 on the basis that the evidential threshold was not met, and that the claimant strenuously denied the allegations against him.

59. Most importantly, there was nothing before the IOT to suggest that there was any risk to patients and the allegations made by Ms A and Ms B with respect to the behaviour of the claimant give no support to there being any such risk. The evidence from patients and colleagues is universally positive and utterly undermines any suggestion of risk.

60. The legally qualified chair of the IOT referred to three cases: Hiew v GMC [2007] EWHC 1078 (Admin) ; Wray/Ray v GMC [2023] EWHC; and X v GMC [2019] EWHC 493 (Admin) as support for the propositions that the risk to be identified needed to be “real, not fanciful”; that the risk needed to be “immediate, not necessarily instantaneous but present and continuing”; with X v GMC “applied specifically to sexual misconduct.” She set out that the task of the IOT was to “decide whether the material before us demonstrates a real and immediate risk that requires regulatory intervention by way of an interim order.” She later sets out (on page 19F-G of the transcript of the IOT’s decision) the following: “Given that this case is about sexual misconduct, we will acknowledge that sexual misconduct allegations are regarded as particularly serious because they can have significant impact on public confidence and even risk vulnerable individuals. In the case of X v General Medical Council, the court has confirmed that even allegations arising in a personal relationship may justify interim measures if they raise concerns about impulse control, coercive behaviour, anger, aggression, boundary keeping and of course risk to patients or public confidence.”

61. The reference to X v General Medical Council [2019] EWHC 493 (Admin) is agreed between the parties not to be a correct reference, as it deals with different issues. The correct case reference for the authority the chair appeared to be referring to was a decision of the divisional court: Dr X v GMC [2001] EWHC (Admin). A mistaken mis-citation of a case would not be an issue. However, this case is also not authority for the proposition advanced by the legally qualified chair. The brief facts of that case were that Dr X, a GP, was accused of indecent assault against his two nieces aged 15 and 13 over a number of years. Dr X had been charged and bailed and it was argued when his suspension was challenged that it was not necessary to suspend given, amongst other things, the allegations had not arisen in his clinical practice. It was held by Pill LJ that the allegations were undoubtedly serious and, whether they were eventually proved or not, they did not plainly and obviously lack substance: “They involve an alleged breach of trust towards vulnerable young people. The alleged offences have an obvious impact upon the fitness of the claimant to have that intimate contact with patients which is a necessary part of his duties as a doctor” and in those circumstances, the Divisional Court did not find that the tribunal had erred in suspending Dr X. In this case, the allegations are entirely different. There are not allegations of a breach of trust involving minors who could not legally consent. While it is alleged that the claimant abused the trust of his sexual partners in the most heinous way, the behaviour of the claimant in his private life is not something that increases risk of misconduct in his professional life. The allegations are very strictly confined to his behaviour in his adult sexual relationships where it is alleged that he abuses those he is already in an intimate relationship with. There is nothing in his professional life which suggests that he ever “oversteps” or abuses his professional position.

62. The direction provided by the chair of the IOT is not contained in either X v GMC [2019] or Dr X v GMC [2001] and the cases provide no authority for what she set out. The IOT was obliged to consider risk to the public and whether, if there were risk, that risk is real and immediate. The IOT clearly misdirected itself as to the appropriate test, which was compounded by incorrect references to R(Kuzmin) v GMC [2023] EWHC 60 (Admin) , which was in fact dealing with the issue of adverse inferences, and Wray/Ray v GMC, which is not a recognised authority.

63. The IOT’s analysis and assessment of risk is set out at paragraphs 25 to 38 of its determination. The IOT found that there was nothing to stop the claimant from forming further relationships in which the same behaviours were alleged and that, having considered the totality of the evidence before it, the IOT concluded, that the material before it “demonstrates a real and immediate risk to the public which cannot be adequately mitigated without regulatory restriction.” (para 27). The decision to add the further condition not to be able to have face to face consultations with female patients appears to have been based on a view that the claimant’s alleged pattern of behaviour, as alleged by Ms A and Ms B, but also with respect to Ms C, was a “pattern of alleged behaviour [which] raised concern about [the claimant’s] ability to maintain appropriate boundaries. The Tribunal was therefore concerned that [the claimant] may pose a risk to patients and that the current conditions did not sufficiently address the potential risks to female patients.”

64. There are two fundamental errors in this reasoning: first, the IOT seemed to have placed reliance on an allegation being made by Ms C and, second, they relied on allegations about the claimant’s private behaviour without any evidence to support that impacting his behaviour in a clinical setting.

65. No weight should have been given to the police note referencing Ms C given the lack of any formal complaint or further information from her in the two years that had passed since the log book entry. If there was a complaint that was to be relied upon by the IOT then it should be expected that it is clearly made and confirmed in writing as the IOT needs to consider the source of the complaint and the seriousness of the complaint (see GMC v Sheill [2006] EWHC 3025). Further, the claimant was not given notice of this complaint being relied upon by the IOT and was not given any opportunity to make submissions upon it. It is not sufficient to say that Counsel for the claimant could have dealt with it at the hearing in circumstances where the other available evidence did not suggest that there was a further allegation of rape and the GMC, at least at the time of the hearing, were not relying upon the police note about Ms C. The evidence of Ms B contained in her statement made subsequent to the IOT hearing is that the claimant would wake her up in the middle of the night in order to be “nasty” is not alone any support for an allegation of rape. In Perry v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2012] EWCA Civ 145 , the Court of Appeal set out the following important principle: “The Committee must of course permit both parties to make their submissions on the need for an interim order and, if one is to be made, its nature and its terms. For that purpose it must consider the nature of the evidence on which the allegation made against the registrant is based. It is entitled to discount evidence that is inconsistent with objective or undisputed evidence or which is manifestly unreliable. The Committee may receive and assess evidence on the effect of an interim order on the registrant, and the registrant is entitled to give evidence on this...” The claimant was not under investigation in respect of any matters concerning a third former partner and had not been put on notice that there was any such further allegation and he was not told by the IOT that he needed to address them on this matter.

66. Further, the IOT failed to give proper consideration to the distinction between the fact that the allegations made by Ms A and Ms B, relied upon by the GMC, were made with respect to the claimant’s behaviour in a private context and there was no evidence to suggest that his behaviour during his marriage, during the years 2008 to 2014, and during his relationship with Ms A between 2019 and 2024, had any impact upon his behaviour towards patients. There was no basis for suggesting that there was any issue with respect to the claimant’s ability to recognise boundaries and control himself in a professional clinical setting. As set out in NMC v Persand : “If the case is that it is necessary to protect patients, then there needs to be an intensive focus on precisely how and why the evidence demonstrates that patients may be at risk [from the nurse] and how serious that risk is. A case where patients can be shown to have suffered harm will clearly have more potency than a case such as the present where there is very limited, if any evidence, that a patient has come to harm” In this case there is no evidence of patient harm and the claimant has an exemplary record. The concerns raised by the IOT show a failure to focus on patient safety and the concerns.

67. While the court, in exercising its original power, gives due respect to the IOT, I am satisfied that the IOT was wrong to impose any of the conditions imposed by the order dated 17 June 2026 on the basis of there being a risk to the public. There was no evidence of violent sexual conduct in the hospital and the evidence from Ms A that the claimant was having sex outside his marriage and while in the hospital does not, without more, justify a finding of risk to the public. None of the evidence available suggests the existence of a real and present and continuing risk to patients and the conditions were not necessary to protect the public. As a consequence, ground 1 of this challenge must succeed.

68. The second ground of challenge is that the IOT was wrong to impose conditions on the basis of it being desirable in the interests of the public.

69. In deciding whether to impose an order in the public interest, the tribunal should consider whether “trust in the profession is likely to be seriously damaged if the doctor continues to hold unrestricted registration while the concern is being investigated or pending the allegation.” [MPT Guidance, para 47]

70. There is a high bar to be met in order for an interim order to be imposed when it is not also said to be in the public interest. Sheikh v General Dental Council [2007] EWHC 2972 (Admin) , Davis J. set out: “the bar is set high; and I think that, in the ordinary case at least, necessity is an appropriate yardstick. That is so because of reasons of proportionality. It is a very serious thing indeed for a dentist or a doctor to be suspended. It is serious in many cases just because of the impact on that person's right to earn a living. It is serious in all cases because of the detriment to him in reputational terms. Accordingly, it is, in my view, likely to be a relatively rare case where a suspension order will be made on an interim basis on the ground that it is in the public interest.”

71. In Persand , David Lock KC, having referred to Sheikh , said “There must be far more than a concern that a hypothetical member of the public might have a concern if no interim sanction was imposed.” It seems to me that is the litmus test. There must be far more than the potential for a hypothetical member of the public having a concern as that would justify the imposition of conditions on public interest grounds whenever an allegation is made.

72. In this case, the IOT considered that an interim order ought to be made on the basis of risk to the public and therefore approached the issue as to whether an interim order ought to be made in the public interest on the basis that there was a risk of repetition of the behaviour alleged against the claimant. Having determined that there was a risk to patients the IOT determined that it was justified to make an order in the interest of the public. Having determined that the IOT was wrong to impose an interim order on the basis of public protection, the evidence similarly does not justify the determination that an interim order was in the public interest. There was no real and continuing risk to patients and the justification for an order being made in the public interest in this case does not withstand scrutiny.

73. The IOT did not take into account, sufficiently or at all, the wider picture and that when considering public interest account needed to be taken of the fact that the allegations are said to have occurred in a domestic context; that after investigation the police decided that the evidential threshold had not been met, and the claimant has never been charged with any matter; the claimant’s exemplary record as a surgeon and physician; and that there was no evidence to support the claimant posing a real or immediate risk to any patient. Given the evidence of his known behaviour throughout, the allegation that he had boasted of engaging in consensual sex with colleagues while in hospital (initially contained in the evidence of Ms A before the IOT and now referred to in the recent statement of Ms B) neither places patients at risk nor supports the claimant not knowing how to maintain “appropriate boundaries.” The imposition of interim conditions on the basis of it being in the public interest requires a high hurdle to be overcome. On the evidence in this case, that has not been reached.

74. The third ground of challenge to the IOT’s decision on 17 June 2026 is that the conditions imposed were not proportionate. As I have found that the imposition of conditions pending the resolution of the proceedings is not justified on the grounds of either public protection or public interest, the issue of whether the conditions were proportionate is not a necessary consideration. For completeness I will deal with the issue of proportionality, starting with the MPTS Guidance which provides that: “Conditions must be appropriate, workable and measurable: to be appropriate, interim conditions must address the risk(s) identified to the protection of the public, the interests of the public and/or the doctor themselves to be workable.”

75. The evidence submitted by the claimant to the IOT, when challenging the conditions originally imposed in December 2025, showed that those conditions of reporting had very severely impacted his ability to practise. He had lost the NHS locum work that he had been undertaking and the health insurers who had regularly used him, would not make further referrals. While he continued with some patients pro bono for the sake of continuity of care, the practical impact of the reporting conditions has meant that his ability to work has been significantly reduced which has had a consequential impact on his patients, and those who might otherwise have been his patients.

76. The claimant had sought to have the conditions lifted at the hearing on 17 June 2026 while the GMC were seeking to maintain them. The IOT determined that the additional restriction of the claimant not being permitted to treat female patients face-to-face, other than in life threatening situations, needed to be imposed. It appears that decision was based on the reference to Ms C in the police log, picked up by one of the IOT members, together with the additional detailed statement of Ms A. No alternative condition of the claimant being chaperoned when seeing female patients was aired by the IOT and, while it is said that the claimant’s counsel at the June 2026 hearing could have suggested a chaperone, that is not realistic in circumstances where the GMC’s position at the hearing had been to maintain the existing conditions, while the claimant was seeking to have those conditions lifted. It was for the IOT to ensure that any conditions imposed were necessary or desirable and proportionate.

77. The IOT dealt with the issue of proportionality of the conditions, including the additional condition, in the following terms: “35. In accordance with GMC v Ritchie, the Tribunal undertook a structed proportionality assessment and considered whether less restrictive measures could adequately maintain public confidence. The Tribunal concluded that, given the seriousness of the concerns, the similarity of the allegations across two former partners, and the potential implications for professional standards, an interim order is required to uphold public confidence in the medical professional and in the effectiveness of its regulatory framework. …

38. The Tribunal came to the view the conditions would be sufficient given that Ms A and Ms B reference [the claimant’s] conduct in a private context. The Tribunal was of the view that if additional evidence that the same or similar sexual and violent conduct was alleged in the workplace, this would have required an interim order of suspension. ”

78. It does not appear that the IOT engaged with the evidence of how the existing conditions had adversely impacted the claimant and his patients and the purpose of those conditions. The conditions are not there as a punishment but are there to serve a purpose. Neither the original conditions, kept in place by the IOT in June 2026, or the additional condition of no face-to-face interaction with female patients other than in life-threatening situations, could be justified in the circumstances of this matter. Each condition imposed must be necessary: “Imposing a standard and extensive set of conditions seems to me to be wrong in principle because the test of "necessity" applies just as much to each individual condition imposed on a nurse [doctor or dentist] as it does to any case of suspension. I thus have to ask whether each of the conditions satisfies that test.” ( Persand)

79. The additional condition directly prohibits the claimant from treating any women, approximately half the population and it is essential that, in imposing conditions, the IOT does not in fact suspend (as that would be contrary to their powers) – see Hickinbottom J (as he then was) in Udom v GMC [2009] EWHC 3242 (Admin) . I do not accept the claimant’s contentions that the conditions imposed in this matter were akin to a suspension and the facts of both GMC v Dr E [2013] EWHC 3425 (Admin) and GMC v Makki [2014] EWHC 3425 (Admin) , relied upon by the claimant to make good that submission, put those cases in a different category to this and do not assist. While not holding that these conditions are akin to a suspension, I do not accept that the conditions imposed were proportionate given the practical implications.

80. Consequently, had I not already found that IOT was wrong to impose conditions, based upon public protection and public interest, then I would have ordered both the original and additional conditions to be set aside on the ground that they were not proportionate. Conclusion

81. For the reasons set out in detail in this judgment, I find that he IOT was wrong to impose the conditions of notification and the prohibition on face-to-face treatment of female patient, save in life-threatening situations. These conditions must therefore be revoked.

RMD v General Medical Council [2026] EWHC ADMIN 2684 — UK case law · My AI Judge