UK case law

Rose Builders (Properties) Limited v Alpha Trust

[2026] EWHC CH 2241 · High Court (Property, Trusts and Probate List) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

SAIRA SALIMI : Introduction

1. The Claimant is a building company, part of a small family-controlled group of companies operating in the area of Lawford, Mistley and Manningtree in Essex. The Defendant is a multi-academy trust which operates five schools, including Manningtree High School (“the School”).

2. These proceedings have been brought by way of a claim under Part 8 of the CPR for declarations concerning the application, and the proper construction, of a restrictive covenant over land presently owned by the Claimant and the associated provisions for payment on change of use of the land.

3. The benefit of the covenant was originally held by Manningtree High School Limited (“MHS”), a company limited by guarantee which has since been dissolved. The Defendant took over the operation of the School from MHS in 2019. Witnesses

4. I heard evidence from two witnesses of fact. Mr Steven Rose is a director of the Claimant. He also holds 60% of shares of the Rose group of companies, and is a trustee of the trust which holds the remaining 40% of the shares for the benefit of his children.

5. Mrs Jacqueline Jackson, the Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Defendant, gave evidence on behalf of the Defendant.

6. Mr Rose had personal knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the documents containing the disputed provisions. Mrs Jackson did not, as at the relevant time she had been based at Colchester County High School for Girls, another school in the Alpha Trust group. She was substituted quite late in these proceedings, with the consent of the Claimant, for Mrs Tina Woodhouse, the Chief Financial Officer, who had given a witness statement but was on long term sick leave. Mrs Woodhouse also had no personal knowledge of events relevant to this claim.

7. I found Mr Rose to be an honest and careful witness, who was careful not to assert any matters with certainty where his recollection was imperfect.

8. Mrs Jackson was also an honest and careful witness, although her knowledge of the matters in question was necessarily limited. Her oral evidence assisted in bringing to light some important correspondence addressed to MHS at the time of the transfer of assets to the Defendant, namely the letter from the Education Funding Authority referred to at paragraph 19 and a letter from VWV, solicitors for MHS, dating from the period of the transfer to the Defendant of the undertaking of MHS. These documents had not been disclosed earlier in the proceedings, although they must clearly have been in the Defendant’s possession throughout. Factual background

9. The factual background to these proceedings is not disputed. The agreement between the Claimant and MHS

10. The Claimant entered into a land swap agreement with MHS in 2015 (the “Land Swap Agreement”) following a sequence of discussions and other agreements, the history of which is set out briefly below.

11. MHS owned a field some distance from the School buildings, off Long Road in Lawford, which it had acquired in order to comply, at least on paper, with recommended allowances for playing field space per pupil. Mrs Deborah Hollister, the head teacher of the School at the relevant time, wrote to Mr Rose on 15 March 2012, explaining that the recommended figure for a school of 855 pupils was 40,000 square metres, and that the School had only 32,000 square metres of space on its site in Colchester Road. The field in question added 20,000 square metres of land to the School’s total on paper. However, it was never used as a playing field, and at the time when discussions between MHS and the Claimant were taking place, it was used for grazing sheep. That land is referred to in subsequent documents and the annexed plans, and will be referred to in this judgment, as the “Green Land”.

12. MHS had previously tried and failed to acquire additional land near the School site from the landowners (the Poole family and trusts associated with them). On 1 September 2010, the Claimant entered into an option agreement for land adjoining the School site. The options would take effect in the event of the grant of planning permission for residential development. The Claimant was to bear the costs of making the application for planning permission.

13. Mr Rose held a number of discussions with Mrs Hollister and Mrs Pereira, the chair of governors of the School at the time. His notes from their meetings on 11 November 2010, 6 February 2012 and 24 October 2012 indicate that they discussed various items on the School’s “wish list” of items to resolve certain long-standing problems, which included expanding, levelling and reseeding the on-site playing field, creating a coach turning space and creating a multi-use games area (“MUGA”) which would be of general community benefit. The Claimant had the benefit of the option agreement referred to above over land (referred to in the proceedings as the “Brown Land” and the “Lime Green Land”) close to the School which would enable MHS to achieve these aims, and which could be transferred to MHS once the option agreement had taken effect.

14. The only asset that MHS had to offer in return was the Green Land, which at the time did not have the benefit of planning permission and was simply a green field site. Mr Rose’s evidence, which I fully accept, was that he was willing and happy to accept a bargain which was not obviously to the Claimant’s advantage, because he had lived all his life in the area and he was very keen to benefit the community in Lawford in general and the School in particular.

15. Mr Rose prepared draft heads of terms between the Claimant and the School and sent them to Mr Michael Wright of the Claimant’s solicitors, Holmes and Hills, on 12 November 2012. The heads of terms provided that the Claimant would seek planning permission for mixed-use development on land near the School. If that application was successful, the Claimant would also provide community benefits. The community benefits relevant to the School would be the MUGA (which at that time might have been located next to the School or elsewhere in the village), the bus park and the transfer of land for the expansion of existing playing fields, and these would be recorded in a s. 106 agreement. I record that it is not disputed that all of this development took place, that the Claimant funded it in accordance with the agreement, and that the area eventually selected by the local planning authority for the MUGA was close to the School.

16. At a relatively late stage in the negotiations, Mrs Hollister wrote to Mr Rose on 2 May 2013 to say that MHS had been seeking advice and guidance on the disposal of assets. She said: “What has been made clear to us is the need to ensure that we are securing or entering into any agreement with due diligence and are mindful of ensuring best value and benefit to the school both in the short and longer term. In that regard we have considered the central underlying aspect of the proposal: the potential value of the school field on Long Road [i.e. the Green Land] should it ever be available for development, and how that relates to the benefits outline [sic] in the proposed Heads of Terms.”

17. She proposed a meeting to discuss this. There is no note of that meeting available to me, but this letter and the subsequent meeting appear to have led to the eventual inclusion of provision for overage on the Green Land in the Land Swap Agreement.

18. On 23 June 2014, the Claimant entered into an agreement under s.106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in relation to the land near the School which it proposed to develop. The other parties to that agreement were Tendring District Council, as the local planning authority, the Trustees of the Henry Murton Poole Trust, Mr Ranulph Poole and the Executors of Jeltje Poole. The Trustees, Mr Ranulph Poole and the Executors were the freehold owners in respect of the land over which the Claimant held options. In the agreement, the three Poole parties together were defined as the Owners, and the Claimant was defined as the Developer. The Owners entered into a number of covenants, which the agreement provided were also to be binding on the Developer, including covenants to agree the specifications for the coach park and the MUGA before the commencement of development.

19. On 4 August 2014, the Education Funding Agency wrote to Mrs Finley-Hewitson, the Chair of Trustees for MHS, consenting to its disposal of the Green Land. Consent was granted on the basis that the Claimant “will level your existing sports field as necessary and provide a new 400m elliptical athletics track and new floodlit MUGA at a cost of £250,000. These new sports facilities will be available to the pupils during all school hours and for community use…Consent is also granted on the basis that the academy trust will benefit as a result of a s.106 obligation imposed on the developer who will provide 0.18 hectares (0.44 acres) of land for and pay the £330,000 cost of creating a bus turning point that will greatly improve the safety of pupils…Consent is also condition [sic] on the academy trust making the disposal of Long Road [i.e. the Green Land] subject to an overage provision that will entitle the academy trust to receive fifty percent of the development value of the Long Road site in the event that it is developed within 25 years”.

20. On 13 February 2015, the Claimant and MHS entered into the Land Swap Agreement. By that agreement the Lime Green Land and the Brown Land were to be transferred to MHS and the Green Land would be transferred to the Claimant. The agreement set out the form of transfer to the Claimant in an annexed draft form TP1, and a transfer of the Green Land was subsequently executed on 6 July 2018 in exactly the form agreed. A schedule to the TP1 included the following provision at paragraph 3.1: “The Transferee [i.e. the Claimant] for itself and its successors in title so as to bind the Property and each and every part of it covenants with the Transferor for its own personal benefit that the Property and every part or parts thereof will not for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date of this transfer be used for the Prohibited Use.”

21. The Prohibited Use is defined as “any use other than as agricultural land”. “Prohibited Use Planning Consent” is defined as “the grant of a planning permission authorising the use of the Property (or any part thereof) for the relevant Prohibited Use”. The Schedule also made provision about the calculation of payment for the release of the covenant set out above. In brief, so far as relevant for these proceedings, it required the Claimant, on commencement of development for the Prohibited Use, to serve a “Price Notice” on MHS, enclosing a copy of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent and a reasoned valuation by a surveyor setting out the amount of overage payable (defined as the “Variation Price”). The notice was also required to include a statement of the costs incurred by the Claimant in obtaining planning permission and in carrying out the works for the benefit of the School specified in the s. 106 agreement, which are to be deducted from the Variation Price payable by the Claimant. Planning permission over the Green Land

22. After the execution of the Land Swap Agreement, but before the actual transfer of the Green Land to the Claimant, on 13 April 2017 the Claimant obtained a grant of outline planning permission (the “Outline Planning Permission”) in relation to “Land east of Bromley Road Lawford Essex”. The land to which the Outline Planning Permission related was a plot of 22.76 hectares, which included the Green Land. The Outline Planning Permission gave permission for the construction of 360 houses “with two vehicular access points, site roads, pedestrian and cycle routes, a new primary school access with off-road pick-up and drop-off parking, a community building with public access toilets, a junior camping field, village green, public open space, structural landscaping and playground.” The two vehicular access points to the development were to be in Bromley Road and Long Road. The Long Road access would be onto the Green Land. It was described from the outset as a large development “likely to be delivered in phases".

23. There were several conditions attached to the Outline Planning Permission. In particular, Conditions 3 to 5 required submission of a master plan showing indicative layouts for the development, approval by the planning authority of the exterior appearance of the proposed dwellings, and “general conformity” with the principles set out in the “Land Use Audit” drawings submitted with the application. Those drawings showed the Long Road access on the Green Land. Condition 8 provided that there was to be no occupation at all of any of the dwellings until the access point from Bromley Road had been constructed and two bus stops had been installed on Bromley Road. Condition 8 had been met by the time of the hearing. Condition 9 provided, in its original form, that no more than 200 dwellings were to be occupied before the second vehicle access point, on Long Road, was constructed.

24. Originally, there was no application to build any units on the Green Land: the second vehicular access point was to be from Long Road onto the Green Land, but the only proposed construction on the Green Land was a road from that access point to the rest of the development, shown on the Land Use Audit plan referred to above.

25. The outline planning permission was followed by three approvals of reserved matters connected with that planning permission, on 14 March 2018, 9 July 2020 and 4 December 2020, and a further grant of planning permission on 17 March 2023 (“the March 2023 Planning Permission”). The March 2023 Planning Permission granted permission for an additional 80 dwellings and one convenience store over phases 4a and 4b of the development. It is a condition of that permission that the Long Road access must be constructed if 76 or more dwellings, and the convenience store, are constructed and occupied.

26. Phases 1 to 3 of the development are on land to the west of the Green Land; access to the development is via the Bromley Road entrance. At the time of the hearing construction of Phase 1 was complete: 120 dwellings have been constructed, of which 118 are occupied. Phases 2 and 3 have both been begun, and some of the dwellings are occupied, but these phases are not yet complete. Mr Rose gave evidence that Phase 4a, to the south-west of the Green Land, had also been largely completed, with 43 out of a total of 45 dwellings occupied. Phase 4b is development on the Green Land, which cannot be completed until the outcome of these proceedings is known and the Variation Price, if any, paid. Initially, as I note above, there was no permission to build anything except the access road on the Green Land, but the March 2023 Planning Permission granted permission for the construction of 80 dwellings and one convenience store across phases 4a and 4b. The approved plans provide for 45 houses on Phase 4a, and 35 dwellings and the convenience store on the Green Land / Phase 4b. No dwellings or other structures are to be constructed on the Sliver. Mr Rose’s evidence was that the agreement with a supermarket operator for provision of a convenience store had expired as a consequence of this dispute, and it was unclear whether any other operator would be interested. If the convenience store is not constructed, the terms of the March 2023 Planning Permission would not permit the Claimant to build the flats. He thought it possible that the Claimant would need to make a further application for planning permission to alter the scheme.

27. On 1 April 2021, Condition 9 of the Outline Planning Permission (referred to at paragraph 23 above) was varied so that no more than 260 dwellings were to be occupied before the access on Long Road was completed (an increase of 60 dwellings over the original condition).

28. On 31 January 2022, Condition 9 was further varied, to provide that no more than 359 dwellings were to be occupied before the highway access to the development from Long Road was completed. The total number of dwellings constructed and occupied across Phases 1 to 3 was 283 at the date of the hearing. The School Transfer

29. Meanwhile, on 23 August 2019, an agreement was made between MHS and the Defendant for the transfer of the property, assets and liabilities of MHS to the Defendant. The agreement was headed “transfer of the entire operation, assets and undertaking of Manningtree High School". Clause 3 of the agreement provided that “[MHS] hereby transfers the Undertaking as a going concern together with the Assets (subject in each case to all Encumbrances) to Alpha”. “Assets” are defined in the agreement as including, but not limited to, the benefit of “the Contracts” among other assets. “Contracts” is defined as including “any contracts, arrangements, licences or other commitments (including any collateral warranties, guarantees, bonds and third party rights in favour of Manningtree) entered into by the Transferor [i.e. MHS]”. “Undertaking” is defined as “the activities carried on by [MHS] at the time of transfer including, but not limited to, the operation of the Academy and associated activities”.

30. It is common ground that there is no transfer, in that agreement or elsewhere, which expressly identifies the benefit of the covenant in the TP1 relating to the Green Land. Subsequent history and these proceedings

31. On 29 April 2022, the Claimant and the Defendant entered into a Deed of Variation of the TP1 relating to the Green Land (the “Deed of Variation”). The Schedule to the Deed of Variation corrected a number of errors in the Schedule to the TP1, in which the words “transferor” and “transferee” had been inadvertently transposed.

32. On 29 April 2022, after the dissolution of MHS and the transfer of its assets and liabilities to the Defendant, a further corrective TP1 (“the Alpha Transfer”) was executed and registered, transferring a small sliver of land from Alpha Trust to the Claimant. The sliver of land (“the Sliver”) was between the main body of the Green Land which had already been transferred and the boundary fence, and had been accidentally omitted from the original TP1 due to an error in the plan. That TP1 contained a covenant in respect of the Sliver in the same terms as the earlier one relating to the Green Land. It is not disputed that the Defendant has the benefit of the covenant in relation to the Sliver.

33. The Claimant served a Price Notice on the Defendant on 10 th May 2023, and an amended Price Notice on 31 st May 2023. The amended Price Notice provided for a Variation Price of £549,026 following the grant of planning permission in relation to the Green Land and the Sliver. The March 2023 Planning Permission was identified as the Prohibited Use Planning Consent and included with the Price Notice. The Defendant served a counter-notice on 27 June 2023, identifying a Variation Price of £4,536,090.34.

34. The basis of valuation is disputed between the parties. Following the exchange of notices, revealing the fundamentally different assumptions of the two parties, the Claimant obtained an Opinion from Nicole Sandells KC (who also represented them before me) as to the proper legal basis of valuation of the Green Land. This was shared with the Defendant on 15 February 2024, without waiver of privilege.

35. The Claimant then served a re-amended Price Notice on the Defendant on 15 May 2024, in which the valuation was carried out in accordance with the advice in Miss Sandells’ Opinion. This time the calculation resulted in a Variation Price of -£120,165, resulting in a balancing payment due to the Claimant.

36. The Defendant, not entirely surprisingly, resisted this approach to valuation, and on 11 June 2024 wrote to the Claimant enclosing their own legal opinion, provided by Joanne Wicks KC, also without waiver of privilege. On the same day they also served an amended counter-notice, setting the Variation Price at £3,615,729.56, and proposed submitting the dispute to arbitration.

37. The Claimant’s solicitors replied on 12 July 2024 declining to submit the issues to arbitration and indicating that they considered that the issue of Part 8 proceedings would be the better approach. They received no reply, and a draft claim form and questions for the court were sent to the Defendant’s solicitors on 18 October 2024.

38. The Claimant issued a Part 8 claim form on 9 January 2025, seeking declarations as to the true construction of the “Release Clauses” (i.e. the provisions of the TP1 relating to the Green Land which provided for the release of the covenant over that land, and the equivalent provisions in the Alpha Transfer relating to the Sliver). The Rider to the Part 8 Claim Form set out the following questions for the court to determine: “(a) Is the Defendant entitled to the benefit of the Covenant and the Release Clauses contained in the TP1 and/or entitled to receive any Variation Price that might arise and/or able to release or vary the Covenant as envisaged by the Release Clauses. If not, who, if anyone, is entitled? (b) By reference to the TP1 and the Alpha Transfer as appropriate: (i) Has any act or omission of the Claimant occurred that has reduced the Market Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver as defined in the TP1 and/or the Alpha Transfer? (ii) If so, how is that act or omission to be dealt with when assessing the Market Value and/or Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver? What, if any, is its effect on the calculation of the Variation Price? (iii) Is the Existing Use Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver the Market Value of that land, and only that land, as agricultural land with no other lawful use, and no prospect of that changing, with no hope value, and with no prospect of planning consent being granted. If not, how should the Existing Use Value definition be construed? (iv) Is the Enhanced Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver the Market Value of that land, and only that land, on the date of the relevant Price Notice with the assumption of: (a) the benefit of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent (as defined) as it applies to the Green Land and/or the Sliver as appropriate, and only that consent and that geographical limitation; and (b) the benefit of a variation or removal of the Covenant to permit the relevant land to be used for the uses permitted by the Prohibited Use Planning Consent? If not, how should the Enhanced Value definition be construed? (v) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, does either piece of land have the benefit of a ransom value that is to be taken into account when assessing the relevant Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value and/or the Variation Price as a result of Full Planning Permission 22/00958/FUL which permitted the development of the Green Land and the Sliver and adjoining land known as Phase 4a, marked as such on the plan appended hereto? (vi) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, does either piece of land have the benefit of a ransom value that is to be taken into account when assessing the relevant Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value and/or the Variation Price as a result of any other planning permission granted in respect of development land known as Phase 1, Phase 2 and/or Phase 3, marked as such on the plan appended hereto? (vii) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, what element of the costs creating an access to Long Road as required by Full Planning Permission 22/00958/FUL as a condition for the development of the Green Land should be attributed to (a) the Green Land; (b) the Sliver; and (c) the Phase 4a land? (viii) The Variation Price for both the Green Land and the Sliver is defined as 50% of the difference between the Existing Use Value and the Enhanced Value of the relevant land after deducting therefrom certain deductions, namely (as defined): (a) the Deductible Costs; (b) the Additional Deductible Costs; (c) the First Tranche; and (d) the Additional First Tranche. Is it correct that those sums are to be deducted from the 50% difference figure to arrive at the Variation Price? If not, when and how are those sums to be deducted? (ix) What is the correct valuation date for establishing the Variation Price?”

39. The Defendant acknowledged service on 24 January 2025. It indicated that although the broad nature and subject of the questions was agreed, their text was not, and it indicated that more detail of its objections would follow. The Acknowledgment of Service also indicated that there would be one additional question, namely whether the Claimant could now avoid payment of the Variation Price by ceasing further development of the Green Land.

40. Following a directions hearing before Master Pester on 2 June 2025, at which the Defendant made submissions that some of the questions set out in the Rider to the claim form were not questions of law suitable to be answered by the court and that they were “infelicitously expressed”, no amendments were made to the list of questions, save that by order of Deputy Master Raeburn dated 11 July 2025 an additional question, dealing with the point raised in the Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Service, was added as follows: “If the Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the Covenant and the Release Clauses contained in the TP1, under paragraph 3.6 of Schedule 1 to the TP1, once the Variation Price has been agreed or determined by an expert, must the Claimant (as Transferee) within 20 Working Days of that agreement/determination serve a Request on the Defendant (as Transferor)?”

41. A matter of weeks before the trial, the Defendant took further issue with the questions, seeking to substitute its own questions in their place, and also sought to admit a witness statement from Mr Andrew Redman, the surveyor acting for the Defendant. It subsequently emerged that the Defendant also wished Mr Redman to give oral evidence. Although almost a year had elapsed since the order of Deputy Master Raeburn, no application had previously been made to admit that witness statement or to alter the questions for the court.

42. I ordered that the application to admit the witness statement, and to amend the questions, should be heard at the start of the trial. I refused both applications, for the reasons I gave at the hearing: in brief, the applications were made far too late in the proceedings, with no good explanation for the delay, and in any event lacked merit. It was not clear why the Defendant’s alternative formulations were to be preferred to the Claimant’s original questions, or what assistance Mr Redman could give in respect of the form of the legal questions for the court. The questions for me to determine Is the Defendant entitled to the benefit of the Covenant and the Release Clauses contained in the TP1 and/or entitled to receive any Variation Price that might arise and/or able to release or vary the Covenant as envisaged by the Release Clauses. If not, who, if anyone, is entitled?

43. It is not disputed that the benefit of the covenant is capable of being assigned to another person. If I conclude that the benefit has not been assigned to the Defendant, I must then consider, bearing in mind that MHS has been dissolved, whether there is any other party to whom it has or could have transferred, and whether the Claimant continues to be bound by it.

44. Mr Lopez in his closing submissions asserted that the benefit of the covenant was annexed to land and had therefore transferred with the land. The land identified was the main School site. There are two difficulties with this submission: first, the covenant states on its face that it is “for the personal benefit” of MHS, . Mr Lopez argued in his closing submissions that that was a “manifest error”, but this was a point that had not been expressly raised in pleadings or submissions and was not supported by any evidence, and therefore I discount that argument and will not consider it further.

45. Second, and equally importantly, the main School site is on the other side of the village and could in no way be said to be capable of benefiting from a restrictive covenant over the Green Land. Considering the circumstances in which the covenant was entered into, it is clear that the intention was not to protect other land held by MHS from disruption and nuisance resulting from the development of the Green Land, but solely to ensure that MHS had a share in any uplift in value resulting from the grant of planning permission. I find that the benefit of the covenant was not annexed to any land: it was a covenant for the personal financial benefit of MHS which would more accurately be described as an overage agreement, although I will continue to refer to it as a covenant in this judgment.

46. In the absence of an express transfer of the benefit of the covenant or annexation to other land held by the Defendant, the question is whether the effect of the agreement transferring MHS’s assets, liabilities and responsibilities to the Defendant, or of any other document, was also to transfer the benefit of the covenant in relation to the Green Land. (As I note above, it is not disputed that the Defendant has the benefit of the covenant in relation to the Sliver, which was transferred at a later date by the Defendant on the same terms as pertained to the Green Land.)

47. The Claimant argues that there is insufficient evidence that the benefit of the covenant has been transferred. It was clear that Mr Rose feels understandably aggrieved that, after the Claimant expended substantial sums of money and time on work that benefited the School (the transfer of land near the School site, the provision of the MUGA, the extended and levelled playing field, and the coach parking and turning space), the Defendant has taken such a hard line in relation to the covenant relating to the Green Land. The Claimant initially assumed that the benefit of the covenant had been transferred to the Defendant, but the counter-notices seeking millions of pounds of overage payments (initially £4,536,090.34, subsequently £3,615,729.56) have caused it to investigate this point further.

48. The Defendant makes a number of arguments in relation to the transfer of the benefit. The first is that the benefit was transferred by the Deed of Variation signed by the parties on 29 April 2022. That deed contained a recital affirming that the Defendant “is the successor in title to Manningtree High School and, as such, is entitled to the benefit of the covenants contained in the Original Transfer”.

49. I cannot draw any conclusions from the inclusion of that recital, although it is relevant evidence of the state of the parties’ understanding of the position at the time of the Deed of Variation. It is not itself an effective provision. It cannot constitute a transfer of the benefit of the covenant, although clearly at that date both parties assumed that the benefit had been transferred.

50. The substantive provisions of the Deed of Variation, so far as relevant to these proceedings, are as follows: “2. Variation of the Original Transfer 2.1 The Original Transfer shall be read and construed as if the variations in the Schedule to this deed had been contained in the Original Transfer. 2.2 The Original Transfer shall remain fully effective as varied by this deed and the terms of the Original Transfer shall have effect as though the provisions contained in this deed had been contained in the Original Transfer with effect from the date of the Original Transfer. 2.3 Rose and Alpha agree that all the provisions in the Original Transfer (as varied by this deed) are deemed incorporated in this deed: (a) for the purposes of satisfying section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 , and (b) with the intention that the terms of the Original Transfer (as varied by this deed) shall remain binding on the parties.

3. Covenants 3.1 Rose covenants to observe and perform Rose’s covenants in the Original Transfer as varied by this deed.”

51. Although the Claimant expressly covenanted in clause 3 of the Deed of Variation to comply with its obligations under the original TP1, the benefit of the covenant in that TP1 was expressed to be personal to MHS. Therefore, in the absence of a separate transfer of the benefit of the covenant, clause 3 of the Deed of Variation merely recites the Claimant’s ongoing obligation to MHS. MHS was not a party to the Deed of Variation, having been dissolved by that date, and therefore it cannot have transferred the benefit to the Defendant by the Deed of Variation. Mr Lopez had no answer to this point. I reject the Defendant’s argument that the Deed of Variation operated to transfer the benefit of the covenant to the Defendant, which it plainly could not do.

52. The Defendant also relies on a separate deed of novation dated 18 September 2019 to which all of MHS, the Claimant and the Defendant were parties. However, this reliance is misconceived. That deed had effect to transfer all the rights and obligations of MHS under a contract dated 6 July 2018 in relation to the release of an entirely separate set of restrictions set out in a deed of covenant between MHS and Essex County Council, which are not otherwise relevant to these proceedings. It could have transferred the benefit of the covenant in relation to the Green Land, if the parties had considered the point and drafted it accordingly. But they did not, and it does not. I need not consider this document further.

53. However, I must consider the effect of the School Transfer Agreement. Clause 3 of that agreement provides, “Subject to clause 8, and in consideration of Alpha assuming responsibility for the Assumed Liabilities, this agreement records the fact that, with effect from the time of transfer, Manningtree hereby transfers the Undertaking as a going concern together with the Assets (subject in each case to all Encumbrances) to Alpha.”

54. The School Transfer Agreement is wide in its terms and includes matters not directly connected with the operation of the School, as evidenced by the definition of “Undertaking” in the agreement as “including, but not limited to” activities associated with the School. Miss Sandells submitted that the definition of “Undertaking” could not include the benefit of the covenant, as it does not relate to any “activity” of the School, but I do not think that can be right: it seems to me that the definition is deliberately wide precisely in order to catch assets and liabilities belonging to MHS but not used directly for the School’s purposes. If “activity” is given a narrow meaning which would exclude the mere holding of a right, that would risk exclusion of any asset held passively and not expressly referred to in the School Transfer Agreement.

55. “Assets” are defined in the School Transfer Agreement as “all property, undertaking, rights and assets held by [MHS] in connection with the Undertaking”, including but not limited to a number of listed items, including the benefit of all contracts, subject to the burden of those contracts. Clause 8 goes on to specify that the School Transfer Agreement includes an assignment of all contracts that are capable of assignment, and that MHS holds any contracts which cannot be assigned without further formality on trust for the Defendant absolutely. There is nothing in the agreement to suggest that the benefit of the covenant is excluded from the transfer, and the covenant is a “contract” within the very wide definition set out in the agreement, which is set out in paragraph 29 above. It is also clearly an “Asset” within the definition set out in the agreement: it conferred a right on MHS “in connection with the Undertaking” within the wide definition of that term.

56. There is a schedule of contracts included in the transfer agreement, but it does not include the disputed covenant.

57. The letter from VWV identified by Mrs Jackson and referred to at paragraph 8, which is a report on the key terms of the School Transfer Agreement, mentions that the Green Land is excluded from the transfer, but says nothing at all about the benefit of the covenant.

58. There is nothing in the terms of the covenant itself that suggests that any additional formality would be required to transfer the benefit of it or that it could not be transferred by implication in a general agreement for transfer. Clause 5 of the Schedule to the TP1 for the Green Land (as corrected by the subsequent Deed of Variation) expressly provides, “The benefit of the covenants contained in this schedule may be assigned by the Transferor”.

59. The question, then, is whether there are any additional formalities imposed elsewhere which should have been complied with in order to transfer the benefit of the covenant. Miss Sandells referred me to s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 , which provides as follows: “(1) Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice— (a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action; (b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and (c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor… [a proviso follows which is not relevant in this case].”

60. The benefit of the covenant is clearly a “thing in action”. Section 136 quite clearly requires “express notice” of transfer to be given to the person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim the relevant right. Although it does not use the language of an “express assignment” under the hand of the assignor, it must be implied in that provision that there is some clearly identified writing under hand which transfers the legal right to it. In my view this must, as a minimum, identify the thing to be transferred. The evidence before me showed that both the Defendant and the Claimant assumed, at the time of the Deed of Variation in 2022, that it had been transferred, but did not show that there was an actual transfer of which notice was given to the Claimant. There was, as the Claimant argued, a common mistake at that time.

61. I conclude, therefore, that the benefit of the covenant was not properly transferred to the Defendant by MHS, in accordance with the requirements of s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 . There remains, however, to be considered the question of whether the Claimant is estopped by its own actions from denying that the Defendant is entitled to it.

62. Mr Lopez argued on behalf of the Defendant that the Claimant is so estopped (although this argument was not raised in the Defendant’s Acknowledgment of Service). He submitted that there is an unambiguous statement in the Deed of Variation that the Defendant is the successor in title to Manningtree High School and as such entitled to the benefit of the covenant, and that the Claimant may not now resile from that position.

63. The Claimant disputes this. Miss Sandells submitted in closing that this case is exactly in line with the facts of Re Distributors and Warehousing Limited [1985] 1 BCC 995570, in which two companies had guaranteed the liability of Distributors and Warehousing Limited under a lease of a warehouse. The freehold reversion was subsequently sold, without any assignment of the benefit of the guarantee. A later deed of variation of the lease included the following clause among the operative provisions: “The Guarantors hereby consent to the terms of this Deed and acknowledge that their obligations under the Covenant on their part contained in the Lease extends to and includes the payment by Distributors and Warehousing Ltd of the additional rent and all other sums hereby made payable.”

64. Walton J set out his view on the law at page 139, as follows: “As regards the suggestion of estoppel by deed, what is the law? It is in my judgment accurately set out in 16 Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn) para 1571 and following: ‘Estoppel by deed is based on the principle that when a person has entered into a solemn engagement by a deed under his hand and seal as to certain facts he will not be permitted to deny any matter which he has so asserted. It is a rule of evidence according to which certain evidence is taken to be of so high and conclusive a nature as to admit of no contradictory proof. The averment relied upon to work an estoppel must be ‘‘certain to every intent” without any ambiguity, but may be contained in the recital or in any part of the deed. A mere mistake in a deed, on account of which no one has acted to his detriment, will not give rise to an estoppel but may give grounds for rectification. A party is estopped from denying any specific facts contained in a recital in the deed to which he is a party, provided the recital is certain, precise and unambiguous. He is not bound by inferences which may be drawn from the statements in the deed, and a recital which, although incomplete, is true so far as it goes does not prevent the party from averring what is necessary to complete the truth. Nothing is to be taken by a way of “‘intendment”’; there is no such thing as an estoppel by something implied, and the averment relied upon to work an estoppel must be of something particular, not of a generality. A covenant that a man has a thing is not equivalent to a positive statement that he has it, and consequently, in order to work an estoppel, a recital of title must aver precisely that the person in title is seised in fee or has a legal estate and thus the operative words of an ordinary conveyance by grant create no estoppel.’

65. He goes on to say that in his judgment the language of the covenant by the guarantors in that case does not constitute an unequivocal statement that the guarantors were bound to the new landlord in the terms of the covenant of guarantee (although it was, of course, clearly implied by the language of the clause that the parties believed that they were).

66. Mr Lopez did not advance any positive case that the Defendant had relied on the mistake concerning the transfer to their detriment, and I am unable to identify any conduct which amounts to such detrimental reliance. He argued that it is not essential to show that there has been detrimental reliance in a case of estoppel by deed, and for that proposition relied on Reeve v McDonagh [2024] EWHC 439 (Ch) . He also argued that Reeve proposes a different test from Distributors and Warehousing , relying on paragraph 56 of the judgment, which quotes from the earlier judgment of Neuberger J (as he then was) in PW&Co v Milton Gate Investments Ltd [2004] Ch 142 . The passage in question sets out part of the same passage of Halsbury’s Laws that I quote in paragraph 64 above from Walton J’s judgment, and goes on to say that “it requires no subsequent conduct or any other act of reliance by the party invoking the estoppel.”

67. Reeve describes estoppel by deed as a “sub-species of estoppel by contract” (paragraph 55). In this type of estoppel the parties agree between themselves that a certain state of affairs is the case, and are not permitted subsequently to resile from that agreement. Nothing further is then required to found the estoppel, which may be based on a recital to a deed and need not be founded on an operative provision. Reeve is very clear that estoppel of this kind is to be restrictively interpreted. Joanna Smith J quotes from the same passage of Halsbury’s as I set out in paragraph 63 above, although not so extensively. She also quotes, at paragraph 158, from Greer v Kettle [138] AC 156 , “Subsequent cases laid down that the recital must relate to specific facts, must be certain, clear and unambiguous, and would not avail persons who were not parties or privies to the deed…”.

68. This seems to me to be entirely in line with the reasoning in Re Distributors and Warehousing Limited. This is the test which I must apply to the recital in the Deed of Variation in this case, namely that “Alpha is the successor in title to Manningtree High School and as such is entitled to the benefit of the covenants contained in the Original Transfer.”

69. It seems to me that this statement is entirely on all fours with the statement in Distributors and Warehousing Limited. It rests on a clear but unexpressed assumption that MHS has properly transferred the benefit of the covenant to Alpha, which the Defendant therefore cannot enforce. Further, an aspect of this case which is to be distinguished from both Re Distributors and Warehousing Limited and Reeve is that MHS was not a party to the Deed of Variation (unlike the guarantors in Distributors and Warehousing Limited and the parties’ predecessors in title in Reeve ). I have already found that, because of that omission, the Deed of Variation was incapable of transferring the benefit of the covenant. It seems to me, bearing in mind that estoppel by deed is to be restrictively interpreted, the absence from the deed of the party which, as a matter of law, continued to be entitled to the benefit of the covenant, is a significant difficulty in reliance on estoppel by deed.

70. In the light of the considerations set out above, I conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the covenant in relation to the Green Land. MHS, which was so entitled, has been dissolved. What then becomes of the benefit of the covenant?

71. I accept Miss Sandells’ submission that the original terms of the Land Swap Agreement between MHS and the Claimant deal quite adequately with that question. Clause 26.2 of that agreement provides that the Claimant is entitled to give notice of termination of the agreement if MHS ceases to exist. MHS has ceased to exist, and therefore under clause 27 of the agreement the Claimant’s obligations fall away and MHS and the Claimant are each to remove all entries registered against the Green Land, the Brown Land and the Lime Green land as a consequence. There is no person remaining who is entitled to the benefit of the covenant. The Claimant is therefore entitled to a declaration to that effect.

72. Having concluded that the covenant has fallen away and the Defendant is not entitled to the benefit in relation to the Green Land, the remaining questions set out in the Rider to the Part 8 Claim Form, and the additional question added by the order of Deputy Master Raeburn, by reference to the terms of the TP1 and the subsequent transfer to the Defendant (referred to in the questions as the “Alpha Transfer”) are relevant only in relation to the Sliver and have fallen away in relation to the Green Land. These are primarily questions of construction of the relevant documents in accordance with the ordinary principles of construction. (i) Has any act or omission of the Claimant occurred that has reduced the Market Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver as defined in the TP1 and/or the Alpha Transfer?

73. This question arose from the view of Ms Wicks KC that the changes to Condition 9 to the Outline Planning Permission (set out in paragraphs 23 to 28 above) had the effect of reducing the market value, as defined in the TP1, of the Green Land and / or the Sliver, because the increase in the number of dwellings to be built before the Claimant was required to build the Long Road access reduced the potential ransom value of the Green Land or the Sliver. However, it appeared from the parties’ submissions before me that, although the Defendant does not agree that there has been no act or omission of the Claimant which would reduce the value of either the Green Land or the Sliver (relying on the changes over time to the Outline Planning Permission), it accepts that the calculation is to be carried out on the assumption that there has been no reduction in the Market Value, and therefore I do not need to consider this question.

74. This also means that question (ii) (“If so, how is that act or omission to be dealt with when assessing the Market Value and/or Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver? What, if any, is its effect on the calculation of the Variation Price?”) falls away. (iii) Is the Existing Use Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver the Market Value of that land, and only that land, as agricultural land with no other lawful use, and no prospect of that changing, with no hope value, and with no prospect of planning consent being granted? If not, how should the Existing Use Value definition be construed?

75. “Existing Use Value” is defined in the Schedule to each of the TP1 of the Green Land and the Alpha Transfer as follows: ““ Existing Use Value ” means in respect of the first request giving rise to a Valuation Price the Market Value or a proper proportion thereof based on the area of the Relevant Land to the area of the Property and thereafter means the Market Value of the Relevant Land at the date of the relevant Price Notice on the assumption that: (a) the Relevant Land is and will always remain subject to the Covenant (subject to any variation of the Covenant made prior to the date of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent; (b) it is not lawful to undertake the development permitted by the Prohibited Use Planning consent; and (c) there is no prospect of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent being granted.”

76. “Market Value” in turn is defined as being “the value assessed in accordance with VPS 4 Paragraph 1.2 of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors – Professional Standards 2014 and assuming that since the date of this transfer [i.e. the TP1 of the Sliver or the Green Land, as the case may be]: (a) taking into account the assumptions referred to in this contract, and (b) assuming no act or omission of the Transferee [i.e. the Claimant] has occurred that has reduced the Market Value of the Relevant Land.”

77. The parties are in broad agreement on this question: the difference in their respective figures for the EUV in the original Price Notice and counter-notice was approximately £1,100. Ms Wicks said in her Opinion that she agreed with Miss Sandells’ view that “the EUV is the market value of the Green Land, and just the Green Land…as an agricultural field with no other lawful use, and no prospect of that changing – so no hope value and ignoring any existing or prior planning permission that might permit development or use of the Green Land for anything other than agricultural use.”

78. I agree with that interpretation of the provision. The base value from which the assessment of the Variation Price begins is the value of the Green Land or the Sliver, as the case may be, if held in perpetuity for agricultural use only, as at the date of the Price Notice. (iv) Is the Enhanced Value of the Green Land and/or the Sliver the Market Value of that land, and only that land, on the date of the relevant Price Notice with the assumption of: (a) the benefit of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent (as defined) as it applies to the Green Land and/or the Sliver as appropriate, and only that consent and that geographical limitation; and (b) the benefit of a variation or removal of the Covenant to permit the relevant land to be used for the uses permitted by the Prohibited Use Planning Consent? If not, how should the Enhanced Value definition be construed?

79. There is a significant dispute about the proper interpretation of “Enhanced Value”. It is defined as follows in the Schedule to the TP1 of the Green Land and the Alpha Transfer: ‘“Enhanced Value” means the Market Value of the Relevant Land at the date of the relevant Price Notice with the benefit of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent and assuming that the Covenant has been varied to permit the Relevant Land to be used for the uses permitted by the Prohibited Use Planning Consent.’

80. The Defendant contends that the calculation of the Enhanced Value in accordance with that definition should include (a) the benefit of the Prohibited Use Planning Consent; (b) the benefit of the removal of the covenant to permit the use under the Prohibited Use Planning consent; and (c) ransom value in respect of Phases 1-3 of the Outline Planning Permission, which did not permit more than 200 houses on the development to be occupied without the building of the Long Road access on the Green Land.

81. The Defendant appears to be relying, for this conclusion, on the proposition that between the initial grant of the Outline Planning Permission and the serving of the initial Price Notice on 10 May 2023 the Claimant has increased the Market Value of the Green Land and the Sliver by conferring on them additional value (by way of ransom value or otherwise) in respect of any houses in excess of the number specified in Condition 9 of the Outline Planning Permission. That number was initially 200 and is now 359, and therefore the Defendant argues that the calculation of the Enhanced Value should take account of that initial requirement, as a number of dwellings exceeding 200 has now been built and occupied.

82. The Claimant disputes this interpretation. It argues that the Enhanced Value is the value of the Green Land at the date of the commencement of development in accordance with the March 2023 Planning Permission, with the benefit of that planning permission and assuming that the covenant has been varied to allow the Green Land and the Sliver to be used for that purpose, and that purpose alone. There is nothing in the provisions for calculating a price for the release of the covenant which entitles or requires a valuer to take into account planning conditions under a separate planning consent which previously applied in respect of development on neighbouring land, and which have now been varied.

83. The planning history, so far as relevant to the questions that I have been asked, is set out in paragraphs 22 to 28 above. I should record that there is no suggestion that at any time the Claimant has failed to comply with any planning condition.

84. At the point when the initial Price Notice was given, Condition 9 of the Outline Planning Permission had been varied, and the relevant provision as at that date permitted the construction and occupation of up to 359 dwellings before the requirement to build the Long Road access applied. The March 2023 Planning Permission imposed a separate requirement, referred to at paragraph 25 above, for the Long Road access to be built if 76 dwellings are constructed and occupied.

85. It is not at all surprising, in a large-scale development of this nature, that the planning conditions of the relevant permissions should have been varied as the phases progressed. Mr Rose indicated in his oral evidence that there might be yet further changes requested if it proved impossible to find a suitable convenience store operator to enable the development of phase 4b as envisaged.

86. In any event, the Defendant’s position is untenable. The calculation for the release of the covenant depends on the issue of a Price Notice by reference to a specific planning permission. At the date when the Outline Planning Permission was granted and Condition 9 in its original form was imposed, the Claimant did not even hold title to the Green Land or the Sliver and there was no question of a Price Notice being issued by reference to the Outline Planning Permission. When the Price Notice was issued, it was issued by reference to the March 2023 Planning Permission, and it is that planning permission which is the “Prohibited Use Planning Consent” for the purposes of calculation of the overage payable. It is true that the Outline Planning Permission also gave permission for the use of the Green Land for a Prohibited Use, in the form of construction of the Long Road access, but (even without the express language of the covenant by reference to a particular planning permission, with which I deal below) the Long Road access is also required once the relevant threshold for construction and occupation under the March 2023 Planning Permission has been met, and it cannot be counted twice for the purposes of valuation.

87. It is perfectly clear from the definitions of “Existing Use Value” and “Enhanced Value” that both are to be calculated as at the date of the Price Notice and by reference to the “Prohibited Use Planning Consent”. In this case the planning permission included with the Price Notice was the March 2023 Planning Permission, and the Variation Price therefore fell to be calculated by reference to that planning permission.

88. The Claimant cannot be said to have acted in a way that reduced the value of the Green Land or the Sliver in seeking variations of the condition relating to the construction of the Long Road access under the Outline Planning Permission before the Price Notice was even given. No sensible construction of the provisions for release of the covenant could come to that conclusion: the text does not support it, and it is also not a commercially sensible provision. A planning consent might be amended to reflect that changed circumstances have affected the commercial viability of a scheme, for example. Would it really be commercially sensible, or likely to have been in the minds of the parties, that the party seeking the release of the covenant would be bound by an earlier version of a planning condition in relation to a separate planning permission which happened to result in a higher sale value (and, if so, how would the appropriate version of the condition be identified)? I do not believe it would: it would need very clear words in the agreement to persuade me that that is an appropriate interpretation.

89. I therefore accept the Claimant’s argument that “Enhanced Value”, as defined in the agreement, means the value of the Green Land or the Sliver as the case may be, with the benefit of the March 2023 Planning Permission as it stood at the date of the Price Notice and with the release of the covenant, but with no additional ransom value relating to the earlier planning condition imposed under a separate planning permission. (v) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, does either piece of land have the benefit of a ransom value that is to be taken into account when assessing the relevant Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value and/or the Variation Price as a result of Full Planning Permission 22/00958/FUL which permitted the development of the Green Land and the Sliver and adjoining land known as Phase 4a, marked as such on the plan appended hereto?

90. This question is straightforward to answer. Phase 4a is almost complete and its completion will not trigger the requirement to build the Long Road access under the March 2023 Planning Permission. There is therefore no ransom value for Phase 4a to be taken into account for the purposes of ascertaining the Enhanced Value of the Green Land. The Green Land is to be valued by reference to the buildings for which consent has been given on that land, and only that land. The Long Road access will have to be constructed if development on the Green Land is to proceed in accordance with the March 2023 Planning Permission, but the costs of construction of the access will also have to be taken into account for valuation purposes. (vi) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, does either piece of land have the benefit of a ransom value that is to be taken into account when assessing the relevant Existing Use Value and/or the Enhanced Value and/or the Variation Price as a result of any other planning permission granted in respect of development land known as Phase 1, Phase 2 and/or Phase 3, marked as such on the plan appended hereto?

91. For the reasons given above, I do not consider that any ransom value falls to be taken into account in respect of the calculation of any of the Existing Use Value, the Enhanced Value or the Variation Price as a result of any other planning permission. (vii) In valuing the Green Land and/or the Sliver, what element of the costs of creating an access to Long Road as required by Full Planning Permission 22/00958/FUL as a condition for the development of the Green Land should be attributed to (a) the Green Land; (b) the Sliver; and (c) the Phase 4a land?

92. It is plain that the construction of the Long Road access and the access road connecting it to the rest of the development will have costs associated with it which feed into the calculation of the market value of the Green Land for the purposes of the calculation required by the covenant. The question is to which land the costs are to be attributed. As the planning consent, in its current form, does not require the construction of the Long Road access until the Phase 4b development takes place and the dwellings are occupied, and all those dwellings will be located on the Green Land, I accept the Claimant’s argument that the costs fall to be attributed to the Green Land only. (viii) The Variation Price for both the Green Land and the Sliver is defined as 50% of the difference between the Existing Use Value and the Enhanced Value of the relevant land after deducting therefrom certain deductions, namely (as defined): (a) the Deductible Costs; (b) the Additional Deductible Costs; (c) the First Tranche; and (d) the Additional First Tranche. Is it correct that those sums are to be deducted from the 50% difference figure to arrive at the Variation Price? If not, when and how are those sums to be deducted?

93. This point is no longer a matter of dispute between the parties. The letter quoted at paragraph 19 above was not disclosed until trial, following Mrs Jackson’s oral evidence, and the Defendant apologised for the failure to identify it as a relevant document at an earlier stage. It makes clear that the deductions are to be taken from the 50% difference figure to arrive at the Variation Price. On the final day of the trial the Defendant accepted that this was the correct interpretation of the provision. I will only add that, given the substantial sums expended on works for the benefit of the School by the Claimant (to which neither MHS nor the Defendant made any contribution), and bearing in mind also that there is no entitlement for the Claimant to make any deduction in respect of the £330,000 costs of the works to create the coach park, this is supported by the language used in the agreement between the Claimant and MHS and is also fair and reasonable. (ix) What is the correct valuation date for establishing the Variation Price?”

94. The answer to this is clear from the definition of “Existing Use Value” set out above: the relevant date for valuation is the date of the Price Notice given by the Claimant. The parties did not invite me to determine whether the relevant date was 10 May 2023, when the initial Price Notice was served, or 31 May 2023, when the amended Price Notice was served, and given the very short period between the two dates it seems to me that very little if anything will turn on this. However, as the amended Price Notice is the one on which the Claimant relied subsequently, the date of that Price Notice would seem to be the appropriate date for valuation. “If the Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the Covenant and the Release Clauses contained in the TP1, under paragraph 3.6 of Schedule 1 to the TP1, once the Variation Price has been agreed or determined by an expert, must the Claimant (as Transferee) within 20 Working Days of that agreement/determination serve a Request on the Defendant (as Transferor)?”

95. If the Claimant wishes to develop land which is bound by the covenant, it must comply with the release provisions of the covenant and pay the Variation Price agreed in accordance with those provisions. That is undisputed. The question, then, is whether once it has served the initial Price Notice it must proceed to pay the Variation Price, however uncommercial, or whether it could choose instead to abandon the process and leave the Sliver as undeveloped agricultural land, without completing the originally planned development.

96. The Defendant submitted at trial that the Claimant, having commenced development, is obliged to complete the development in accordance with the requirements of the Outline Planning Permission and the March 2023 Planning Permission, and therefore that it must pay the Variation Price once agreed or determined by an expert in accordance with the release provisions of the original covenant.

97. I cannot accept that submission. There is no obligation on a person who obtains planning permission to carry out the works at all. In a case like this, the local planning authority is likely to provide for certain steps to be taken at specified stages of development (as with the Long Road access in this case) precisely to avoid a developer failing to comply with important obligations once the financially rewarding parts of the development are complete. The Defendant argues that, having commenced the development, the Claimant is bound by Conditions 3 to 5 of the Outline Planning Permission to construct the whole development in accordance with the original layout plan. Hillside Parks Ltd v Snowdonia National Park Authority [2022] UKSC 30 deals extensively with the situation where multiple grants of planning permission have been made, and what has been constructed on the ground differs significantly from the master plan. The court expressly (at paragraphs 55 and 56) rejected the argument that if a development authorised by planning permission is not fully completed, the development will be unlawful. At paragraph 68, it states expressly that failure or inability to complete a development for which planning permission has been granted does not render the development to date unlawful. The Claimant in this case has carried out part of the development for which permission has been granted, and has complied with all the conditions with which it is required to comply for the development so far completed. As a matter of planning law, it is not required to complete the whole development.

98. This case can be distinguished from cases such as in which the developer has completed the whole development save for one, or a very small number, of dwellings specifically to frustrate a requirement for an overage payment. In this case, no development has been completed in relation to the Green Land or the Sliver, and the question I have been asked presupposes that no development at all will take place on either.

99. The question, then, is whether the terms of the covenant itself require the Claimant, once it has served a Price Notice, to proceed with the process and pay the Variation Price, even if that price would render the proposed development commercially unviable. The authorities are clear that the mere fact that a contract would constitute a bad bargain for one party if construed in a particular way is not in itself a reason to avoid that construction. People are free to make bad bargains and may be held to them.

100. Clause 3 of the Schedule to the TP1 of the Green Land and the equivalent provision in the Alpha Transfer provide that the Claimant must serve a Price Notice on the commencement of development pursuant to a Prohibited Use Planning Consent. The Defendant may serve a counter-notice or accept the Claimant’s valuation. If they are unable to agree a price, it must be submitted to an expert for determination. Within 20 working days of the agreement or determination the Claimant must serve a Request (for the variation of the covenant to permit the works permitted under the planning consent).

101. Would a fair and impartial observer, with the state of knowledge of the relevant parties at the time of entering into that agreement, consider that once the process had begun the agreement requires parties to complete it come what may? The Defendant says that such an observer would: the use of mandatory language (“must”) in the provision requiring service of a request for a variation shows that the Claimant is obliged to follow through the process.

102. The Claimant argues that clause 3 is subject to an implied term “must if the Claimant wants to proceed with the variation to allow it to implement the Prohibited Use Planning Consent”, and that it is open to the Claimant to decline to pay an unreasonable Variation Price and choose instead to leave the land undeveloped. The Claimant also notes that although the agreement provides that once the Variation Price has been settled the Claimant must serve a request for a deed of variation on the Defendant, it does not provide that the Claimant must pay the Variation Price. It says merely that “upon payment of the Variation Price the Transferor [i.e. the Defendant] must execute a Deed of Variation”. It is therefore clear that if the price is not paid there will be no deed of variation, and the land cannot be developed until the end of the twenty-five year period of the restriction, but no consequence is specified if the Claimant fails to pay. It simply does not obtain the variation it seeks.

103. This point seems to me to have considerable force and to support the Claimant’s argument for an implied term in the earlier provision: a reasonable observer would not consider, in the absence of any enforceable obligation to pay, that the Claimant was obliged to serve a request with no intention to pay the resulting price. That would be an absurd construction. I therefore accept the Claimant’s position and declare that there is no obligation on the Claimant to make the Request. Conclusion

104. The Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the covenant in dispute in these proceedings in so far as it relates to the Green Land. The Claimant is also entitled to serve notice of the termination of the agreement, and to remove the restriction on the title to the Green Land. The Defendant is, however, entitled to the benefit of the covenant in so far as it relates to the Sliver, and in determining the Variation Price the provisions of the Alpha Transfer are to be interpreted in accordance with the answers to the questions set out above. The parties are entitled to declarations accordingly.

Rose Builders (Properties) Limited v Alpha Trust [2026] EWHC CH 2241 — UK case law · My AI Judge