UK case law

Salford City Council v Richard Brown

[2026] UKUT LC 393 · Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) · 2026

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Full judgment

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by Salford City Council against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal not to confirm a financial penalty that it had imposed upon the respondent, Mr Richard Brown, as director of a company that had committed the offence of failing to comply with the regulations applicable to houses in multiple occupation. The appellant challenges the FTT’s conclusion that the conditions for a director’s liability in section 251 of the Housing Act 2004 were not met.

2. The appeal was heard on 23 September 2026 together with another appeal, Khuja v Cherwell District Council [2026] UKUT 363 (LC) . Both appeals were about section 251 , and it was helpful to me to hear both cases together, but the issues raised in the two appeals were quite different and I have decided to give two separate decisions.

3. Salford City Council was represented by Mr Paul Whatley of counsel and Mr Brown by Mr Michael Field of counsel. I am grateful to them both. Because the City Council was the respondent in the FTT, to avoid confusion I refer to the parties by name. The legal background

4. The Housing Act 2004 creates a number of housing offences, including the offence of managing or being in control of a house in multiple occupation and failing to comply with the regulations applicable to it (section 234(5)). That offence is one of those listed in section 249 A of the 2004 Act , in respect of which the local housing authority may impose a financial penalty if it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the offence has been committed. There is an appeal to the FTT, which must conduct a re-hearing of the matter and may confirm, vary or cancel the penalty; again, the standard of proof of the facts that constitute the offence is the criminal standard.

5. Section 251 of the 2004 Act says this: “251. Offences by body corporate (1) Where an offence under this Act committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of– (a) a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or (b) a person purporting to act in such a capacity, he as well as the body corporate commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

6. There is no authoritative case law about section 251 . A number of observations can be made about the text of the section. First, it is perfectly clear that the liability of a director or other officer is not established by his position alone; specifically, liability does not follow simply from being the director. Second, the section requires proof that the offence was committed by the company, and that it was committed with the director’s “consent or connivance” or was attributable to his neglect. While the appeal in Khuja v Cherwell was concerned with the meaning of “consent”, the term in question in the present appeal is “neglect”.

7. Similar provisions appear in other contexts. Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 is virtually identical to section 251 of the Housing Act 2004 . The authorities about that provision give useful indications of what is required in order to prove consent or neglect. Far more has been said about neglect; it is clear that neglect can be inferred where the matters concerned were within the responsibility of the director concerned. Thus in R v P [2008] ICR 96 Latham LJ cited with approval (at paragraph 8) the dicta of Lord Emslie in the earlier Scottish case of Wotherspoon v H M Advocate (1978) JC 74: “…Accordingly, in considering in a given case whether there has been neglect within the meaning of section 37(1) on the part of a particular director or other particular officer charged, the search must be to discover whether the accused has failed to take some steps to prevent the commission of an offence by the corporation to which he belongs if the taking of those steps either expressly falls or should be held to fall within the scope of the functions of the office which he holds. In all cases accordingly the functions of the office of a person charged with a contravention of section 37(1) will be a highly relevant consideration for any judge or jury …”

8. In R v Chargot Limited (t/as Contract Services) & ors [2009] 1 WLR 1 Lord Hope said at paragraph 34: “… consent can be established by inference as well as by proof of an express agreement. The state of mind that the words “connivance” and “neglect” contemplate is one that may also be established by inference. The offences that are created by sections 2(1) and 3(1) are directed to the result that must be achieved by the body corporate. Where it is shown that the body corporate failed to achieve or prevent the result that those sections contemplate, it will be a relatively short step for the inference to be drawn that there was connivance or neglect on his part if the circumstances under which the risk arose were under the direction or control of the officer. The more remote his area of responsibility is from those circumstances, the harder it will be to draw that inference.”

9. Huckerby v Elliott [1970] 1 All ER 189 was an appeal from a prosecution for failing to hold a gaming licence under the Finance Act 1966 , which contained a provision similar to section 251 . The appellant, Ms Huckerby, was the director of the company that had committed the offence. Lord Parker CJ considered the responsibilities of a director and said at page 194: “I cannot think that in general at any rate it is the duty of each director of a company to exercise some degree of control … over what is going on …; nor do I think it is right to say that there is a duty to supervise the running of the company and in particular a co-director who is the secretary.”

10. What I take from those authorities is that when an offence is committed that is “within the scope of the functions of the office which [the director] holds”, ie. was within his area of responsibility, then it will usually be easy to infer that the offence was committed as a result of the director’s neglect. However, where there are for example two directors, and one deals with the running and daily operation of the company and the other is responsible for financial matters, the financial director is not required to supervise the other director’s operations and if there has been a breach of health and safety legislation or the requirements of the Housing Act 2004 , for example, the financial director is unlikely to be liable under section 251 . For that reason the conviction of the appellant in Huckerby v Elliot was quashed. The facts, and the decision of the FTT

11. Mr Brown is the sole director of a number of related companies which are in the business of managing rented property on behalf of landlords. 151 Manchester Road, Worsley, Manchester is operated as an HMO, and is managed by Want This Room Limited which is one of the companies of which Mr Brown is a director. In February 2023 the City Council imposed a financial penalty on Mr Brown (after following the correct process of notices under the 2004 Act ) of £10,850 on the basis that the company had committed the offence of failing to comply with HMO regulations and that Mr Brown was liable under section 251 of the 2004 Act . I do not need to say anything about the facts said to have given rise to that offence because they are not in issue in the appeal.

12. Mr Brown appealed to the FTT. In its decision of 18 August 2025 the FTT said this: “6. The issues are (1) is the Appellant as a director of WTR liable to be proceeded against? if yes, (2) was an offence committed? and (3) the amount of any [penalty] to be imposed.

7. The primary issue to be determined by the Tribunal before it addresses the other matters in dispute is whether the Appellant is liable to prosecution as the sole director of WTR.”

13. The FTT proceeded to examine that first question, and answered it in the negative, Accordingly there has as yet been no decision that Want This Room Limited is guilty of an offence, which is a pre-requisite to a director’s liability.

14. The FTT set out section 251 and explained that the City Council asserted that the offence had been committed and was “attributable to the neglect” of Mr Brown as director, who “has been negligent in the operation of [WTR] by not ensuring the adequate management of the property and not having proper systems in place to avoid the commissioning of the offence.” The FTT observed that the City Council had not imposed a financial penalty on Want This Room Limited (“WTR”), as a result of confusion about which of the companies in the group was the manager of this particular property, although by the time of the FTT hearing it was not in dispute that it was WTR.

15. The FTT recorded Mr Brown’s evidence about his role: “21. The Appellant had widespread business interests at the time of the alleged offence. This included over 30 director appointments. The Appellant's companies manage 900 tenancies across 180 properties. The Appellant's evidence is that he spent 1-2 days per week working across the three property management groups, of which WTR was a part. He says that a small percentage of his time would have been spent on WTR.

22. The Appellant states there was a clear delineation of roles within the property group. The evidence of the management structure for the property group shows matters relating to property management for WTR which was the responsibility of a shadow director, Kemi Egan, and a team that worked under her. The Appellant says he was concerned with the money and Kemi Egan dealt with operational matters.

23. … The Appellant described Ms Egan as a '50% joint venture partner'. … she was not a director of WTR or any of the Appellant's other companies and she had no financial interest in the various businesses. …

25. … He accepted that his role as a director was to put systems in place to manage properties but maintained that it was for others to operate them. He demonstrated a detailed knowledge of residential legislations and procedures but stressed that day-to-day operations were left to others. He said that he did not have personal awareness of issues that arose.

26. When the parent company, the Rosemount Group, acquired a number of companies including WTR, the Appellant states he was provided with the company overview and organisational chart. He says he acquired a mature business and believed it was functioning to high standards from a compliance perspective. The Appellant claims that he received a quarterly compliance audit report which included the Property among numerous other properties across many locations.

27. The Appellant's evidence is that he was not made aware of any issues in respect of the property and the first time he learned of any compliance concerns was on 8 August 2022 when he was passed an invitation to attend a meeting with the Respondent.

28. The Appellant mostly worked remotely from his home in Slough and the management of WTR was not under his immediate direction and control. He was not in day-to-day contact with what was being done. He was remote, in every sense, from the day-to-day operation of the management of WTR.”.

16. The FTT concluded as follows: “29. The Tribunal … [accepts] the Appellant's description that he was responsible for financial matters leaving the day-to day management to others employed for that purpose as part of the management structure.

30. The Tribunal found the Appellant to be very experienced in property rental in various capacities. He shows a detailed knowledge of the sector and has a keen awareness of his standing in the industry. The evidence establishes a clear management structure that he put in place that allocates responsibility for day-to day activities to a number of people within the various companies. The Appellant was an honest witness who made concessions when necessary.

31. The Tribunal finds that it cannot be properly said that the Appellant exercised any neglect. He had a considerable portfolio of properties across many companies for which he was a director. He was entitled to rely on Ms Egan's expertise to manage the Property. He was not under a duty to supervise the running of WTR and it was proper for him to leave the running of the company to her.

32. … The Respondent has not proved neglect on the Appellant's part and no causal connection to the alleged offences.”

17. Against that conclusion the City Council appeals, with the permission of this Tribunal; it says that the FTT erred in finding that the company’s offence was not attributable to Mr Brown’s neglect, and that it misconstrued section 251 , and thereby circumvented its purpose as an anti-avoidance provision. The arguments in the appeal

18. For the City Council Mr Whatley argued that the company’s function was the management of rented properties, including compliance with housing legislation and regulation. As sole director Mr Brown was responsible for that compliance. He had no management systems in place to prevent the commission of housing offences. It was not open to him to leave matters to Ms Egan, who was neither a director nor an employee of the company, and claim that housing legislation was not his area of responsibility. The authorities relating to health and safety and other legislation with similar provisions are for the most part concerned with companies with more than one director where it was legitimate for one director to say that another director was responsible – as in Huckerby – but this was not such a case.

19. Accordingly the FTT was wrong, according to the City Council, to say that Mr Brown was not responsible for legislative compliance, or that he had no duty to prevent the commission of offences. It was his responsibility as sole director, and he could not discharge it on a once-and-for-all basis by a delegation to Ms Egan.

20. Mr Whatley pointed out that Mr Brown had not even produced documents demonstrating the delegation to Ms Egan, nor any real system under her for ensuring compliance with housing legislation. There was an officer referred to as a “Compliance Officer”, but it was not at all clear what was actually done. Nor had Mr Brown shown that there was any reporting system whereby he was kept informed about compliance with regulations.

21. For Mr Brown, Mr Field begins by pointing out that the FTT accepted all Mr Brown’s evidence and found him to be an honest witness. Its findings of fact about Mr Brown’s involvement in the day-to-day running of WTR, and about the management structure of WTR and other companies, were amply justified on the evidence. Mr Field relied upon the dicta of Lord Parker CJ in Huckerby v Elliott and argued that Mr Brown was entitled to rely upon Ms Egan and her team and was not under a duty to supervise her. The materials disclosed about the way WTR was managed showed that there was a proper system in place and that compliance was monitored. A compliance report had been before the FTT. For the director to be held responsible under section 251 on the basis of neglect, said Mr Field, there has to be more than a mere failure to see that the law is observed; it requires identifying a duty to do a specific act and a failure to do so. Discussion

22. The officers of Salford City Council took enforcement action on the basis that HMO regulations had not been complied with. Whether an offence had in fact been committed by WTR was one of the questions the FTT had to answer (see paragraph 12 above), but it did not do so because it did not get past the first issue.

23. There is therefore no finding of fact by the FTT as to whether or not WTR committed an offence, what that offence was, or how it was committed. It would I think have been preferable for the FTT to answer its second question first. As it is, the FTT was working on a provisional basis; if an offence had been committed, could it have been attributable to Mr Brown’s neglect? In effect what it found was that whatever the facts surrounding the offence it could not have been attributable to neglect on the part of Mr Brown because he had properly delegated to Ms Egan the duty to ensure that the company complied with housing legislation. I observe that the FTT made no finding to the effect that, despite that delegation, full reports on compliance were provided to Mr Brown or even that there was a practice of reporting back to him; he was exonerated not because he was keeping tabs on compliance, but because he had delegated the matter.

24. The finding challenged in this appeal is therefore the finding that because of that delegation Mr Brown could not possibly be liable under section 251 . For the reasons I am about to explain, the appeal succeeds; the FTT was wrong to rule out criminal liability on Mr Brown’s part. That does not mean that he is so liable, only that liability has not yet been ruled out, and cannot be ruled out on the ground that compliance was not Mr Brown’s responsibility by virtue of delegation. Even if an offence has been committed, it may be found that the facts were such that it could not possibly be attributable to the neglect of the director even though he was fully responsible for statutory compliance.

25. That is all for the future, as this matter has to be remitted to the FTT. As to the appeal itself, I start with Mr Field’s proposition that for a director or other officer to be liable under section 251 it is necessary to identify a duty to do a specific act and a failure to do so. I disagree. For a person to be liable under section 251 on the basis of neglect there is no need to identify a specific act which that person should have done. The authorities on the health and safety legislation and other regimes make it clear that neglect can be inferred from responsibility. The sole director of a company is responsible for all its actions, and at the heart of this appeal is the issue whether that responsibility can be passed to another person who is not a director.

26. I asked Mr Whatley at the hearing if he agreed with me that if Ms Egan had been a statutory director the City Council could not succeed in the appeal. With some hesitation, he agreed. It seems to me that what Lord Parker CJ said in Huckerby means that if Ms Egan had been a statutory director then her responsibility for statutory compliance would be the end of the matter so far as Mr Brown was concerned. He would be entitled to rely on her responsibility, and on the fact that his area of responsibility was quite different. He would not be under any duty to supervise her or check up on her.

27. This appeal turns on the question whether delegation to a person who is not a director of the company can exonerate Mr Brown in the same way.

28. I bear in mind that there is no appeal against any of the findings of fact made by the FTT. It accepted Mr Brown’s evidence that he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of WTR and that compliance with housing legislation was Ms Egan’s responsibility and ensured by a team reporting to her. The details of that delegation are not important to the appeal, although I was shown documents that illustrated the company group structure and the organisational structure of WTR itself and showed that there was a “compliance officer”. I have to say that it is not at all clear from what I have seen, including the “compliance report” submitted to the Tribunal after the appeal hearing, that “compliance” in that context actually meant compliance with housing legislation. But that is immaterial; the factual premise of the appeal is that Ms Egan was responsible for compliance with housing legislation and had a team working with her.

29. In my judgment the FTT was plainly wrong to decide that that made it impossible for Mr Brown to be liable under section 251 . Lord Parker CJ in Huckerby was speaking only of a division of responsibilities between directors. He did not say that a director was under no duty to supervise or check up on someone to whom a responsibility had been delegated, if that person was not a director, nor an officer, nor even an employee of the company.

30. It would be very surprising if he had said anything of the sort. It is one thing to say that duties, and work, can be shared between directors so that one of them is responsible for regulatory compliance and one is not. It is quite another to say that a director can delegate that responsibility to a person who is not a director, nor an officer or employee of the company, and is thereby exonerated from responsibility. That would be a most startling idea.

31. I accept that Ms Egan signed herself, on letters to staff, as “Director”, held herself out as director, and is described by Mr Brown as a shadow director. She is said to have had an equitable interest in the company, although she was not a shareholder. In my judgment none of that is relevant, because none of it gave her the legal role and statutory responsibilities of a director.

32. It may be that Ms Egan herself (who is no longer connected with the company) could have been found liable under Section 251 , because she purported to act as director. That too is immaterial; more than one person might be liable under section 251 . I also accept that Mr Brown’s directorships were so extensive that it was not practicable for him to manage the day-to-day running of the companies. The difficulty is that the fact that a director has over-stretched himself does not remove his statutory liabilities.

33. I find that the fact that compliance with housing legislation and regulation was the responsibility of Ms Egan does not mean that Mr Brown cannot be liable under section 251 . The appeal therefore succeeds.

34. I repeat that that does not necessarily mean that he is liable; no such finding can be made until the second of the FTT’s three questions has been answered so that the nature of the offence and the facts of its commission are known. Only then can the FTT decide, whether by a direct finding of fact or by inference, whether the offence was attributable to neglect on the part of Mr Brown. Obviously if there was a breach of regulations because of a failure by the company to take certain actions then neglect will readily be inferred, as Lord Hope said in R v Chargot (paragraph 8 above). But breaches of regulations are not always caused by a failure to take action. I say no more about that, and it will be a matter for the FTT.

35. I have reached my conclusion without reference to the fact that section 251 is an anti-avoidance provision, designed to ensure that individuals cannot hide behind a corporate body. It is uncontroversial that it is such a provision; but it remains important that an individual should not be found liable unless the requirements of the statute are properly met. The FTT’s error was to find that Mr Brown could not possibly be liable because of the delegation of responsibility to Ms Egan. Conclusion

36. The appeal succeeds. The matter is therefore remitted to the FTT. It will need to start afresh, and to consider first, whether the company had indeed committed an offence. The next issue to consider will be whether that offence was attributable to neglect on Mr Brown’s part. Only if it so finds, on the criminal standard of proof, will it be appropriate to move on to the third question, the amount of the penalty.

37. The City Council has asked that the matter be remitted to a differently constituted FTT, and I so direct. Judge Elizabeth Cooke 19 October 2026 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.