UK case law

Savace Limited v Care Quality Commission

[2026] UKFTT HESC 1287 · Care Standards · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. Mrs Andrea Charlesworth, nominated individual of Savace Limited (the Applicant), lodged an application to appeal with the First-tier Tribunal. The application is dated 31 July 2026. The date of receipt of the appeal application was 31 July 2026.

2. The appeal concerned a decision of the Care Quality Commission (CQC, the Respondent) to cancel its registration as a service provider in respect of the regulated activities of treatment of accommodation for persons who require nursing or personal care and treatment of disease, disorder or injury at Bramcote Hills Care Home, Sandringham Drive, Bramcote, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, NG9 3EJ. The decision was made pursuant to section 17(1) (e) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 and Regulation 6(1)(c) of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 because the service provider had not been carrying on the regulated activities for a continuous period of 12 months or more.

3. The Notice of Decision (dated 11 June 2026) was emailed to an email address for Bramcote Hills Care Home and to an email address for Ms Andrea Mrozowski (Mrs Charlesworth’s personal email address) on 11 June 2026, so it was received on that date. The statutory 28-day time period for bringing the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal started to run on 12 June 2026 and the last date for bringing the appeal in time was 10 July 2026. The Tribunal administration’s first record of receipt of the appeal application, dated 31 July 2026, is 31 July 2026. The dates set out in this paragraph are not in dispute.

4. Pursuant to section 32(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 ( the Act ), no appeal against a decision or order may be brought by a person more than 28 days after service on the person of notice of the decision or order.

5. Until the Supreme Court decision in Pomiechowski & Others v District Court of Legunica Poland [2012] UKSC 20 , statutory time limits were interpreted as being absolute, with no discretion afforded to the relevant judicial body to exercise a discretion to extend the statutory time limit. Ultimately, the case established that absolute statutory time limits should be read in a way which is consistent with Article 6 of the ECHR: i.e. that the relevant judicial body must have discretion to extend statutory time limits where the very essence of the right to appeal is impaired.

6. By way of an order dated 5 August 2026, Tribunal Judge Khan listed the application for a preliminary hearing on 3 September 2026 to consider the preliminary issue of exercising the discretion to extend the statutory time limit and registering the appeal. The hearing

7. Mrs Charlesworth attended the preliminary hearing, representing the Applicant and, in effect, representing herself. Mr John Whetton, director at Savace Care Ltd also attended, to provide support. Miss Jane Bucklow, counsel, instructed by Mrs Maariyah Ahmed (also attending), represented the Respondent, the CQC.

8. In advance of the hearing, the Tribunal had read a 128-page digital hearing bundle, which contained the parties’ helpful written submissions. There were no preliminary issues. The Law

9. The Tribunal has an inherent discretion (or duty) to extend statutory time limits which can only be reasonably exercised in circumstances where the very essence of the right to appeal was impaired, or, in other words, the Applicant doing all they personally can to bring the appeal and notify timeously. Once the discretion (or duty) arises, it must be exercised to the minimum extent necessary to secure compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights.

10. In R (on the application of) Adesina & Others v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818 , in the context of the statutory framework which regulates nurses and midwives’ registration, the Court of Appeal considered that the scope of the discretion to extend time is extremely narrow. It is worth taking a moment to examine the circumstances of Adesina (Ms Adesina) and the other appellant in the joined appeal, Ms Baines. For both Ms Adesina and Ms Baines, they missed the statutory deadlines in their appeals by only a matter of days and on the contributing basis that it took some time to seek legal advice. In both cases, the delay was not considered exceptional, and the time limits were not extended by the Court of Appeal in either case.

11. The Court of Appeal considered the issue more recently and in the context of a statutory right of appeal against a decision of the Health and Care Professions Council (in which there is a 28-day time limit for bringing the appeal). In Lars Stuewe v Health and Care Professions Council [2021] EWHC 3362 (Admin) , the scope of the discretion has been determined as – that the circumstances are exceptional, taking into account all relevant factors, one of which may be the actions of the Appellant. As was made clear in this case, each case will turn on its own facts and the assistance to be drawn from the outcomes on the facts of other cases may be limited.

12. It will often be relevant – a relevant factor - to consider whether the Appellant has done everything they can to lodge the appeal within the time limit.

13. The correct approach in each case is for the Tribunal to ask whether or not “exceptional circumstances” exist such that denying a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. It may be relevant to consider, in answering the question, whether an Appellant has personally done all that they can reasonably be expected to do to bring the appeal in time.

14. Rule 5(3)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 gives the Tribunal the power to extend time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit. The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons

15. The factual background was not in dispute. Mrs Charlesworth confirmed with the Tribunal, in oral evidence, that she received the notice of decision on 11 June 2026, sent to her personal email address. She accepted that she had not read the notice of decision fully, which led her to send the appeal application to the general enquires email address for the CQC. She explained that she had not engaged with the First-tier Tribunal before and in her role as the nominated individual, she had regular contact with the CQC. She had made a wrong assumption and based it on not fully reading/processing the clear information in the notice of decision, which included a hyperlink to more information and guidance on the First-tier Tribunal and a hyperlink for the correct email address for the Care Standards Tribunal. She accepted that she made a mistake. On or around 23 July 2026, she attended a meeting with the directors of Savace Care Ltd and agreed to seek an update on the appeal application she had wrongly sent to the CQC. On 23 July 2026, Mrs Charlesworth emailed the Care Standards Tribunal to request an update. On the same date, the Care Standards Tribunal responded to the email to confirm no application had been received. The email also provided information on next steps and attached the required documents for completion. The email also contained information about the timeliness of appeals, including the guidance to send the appeal as soon as possible.

16. Mrs Charlesworth then sent the appeal application so that it was received by the Care Standards Tribunal on 31 July 2026. She confirmed that the further delay was caused by her understanding that she was the person who would need to send the appeal application and she was on leave in Wales from 24 to 29 July 2026. The Tribunal noted that the email from the Care Standards Tribunal was sent at 11.20 am on 23 July 2026 and noted that Mrs Charlesworth previously completed the appeal application (sent to the CQC on 19 June 2026). That would have provided a reasonable time frame to send the appeal application on that date before starting leave.

17. The Tribunal considered carefully the submissions from both parties on the approach to take to the out of time appeal. Mrs Charlesworth asked the Tribunal to accept the genuine oversight on her part and extend time for bringing the appeal from 10 July 2026 to 31 July 2026. The CQC submitted that the exceptional circumstances criterion was not met and it would run contrary to the clear guidance, since the Pomiechowski case, to extend time for bringing the appeal in the context of an error, entirely on the part of the Appellant.

18. The Tribunal considered the line of principles from case law, starting with Pomiechowski & Others v District Court of Legunica Poland [2012] UKSC 20 , helpfully provided by the Respondent in the hearing bundle. The Tribunal asked itself, having established that the appeal application was received on 31 July 2026, concerning a decision notified on 11 June 2026, are there exceptional circumstances in play such that denying a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal?

19. In considering the circumstances, the Tribunal took into account what Mrs Charlesworth did to ensure the appeal application was received in time. Did she do all she reasonably could to ensure it was lodged in time? In the Tribunal's judgment, she did not. She did not fully read and process the information in the notice of decision, which she read on 11 June 2026. She did not launch the hyperlink to read further information about the steps to take when bringing an appeal against the decision of 11 June 2026. She did not send the appeal application to the clearly identified email address for the Care Standards Tribunal, contained in the notice of decision, until 31 July 2026. Furthermore, when it became apparent, on 23 July 2026, that the appeal application had not been sent to the correct recipient, Mrs Charlesworth waited until she returned from leave, on 31 July 2026 before sending the appeal application so that it was received by the Care Standards Tribunal.

20. In the Tribunal’s view, Mrs Charlesworth had meaningful opportunities to send the appeal application within time and to send it on a date much closer to the statutory deadline. When the position became clear to Mrs Charlesworth, on 23 July 2026, it would have been reasonable to take immediate steps to send the appeal application to the Tribunal on that same date.

21. The Tribunal considered the nature of the appeal, as part of its proportionality assessment, not least as this is an unfortunate set of circumstances for Mrs Charlesworth and the service provider. The Tribunal noted that when the service provider is ready to do so, it can make a new application for registration of the service provider to the Respondent, which will take into account that the cancellation of registration was an ‘administrative’ cancellation, due to dormancy for 12 months or more, as opposed to a cancellation due to breaches of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014.

22. The Tribunal concludes that Mrs Charlesworth did not do all that was reasonable once she had received the notice of decision on 11 June 2026, sent the appeal application to the wrong email address on 19 June 2026 and received the email confirmation from the Care Standards Tribunal on 23 July 2026. For those key reasons, the Tribunal does not consider it proportionate, in the circumstances, to extend time for sending the appeal application so that it is received from 10 July 2026 to 31 July 2026. Order It is ordered that:

1. The application to extend time for bringing the appeal is refused.

2. This is the final order in the proceedings. Judge S Brownlee First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 08 September 2026 WARNING Both parties are reminded that failure to comply with any of these directions may result in the Tribunal using its powers in Rule 8(4)(a) to strike out all or part of the party’s case or restricting the party’s participation in the proceedings.