UK case law
Serapid Limited v Octavius Infrastructure Limited
[2026] EWHC TCC 2695 · High Courts (Business and Property Courts) · 2026
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Full judgment
MR JUSTICE MOODY: Introduction
1. This is an application for summary judgment to enforce the decision of an adjudicator. The Defendant resists the application on the ground that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction because (the Defendant submits) there was no contract between the parties.
2. The Claimant, Serapid Limited (“Serapid”) is a specialist manufacturer of lifts. The Defendant, Octavius Infrastructure Limited (“Octavius”) builds and maintains railways and roads. In 2025 the parties negotiated for a contract in relation to the supply of lifts at Chalkwell railway station in Essex. They are in dispute as to whether a contract was ever agreed between them, and that is the underlying issue on this application. As I explain below, the parties were negotiating, and in the meantime Serapid started manufacturing the lifts. Network Rail later decided that it wished to use alternative lift technology, and Serapid were informed that the lifts would no longer be required. Serapid referred the dispute to adjudication, alleging wrongful termination and seeking £667,526. The Adjudicator decided that there was a contract between the parties and made a non-binding determination that he had jurisdiction. He decided that Octavius should pay Serapid £416,499 (exclusive of VAT) plus his fees of £29,250. The fees have been paid but the balance has not.
3. On this application Octavius’s stance is that, whilst the parties entered into negotiations, they never agreed a contract. Serapid’s pleaded position is that the parties entered into a contract on the NEC3 Engineering and Construction Subcontract terms “on or around 6 th June 2025”. This was Serapid’s case before the Adjudicator, and it is the case that he accepted. Serapid now also run an alternative case which is that, if there was no binding contract entered into on NEC3 terms, then the parties did at least enter into a “simple oral contract”. Serapid submits that Octavius has no real prospect of establishing that the parties did not contract on NEC3 terms, alternatively that they did not enter in to a simple contract. Serapid further submits that both contractual routes lead to the Adjudicator having jurisdiction by virtue of the same statutory scheme. The Facts
4. Octavius was the main contractor to Network Rail Infrastructure Limited (“NRIL”) for an Access for All (“AFA”) scheme at Chalkwell involving the demolition of the existing footbridge and construction of a new footbridge with two lifts. Serapid and Octavius had already contracted in relation to an AFA scheme at Grays station, and Octavius sought to engage Serapid in relation to the works at Chalkwell in the light of that relationship and at NRIL’s request. A similar project was also progressing at Southend East station and Octavius and Serapid were also in negotiations in relation to that scheme. The parties had previously entered into a formal subcontract in August 2024 in relation to the design of the lifts at Chalkwell (“the First Stage Design Subcontract”). The lifts were to be driven by a Dual Lift Drive System (“DLDS”).
5. The First Stage Design Subcontract was signed by an authorised signatory on behalf of Octavius and a director on behalf of Serapid. The covering letter dated 27 August 2024 and signed by Lisa Cridge, the commercial manager of Octavius, requested execution of the attached subcontract and stated: “If you commence performance of the Sub-Contract (including but not limited to preparation of designs or commencing work on Site or ordering goods and materials for use in the Sub-Contract Works) you will be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions of the enclosed Sub-Contract Agreement notwithstanding that the Agreement may not have been executed by you. However it is a condition precedent to any payment becoming due that you have properly executed and returned the Sub-Contract Agreement to us without any alteration or amendment whatsoever.”
6. On 9 th December 2024 Octavius sent Serapid an invitation to tender in relation to the supply and installation of the DLDS lifts at Chalkwell. This included a copy of the draft “Stage 2 Subcontract”, (“the Contract”). It provided that the Contract would be subject to the standard NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract (April 2014) terms. Serapid issued a number of quotes in response. On 14 th February 2025 Serapid issued quote number 9 which offered to carry out the works for £872,175. This provided that Serapid’s own General Terms and Conditions “shall apply exclusively”. It appears that there were negotiations between Octavius and NRIL going on in the background.
7. On 20 th May Bradley Mansbridge (Octavius’s senior project manager) forwarded a draft Contract to Serapid. The covering letter stated: “As we draw ever closer to our contract award (OIL/NR ) we wanted to minimise the risk to any procurement delays by agreeing our subcontract Ts and Cs. Please can I ask that you look to review the attached and provide comments back to us by the end of the week? This would allow us to arrange a meeting for early next week to discuss next steps.” Octavius/NRIL
8. The attached draft identified the scope of the works, and provided for a start date of 6th June 2025 and completion by 26th November 2026. It provided for a price of £872,175.00 and a direct fee percentage of 0%. The NEC3 terms were to apply. The first assessment date and other data were left as “XXXX”. The Contract Data Part One stated that “Completion of the data in full, according to the Options chosen, is essential to create a complete contract”. It provided for execution as a deed.
9. On 27th May 2025, Serapid’s solicitors, Archor, produced a substantial schedule of comments and proposed amendments. These were discussed at a Teams meeting held on 4th June 2025. Following that meeting Mr Mansbridge forwarded an updated draft Contract with comments raised by Octavius and the updates against them. The main outstanding points at that stage were clause 43.5 (which addressed defects), the fee percentage, clause X18.1 (which capped the sub-contractor’s liability) and clause 20.3 (regarding indemnities).
10. On 6 th June 2025 Isayas Tecleberhan (Octavius’s framework director) emailed Serapid’s Guillaume Davies stating that it would be “prudent to have a meeting as the teams are embarking on two more AFA schemes, namely Chalkwell and Southend East.” The meeting took place on 10th June 2025. In a witness statement provided to the adjudicator, Mr Tecleberhan’s evidence about this was that the meeting was introductory, that terms were not discussed and also that later in August he told Mr Davies in terms that the parties “were not in contract”.
11. On 12th June the fee proposal was agreed at 18%, and other points including clause 20.3 were also agreed so that by 09.42am that day Lisa Cridge of Octavius was stating in internal communications that, although the drafting of clause X18 was outstanding from Serapid’s solicitor “we can at least get the rest of the contract drafted”. On 13th June Mr Mansbridge emailed Mr Davies: “All, now that we have closed the comments we will look to get a revised subcontract order out to the Serapid team for final acceptance today/ Monday”.
12. The drafting of clause X18 was resolved on 16th June and Lisa Cridge instructed an employee to make the final agreed amendments to the “lawyer” questions. Mr Mansbridge emailed Frank Leroy of Serapid stating: “Can you confirm that procurement has stared on programme for Chalkwell (09/06/25) despite the signed subcontract ?order? Or are we looking at extended delays until the contract has been signed? I believe that all issues have been resolved legally and commercially and that our Subcontract Order will be with you this week as a mater of priority.” [sic]
13. For Serapid, Ms Chambers submitted that at this point everything of importance had been agreed; all that was required was a signature.
14. In my view this email demonstrates that Mr Mansbridge was proceeding on the basis that the terms were essentially agreed, but it may also suggest that he recognised the need for a contract to be signed before the parties were bound. This appears to be why he queried whether Serapid would commence procurement.
15. On 24 th June Julian Wisbey (Octavius’s programme manager) met Mr Mansbridge and noted: “Chalkwell: No orders let yet ... No cost plan yet”. On 27 th June Mr Mansbridge wrote internally: “On the understanding that we have now agreed the Ts & Cs for Chalkwell, can I ask that @Nick Littlejohn is authorised to use this as the basis to draft the Serapid contract for Southend East?” The same email said that Serapid “have now expressed concerns over their price submission for Chalkwell with the current changes and have confirmed their intent to provide an updated quotation”, that “its likely a shared risk item.... it won’t land well obviously”, and that “we are already several weeks in delay for placing these orders”. Lisa Cridge replied: “I haven’t seen the completed draft terms for Serapid but in theory, yes this can used used [sic] for Southend providing it reflects the negotiations.”
16. On 10 th July Serapid’s Frank Leroy thanked Octavius “for the invitation and for your willingness to proceed with the finalization of the contract”. On 30 th July and 1 st August Octavius’s Julian Wisbey asked Serapid’s Guillaume Davies to “look into both Chalkwell & Southend signing of Contracts” and to “confirm by return what the status is with signing Contracts for these please”. In August Serapid produced its Execution Strategy. Immediately after recording that Octavius and Network Rail had executed their contracts in late May and early June, it stated: “Because of the above and still with anticipation (prior to being under contract) SERAPID Corporate leadership decided to approve the relaunch of the ESSEX 2 and full industrialisation of the DLDS. This decision is to be seen as a very strong commitment from SERAPID to the AFA Scheme, given the still very risky commercial exposure.” Its section 2 was headed “Contract execution” and it concluded that the parties would “decide if escalation meeting... needs to take place prior to finalise contractual execution.” There is a dispute as to whether the reference to “prior to being under contract” referred to the position in August or at an earlier stage. Notwithstanding this, I accept Mr Brogden’s submission that this document suggested that the scope, price, programme and execution all remained to be resolved. It is a reasonable inference that Serapid were proceeding at that time on the basis that they were not then bound.
17. On 24th August 2025 Mr Tecleberhan and Mr Davies held a call. Mr Teclerabehan, on his evidence, expressly raised the continued absence of any contract and requested that Serapid progress the commercial elements as a matter of urgency, namely “price, programme and methodology”. Mr Tecleberhan says that Mr Davies confirmed that no contract was in place at that time and further confirmed that Serapid had chosen to purchase some long lead items at their own risk. Mr Tecleberhan says that he made it clear that the parties did not have an agreed position, were not in contract and the proposed dates did not meet the requirements set out to Serapid at the tender stage.
18. On 1 st September Mr Tecleberhan replied to a Serapid “proposal”, and commented “to expedite the contract execution it would be good to agree baseline programme that can be incorporated within the contract…” On 3 rd September Octavius gave NRIL a formal early warning under the main contract: “As an escalation to EWN03 we are still yet to agree a Contract with Serapid for the supply and installation of the VLB Lifts ... Serapid have now suggested that they are contracted to procure, fabricate and deliver their DLDS components only”. This would appear to be a statement to a third party under a contractual notice procedure, made two months before any dispute arose.
19. In October Serapid re-priced the works. On 24 th October Serapid’s Mr Davies reported to Mr Tecleberhan on “the conclusive progress that has been made on the readiness to contractualization for the schemes in reference”. On 28 October Serapid issued a new quotation 13062-11 (index 112) for Chalkwell at £1,065,000.
20. On 7 th November Octavius wrote that following NRIL’s change of lift type “we will no longer require Serapid’s services for these works” and that “Octavius has no contractual obligation with Serapid regarding the manufacture or installation of the lifts for Southend East and Chalkwell”. The Adjudication
21. Serapid referred the matter to adjudication. The dispute related to the termination of Serapid’s employment and the sums due on termination. Mr Wayne Lord was appointed as the Adjudicator. He identified the “crux” of the dispute as being whether the parties had entered into a contract on NEC3 terms. Assuming there was such a contract it is common ground that the statutory scheme under the was applicable. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996
22. His jurisdiction was challenged by Octavius on the basis that there was no contract between the parties. The Adjudicator rejected this. In his letter of 16th April 2026 he confirmed that the parties had agreed substantively on the standard terms and conditions, a price, and envisaged programme, and on the documents which would form the contract by around 6th June 2025. He concluded that there were minor items to be agreed beyond that date, namely “the provision of a single document, for Serapid to revise their Fee %, and some indemnity clause wording to be agreed but these were agreed, finalised and suitable amendments made by Octavius to the documentation on 16th June 2025”.
23. Octavius subsequently raised further arguments on jurisdiction and so the Adjudicator revisited the issue in his Decision. He concluded: “[128] I find that the Parties had, in a very short space of time, agreed with sufficient clarity on the substantive terms of the Subcontract in or around 6 June 2025 to include price, programme, completion and key dates to such an extent that individuals from both parties understood that there was a requirement for Serapid to commence procurement even in the absence of a signed order. The remaining minor items relating to a document, Fee %, indemnities, and X18 were all closed out and accepted without further protest by Octavius on 16 June 2025. The communications between the Parties during early June 2025 confirmed that both sides thought they had entered into a binding agreement. Octavius were always in control of the signing process and that administrative task was never completed. Procurement commenced in early June 2025 at Octavius’ insistence and Serapid were repeatedly pressed for updates on progress and procurement right up to 29 October 2025. [129] A contract existed.”
24. Neither party sought to argue that the termination on 7th November 2025 was made pursuant to any of the NEC3 sub-contract clauses. Serapid argued and the Adjudicator decided that Octavius had terminated the Contract at will. He assessed the amount due on termination under clause 93 and the termination table of the Subcontract. The balance of the decision went on to deal with the sum due to Serapid. On Serapid’s case that was £667,526. The Adjudicator awarded £416,499.00 as follows: Item Sum awarded Engineering costs £9,588 Project Management £1,234 DLDS Manufacturing £341,484 Travel costs mainly site visits £659.78 Sub-total £352,965.00 Agreed 18% £63,534.00 Total £416,499.00
25. This sum, along with the Adjudicator’s fees and expenses of £29,250.00, was ordered to be paid by Octavius. The Adjudicator’s fees have been paid but the sum of £416,499.00 has not. Summary Judgment
26. The test for summary judgment is well known and does not require extensive citation here. CPR Part 24.3 provides that the Court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or issue if (a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
27. In Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) the applicable principles were formulated by Mr Justice Lewison at paragraph [15] and they were subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 at [24]. In summary the Court: i) should consider whether the case of the respondents to the application has a realistic as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success; ii) must not conduct a mini-trial and does not have to take everything said by a claimant at face value. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents; iii) must take into account not only the evidence before it, but also that which can reasonably be expected to be available at trial where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts would add to or alter the evidence available at trial so as to affect the outcome. However it is not enough to simply argue that a case should be allowed to go to trial because “something may turn up”.
28. More specifically in relation to summary judgment in the context of adjudication enforcement, the Court of Appeal in Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1358 approved Jackson J’s approach at first instance [2005] BLR 310 where he held at [80]: “1. The adjudication procedure does not involve the final determination of anybody’s rights (unless all parties so wish).
2. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that adjudicators’ decisions must be enforced, even if they result from errors of procedure, fact, or law; …
3. Where an adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in serious breach of the rules of natural justice, the court will not enforce his decision... 4 Judges must be astute to examine technical defences with a degree of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act . Errors of law, fact or procedure by an adjudicator must be examined critically before the court accepts that such errors constitute excess of jurisdiction or serious breaches of the rules of natural justice ….”
29. I bear this all in mind as I approach the issues in this case. Formation of Contracts
30. As I have indicated, Serapid’s primary case is that a contract was agreed on or about 6 th June on NEC3 terms. In the alternative Serapid submits that there was a “simple oral contract” not on NEC3 terms. The alternative case was not advanced before the Adjudicator.
31. I did not detect any difference between the parties as to the correct approach as a matter of law. Keating on Construction Contracts (12th edition 2024) at [2-023] sets out a useful summary which was relied on by both parties. The authors suggest that: “…a useful approach is to ask whether the following can be answered in the affirmative: (a) In the relevant period of negotiation did the parties intend to contract? (b) At the time when they are alleged to have contracted, had they agreed with sufficient certainty upon the terms which they then regarded as being required in order that a contract should come into existence? (c) Did those terms include all those terms which, even though the parties did not realise it, were in fact essential to be agreed if the contract was to be legally enforceable and commercially workable? (d) Was there a sufficient indication of acceptance by the offeree of the offer as was then made complying with any stipulation in the offer itself as to the manner of acceptance?”
32. The leading case is the decision of the Supreme Court in RTS Flexible Systems v Molkerei GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14 . In that case, works had commenced based upon a letter of intent dated 21st February 2005 which expired on 27th May 2025 (“the LOI contract”). Complex contractual negotiations ensued but no formalised contract was entered into. Christopher Clarke J found that there was a contract after the expiry of the LOI contract, but that it did not incorporate the standard terms contended for. The Court of Appeal held that there was no contract between the parties after 27th May 2025.
33. The Supreme Court dealt with the applicable principles at [45] as follows: “The general principles are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if so, upon what terms depends on what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind, but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and had agreed all the terms which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation of legally binding relations. Even if certain terms of economic or other significance to the parties have not been finalised, an objective appraisal of their words and conduct may lead to the conclusion that they did not intend agreement of such terms to be a pre-condition to a concluded and legally binding agreement.”
34. Thus the question as to when and, if so, on what terms the bargain was struck is intensely fact sensitive. The parties relied on a number of cases to support their submissions. Two decisions may stand as examples on either side of the line. In British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co [1984] 1 All ER 504 , Cleveland Bridge asked British Steel to start manufacturing steel nodes “pending” a formal sub-contract while price, delivery and terms were still under negotiation. Robert Goff J held that no contract had been concluded when it was contemplated that it would be subject to standard terms but without agreement on whose terms, and the standard terms of the parties contained very different liabilities for defective goods and delay. He held [p510d] that “since the parties were still in a state of negotiation, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what the material terms of that contract would be”. By contrast, in DAZN Limited v Coupang Corporation [2025] EWCA Civ 1083 the Court of Appeal was able to spell out from emails a binding agreement relating to the licensing of broadcasting rights in relation to the FIFA Club World Cup. Analysis
35. I consider that Octavius stands a real prospect of success in establishing that no contract had been agreed between the parties for the following reasons.
36. First, Serapid’s pleaded case is that the contract was agreed on NEC3 terms “on or about 6 th June 2025”. In submissions this was modified to 13 th June, alternatively 20 th June. As I have indicated, as an alternative case Serapid now submits that if there was not a contract on NEC3 terms agreed in June 2025, then there was at least a “simple contract” agreed orally in June 2025. The position is therefore that Serapid does not clearly pinpoint a time when the bargain was struck, when the relevant offer was made or acceptance received. In my judgment, the vagueness of Serapid’s case gives some support to Octavius’s position that there is at least a real prospect of showing that there was no contract at all. Indeed, Serapid’s reliance on a new alternative case suggests a tacit recognition that Octavius has a real prospect of defeating the primary case.
37. Second, whilst it is clear that key contract terms appear to have been substantially agreed by late June 2025, there is a good deal of evidence which suggests that neither side regarded the parties as bound at that stage. So, by way of example, Mr Mansbridge’s emails of 13 th June and 16 th June suggested that a signed contract would be required. Serapid’s Frank Leroy referred on 10 th July to proceeding to “finalization of the contract”, and (as set out above) a reasonable reading of Serapid’s execution strategy is that they considered that they were not in contract at that stage. Furthermore the parties continued negotiating after that date. It is notable in particular that Serapid sought to reopen the price. The First Stage Design Subcontract had been executed formally, and Octavius’s invitation to tender required execution as a deed. This evidence all seems to me to support a conclusion that – looked at objectively - the parties had not agreed in June 2025 to create legal relations.
38. Serapid relies heavily on Mr Mansbridge’s email of 16th June. However, whilst he noted that he believed that “… all issues have been resolved legally and commercially”, he continued that “our subcontract order will be with you this week as a mater [sic] of priority”, and he also asked for confirmation that the procurement had started “despite the signed subcontract ?order?”. (He must have meant despite the order not having been signed.) It seems to me that this e-mail is at least arguably consistent with Mr Mansbridge believing there was no binding contract until there was a signed document. I accept Octavius’s submission that this is akin to the situation in British Steel : a request to proceed pending a formal contract.
39. Serapid also emphasises the fact that it carried on manufacturing the lifts for five months, and says that no commercial party would have done that without a contract. However, as Mr Brogden pointed out, procurement began on 3rd June, so even on Serapid’s case it commenced work before a contract was agreed. Correspondence in May 2025 shows that Serapid thought that it needed a letter of intent in advance of procurement. Thus, on 7 th May Mr Mansbridge asked what a letter of intent for the long lead items would entail and cost. Mr Davies replied on 9 th May that procuring on a letter of intent “would bring significant complexity”, and proposed instead that “Octavius to issue a formal Equipment supply PO to SERAPID for the full DLDS scope” and that “Octavius and SERAPID to agree on a cancellation clause, that would secure the payment of both cost and gross margin, for all committed cost, at the time of cancellation notification”. So the fact that procurement commenced does not necessarily indicate that contract terms had been agreed or substantially agreed.
40. I have reached these conclusions primarily upon an objective analysis of the documents, but it is clear that witness evidence would also be relevant. Indeed, the Adjudicator noted that he faced conflicts of witness evidence and so he set it aside and decided the issue by reference to the documents alone. By way of example, what was said at the meetings on 4 th and 10th June and 24 th August cannot be resolved on the documents.
41. As to the alternative case, it seems to me that this should be rejected on both procedural and substantive grounds.
42. First, the alternative case is not pleaded. The Particulars of Claim plead one contract: the NEC3 Subcontract “as amended”, its Option W2 clause 5.1, and a reference “under the Subcontract”. I accept Octavius’s submission that a party should be confined to the case it has pleaded, and a claimant who wishes to run an alternative must seek permission to amend its pleadings.
43. Second, the alternative case was not the dispute referred, and it is not the dispute the Adjudicator decided. The Notice of Adjudication identified one contract: an NEC3 Engineering and Construction Subcontract as amended, concluded “on or around 6 June 2025”.
44. Third, there is no clarity as to when, by whom or in what circumstances the oral contract was agreed. There is no clarity as to the offer or acceptance, price or scope.
45. Fourth, the existence of an oral contract will require an analysis of disputed witness evidence.
46. Accordingly I reject Serapid’s alternative case. Even if it were permissible to allow Serapid to rely upon a new unpleaded case which was not referred, I consider that Octavius has a real prospect of establishing that no such contract was agreed.
47. I heard interesting submissions from both parties as to what the position would be if the Court was satisfied that either Serapid’s primary or secondary case could be correct; in other words there was a contract on one or other basis, but the correct basis could not be determined, and Octavius had no real prospect of showing there was no contract at all. Ms Chambers submitted that by reference to the line of cases commencing with Pegram Shopfitters Ltd v Tally Weijl (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1750 , [2004] 1 WLR 2082 and ending with High Tech Construction Limited v WLP Trading and Marketing [2026] EWHC 152 (TCC) , it would make no difference to the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction since both contractual routes led to the application of the same statutory scheme. Since I am satisfied that Octavius has a real prospect of showing that there was no contract at all, the complexities that arose in those cases do not arise here. In High Tech at [70] Constable J distilled the principles arising from the caselaw and held: “… There will be clear cases where the contract formation debate goes to the heart of the jurisdiction of the adjudicator. The paradigm (if rare) case will be where party A contends that there is a contract with an adjudication provision governing the relationship and party B contends that there is no contract governing their relationship at all… In … these cases, the adjudicator’s jurisdiction stems from party A being correct, and (providing the jurisdictional point has not been waived) if there is a reasonable prospect that party B's contention is correct, summary judgment should not be given.”
48. In my judgment that is the position in this case. Conclusion
49. For these reasons, I conclude that Octavius has a real prospect of establishing that there was no contract between the parties. Accordingly the application for summary judgment is dismissed.