UK case law
Sergio Graft, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham
[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2483 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026
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Full judgment
1. MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS: The claimant has brought two claims for judicial review against the defendant, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. First, AC-2025-LON-000265, is a challenge to the defendant's decision of 7 November 2024 according him Band 2 (rather than Band 1) priority on its housing register and to an alleged ongoing failure to address disrepair and uninhabitable conditions at the claimant's address, Flat 4, H Block, Peabody Estate, Lilly Road, London SW6 1UT ("the premises"). Secondly, AC-2026-LON-000196 is a challenge to the defendant's alleged ongoing failure to discharge its enforcement duties under the Housing Act 2004 in respect of the premises which, by the time of this claim, were subject to a Prohibition Order; the defendant's failure to recognise the claimant was homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 ; and its failure to reconsider his banding on the housing register and notify him of his statutory right to review. I will refer to AC-2025-LON-00265 as "the first claim" and to AC-2026-LON-000196 as "the second claim".
2. By orders dated 2 July 2026, Vikram Sachdeva KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission to apply for judicial review in both of these cases. The claimant then renewed his applications for permission. Both renewal applications have been listed before me today.
3. The claimant is a litigant in person. He attended the court building today but declined to enter the courtroom. Outside court, he handed the Court Associate a document which states as follows: "NOTICE TO THE COURT [the case numbers are then given]
1. NOTICE OF REFUSAL OF REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS I, Mr Sergio Graft, attended Administrative Court today. I am unable to participate effectively because mandatory reasonable adjustments have been unlawfully rejected by Her Honour Judge Heather Williams.
2. THE REFUSED ADJUSTMENTS • Accreditation and support from the Ministry of Justice Registered Intermediary Scheme. • An accredited intermediary to facilitate my effective communication. • A Belarusian interpreter for clarity in oral proceedings.
3. IMPACT ON FAIR PARTICIPATION Without these adjustments I cannot understand or respond to proceedings effectively. This places me at a substantial disadvantage and breaches: • Article 6 ECHR (right to a fair hearing) • The Equality Act 2010 (disability discrimination provisions) • The Equal Treat Benchman Book (Chapter 9, paras 15 – 18) • Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 1A (Overriding Objective) • R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 .
4. CLEAR NOTICE OF PREJUDICE My attendance today should not be taken as an indication that I can participate fairly or effectively without the requested adjustments. I reserve all rights to challenge the lawfulness of any judgment reached in proceedings conducted in breach of these mandatory duties."
4. The claimant also handed in, via the Court Associate, a four-page document, which is an additional skeleton argument or speaking note. I have taken time to consider these documents. For the avoidance of doubt, the claimant did not apply for an adjournment.
5. The landlord of the premises is the Peabody Trust ("Peabody"). Although initially named as an interested party in the second claim, it does not appear the claim form was ever served on Peabody, who has played no active part in these proceedings.
6. In order to address the applications before the court, it is necessary to set out the chronology of events in some detail. The relevant events and the proceedings The first claim
7. The claimant was granted a weekly assured tenancy of the premises on 21 November 2016. On 15 March 2024 he applied to the defendant's housing register. The defendant's letter of 7 November 2024 indicated he had been registered for a one-bedroom property in band 2 with 15 March 2024 as the start date under the defendant's allocation scheme. The letter informed the claimant he had the right to have the decision reviewed. The claimant applied for a review and also sent a pre-action protocol letter.
8. The claim form in the first claim was received by the Administrative Court office on 20 January 2025. The claim form indicated the challenge was to the 7 November 2024 decision and to the defendant's failure to address disrepair and uninhabitable conditions at the premises. It is unnecessary to refer to an additional complaint about a locked estate gate, as that was not subsequently pursued.
9. The claim identified five grounds of challenge. (1) The defendant had failed to discharge its statutory duties under the Housing Act 2004 in that it had failed to ensure the claimant's accommodation met the minimum standard for human habitation. The main problem was rising damp. (2) Prolonging the claimant's stay in this accommodation was a breach of his rights under Article 8 ECHR and Article 8 read with Article 14. In this regard, the claimant relied upon his status as a disabled individual. (3) The defendant had breached the public sector equality duty ("PSED") which obliged the defendant to eliminate discrimination for disabled people like the claimant. (4) The defendant had delayed for over six months in determining the claimant's housing register application. (5) Despite the claimant's eligibility for housing benefit, the defendant had not addressed the financial burden that had been placed on him by his housing costs.
10. I note that these grounds did not include a substantive challenge to the defendant's determination that the claimant fell into Band 2 on the housing register rather than Band 1, as opposed to a complaint about delay.
11. The claim form was issued by this court on 20 January 2025. The claimant accepts he did not serve the sealed claim form on the defendant within seven days of it being issued as required by CPR 54.7. In his subsequent renewal documents, the claimant said he was unaware that it was his responsibility to do so.
12. On 21 December 2025, the claimant emailed the Administrative Court Office to enquire as to what was happening with his case. On 23 December 2025, the court office informed him that his case had been closed on 22 May 2025. The same day the claimant made an application for the reinstatement of his case, seeking relief from sanctions in respect of his failure to serve the sealed claim form. The 12 February 2025 review decision
13. In the meantime, by a letter dated 12 February 2025, the defendant conveyed the outcome of its review, upholding the decision to place the claimant on the housing register in Band 2. The letter summarised the claimant's grounds for requesting a review, referring to the disrepair at the premises and the claimant's evidence as to the impact of this on his health and wellbeing, including the medical information he had submitted.
14. The letter then set out the criteria for the "emergency medical or disability" category for Band 1 priority. This includes life-threatening conditions and where: "… the applicant's accommodation is directly contributing to the deterioration of the applicant's health such as severe chest condition requiring intermittent hospitalisation as a result of chronic dampness at the accommodation and the condition of the property cannot be resolved within a reasonable time - usually six months."
15. Next, the letter set out the "private sector properties insanitary or unfit category" of Band 1. This read: "Private sector tenants and residents of dwellings that the Council's Private Sector Housing Team has determined that the property poses a category 1 hazard under the Housing Health and Safety Rating System … and the Council are satisfied that the problem cannot be resolved by the landlord within 6 months and, as a result, continuing to occupy the accommodation will pose a considerable risk to the applicant's health. This includes a property that has severe damp, major structural defects, including subsidence, flooding, collapse of roof or have living conditions which are a statutory nuisance and there is no prospect of the problem being remedied within a 6-month timeframe."
16. The author of the review decision letter said the medical information supplied by the claimant indicated he had post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), a personality disorder and psychosis and the claimant had reported he was getting colds more often than usual because of the damp at the premises. The author noted the claimant's mental health problems predated his move to the premises. He also referred to advice he had obtained from the council's Psychiatric Advisor.
17. The author indicated that he could not find any evidence that the claimant met any of the Band 1 criteria he had referred to. He noted that Environment Health ("EH") had visited the premises on 26 July 2023, 27 November 2023 and 10 September 2024 and that on 7 October 2024 EH had served Peabody with a category 2 hazard awareness notice relating to damp and mould, personal hygiene, sanitation and drainage. EH had advised the author that the claimant was expected to participate with the TST team at Peabody, who had the capacity to move him to alternative accommodation, but they were having problems with his engagement with this service (which remained open to him). The letter continued that on 22 September 2023, Peabody offered to decant the claimant from the premises while major repair works were carried out but he had declined to engage. There had also been ongoing problems with Peabody gaining access to the premises to carry out surveys. The author concluded that, in light of all the available information, the claimant did not qualify under the "private sector properties insanitary or unfit" category or any of the other categories of Band 1.
18. The letter also referred to the author having considered the council's obligations under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and to the discretion to consider cases of exceptional need outside of the prescribed categories in the allocation scheme. As regards the PSED, the author said he had weighed up the claimant's evidence and submissions, along with the information from EH, and the attempts made by Peabody to move him to an alternative property whilst repairs were carried out.
19. The claimant did not apply for a judicial review of this 12 February 2025 decision letter. The Prohibition Order
20. On 20 May 2025, acting under section 20 of the Housing Act 2024, the defendant served a Prohibition Order on Peabody in respect of the premises. The notice stated the council was satisfied that one or more category 1 hazards existed on the premises, as set out in Schedule 1 to the order and that the council considered that making the Prohibition Order was the most appropriate course of action under section 5(2) of the Act for the reasons set out in the accompanying Statement of Reasons.
21. The order prohibited the premises from being used for living or sleeping accommodation. It also stated that the council considered that, if the remedial action specified in Schedule 2 of the order were taken, this would result in the council revoking the order under section 25 of the Act . The Statement of Reasons said the hazards at the premises posed an imminent risk to the health and safety of occupiers and visitors to the premises. Neither the claimant nor the defendant has provided the court with Schedules 1 or 2 to the Prohibition Order. Peabody initially appealed the order but did not then pursue this. The order became operative on 26 August 2025.
22. On 18 September 2025, Peabody applied to the Magistrates' Court for an order under section 35 of the Housing Act 2004 to require the claimant to give vacant possession of the premises and to cooperate with Peabody, its agents and contractors for the purposes of carrying out the necessary remedial works. After an earlier adjournment, the application has now been heard and judgment is awaited. The second claim
23. On 8 September 2025, the claimant sent a further pre-action protocol letter to the defendant. He said that in June 2025 he had asked to be placed in Band 1 on the housing register because of the condition of his accommodation and the defendant had not responded. He also referred to being homeless.
24. On 16 September 2025, the defendant responded indicating it had no record of the claimant having made a homelessness application. The claimant replied to this letter on 18 September 2025, saying the defendant's attempt to divert the matter into a homeless application was "irrelevant". He said that he was not willing to make a homelessness application whilst multiple legal disputes remained unresolved and that the pre-action protocol letter was not a homelessness application.
25. On 5 January 2026, the second claim was received by the Administrative Court Office for issue. The claimant had previously submitted versions of the claim form which the court had declined to accept on 31 October, 2 December and 29 December 2025. The second claim was issued on 16 January 2026.
26. The decisions challenged in the second claim were said to be the continuing failure of the defendant to discharge its statutory duties following issue of the Prohibition Order. Specifically, the failure to take enforcement action against Peabody, the failure to recognise that his continued occupation of the premises rendered the claimant homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 and the failure to reconsider his housing banding and notify him of his statutory right of review under the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999.
27. The claimant's statement of facts and grounds identified five grounds of challenge. (1) The defendant had acted unlawfully in failing to perform its mandatory statutory duty to enforce the Prohibition Order under the Housing Act 2004 . (2) In failing to do so, the defendant had acted irrationally or unreasonably. (3) The defendant had failed to notify the claimant of his right to a review of the Band 2 allocation decision. (4) The defendant was in breach of sections 20 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010 in failing to make reasonable adjustments and to have due regard to the claimant's disabilities when handling enforcement and allocation decisions. (5) The defendant's prolonged inaction amounted to a breach of the claimant's rights guaranteed by Article 8 and/or Article 8 read with Article 14 ECHR.
28. The claimant sought a mandatory order requiring the defendant to enforce the Prohibition Order and to reconsider the claimant's housing banding and award him Band 1 status, along with declaratory relief. I note that none of the claimant's five grounds challenged the defendant's substantive determination that he should be accorded Band 2 priority or the defendant's alleged failure to treat him as a homeless person.
29. The claimant also made an application for his claim to be considered urgently. In support of that claim, he submitted two medical letters from his general practitioner, the North End Medical Centre. The first in time letter dated 1 June 2017 said: "This is to confirm that Mr Graft suffers from chronic mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder and psychoses - with a recent exacerbation that had him under review by the Mental Health Team Service. He is therefore currently not fit for employment. He has been to the surgery complaining of damp issues in his flat since January this year and these concerns appear to have contributed adversely to his mental health status."
30. The second letter, dated 6 September 2018, repeated the text I have just quoted, adding that Mr Graft "finds he is prone to developing viral cold infections more often since the damp exposure". The letter gave the date of his PTSD diagnosis as 1 January 2002. The list also included diagnoses of a personality disorder on 19 November 2014 and schizophrenic disorders on 17 March 2009. The defendant's response
31. On 12 February 2026, the defendant filed its acknowledgement of service and summary grounds of defence ("SGD"), denying the claim. The SGD clarified that the Prohibition Order had been served on the basis of damp and mould growth at the premises. The SGD said that Peabody had indicated to the defendant that it wished to carry out the necessary remedial works but the claimant had been unwilling to allow access to the premises and had failed to reasonably engage with Peabody's offers of temporary accommodation whilst the works were being undertaken. The defendant's position was that whilst Peabody appeared to be taking reasonable steps to undertake the remedial works, the defendant could properly decide not to take steps to enforce the order. As matters stood, if criminal proceedings were brought against Peabody for an offence under section 32(1) of the 2004 Act , Peabody could have a reasonable excuse defence under subsection (3).
32. As regards the suggestion of the claimant being statutory homeless, he had made a homelessness application on 6 April 2023 which had been closed on 18 May 2023 due to his lack of engagement and in his letter of 16 February 2025 he had indicated he was not willing to submit a homelessness application. Accordingly, there was no need for the defendant to reach a view on whether the claimant is statutory homeless under section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 .
33. The SGD also referred to the 12 February 2025 review decision regarding the claimant's banding on the housing register. The defendant's position was that, although the decision had been made before the Prohibition Order, the council could not be criticised for not revising the claimant's banding in circumstances where Peabody had indicated it wished to undertake the remedial works but had been unable to do so due to the claimant's conduct. Further, the claimant's health problems have been properly considered in the February 2025 review decision.
34. The SGD also contended that the section 20 Equality Act claim was not properly formulated; and that the claim was brought some four months beyond the CPR 54.5(1) time limit, given that the pre-action protocol letter was dated 8 September 2025. Refusal of permission on the papers
35. On 2 July 2026, the deputy high court judge refused permission to apply for judicial review in relation to both claims. In relation to the first claim, he said there was no arguable illegality under the Housing Act 2004 given the defendant had issued the Prohibition Order and the claimant was preventing the remedial works from being undertaken. He noted that the claimant had not provided a basis for showing that the decision to place him in Band 2 of the housing register was unlawful and that the complaint about his housing costs contained no particularisation.
36. In addition, the claimant had failed to serve the claim form and his application for relief from sanctions was refused on the basis that the breach was serious and significant, that there was no good reason for the breach and that the application was made 10 months after the breach. In all the circumstances, the interests of justice did not justify relief being granted.
37. In refusing permission in relation to the second claim, the deputy high court judge again referred to the Prohibition Order and the claimant's denial of access to the premises. He noted the claimant had not made a homelessness application. He accepted the defendant could not be criticised for not revising the claimant's housing band when he was preventing Peabody from carrying out the works. There was no arguable section 20 Equality Act claim, the claimant not having identified the provision, criteria or practice ("PCP") that he relied upon, and there was no arguable breach of section 149 of the Act or of Article 8 or Article 14 ECHR. He also considered the claim was filed out of time.
38. The claimant was not ordered to pay costs in either case, as no cost schedules had been supplied. Both orders directed the claimant to file a permission hearing bundle within 21 days of service of the order if he renewed his application for permission. The claimant's renewals
39. The claimant filed a notice of renewal dated 7 July 2026 in the first claim, identifying eight reasons for doing so: (1) The judge erred in referring to material in the second claim. Every case must be considered on the basis of the documents filed in that particular case only. (2) The judge failed to engage with his substantive grounds. (3) In light of the Prohibition Order, the defendant could not discharge its housing duty by requiring the claimant to remain at the premises. (4) The judge's reference to the claimant preventing access to the premises was based on disputed, unproven allegations. (5) A live tribunal case raised the same issues, thereby underscoring the importance of the matters the claimant had raised. (I pause to note that the Tribunal case in question has not been identified and the reference provided by the claimant is not in a format that I am familiar with. In any event, if the same issues are being raised in a Tribunal case that would suggest the Claimant may have an alternative remedy, rather than it supporting his application for judicial review.) (6) The judge was wrong to refuse his relief from sanctions application. (7) The judge was wrong to rely on the defendant's delay. (I interject at this stage that this point was simply a misunderstanding. The judge had relied on the claimant's delay.) (8) The judge had failed to consider the position under the Equality Act.
40. The claimant also filed a renewal notice dated 7 July 2026 in the second claim, relying upon six reasons: (1) The judge's finding that the claimant was preventing access to the premises was erroneous. (2) The claimant's homelessness status under section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 arose automatically from the Prohibition Order as his accommodation was recognised to be unfit for occupation. (3) The defendant's duty to reconsider his priority banding was triggered by the Prohibition Order. (4) In relation to the section 20 Equality Act claim, the judge failed to consider that the PCP relied on was the council's failure to provide accessible processes to a vulnerable individual. (5) The judge had rejected the ECHR claim on the basis of unsubstantiated assertion. (6) His claim was not out of time. The chronology of the proceedings from late July 2026
41. By an application notice dated 28 July 2026 in the first claim, the claimant applied for an extension of time for filing the permission hearing bundle. He also supplied two witness statements dated 28 July 2026. In section 11 of the N244 form, the claimant said he was a registered disabled person who had long-term mental health issues and that he requested from the court: (a) the provision of an intermediary from the Ministry of Justice’s Registered Intermediary Scheme to assist him with "communication and understanding the proceedings"; and (b) a Belarusian interpreter fluent in the Eastern dialect to sit next to him at the hearing due to his hearing impairment, which makes it difficult for him to follow legal proceedings in English, particularly when he is anxious or stressed. Although not included in section 3 of the N244 form, the claimant's draft order sought the provision of an intermediary and a Belarusian interpreter.
42. One of the claimant's 28 July 2026 witness statements focused on amplifying his reasons for disagreeing with the refusal of permission. In relation to his failure to serve the claim form, he said he was unaware that it was his responsibility to do so and this was an honest mistake, that he had proactively emailed the court on 21 December 2025 and then he had promptly made his application for the case to be reopened when the court informed him the case had been closed. He said the judge's decision to refuse relief from sanctions was a disproportionate and unjust one, given he was a vulnerable litigant in person.
43. In terms of the financial burden on him, the claimant said he was being required to contribute to housing costs despite being eligible for full housing benefit and that this constituted a breach of the defendant's duty to provide adequate support. No further details of that aspect of the claim were provided.
44. In his other 20 July 2026 statement, the claimant said that he had misunderstood the date for the 21 day period for filing the permission hearing bundle. He also said his mental health conditions significantly affected his capacity to manage complex administrative procedures, interpret legal directions, and respond to deadlines. The stress caused by his housing situation and by the proceedings had exacerbated his condition.
45. The claimant did not give further details of his medical condition or attach supporting medical evidence. He said the adjustments he sought were needed to facilitate his full and effective participation in the renewal hearing.
46. The claimant then filed an application notice dated 29 July 2026 in the second claim. Section 3 of the N244 indicated he was seeking an extension of time for filing the permission hearing bundle and relief from sanctions in respect of his failure to have filed that bundle. In section 11 of the form he referred to having PTSD, psychoses and a hearing impairment. He indicated that medical evidence dated 28 September 2021 had already been supplied to the court. He said he was vulnerable within the meaning of the Equal Treatment Bench Book ("ETBB") and the Civil Justice Council's guidance on vulnerable parties and witnesses. He requested the same adjustments as he had sought in the first claim.
47. The renewal hearing in the first claim was listed for 11 August 2026 before Andrew Kinnier KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. The claimant attended the Royal Courts of Justice and handed a note to the Court Associate outside of court which said: "I have attended the Administrative Court today in accordance with the court's listing. However, I am unable to participate effectively in today's proceedings because the reasonable adjustments previously requested by me have not been provided, including the required assistance from the Ministry of Justice Registered Intermediary Scheme, including the provision of an intermediary/assessor and Belarusian interpreter. Without these adjustments, I am unable to understand and respond to the proceedings effectively, which places me at a substantial disadvantage and prevents my effective participation. My attendance at court today should not be interpreted as an indication that I am able to participate fairly in the absence of those requested reasonable adjustments."
48. By his order sealed on 12 August 2026, the deputy high court judge adjourned the renewal hearing to be heard with the second claim. He directed that if the claimant's position remained that he required an interpreter, by 4 pm on Friday 14 August 2026, he was to file and serve an application which "explains why an interpreter is required and in particular addresses the factors set out at paragraph 10.3.2 of the Administrative Court Guide 2025". He also directed that if the claimant's position remained that he required an intermediary, he was to file and serve an application by the same date "which explains why one is required and is supported by corroborative evidence of the nature of his long-term mental illness and its consequences for his ability to participate effectively in the proceedings without an intermediary".
49. In his reasons, the deputy high court judge said that, as matters stood, he was not persuaded that the claimant required an interpreter. His documents gave no indication at all that he required the help of a translator. They suggested he had a good, even fluent, understanding of English. Further, he had not provided evidence addressing the other criteria in the relevant paragraph of the Administrative Court Guidance ("ACG"), including showing he was not eligible for legal aid and that no-one else was ready, willing and able to assist him. The deputy high court judge emphasised in terms that the application must be "supported by evidence rather than mere assertion".
50. The deputy high court judge says he was also not persuaded as matters stood that an intermediary was required. This was a matter for the court to decide but the claimant had declined to attend the hearing to enable the judge to assess what other measures might assist him to participate effectively in the proceedings. The judge noted that the claimant had provided no independent evidence that confirmed the nature of his long-term mental illness, or the consequences for his ability to participate effectively in the proceedings. Furthermore, the claimant's conduct of the case suggested he could advance his arguments in clear and intelligible English without the assistance of others. The claimant was warned that if he declined to come to court for the adjourned hearing, there was a significant risk the case would proceed in his absence. The judge said he had adjourned the hearing "with very considerable reluctance", but that bearing in mind the claimant was a litigant in person, he considered he should have "one final opportunity" to explain why an interpreter and/or an intermediary was required. The judge concluded by emphasising again that it was necessary for the claimant to provide corroborate evidence and that "mere assertions will not suffice".
51. By two application notices dated 14 August 2026 the claimant made applications in the first claim for the court to provide a Belarusian interpreter fluent in the Eastern dialect, and for the court to appoint an intermediary to assist him at the renewal hearing.
52. In section 3 of the former application, the claimant accepted he was able to prepare written documents in English and had conducted substantial written correspondence in English, but he said that whether he could effectively participate in a complex oral High Court hearing was a separate question and his ability to produce articulate written documents should not be treated as determinative. He said the renewal hearing would involve him having to understand questions, submissions, directions and judicial explanations in real time and to respond.
53. The claimant's attached medical evidence comprising two letters from his GP surgery, one dated 28 September 2021 and the other 19 December 2024. Their contents were the same or very similar to the letters of 2017 and 2018 that I referred to earlier.
54. In section 3 of the application notice seeking an intermediary, the claimant referred to the same medical evidence and made similar points about the distinction between his ability to prepare cogent written documentation and the question of whether he would be able to participate effectively in a hearing which, he said, would require his immediate processing of questions, submissions, judicial directions and changing issues.
55. By order dated 4 September 2026, Jonathan Glasson KC, sitting as a deputy high court judge, adjourned the renewal hearing which had been listed for 8 September 2026. He directed that the first and second claim were to be listed for hearing with AC-2025-LON-002657 on 22 September 2026, with an overall time estimate of two hours. AC-2025-LON-002657 is the claimant’s application for judicial review against a decision made by Willesden County Court ("the Willesden claim") in which neither the defendant nor the interested party has played an active part.
56. By orders dated 15 September (sealed on 16 September 2026), I refused the claimant's applications to be provided with a Belarusian interpreter and an intermediary. Although, as far as I was aware, the claimant had not made similar applications in the second claim, I considered the position in relation to both of the claims brought against the defendant. In my reasons I noted that, despite the deputy high court judge's earlier order of 12 August 2026, the claimant had not adequately explained why he required an interpreter for the hearing in circumstances where, as he acknowledged, he is able to prepare written documents in English and has conducted substantial written correspondence in English and where it is apparent from the same that he has a good standard of English. I noted that the claimant has simply asserted he would not be able to participate effectively in the hearing given his mental health issues.
57. I explained that I bore in mind the nature of the renewal hearing and that the court would have read all the documents in advance of the hearing and would allow the claimant additional time to respond to the court's questions and would provide him with breaks during the hearing if he required those adjustments. I also noted that, contrary to the deputy high court judge's order, the claimant had not addressed the factors at paragraph 10.3.2 of the ACG. I concluded that I was satisfied the court could ensure the claimant's effective participation in the hearing without the provision of an interpreter or an intermediary. As regards the latter request, I noted that the medical letters provided did not identify the consequences of the claimant's mental health conditions, nor provide supporting evidence as to why an intermediary was required to enable his effective participation in the proceedings, as opposed to assertion.
58. By a further application notice dated 14 September 2026, the claimant sought the court's directions clarifying whether he was required to submit hard copy bundles of documents for the renewal hearing. He proposed the defendant should prepare the documents bundle and supply hard copies of this. As the defendant agreed to do so, I made an order dated 16 September 2026 reflecting this.
59. By a further application notice dated 16 September 2026, the claimant made an application for reconsideration of my recent orders refusing his applications for an intermediary and an interpreter. He contended my order should not be treated as having finally determined those applications. By order dated 18 September 2026, I refused this application as no proper basis had been shown for reopening the court's earlier decisions and no further corroborative evidence had been provided. I reminded the claimant of the need for him to conduct the litigation proportionately and that the court's limited resources were not to be taken up by multiple repetitive applications. The skeleton arguments
60. The claimant filed a skeleton argument dated 3 September 2026. The document partly repeats the contentions I have already set out. The claimant developed his point about his band on the housing register by saying that Band 1 of the defendant's allocation scheme included those living in properties with category 1 hazards that had been unresolved for six months, which applied in his case. Accordingly, he said, the defendant was misapplying its own scheme. In addition, the claimant sought to introduce some new matters, including contentions relating to a Care Act assessment which had taken place on 4 February 2026 and a requested review of his care plan; and documentation he had received from the defendant as a result of a Subject Access Request. (The documentation itself was not provided.)
61. The claimant also filed a witness statement dated 3 September 2026 which covered similar points but also referred to an incomplete and inaccurate occupational therapy assessment referral. These documents followed a lengthy email the claimant has sent to the court on 1 September 2026 where he had already set out in 105 numbered paragraphs a response to the defendant's earlier skeleton argument which it had provided for the August 2026 hearing.
62. On 18 September 2026 the claimant filed a further document with the court headed "Comparative statutory analysis and schedule of legal irregularities". The four central points made in this document were: (a) It was absurd and contradictory for the defendant to serve a Prohibition Order in respect of the premises but not accept that he met the definition of homelessness in section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 , which applies where it is not reasonable to continue to occupy the property in question. (b) The claimant's circumstances came within Band 1 of the defendant's allocation scheme. This was for the reasons set out in his earlier skeleton argument. (c) The defendant had abdicated its enforcement duties under the Housing Act 2004 . (d) The contents of the defendant's skeleton argument proved it had failed to discharge the PSED because of the indication that it did not understand his claim under the Equality Act.
63. The defendant filed a skeleton argument dated 14 September 2026 which largely repeated the contentions in the SGD.
64. The further four page document which the claimant handed in to court this morning largely concentrated on what I have just summarised as points (a) and (b) in his document of 18 September 2026. So, whilst I have read the document, there is no need for me to repeat those. He also addressed a contention that, as I understand it, is not in fact made, namely that permission should be refused because of the claimant's default in relation to the permission hearing bundle. Fourthly, he repeated earlier written submissions as to why he should obtain relief from sanctions in relation to the first claim. Adjustments that would have been made for this hearing
65. I emphasise that, had the claimant attended this hearing, I would have taken the following steps to ensure his effective participation: (1) At the outset I would have explained the structure of the hearing and the issues the court was due to decide. (2) I would have allowed him to choose whether the application in the Willesden claim or the applications in this claim were heard first. (3) I would have allowed the claimant the pauses and the breaks that I had referred to in my 15 September 2026 orders. (4) I would have kept my questions to a minimum and I would have tried, so far as possible, to raise them at the end of his submissions rather than interrupt his flow. (5) I would have indicated to the claimant at the outset that he could check with me if anything was not clear to him during the course of submissions. (6) I would have checked the claimant had the relevant documentation available to him. (7) I would have reminded Mr Peacock to speak relatively slowly and to use non-technical language so far as possible in his submissions.
66. Via my clerk, I did indicate to the Court Associate that they should try and encourage Mr Graft to come into the courtroom so that matters could be explored with him, but I was told that he declined to do so. As the deputy high court judge noted in his order of 12 August 2026, had Mr Graft come into the courtroom I would also have had the opportunity to discuss other potential adjustments with him.
67. In terms of the points made by the Claimant in his “Notice to the Court” document which he handed in today, I note the following: (1) Mr Graft has never made an application to rely on a McKenzie Friend, nor for any specific adjustment related to a hearing impairment, such as, for example, provision of a hearing loop. (2) He has never supplied any medical evidence to this court establishing or referring to him having a hearing impairment. Further, in his various written applications and statements filed with the court, he has not given any detail as to the nature or extent of the hearing impairment he refers to. (3) The deputy high court judge's order of 12 August 2026 clearly explained what was required of the claimant if he maintained his applications for an intermediary and an interpreter, but he failed to supply the appropriate detail or corroborative evidence, as I set out in my orders dated 15 September 2026. (4) Furthermore, the deputy high court judge’s order had warned the claimant in terms that he was giving the claimant a final opportunity to provide this material. (5) The claimant was also warned by the deputy high court judge that if he did not participate in the adjourned hearing, it could go ahead in his absence. (6) As I indicated in my orders dated 15 September and as I have just summarised, there were a number of adjustments that I was willing to make in order to ensure the claimant's effective participation in this hearing. (7) I am familiar with the relevant chapters in the ETBB on, for example, litigants in person, special measures and litigants with mental disabilities. The Civil Justice Council's report of 2021 which the claimant has referred to, led to Practice Direction 1A of the CPR, with which I am also familiar. It does not follow from the fact that a litigant has certain mental health difficulties that they are entitled to an intermediary as opposed to a consideration of what adjustments or special measures will enable them to participate effectively at the relevant hearing. There is a whole range of such measures potentially available, including those I have just referred to, all of which stop short of the appointment of an intermediary. In my experience, it would be very unusual for the court to appoint an intermediary to assist a claimant to make submissions at a two-hour renewal hearing of their applications to apply for judicial review. All the more so in a case like this where the claimant has articulately set out his case in his original grounds, in his renewal grounds and in his, at least four, skeleton arguments that I have available to me for this hearing, including the document that the claimant handed in this morning reflecting the oral submissions he would have made. The grounds before the court
68. Paragraph 7.11.1 ACG provides that if the claimant wishes to amend his grounds after they have been served, he must apply for an order allowing him to do so. Paragraph 12 of PD 54A states that such an application must be made in accordance with the requirements of CPR Part 23. The application should be made promptly, should include a draft of the proposed amended grounds and be supported by evidence.
69. The claimant has never applied to amend his grounds in either the first or the second claim. I raise this to explain why I do not propose to deal with new matters that have only been raised in the claimant's recent skeleton arguments, such as, for example, his Care Act assessment. However, where the point raised in the skeleton argument sufficiently relates to the earlier grounds, even if it was not spelt out in those grounds, I have, in fairness to the claimant, afforded him a degree of latitude. Whether permission should be granted in the first claim
70. Paragraph 7.9.1 of the ACG clearly states that the claimant must serve a sealed copy of the claim form together with a copy of the documentation filed with the court on the defendant within seven days of the claim being issued. This reflects the requirement to do so in CPR 54.7. The text of the ACG continues that, if the claim form is not served within this period, an application must be made for an extension of time for service and if the claimant fails to obtain an extension of time in which to effect valid service, the claim form has to be set aside and the court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The footnotes to paragraph 7.9.1 indicate that, when the court considers an application under CPR 3.1(2)(a) for an extension of time for service of the claim form, it should follow the principles in CPR 7.6: see R(on the application of The Good law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355 . Accordingly, unless a claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with the CPR 54.7 time limit but has been unable to do so, the time for service should not be extended. CPR 7.6 also requires that the claimant has acted promptly in making the application for an extension of time.
71. It is accepted the claimant did not serve the claim form within the seven-day period. In applying the relief from sanctions approach when he declined to extend time for service of the claim form, the deputy high court judge in fact applied an approach that was more generous to the claimant than the one I have just described. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I would arrive at the same conclusion as the deputy high court judge if I considered this matter by reference to the relief from sanctions test.
72. The claimant has not shown that he took all reasonable steps to comply with the seven day time limit but was unable to do so. In particular, it appears that he simply assumed the court would serve the claim form. He does not suggest that the court actively misled him in this regard and he does not point to any other source as misleading him. The ACG, amongst other sources, makes it clear that it is the claimant's responsibility to serve the claim form. Case law confirms that the CPR requirements apply to litigants in person as well as to legally represented parties.
73. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time for serving the claim form must be refused.
74. For completeness, I also note that the claimant did not apply for an extension of time until 23 December 2025, nearly a year after the claim form had been issued. Whilst the claimant responded quickly to the court's communication of 23 December 2025, he should have sought clarification from the court at a much earlier stage as to why his case did not appear to be progressing. I also note that he has never provided the defendant with a full copy of the claim form, even to this date.
75. As the claim form must be set aside, it is unnecessary for me to engage with the detail of the claimant's grounds. However, as there is an inter-relationship with the second claim, I will address them briefly. I do so by reference to the five grounds the claimant identified in his claim.
76. The claimant's complaint that the defendant had failed to discharge its statutory responsibilities under the Housing Act 2004 has been overtaken by events, in that the defendant served the Prohibition Order on 20 May 2025. The claimant's suggestion that the court should consider the first claim in blinkers without reference to this development is wholly unrealistic and meritless. A party owes a duty of full candour in judicial review proceedings to place all relevant matters before the court, and this development is clearly relevant to the claimant's complaint.
77. The deputy high court judge was also entitled to have regard to the dispute over access given that this was the defendant's explanation as to why the works had not been undertaken and why enforcement action not undertaken. Whilst the claimant is right to say that there is a factual dispute over whether he has refused access to Peabody and its contractors, that issue is the subject of the Magistrates' Court proceedings in which evidence has been heard and judgment is awaited. The defendant was entitled to await the outcome of those proceedings before determining whether further enforcement actions should be taken for the reasons it has given. Furthermore, insofar as the claimant suggests that this court rather than the Magistrates' Court should resolve the access dispute, and do so in his favour; the suggestion is misconceived. This court is a court of last resort, whereas the Magistrates' Court has a specific jurisdiction under the Housing Act 2004 in relation to this issue, and indeed the case has been heard there. Moreover, it is not usually the role of this court to hear disputed evidence and to make factual findings on such matters of dispute.
78. The ECHR ground was based on the same proposition that the defendant had breached duties owed to the claimant in respect of his accommodation.
79. It is clear from the terms of 12 February 2025 letter which I have already summarised, that careful consideration was given to the claimant's long-term mental health conditions when his housing register application was addressed. Furthermore, section 149 of the Equality Act requires the defendant to have "due regard" to the matters specified in the section. It does not oblige the defendant to eliminate discrimination for disabled people as the claimant contended.
80. The delay in determining the claimant's housing register application did not render the decision to place him in Band 2 unlawful. As I noted earlier, there was no challenge to that substantive decision. The claimant was not disadvantaged by the time period involved in the decision making, as his entry on the housing register was backdated to the date of his application.
81. As the deputy high court judge observed, the claimant provided no details of his complaint about his housing costs. He did not provide these details in his renewal grounds either.
82. Accordingly, even if the claimant had served the claim form in accordance with the rules of court, I would not have granted permission to apply for judicial review, as his grounds in the first claim are unarguable. Whether permission should be granted in the second claim
83. I do not refuse permission on the basis that the second claim was filed out of time, given the complaints were about ongoing failures on the part of the defendant and given he first attempted to file his claim form in October 2025. However, I do refuse permission on the basis that the claimant's grounds are unarguable.
84. I have already explained why the first ground, that the defendant had failed to perform its statutory duties under the Housing Act to enforce the Prohibition Order, is unarguable in addressing the first claim. The defendant was entitled to take the position it did, as it set out in the SGD.
85. Equally, it follows that the second ground falls away. The defendant has not acted irrationally or unreasonably in not taking enforcement action.
86. The fifth ground, the ECHR ground, is also based on the same flawed premise, that the defendant is in breach of a duty to take enforcement action. The PSED complaint is also advanced on that basis.
87. The third ground, that the defendant failed to notify the claimant of his right to a review of the Band 2 allocation, appears to be misconceived for two reasons. First, the claimant relies upon the 1999 Regulations, but those regulations were revoked on 3 April 2018 by regulation 11 of the Homelessness (Review Procedures etc.) Regulations 2018. Secondly, the claimant did request a review of the November 2024 decision to place him in Band 2, and this was undertaken in February 2025, as I have described. Thereafter, my understanding, as confirmed by Mr Peacock today, is that the defendant has not made any further decision on the claimant's housing band and, accordingly, the question of a right to a review of a decision does not arise.
88. In his renewal grounds, the claimant contended that the defendant's duty to reconsider his priority banding and place him in Band 1 was triggered automatically by the Prohibition Order. I will consider this point, although strictly speaking it is not part of the claimant's grounds.
89. Band 2 of the defendant's allocation scheme includes, in relation to the category of "Applicants living in unsatisfactory housing lacking basic facilities": "Applicants who occupy a private property which is in disrepair or is unfit for occupation and is subject to a Prohibition Order and recovery of the premises is required in order to comply with the Order …"
90. It follows, therefore, that serving a Prohibition Order could not automatically trigger a review of the claimant's banding as the existence of such an order is not inconsistent with the applicant being in Band 2.
91. As I set out earlier, Band 1 applies, amongst other circumstances, where the council has determined that a private sector property poses a category 1 hazard and the council are satisfied that the problem cannot be resolved by the landlord within six months and as a result continuing to occupy the property will pose a considerable risk to the applicant's health. However, in the present case, the Prohibition Order did envisage the premises becoming fit occupation again if the remedial action in Schedule 2 was taken and, as Mr Peacock emphasised today, this is not a situation where the premises could not have been remedied within the period, had there been cooperation.
92. In light of the information before it, including Peabody's outstanding application to the Magistrates' Court and the earlier history of these matters as set out in 12 February 2025 review decision letter, the defendant was acting reasonably in proceeding on the basis reported to them, namely that Peabody was willing to undertake the works but the time taken for the works had become protracted because of the claimant's refusal of access and refusal of decant accommodation. In particular, it was reasonable for the defendant to await the Magistrates' Court determination of this issue. The defendant was entitled to conclude that the claimant could not achieve a higher priority on the housing register simply because he was not permitting the works to take place.
93. Although not a specific ground of the second claim, as it is included in box 3 of the claim form, I will also address the complaint about the defendant's failure to treat the claimant as homeless. Section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 is simply a definition section. Section 183 of the Act states that the following provisions of the Act apply where a person applies to a local housing authority for assistance in obtaining accommodation, and the authority have reason to believe that he is homeless or threatened with homelessness. The relevant duties are then set out in section 184 onwards. The claimant has not made a section 183 application and so has not triggered these duties and thus the defendant is not in breach of them. As I have explained, the claimant declined in terms to make a homelessness application in his letter of 16 September 2025.
94. The claimant's claim in relation to section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 is incoherent. The alleged PCP that is set out in his renewal grounds regarding an alleged failure to provide an accessible process was not advanced previously and bears no apparent relation to the narrative or the complaints in the claim form and it is entirely unparticularised.
95. Accordingly, I also refuse permission to apply for judicial review in the second claim. Outcome
96. In the first claim I set aside the claim form for the reasons I have explained; the court has no jurisdiction to hear this matter. I refuse permission to apply for judicial review in the second claim for the reasons I have given.
97. In relation to the second claim, I will grant the respondent's application for an extension of time of one day in relation to the filing of the acknowledgement of service, so the extension of time is to 12 February 2026. No prejudice was caused by this minor delay, and the claimant has not opposed this.
98. As I indicated before starting to give judgment, I will direct the provision of a transcript at public expense in relation to this oral judgment. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]