UK case law

Sergio Graft, R (on the application of) v Willesden County Court

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2484 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

1. MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS: The claimant applies to judicially review the order of DDJ Adedeji sitting in the Willesden County Court dated 24 July 2025. The order was made in proceedings H43YJ080, a clinical negligence claim brought against the interested party in these proceedings, North End Medical Centre, who was the claimant's GP ("the county court claim").

2. As is standard practice, the defendant court has played no part in these proceedings. The interested party corresponded with the Administrative Court Office at an earlier stage of the proceedings, but it appears it was never served with the claim form and it has not filed an acknowledgement of service.

3. On 1 July 2026, Vikram Sachdeva KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers. The claimant renews his application and today has been listed for the hearing of the renewal application.

4. The claimant is a litigant in person. He attended the court building today but declined to enter the courtroom. Outside court, he handed the Court Associate a document which states as follows: "NOTICE TO THE COURT [the case numbers are then given]

1. NOTICE OF REFUSAL OF REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS I, Mr Sergio Graft, attended Administrative Court today. I am unable to participate effectively because mandatory reasonable adjustments have been unlawfully rejected by Her Honour Judge Heather Williams.

2. THE REFUSED ADJUSTMENTS • Accreditation and support from the Ministry of Justice Registered Intermediary Scheme. • An accredited intermediary to facilitate my effective communication. • A Belarusian interpreter for clarity in oral proceedings.

3. IMPACT ON FAIR PROCEEDINGS Without these adjustments I cannot understand or respond to proceedings effectively. This places me at a substantial disadvantage and breaches: • Article 6 ECHR (right to a fair hearing) • The Equality Act 2010 (disability discrimination provisions) • The Equal Treat Benchman Book (Chapter 9 paragraphs 15 to 18) • The Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 1A (Overriding Objective) • R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 .

4. CLEAR NOTICE OF PREJUDICE My attendance today should not be taken as an indication that I can participate fairly or effectively without the requested adjustments. I reserve all rights to challenge the lawfulness of any judgment reached in proceedings conducted in breach of these mandatory duties."

5. Mr Graft also handed the Court Associate an eight-page speaking note which appears to be what he would have said had he entered court today and participated in the hearing. I have read that in full.

6. Mr Colins of counsel has attended the hearing on behalf of the interested party, but simply to observe. For the avoidance of doubt, the claimant did not make an application for this hearing to be adjourned. The relevant events and the course of proceedings

7. The county court claim was struck out on 28 October 2022 pursuant to CPR 3.4(2). The claimant then made applications dated 19 November 2022, 6 February 2023 and 21 August 2023 for the defendant court to set aside the strike out order and related matters. On 15 September 2023, DJ Webster dismissed those applications. On 25 January 2024 DDJ Gillman rejected the claimant's application to set aside DJ Webster's order.

8. On 29 February 2024, the claimant applied to set aside DDJ Gillman's order. The application was listed for hearing on 25 October 2024. On 4 August 2024, the claimant filed an application notice asking to be provided with "legally established assistance" at the 25 October 2024 hearing. The version of the application notice supplied to the Administrative Court Office does not include section 10 of the N244 form. However, at section 11 of the form, the claimant said: "The claimant is a registered disabled person. The claimant asks the court to provide the assistance under Convention 6, 14 [This appears to have been a reference to Articles 6 and 14 ECHR.] CPR 3.1A(1) and (4) Civil Justice Council (Vulnerable Participant Proceedings) 12, 29, 87, 94 and 103 The Equal Treatment Bench Book Guidance."

9. It does not appear that the claimant supplied a draft order, a supporting witness statement or medical evidence to the defendant court with this application or in relation to it, or at least he did not include any such material to that effect in the documentation he provided to this court.

10. In light of the limited information, it is not entirely clear what assistance the claimant was requesting in his 4 August 2024 application. However, his judicial review claim alleges that by that application he sought a Belarusian interpreter and an intermediary. I will adopt the course most favourable to him and proceed for present purposes on the basis that those requests were either set out in section 10 of the application notice, or in another accompanying document, such as a statement or a covering letter.

11. The 4 August 2024 application was listed for hearing on 24 September 2024. However, on that occasion the court made no order on the application and confirmed the case remained listed for 25 October 2024.

12. On 4 October 2024, the claimant applied for a costs management order and on 20 October 2024 he applied for an injunction. The 25 October 2024 hearing was postponed due to lack of judicial resources.

13. A hearing was subsequently listed to deal with the claimant's applications of 29 February 2024, 4 August 2024, 4 October 2024 and 20 October 2024, to be heard on 4 July 2025. I will refer to these as "the four applications". As the court's order recited, the claimant attended the court building on this day but declined to enter the courtroom because he had not been provided with "legal assistance for the hearing". This appears to be either a misunderstanding as to what the claimant had sought in his 4 August 2024 application or a typographical error. The order then recited that the court had heard from counsel for the North End Medical Centre, who had requested that the four applications be dismissed on the basis they were totally without merit, but the court had taken a view the claimant should be given notice of this request and the interested party's intention to apply for a civil restraint order ("CRO") against the claimant.

14. The 4 July 2025 order directed that the hearing was adjourned and that the four applications be listed on 11 March 2026 with a time estimate of 90 minutes. As far as I am aware, the claimant did not seek permission to appeal the 4 July 2025 order. The claimant's grounds

15. I turn to the claimant's grounds that accompanied his claim form.

16. The claimant stated he is a vulnerable litigant who repeatedly requested the defendant to provide a Ministry of Justice registered intermediary, a Belarusian interpreter fluent in the Eastern dialect, and support from the Citizen's Advice Bureau. He complained the defendant had refused him legally mandated assistance under the Civil Justice Council Vulnerable Parties and Witness Guidance and the Equal Treatment Bench Book ("ETBB"). Further, that the defendant had breached its duty under section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 to make reasonable adjustments and the claimant’s Article 6 ECHR right to a fair trial. He said the defendant had ignored evidence confirming his need for adjustments. The claimant said he had "attached" that evidence with his claim form. However, I have checked the electronic links I have been provided with by the Administrative Court Office and no such attachment appears to have been provided with the claim form (as opposed to various other attachments, including the 4 July 2025 order and the 4 August 2024 application notice, the later with a page missing as I have indicated). The claimant also complained that the defendant had mischaracterised his request as one for legal assistance and that the denial of his requests had rendered the proceedings procedurally unfair.

17. I note in passing that the claimant's grounds cited four cases. One is a well-known Supreme Court decision under the Equality Act 2010 . I could not find the other three cases when I searched the citation references provided via the usual online resources and I wonder whether they are the product of AI hallucinations. However, as I have not had the opportunity to explore this with the claimant, I will not hold it against him.

18. In terms of relief, the claimant sought the quashing of 4 July 2025 order and a mandatory order requiring the defendant to provide him with an intermediary, a Belarusian interpreter and Citizen Advice support and to stay the county court claim until the support was in place.

19. The claimant also filed a witness statement with this court dated 4 August 2025. In this statement he said he required an intermediary "due to cognitive and communication barriers" and an interpreter "to ensure accurate comprehension" and CAB support "to navigate complex proceedings". No details nor supporting medical evidence or other corroborative evidence was provided.

20. A certificate of service indicates the claim form and supporting documentation was served on the defendant on 14 August 2025. As is standard practice, the defendant as a court has taken no part in these proceedings.

21. By a letter dated 27 August 2025, the interested party's solicitors wrote to the Administrative Court Office indicating they had not been served with a sealed claim form. The letter also provided some background about the county court claim. In an undated letter to the Administrative Court Office received on 3 September 2025, the claimant indicated he did not serve the interested party as he believed it was the court's responsibility to do so. This is incorrect: see CPR 54.7 and paragraph 7.9.1 of the Administrative Court Guide 2025. As I indicated earlier, it appears the interested party has never been served with the sealed claim form. The application to amend

22. On 11 March 2026, DJ Griffiths adjourned the hearing of the four applications listed for that date to 29 December 2026. This was following the claimant's 5 March 2026 letter to the defendant court, in which he requested that the hearing of his four applications be adjourned in light of this application for judicial review.

23. By application notice dated 22 April 2026, the claimant applied to amend his grounds for judicial review. In his accompanying witness statement the claimant said he had attended the defendant court building on 11 March 2026 as the hearing had not been adjourned in advance. He said the parties waited outside court and then were informed by the usher that, after reading the papers, the judge had decided to adjourn the case.

24. The claimant contends that the order is false as the recital states, "Upon hearing the claimant in person, hearing counsel for the defendant", when in fact the parties had not entered the courtroom. Further, that it was procedurally improper for the order to have been made without the court first hearing from him. Section 11 of the application notice asked this court to make reasonable adjustments for the claimant by appointing a Ministry of Justice registered intermediary, a Belarusian interpreter fluent in the Eastern dialect, and a representative from Citizen's Advice or other voluntary sector support organisation. The text stated the claimant required these steps to facilitate his full and effective participation in the proceedings. The refusal of permission to apply for judicial review on the papers

25. The deputy high court judge refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers. He referred to the high threshold that applies to applications to judicially review decisions of the county court and he noted the claimant had a potential alternative remedy when his 4 August 2024 application was heard by the defendant court. He also refused the application to amend the claimant's grounds. He directed that if the claimant renewed his application, he was to file a permission hearing bundle within 21 days of service of the court order. The claimant's renewal grounds and his further applications

26. By notice dated 6 July 2026, the claimant renewed his application for permission to apply for judicial review. He said the deputy high court judge had not engaged with his grounds and that the defendant's failure to make the reasonable adjustments he had sought was a procedural irregularity which had denied him a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

27. By application notice dated 29 July 2026, the claimant applied for his renewal application to be listed for an in person hearing and for an extension of time for filing the permission hearing bundle. He provided a draft order and a witness statement dated 29 July 2026. Although not referred to in section 3 of the form N244, these documents indicated that the claimant was requesting the court to appoint an intermediary and to provide a Belarusian interpreter for him for the renewal hearing.

28. Section 11 of the form said the claimant was registered disabled and suffered from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, psychoses and a hearing impairment. He said that medical evidence dated 28 September 2021 had already been filed with the court in these proceedings. He said he was a vulnerable person within the meaning of the ETBB and the Civil Justice Council's guidance on vulnerable witnesses and parties.

29. I have not seen the letter of 28 September 2021 on the court's file for this claim. However, I am aware of this letter, and indeed letters from 2017, 2018 and 2024 written by the claimant's GP surgery, as they are part of the documentation in the claimant's claims for judicial review made against the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham. The four letters are in largely similar terms to each other and state that the claimant suffers from chronic mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder and psychoses and as a result is not fit for employment. At least one of the letters also refers to a diagnosis of schizophrenia. None of the letters explain how the claimant's mental health conditions affect his ability to participate in court proceedings. I will assume in the claimant's favour that he did provide the September 2021 letter to the Administrative Court Office in these proceedings too.

30. In his witness statement, the claimant said that the provision of a Belarusian interpreter fluent in the Eastern dialect sitting next to him at the hearing would assist him with communication, having regard to his hearing impairment, and that for this reason an interpreter attending the hearing remotely would not suffice. The claimant said he required an intermediary present in the courtroom to assist him with communication and understanding of the proceedings. He said his need for this assistance was supported by sections 20 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010 , CPR 1.1 and Practice Direction 1A, the ETBB and the Civil Justice Council's guidance.

31. In a section headed "The impact of my disability on court participation", the claimant said he suffered from severe anxiety and stress, exacerbated by unfamiliar environments. His condition affected his capacity to manage complex administrative procedures and meet deadlines and he required more time than the average person to comprehend what is being said to him and to respond to questions. His hearing impairment made it difficult for him to follow complex proceedings and he relied on clear communication and on having a person seated next to him to assist with understanding.

32. By order dated 4 September 2026, Jonathan Glasson KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, directed that the renewed permission application in this case be heard with the claimant's renewed applications for permission in his two claims against the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham, with an overall time estate of two hours.

33. By order dated 15 September 2026, I granted the claimant's application for an extension of time for filing the permission hearing bundle to 12 noon on 18 September 2026. By the same order I refused his application for an interpreter and an intermediary on the basis the claimant had failed to establish any adequate basis for their provision. I pointed out that the claimant's application did not explain why he required an interpreter as opposed to why he needed the interpreter to attend in person rather than remotely, if one was provided. The documents he had prepared and filed with the court showed he had a good standard of English. I noted it was common for the court to make adjustments to cater for the disabilities of a party to the proceedings without going as far as appointing an intermediary. I indicated that, in light of the contents of the claimant's witness statement, I would give him additional time to respond to questions from the court, and I would permit him to take breaks during the hearing should he require them. I reassured him that the court would also assist him to find his way around the documentation, should the need arise. I explained that in arriving at this decision, I had taken account of the limited nature of the renewal hearing which it did not appear that either the defendant or the interested party would attend or play any active part in.

34. By a further application notice dated 14 September 2026, the claimant sought the court's clarifications as to whether he was required to submit hard copy bundles of documents for the renewal hearing. By order of 16 September 2026, I confirmed he was not required to do so but reminded him of the deadline for submitting the digital permission hearing bundle. The claimant failed to comply with the court's direction to submit a bundle.

35. For the avoidance of doubt, the claimant did not make an equivalent application in this case to the one that he made in the two cases brought against the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham on 16 September 2026 for a reconsideration of my orders refusing an intermediary and an interpreter. In those proceedings I refused that application.

36. The claimant has not filed a skeleton argument in these proceedings. However, as I indicated earlier, I have had regard to the speaking note that was supplied today. The notes refer in a number of places to the core of the case being the defendant's repeated refusal or persistent refusal to comply with its duties to make the adjustments that the claimant sought. I make clear that this is not the basis on which the claim was pleaded. The claim form is explicitly directed to the order of 25 July 2024 and by the amended application an attempt was made to expand the claim to the order of 11 March 2026, but no other orders made by the defendant court have been challenged in these proceedings. I proceed on the basis of the pleaded claim.

37. The speaking note also makes the point that the duty to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act is anticipatory in the sense described by the Supreme Court in Paulley v FirstGroup plc [2017] UKSC 4 . Whilst that is true in the sense described by the Justices in that case, that does not relieve a litigant of the need to establish why a particular adjustment sought is required in his particular case in order to secure his effective participation in the court proceedings.

38. A further point made in the speaking note is that the adjourned hearing in the defendant court does not afford him with an adequate alternative remedy as that hearing will be too late for his 4 August 2024 application to be properly considered. I will return to this point shortly when I come to my decision on the merits. Adjustments that would have been made for this hearing

39. I emphasise that, had the claimant attended this hearing, I would have taken the following steps to ensure his effective participation: (1) At the outset I would have explained the structure of the hearing and the issues the court was due to decide. (2) I would have allowed him to choose whether the application in this claim or the renewal applications in the claims against the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham were heard first. (3) I would have allowed the claimant the pauses and the breaks that I had referred to in my 15 September order. (4) I would have kept my questions to him to a minimum and I would have tried, so far as possible, to raise them at the end of his submissions rather than interrupt his flow. (5) I would have indicated to the claimant at the outset that he could check with me if anything was not clear to him during the course of his submissions. (6) I would have checked the claimant had the documentation that the court has available to him.

40. I also note that in the speaking note he provided, the claimant asks at the outset for me to speak at a measured pace and if he became overwhelmed, to grant him a two-minute pause. I confirm that I would have made both of those adjustments too had he been in court.

41. Via my clerk I did indicate to the Court Associate that they should try to encourage Mr Graft to come into court so that matters could be explored with him, but I was told that he declined to do so.

42. In terms of the points made by the Claimant in his “Notice to the Court” document which he handed in today, I note the following: (1) Mr Graft has never made an application to rely on a McKenzie Friend, nor for any specific adjustment related to a hearing impairment, such as, for example, provision of a hearing loop. (2) He has never supplied any medical evidence to this court establishing or referring to him having a hearing impairment. I note that in his speaking note the claimant says that this medical evidence was provided to the defendant. However, he has produced no evidence to this court of having done so. Further, in his applications and statements filed with the court, the claimant has given no detail as to the nature or extent of the hearing impairment he refers to. (3) As I found in my order dated 15 September 2026, the claimant failed to identify in any detail why he required the claimed assistance and failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence. I record that he has not provided the court with any additional supporting material since that time. (4) As I indicated in my orders dated 15 September and as I have just summarised today, I would have been willing to discuss further reasonable adjustments with the claimant and make further adjustments had he entered the courtroom for the hearing. (5) I note the chronology of the proceedings in the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham claims. On 12 August 2026 there was an earlier renewal hearing listed in one of the two claims where the claimant again attended the court building but declined to enter the court room, handing in a similar note to the judge. On that occasion the hearing was adjourned on terms that clearly indicated the claimant was being given a final opportunity to establish why he required an intermediary and interpreter by providing supporting evidence rather than simply assertion. The claimant failed to provide the requisite corroborative evidence or otherwise address the matters identified in the judge’s order. (6) I am familiar with the relevant chapters in the ETBB on, for example, litigants in person, special measures and litigants with mental disabilities. The Civil Justice Council's report of 2021, which the claimant has referred to, led to Practice Direction 1A of the CPR, with which I am also familiar. It does not follow from the fact that a litigant has certain mental health difficulties that they are entitled to an intermediary as opposed to a consideration of what adjustments or special measures will enable them to participate effectively at the relevant hearing. There is a whole range of such measure potentially available, including those I have just referred to, all of which stop short of the appointment of an intermediary. In my experience, it would be very unusual for the court to appoint an intermediary to assist a claimant to make submissions at a renewal hearing of their application to apply for judicial review listed (overall) for two hours. All the more so where, as in this case, the claimant has set out his case in his original grounds and subsequent documentation, and it was not anticipated that the defendant or interested party would attend to make submissions.

43. As I have already indicated, in determining the merits of this application, I have also had the benefit of the claimant's apparently verbatim speaking note which was handed in this morning. Whether the claimant should be permitted to amend his grounds

44. I refuse the claimant permission to amend his grounds to add a challenge regarding the 11 March 2026 order made by the defendant court. I do so because the proposed grounds are unarguable. The 11 March 2026 order gave the claimant what he was seeking, namely the adjournment of the hearing of the four applications. There was no need for the judge to hear from the claimant before making this decision, because she was granting the adjournment that he had requested by letter. The reference in the recital of the order to the adjournment being granted after the court had heard from the claimant was an error, assuming it was not intended to refer to his written representations, but it was plainly inadvertent and had no material bearing upon the substance of the order that was made. Whether permission to apply for judicial review should be granted

45. In refusing permission to apply for judicial review, the deputy high court judge referred to the high threshold test for a decision of the county court to be subject to judicial review by this court. It was identified by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2002] EWCA Civ 1738 at [56], namely that there has been a want of jurisdiction or a procedural irregularity of such a kind as to constitute a denial of the applicant's right to a fair hearing. Arguably, this approach was generous to the claimant as the Court of Appeal identified this approach as applying where the applicant had been refused permission to appeal the relevant county court decision. By contrast, at [46] to [48] of the judgment, the court addressed the position where no application for permission to appeal has been made. In those circumstances, given that an application for judicial review will be refused in the exercise of the court's discretion where an alternative remedy exists, the court could not envisage what exceptional circumstances might arise as would warrant an application for judicial review in those circumstances.

46. Nevertheless, and because I have not had the opportunity to clarify with the claimant today whether he did apply for permission to appeal 4 July 2025 order, I will take the course most favourable to the claimant and approach the matter by assessing whether he has demonstrated an arguable basis for showing that 4 July 2025 order involved a procedural irregularity that amounted to a denial of his right to a fair hearing.

47. The claimant's application falls well short of this for the following reasons. (1) The order of 4 July 2025 did not refuse the claimant's 4 August 2024 application for adjustments, as his grounds allege. It simply adjourned it to a later date in 2026. The claimant would and indeed will still be able to argue this application before the defendant court at the adjourned hearing. (2) The order of 4 July 2025 was in fact favourable to the claimant in granting an adjournment so that he would have an opportunity to address the interested party's arguments that the four applications were totally without merit and that the court should make a CRO. (3) As I have already highlighted, it appears from the documents that the claimant submitted in support of this application for judicial review, that there was in fact a paucity of information and supporting material placed before the defendant court in order to explain what the claimant was seeking and why he required the adjustments he sought. In the circumstances the defendant would have been entitled to refuse the 4 August 2024 application, although in fact the judge did not do so as I have explained. (4) Even if the claimant did supply the defendant court with the medical evidence I have seen in his cases (the letters from his GP which I referred to earlier), this was plainly insufficient to support the grant of an interpreter or an intermediary, essentially for the reasons I set out in my 15 September 2026 order, which I have already summarised. As I have already indicated, I am familiar with the terms of the ETBB, the Civil Justice Council's 2021 Vulnerable Witnesses and Parties in Civil Proceedings report and the provisions of PD 1A of the CPR. None of these materials require the court to appoint an interpreter and/or an intermediary where a litigant has a mental health condition. There are a range of special measures and adjustments the court can deploy depending on the nature of the claimant's condition and the nature of the hearing in question. Accordingly, and contrary to the claimant's grounds, the defendant court was not "legally mandated" to provide him with these forms of assistance. In addition, even the limited medical evidence that I have assumed in his favour was provided, did not suggest that the claimant had a hearing impairment, and he provided no detail nor supporting evidence as to the extent of his command of English. Further, seeking the help of the Citizen's Advice Bureau or equivalent organisation would be something for the claimant to initiate rather than the defendant to provide. (5) If and insofar as the DDJ may have misunderstood that the claimant was asking for "legal assistance", this does not alter the considerable force of the four points I have just made.

48. I will specifically address the argument in the claimant’s speaking note that the adjournment of his application of 4 August 2024 to a subsequent hearing in 2026 was too late and not an effective alternative remedy.

49. However, this adjournment does not preclude the 4 August 2024 application from being decided at the outset of the adjourned hearing before the defendant court. Given the claimant had not thus far made out any basis for the provision of an interpreter or an intermediary (as I have explained earlier), the various other adjustments the defendant could make were of the kind that I have considered in these proceedings, which can quite easily be made at the start of a hearing if the claimant is in attendance. Furthermore, in the seemingly unlikely event that the claimant both attends the adjourned hearing and makes out a proper case for an interpreter or an intermediary to assist him, then the defendant court would need to consider whether a further adjournment was warranted to facilitate that. Outcome

50. Accordingly, for these reasons I refuse the claimant's application for permission to amend his grounds and I refuse the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. I will direct that a transcript of this judgment be provided at public expense. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]