UK case law

Terence Frederick Greensmith & Anor v Mavis Dulcie Butler & Anor

[2026] UKFTT PC 1353 · Land Registration Division (Property Chamber) · 2026

Get your free legal insight →Email to a colleague
Get your free legal insight on this case →

The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Cases referred to: R (Beresford) v Sunderland CC [2003] UKHL 60 ; [2004] 1 AC 889 Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd [2023] UKSC 48 ; [2025] AC 374 INTRODUCTION

1. The Applicants are the owners of a property known as 22 Northside, which is situated in the fens between Thorney and Whittlesey, a few miles to the east of Peterborough. The property was originally conveyed to the First Applicant in 1978 and then transferred into the joint ownership of him and his wife, the Second Applicant, in 1983. In January 2024, they applied for first registration of the property, relying on a plan attached to an earlier conveyance from 1966.

2. The Respondents are the registered proprietors of the neighbouring property, 21 Northside. Title to that property is registered as number CB304090. The First Respondent objected to the application and the matter was referred to this Tribunal. The nature of the objection was not entirely clear, but a series of orders made by the Tribunal, and the parties’ responses to those orders, have clarified the issues and significantly narrowed the scope of the dispute. At one stage the First Respondent’s husband was joined as the Second Respondent. He passed away several years before the current application was made. Although initially joined by the Tribunal as a party on the basis that he was still listed as a registered proprietor, his name was removed from the proceedings by the Tribunal’s order of 10 th October 2025, for reasons given then by Judge Paton . I understand that the Third Respondent’s interest arises from an equity release agreement .

3. The consequence is that there is now no objection, as such, to the completion of the first registration process. The only point that is in dispute is that the First Respondent claims to have acquired an easement to park on part of the land that is to be registered (along with an ancillary right of way to get to and from the parking place).

4. Therefore, although this started as the Applicants’ application for first registration, the dispute before the Tribunal now only concerns what is effectively the First Respondent’s application for registration of prescriptive easements. The First Respondent had provided a witness statement in support of her claim, in which she said that she had been parking next what is now the Applicants’ house since the 1960s. The Applicants had opted not to file any evidence. The Third Respondent did file a statement, but as I shall explain further below this did not deal with anything of any significance.

5. With the assistance of the parties, a site inspection was conducted on 1 st September. This was attended by the First Applicant, Ms Rickard, and the First Respondent.

6. The hearing took place the following day at Peterborough Combined Court. The Applicants were represented by Ms Rickard. The First Applicant attended, but I was told that, unfortunately, the Second Applicant was unwell and could not attend. The First Respondent attended and was represented by her grandson, Mr Plant.

7. A preliminary procedural point arises because the Third Respondent did not attend. The Tribunal had received a letter from the solicitors acting for that party on 26 th August. That letter explained that the Third Respondent did not intend to attend the hearing (or the site inspection), in order to avoid an escalation in the level of costs incurred. The letter also said that “The Third Respondent is a party to these proceedings purely because of its legal title. It has no evidence to give or arguments to advance in respect of the First Respondent’s claim for easements having no first-hand knowledge of the same. It is content to be bound by the findings of the Tribunal on the applications and claims made before it.”

8. I am satisfied that this letter demonstrates that the Third Respondent had notice of the hearing. I am also satisfied that the explanation that was helpfully given demonstrates that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the Third Respondent’s absence. I therefore determined in accordance with rule 34 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 that the Tribunal should proceed with the hearing. The parties who were present at the hearing agreed with this approach when I discussed it with them.

9. In those circumstances, the only witness present to give evidence was the First Respondent herself. I heard her evidence and brief submissions from Ms Rickard for the Applicants. I then explained to the parties that the Tribunal would direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the application for first registration, but also direct that the register should record various easements for the benefit of the Respondents’ property. This decision sets out my reasons for doing so. FURTHER BACKGROUND

10. The parties’ properties are located in a row of eight houses, split into two terraces of four houses. The row contains numbers 19 to 26, with number 19 being on the left-hand side when viewed from the road. The Applicants’ property, number 22, is at the other end of the same terrace as number 19, with number 21 (the Respondents’ property) to the left. In between numbers 22 and 23 there is a gravelled roadway which continues for some distance back from the main road. The right-hand terrace contains numbers 23 through to 26.

11. That layout can be seen in then plan shown below. The area edged in red is the area that the Applicants are seeking to have registered. The area next to their house, which is hatched in red is the area that is in dispute in this case.

12. There is thus a slightly unusual arrangement where nearly all of the houses have a narrow area of garden land directly behind, and then each house has at least one further, and larger, area of land set back from the road. In some cases, that additional land is quite some distance from the relevant house.

13. The First Respondent purchased 21 Northside in 1960. The conveyance is dated 11 th March 1960 and included the following plan.

14. Clause 2 of the conveyance provided for rights, in common with the owners of the other properties between numbers 19 and 26, to pass and repass on foot over the pathway coloured green, and to pass and repass with or without vehicles over the roadway coloured brown (which, in the plan as reproduced above, is coloured black). The conveyance also reserved a right for the owners of number 20 to pass and repass on foot over the path coloured yellow (which is shown brown in this plan).

15. The first relevant conveyance of number 22 is dated 16 th April 1966. That transferred the property to a Mr Fisher. The property was identified on a plan, which is the source of the plan reproduced at paragraph 11, above (save that the red hatching has been added more recently). The 1966 conveyance transferred the property with the right, in common with other owners, to pass and repass with or without vehicles over the roadway coloured brown, and subject to a right for other owners to pass and repass on foot only along the pathway coloured green. Although not, seemingly, the owner of number 26 . Those rights therefore match up with the 1960 conveyance of 21 Northside. Again, this does not appear to include the owner of number 26. Other than the slight oddity about number 26, but that does not need to be addressed further in this decision.

16. The First Applicant acquired the property from Mr Fisher by way of a conveyance dated 7 th June 1978. That conveyance specifically referred to a rights over the roadway and to being subject to a right to pass and repass on foot over the pathway coloured green. By a deed of gift made in 1983, number 22 was transferred into the Applicants’ joint names.

17. It is apparent from the plans reproduced above that the width of the Applicants’ land, at least at the front of the property, is significantly wider than the width of numbers 19, 20, and 21, because it includes an open area next to the house. On a fairly rough assessment, the frontage of number 22 is about twice as wide as the frontage of those other properties, so that number 22 includes an area of land that is about the same width as the house. That is the area that is hatched red in the plan at paragraph 11, above. It is that area that the First Respondent claims to have been parking in. Having seen the area during the site inspection, and the First Applicant having identified where he says that the area ends, it was clear that it was wide enough that two cars could park side-by-side next to number 22. There was nothing to distinguish that area from the roadway next to number 23 (at least where the two ran alongside each other between the houses; there was a fence marking what was said to be the boundary of number 22 further away from the main road). It appears from a county court judgment that I was shown by the Applicants that the roadway belongs to number 25.

18. I was able to observe during the site inspection that the main road running past the houses was a fairly straight and quite fast stretch of road and that the First Respondent’s property did not have any parking space in front of her house. LAW

19. None of the parties had addressed the law on prescriptive easements in any great detail, although the Applicants’ skeleton argument had referred to R (Beresford) v Sunderland CC [2003] UKHL 60 ; [2004] 1 AC 889 , and it was apparent from the way in which the First Respondent’s witness statement was phrased that there must have been some research carried out. It may help the parties to understand the Tribunal’s decision if I explain briefly the relevant law, as I understand it. What follows is only intended to be a short overview, having regard to the That case is about registering land as a town green under Commons Registration Act 1965 , but it is often referred to in prescriptive easement cases because of the detailed discussion of the meaning of “as of right”. Practice Direction: Reasons for Decisions issued by the Senior President of Tribunals.

20. An easement, such as a right of way, can be created through several different methods. Perhaps the most obvious way of creating an easement is an express grant, but that is not relied on in this case. Another method, which actually encompasses three different sets of rules, is through a period of long use, known as prescription. That is what the First Respondent relies on here, claiming to have acquired easements under Prescription Act 1832. See Gaunt KC & Sir Paul Morgan, Gale on Easements , 22 nd ed. (2025), para.4-02. In very simple terms, prescription requires there to have been a continuous enjoyment of the claimed right, which needs to have been exercised as of right, To be more accurate, the First Respondent does not seem to have clearly identified the legal basis of her claim, but that is how it has been framed by the Third Respondent in its Statement of Case . and cannot have been exercised by force, secretly, or with permission for a sufficiently lengthy period. Hence the Applicants’ reference to Beresford .

21. The basic rule under the 1832 Act is that a period of twenty years is required to establish a right of way by prescription. A claim can be defeated if there has been an interruption for at least one year, but a claim becomes indefeasible after forty years.

22. The First Respondent bears the burden of proving the matters which are essential to make out her case for a prescriptive easement. She must prove that the area has been used for parking for at least twenty years and that this has been as of right. She also has the legal burden of proving that use has been without permission and without contention. As those both involve proving negative propositions, the law has developed an evidential presumption. Where a person claiming to have acquired an easement by prescription can prove that they used it for the relevant period of time, openly, and in a way that would bring home to a reasonable owner of the servient tenement that a right was being asserted, they then have the benefit of an evidential presumption that use has been as of right, without permission, and without contention. In that situation it is for the owner of the servient tenement to prove that there had been permission or contention (as the case may be). As already noted, the Applicants have not filed any evidence.

23. Finally, so far as the legal framework is concerned, I remind myself that in assessing the witness evidence to determine disputes of fact, the Tribunal applies the civil standard of proof, i.e. the balance of probabilities, or whether something is more likely than not. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

24. It is helpful to start this section by recording what is not in issue. First, and as already mentioned, there is no dispute about the Applicants’ entitlement to first registration of 22 Northside. Nor is there any dispute about the extent of the land to be registered as part of the new title being created on first registration. There is also no dispute about the access road that runs alongside the land being registered.

25. The dispute is only about what easements in favour of 21 Northside should be noted on that new title. Even on that though there was a measure of agreement at the hearing that the burden of at least some easement was to be noted. That is because, although the parties do not seem to have focused on this in any great detail, it is clear that the chain of conveyances record a right of way for the benefit of 21 Northside over a path running behind the houses.

26. What we are then left with is the real dispute: can the First Respondent show that she has acquired a right to park (and ancillary rights) over part of the Applicants’ land by prescription?

27. On that issue, the only evidence that was before the Tribunal at the hearing was given by the First Respondent. The Applicants had not put in any statement themselves, effectively opting to do no more than put the First Respondent to proof. The Third Respondent had filed a statement from Sharne Leslie, an Operations Property Manager employed by a company that manages properties on behalf of the Third Respondent. As already explained though, the Third Respondent had no positive evidence of its own to rely on and so this statement did not contain anything material to this issue. It is therefore not necessary to consider what weight should be attached to the statement in the absence of the witness.

28. One point can be cleared out of the way quite quickly. The First Respondent had mentioned in her Statement of Case a court order apparently recognising some rights. That order was not produced for the Tribunal, but after the site inspection the Applicants’ representative forwarded a copy of a judgment given by HHJ Yelton in the Cambridge County Court on 15 th May 2009. Although I have not seen the order made as a result of that claim, it is clear that the case before the learned judge was concerned with a dispute between the owners of numbers 25 and 26 about access over the roadway. Neither of the present parties were parties in that litigation, although it does appear that the First Applicant was mentioned (the decision refers several times to a Mr T Greenside as the owner of number 22; I assume that this is a typographical error).

29. As that decision had not dealt with any dispute about what, if any, rights the First Respondent had over the Applicants’ land, this Tribunal needs to reach a decision based on the available evidence. The First Respondent’s statement represents the entirety of that evidence. Her statement is brief and so I shall set out here the material parts in full. “2. Since taking occupation of the Property in or around the 1960s, I, together with my family members, friends, and visitors, have used the area shown in Evidence Picture 1 (EP1) for the parking of motor vehicles. This use commenced well before the acquisition of the adjoining property by Mr and Mrs Greensmith. “3. The area in question has been used openly, continuously, and without permission or interruption for a period exceeding twenty (20) years. The use has at all times been as of right, that is to say, without force, without secrecy, and without permission. “4. Over the years, I and my visitors have parked in various parts of the area to accommodate the needs of neighbouring properties, including numbers 19 and 20, whose occupants also continue to park within the same general area. “5. I do not seek to claim any specific fixed parking space. I seek the right to park anywhere within the area delineated and shaded on Evidence Picture 1 (EP1). At present, a wooden box and certain building materials are stored within this area, which substantially interfere with the ability to park. The removal of these obstructions would be necessary to enable proper exercise of the right claimed. “6. I further claim a right for myself, my family, friends, and visitors to pass and repass over the land identified in Evidence Picture 2 (EP2) with or without motor vehicles, on foot or otherwise, for the purpose of accessing and egressing the parking area and the Property. “7. The rights claimed have been exercised freely and openly at all times of the day and night, throughout the year, and without interruption or objection from any party.”

30. The two pictures identified as EP1 and EP2 look like this:

31. A couple of points can be immediately noted about EP2, which sets out the area over which a right of access is claimed to have arisen through prescription. First, this area extends the whole width of the roadway between the Applicants’ house and number 23, but around half of that width does not belong to the Applicants. Accordingly, any claim to a right of way (or any other easement) over that area is not part of this case (and, in any event, it would appear that number 21 already has the benefit of a right of way over that area). Secondly, the area shaded red in EP2 extends behind the Applicants’ house and covers some or all of the area that is already subject to a right of way. There is accordingly no need for any prescriptive easement over that part of the land shaded red.

32. The First Respondent gave evidence confirming the contents of her witness statement. Ms Rickard only asked two questions by way of cross examination and did not challenge any of the contents of Ms Butler’s statement. I therefore accept her evidence. It follows that the First Respondent has established that she has used the area of land next to the Applicants’ house for car-parking from 1960 onwards.

33. I am satisfied that the First Respondent’s unchallenged evidence shows that has used the land next to the Applicants’ house for parking since she moved to 21 Northside in 1960 and that she has done so openly and in a way that would have indicated to the Applicants that she was asserting a right to park there.

34. None of that was disputed by the Applicants at the hearing. The only point raised by Ms Rickard in closing submissions was a suggestion that the First Applicant had given permission to the First Respondent to park on his land. She accepted though that there was no evidence from the Applicants to support this argument. She explained that the Applicants had not known that they could address this in evidence. I do not accept that explanation, as the Tribunal had given clear directions about evidence and even given the Applicants further time to adopt their Statement of Case as evidence. That argument must therefore fail because the evidential burden is on the Applicants to show that permission had been given: see paragraph 22, above.

35. Furthermore, even if the First Respondent did need to prove that user was without permission, her unchallenged evidence was that she had not been given permission. If the Applicants disagreed with that evidence, they should have challenged it in cross-examination: see, e.g. , Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd [2023] UKSC 48 ; [2025] AC 374 .

36. Because the First Respondent’s use dates back so far, she has demonstrated considerably more than forty years of use and so it is not necessary to consider whether more recent actions of the Applicants to prevent her and her grandson from parking next to number 22 amount to an interruption. The First Respondent had acquired an indefeasible prescriptive easement long before that. I am satisfied that this means that she has acquired a right to park in the area next to the Applicants’ house, and the associated rights needed to enjoy that right ( i.e. for getting to and from parked vehicles and for getting vehicles to and from the road). CONCLUSION

37. For those reasons, the Chief Land Registrar will be directed to give effect to the application for first registration, but with a further direction, made under rule 40(3)(a), to record the benefit and burden of the easements discussed above.

38. My preliminary view is that there should be no order as to costs. The Applicants have succeeded inasmuch as their application for first registration will now be completed, but the First Respondent has succeeded on the majority of the issue that was actually in dispute. The rights that she has established as a result of this process are, however, not quite as extensive as she had claimed, and there had been times when her case was not put as clearly as it could have been. Balancing all of those factors, I consider that the appropriate outcome will be for there to be no order as to costs. If any party disagrees with that proposal, they should make their application for costs within 28 days after the date on which this decision is sent to them: see rule 13(5). Dated this 3 rd September 2026 Judge Robert Brown By Order of The Tribunal