UK case law
Thames Water Utilities Limited v Karen Imber
[2026] EWHC KB 2720 · High Court (King's Bench Division) · 2026
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Full judgment
1. The claimant, Thames Water Utilities Limited (“Thames Water” or “TWUL”), seeks summary judgment against the defendant, Mrs Karen Imber, in respect of a claim for fraud; alternatively it seeks an order that the defendant should have only conditional permission to defend the claim.
2. The following facts are undisputed.
3. In 2006 and 2007, Mrs Imber’s home in Woodford Green, Essex (“the Property” , was flooded by sewage water. She sued Thames Water. Those proceedings were settled in 2013 with Thames Water making a payment to Mrs Imber of £500,000 in full and final settlement.
4. Unfortunately for Mrs Imber, there was another flood at the Property in 2014. She asserted a further claim against Thames Water in respect of losses caused by the flooding for which she was uninsured. Thames Water denied liability but the parties continued to engage in inter partes correspondence.
5. In 2022 the defendant’s then solicitors, Edesia Law, sent to the claimant (amongst other things) an expert report the defendant had obtained which valued the Property in the sum of £817,000 on the hypothetical basis that there had been no history of flooding at the property. The expert also stated that it was likely that there would be no willing buyer for the Property and therefore, in his expert view, the defendant had suffered a loss of £817,000, plus losses arising from increased insurance premiums and damages for inconvenience and distress.
6. A mediation was scheduled for 20 July 2023. In a mediation statement dated 11 July 2023 Mrs Imber stated, amongst other things, that she “ is trapped [in the Property], as she cannot sell it in light of the repeat in 2014 of the serious flooding issues at the Property ”; and that her position was that the Property was “ unsaleable ”. She stated that, since the Property was unsaleable, her claim for DMV (diminution of market value) was the total value of the house namely £817,000. She also made other claims for loss and damage arising from relocation costs, increased insurance premiums, increased mortgage payments, legal costs and damages for distress and inconvenience. The total value of these other claims was about £144,000.
7. The claimant’s rival position as stated in its mediation statement was that it did not accept that there was any diminution in value and “ the Property could be sold for its full market value if offered for sale now ”.
8. The claim did not settle on the day of the mediation. The parties agreed to adjourn the mediation and continue to negotiate. On 1 August 2023, the defendant’s then solicitor, Mr McPhun, emailed the claimant to make a settlement offer of £250,000 plus the costs in respect of “ all [the defendant’s] heads of claim ”. This offer was rejected by the claimant, but the parties continued to negotiate. On 19 August 2023 the defendant accepted an offer of £180,000 plus costs of £45,000. On 6 September 2023 they entered into a settlement deed by which the claimant agreed to pay the defendant £225,000 in full and final settlement (“the Settlement Agreement”). That sum was paid to the defendant on 13 September 2023.
9. At the time the Settlement Agreement was concluded, the claimant did not know that, before the mediation, the defendant had accepted an offer to buy the Property for the sum of £780,000; and that subsequently, she had exchanged contracts on 2 August and completed the sale on 3 August 2023. The sale price was about £37,000 below the market value given to the property by the defendant’s expert on the hypothetical basis that no flooding had occurred.
10. When the claimant learned of these matters, it brought a claim against the defendant for fraudulent misrepresentation, seeking rescission of the settlement agreement, repayment of the settlement sum and/or damages. The claimant claims that statements made in the defendant’s mediation statement and/or in her solicitors’ email of 1 August 2023 and/or subsequently, to the effect that the Property could not be sold, were made dishonestly and fraudulently.
11. For the purposes of its summary judgment application, the claimant relies only on the allegedly dishonest failure by the defendant to correct her claim in the mediation statement that the property was unsaleable, and the misrepresentations implied by that claim, after the Property was actually sold on 3 August 2023. The Defendant’s version of events
12. The defendant denies that she acted dishonestly or fraudulently in failing to correct the mediation statement or at any time. Her version of events, which is in significant respects disputed, is as follows.
13. The defendant states that she began marketing the Property no later than the early part of 2023. She accepted an offer of £780,000 in or about April 2023. She disclosed the history of flooding in her Property Information Form TA6 on a date after this, and therefore this was known to her prospective purchaser and also to both her own and the buyer’s conveyancing solicitor. She began to view other houses to buy and made an offer on another property. On 13 July 2023 she contacted a removals firm. On 21 July 2023 she told her estate agent that completion on the Property had been agreed for 3 August 2023 and that it was “ all looking good ”.
14. However, in her witness statement she explains that, when she stated that things were “ all looking good ” she was referring to the progress to date, and she nevertheless expected that difficulties would arise in relation to insurance when the buyer sought insurance for the house. She states she had no expectation that the sale would complete.
15. In fact, as already stated, the sale did complete soon afterwards: contracts were exchanged on 2 August 2023 and completion took place the following day.
16. The defendant relies heavily on what she was and wasn’t advised by her solicitor at the time, Mr McPhun of Edesia Law. Since she does so, I should address his position. The defendant wrote a letter before action to Edesia Law on 3 October 2025 alleging professional negligence. Edesia Law responded denying any and all allegations of breach of duty. Mr McPhun was not Mrs Imber’s conveyancing solicitor in 2023 and Edesia Law expressly denied Mrs Imber had informed him that any sale of the Property was ongoing before the Settlement Agreement, whether during the mediation or at all. The firm asserted that the first time she told Mr McPhun that she had sold the Property was on 14 September 2023, and not, as the defendant claims, on 6 September 2023.
17. Mr McPhun was made aware of the claimant’s summary judgment application on 23 September 2026, shortly before the hearing before me, and he wrote to the claimant’s solicitors making lengthy comments on the defendant’s evidence within the constraints of legal professional privilege, which prevented him from giving full disclosure of his dealings with the defendant. Those comments included assertions that parts of the defendant’s evidence describing the defendant’s communications with him are “ an entire fabrication ” and “ frankly, insulting ”. He denied that Mrs Imber had told him about the accepted offer at the mediation or at all, or told him about the sale before 14 September 2023, and noted that there are no documents that support the defendant’s assertion that the defendant told Mr McPhun about the accepted offer or the sale before 6 September 2023.
18. Despite having sent Edesia Law a letter of claim, the defendant has not pursued a claim against that firm or Mr McPhun to date, either by way of Part 20 proceedings or freestanding action.
19. Relying on Mr McPhun’s information, the claimant disputes the defendant’s version of events, but upon this application is content that I should proceed on the assumed basis that that version is accurate. I will do so, whilst making clear that, in so far as the defendant’s account imputes or implies misconduct to Mr McPhun, no investigation into those matters, or any findings of any misconduct, have been made.
20. In her evidence the defendant states that Mr McPhun knew “ of the marketing position and that an accepted offer had been received ”. She says she told him that, although she had accepted an offer, she did not believe the sale would complete. In her witness statement she does not give the date or indicate when she told Mr McPhun this, but I note that in her letter of claim to Mr McPhun, dated 3 October 2025, the defendant states that Mr McPhun was expressly informed by her that a sale was in progress at the mediation, and does not refer to any earlier occasion on which she told Mr McPhun of this fact.
21. The defendant states that Mr McPhun prepared the mediation statement and that she approved it on or shortly before 11 July 2023. At the mediation, on 20 July 2023, she states that, in response to a question from the mediator as to the current position with the sale or marketing of the property, she declared that she had accepted an offer to buy the Property in the sum of £780,000 but she did not expect the sale to complete. She says she said this in the presence of the mediator, Mr McPhun, and a Mr Terry Arthurs. She expected the mediator to pass on this information to the other side.
22. In support of the defendant’s account of what took place at the mediation, the defendant has served a statement from Mr Arthurs in which he confirms that “ what [the defendant] says in that paragraph about what she told him [the mediator] is consistent with my own recollection of what I heard her say ”, and he confirms that she did not ask the mediator to keep what she said confidential and that Mr McPhun did not say anything during the exchange.
23. The defendant states that the claimant’s position at the mediation was that the Property was capable of being sold and there was no diminution in market value, but that she disagreed with that position.
24. Following the mediation and the completed sale of the Property, on her own account the defendant did not tell Mr McPhun that a sale had taken place, or that she had moved address, until 6 September 2023. She did so in the following circumstances. Following the agreement of a settlement amount, Mr McPhun sent her a copy of the executed Settlement Agreement. It was then that she became concerned about clause 7 of the agreement (a warranty that she had not sold or transferred her rights in the claims being settled to anyone else) and contacted Mr McPhun to ask him about this clause. She states that she told Mr McPhun that she had sold the Property and he told her that clause 7 did not mean she could not sell the Property and that she had done nothing wrong.
25. More generally, in her evidence the defendant states that she “ did not understand that marketing the Property, or later accepting an offer, meant that any claim against [the defendant] could not proceed. My belief remained that the flooding and insurance position would defeat a sale once properly examined. Mr McPHun did not at any time advise me of any effect that marketing the property or accepting an offer, might have on my claim ” (paragraph 27 of the defendant’s witness statement). As to her reason for not disclosing the sale of the Property to Mr McPhun, she says that she “ did not think to tell Mr McPhun that [she] had moved. I believed he knew about the accepted offer and that it had been disclosed at mediation [sic]. I continued to rely on him in the negotiations. When I saw the Settlement Agreement, I raised the completed sale with him expressly ”. Principles of law
26. Counsel on both sides, Mr Davies for the Claimant and Mr Berragan for the Defendant, presented their cases helpfully and persuasively. There was no dispute between them as to the applicable principles of law to be applied by the Court upon an application for summary judgment. Both parties rely on the well-known principles summarised by Lewison J in EasyAir Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 Ch . Mr Berragan also drew my attention to Mrs Justice Cockerill’s (as she then was) judgment in King v Stiefel [2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm) , in which the judge clarified that, although the court will be very cautious about granting summary judgment in fraud cases, it would do so in suitable circumstances, bearing in mind that cogent evidence is required to justify a finding of fraud or other discreditable conduct, reflecting the court’s conventional perception that it is generally not likely that people will engage in such conduct (see [24]-[25]).
27. Neither was there any dispute as to the principles of law applying to a cause of action in fraudulent misrepresentation. In his skeleton argument Mr Davies quotes a passage from Chitty on Contracts (36 th ed.) at 10-006 setting out the principles, which are not contentious, and include the principle that: “ If the statement was true at the time it was made but becomes untrue before the contract is agreed, there will normally be a misrepresentation if B [the representor] does not correct the statement ”.
28. In this connection, the claimant relies on Inter Export LLC v Townley [2018] EWCA Civ 2068 , for the proposition that continuing representations in the course of pre-contractual negotiations may produce a misapprehension in the mind of the other party which continues to have a causative effect at the time when the contract is created, and that, if a relevant representation has the quality of continuing, a claimant in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation would still succeed even if the representation was true when it was made but subsequently became false and was not corrected (see [31]-[33]).
29. It is a key part of the cause of action, and for current purposes the most important one, that the defendant should have made his or her misrepresentation dishonestly. As Lord Hughes explained in Ivey v Genting Casinos UK ltd [2018] AC 391 (SC(E)) at [63], “ dishonesty is a simple, if occasionally imprecise, English word ” which means the same in civil law as it does in the criminal sphere. The Supreme Court explained the modern test as follows (at [74]): “When dishonesty is in question, the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he had done is, by those standards, dishonest.”
30. Ivey concerned a case of cheating in a casino. The appellant, Mr Ivey, claimed that he did not regard what he had done as cheating or dishonest. But this was not relevant: by ordinary standards his conduct constituted cheating and was, moreover, dishonest. The parties’ submissions
31. For the purposes of this application, the claimant put its case on the basis that, although the assertions in the mediation statement by the defendant that the Property was unsaleable was a statement of opinion, it included within it implied representations of fact to the effect that the Property had not been sold and there was no prospect that the Property would be sold. Those were continuing representations in the course of pre-contractual negotiations, and it was plainly reasonable for the claimant to rely on them, and the defendant plainly intended the claimant to rely on them. The defendant’s claim for DMV was 85 per cent of her total monetary claim.
32. In the circumstances, when those representations became untrue – when it was plainly untrue that the Property could not and would not be sold – the defendant had a duty to correct them by informing the claimant about the sale.
33. On the issue of dishonesty, the claimant submits that the numbers indicate that the defendant must have appreciated the significance of the representations she had made as to the saleability of the house. Her total claim other than that for DMV was about £144,000, and so in asking for a sum in settlement more than this, she was actively pursuing a claim for DMV in respect of the Property. Even if, in her mind, she had a claim for DMV of only £37,000, on the basis that she would have received the full market value of the house, which was, on her case, £817,000 had it not been for the history of flooding – and there is no evidence supporting a claim to that effect – she still sought and accepted a sum of money which was about £43,000 more than her total claim for damages, DMV and costs together.
34. On inducement, the claimant relies on the principle that the burden of proving that the claimant’s decision was not induced by a misrepresentation normally lies on the defendant (see Chitty 10-044). In Hayward v Zurich Insurance Co Plc [2016] UKSC 48 ; [2017] AC 142 the Supreme Court made clear that it was not necessary to show that the representee believed the representation; even when the representee knew the representation was a lie, it might be able to establish inducement on the facts (see [45]). In this case, it is not necessary for the claimant to show that it believed the house was “ unsaleable ”; it was induced to rely on that representation because there was always a risk a court would take the same view as the defendant.
35. In the circumstances, the claimant submits that the defendant has no real prospect of defending a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, and that being so, the appropriate remedy is rescission and damages to put the claimant back to the position it would have been in had the misrepresentation not been made. Alternatively, if the court does not grant summary judgment, the defendant should be given only conditional permission to defend the claim, the condition being that the defendant pay into Court £225,000 (the settlement sum).
36. The main focus of the defendant’s submissions was the issue of dishonesty. In applying the Ivey two-stage test, the question whether the representor understood that there was a duty to disclose a particular fact was part of the first stage of the test. The second stage involved the court deciding, in the light of the representor’s understanding or belief as to her duty, or absence of duty, to disclose, whether her conduct be seen as dishonest.
37. In this case, the background, on the assumed facts, was that the claimant had disclosed the accepted offer to the mediator in her solicitor’s presence, and she believed that that information had been given to Thames Water, and was not advised that further disclosure was necessary. She did not believe that there was a requirement to provide updates on the sale unless she was specifically asked, because on her case her solicitor was aware the sale was proceeding and she assumed Thames Water knew the sale was proceeding.
38. The second important factor is that on 6 September 2023, having seen the Settlement Deed, she disclosed the sale to her solicitor and was advised that there was no requirement to disclose the sale. The defendant did, therefore, disclose the sale when she thought it was relevant to do so; and having done so, her belief that it was not important was confirmed by her solicitor’s advice and failure to report the sale to Thames Water. When the full facts are considered, it is submitted that her conduct does not satisfy the test for dishonesty.
39. Moreover, the defendant submits there is a real prospect that the claimant will fail to establish that there was any misrepresentation or continuing misrepresentation. All the defendant was saying in her mediation statement was that she genuinely believed that the Property was unsaleable, and she did in fact hold that belief. The questions whether, when the sale completed, the defendant knew that the situation had changed in a significant way and whether the changed situation ought to be disclosed to the claimant are factual questions that are triable issues, and that at this stage those issues should be assessed in the defendant’s favour.
40. More generally, an allegation of fraud is a very serious allegation and the court cannot safely conclude at the interim stage that a person in the position of Ms Imber acted fraudulently. Decision
41. In my judgment the claimant will clearly succeed in establishing that, before the Settlement Agreement, the defendant made representations of fact before the settlement agreement that became false and that the defendant had a duty to, but did not, correct.
42. The assertions in the mediation statement that the Property was “ unsaleable ” may have been a statement of opinion, but they clearly implied, at the very least, that the defendant had not sold the Property and there was no prospect of a future sale. Those implied representations unarguably became false on 3 August 2023. They were made to support the major plank of the defendant’s claim, namely her claim for DMV, which had been expressed by the defendant to be a claim for the full market value of the Property. As DMV was the major part of the defendant’s claim, the questions whether or not the house could be sold, and at what price, were fundamental issues between the parties. Once the Property had been sold for £780,000, the factual basis upon which the defendant was advancing a case that the Property was unsaleable had fundamentally changed.
43. Further, in my judgment the claimant would clearly succeed in establishing that the claimant was influenced by the false representation. Had the defendant corrected the misrepresentation by informing the claimant that the house had in fact sold, it seems to me that it is impossible to imagine the claimant concluding the same settlement deal. The defendant submitted that the claimant had throughout maintained that the Property was saleable and had suffered little or no diminution in value, and that the fact of the sale therefore could not have induced the settlement. I do not accept that submission. As the Supreme Court explained in Hayward , inducement does not depend upon the representee accepting the truth of the representation. The question is whether the representation materially influenced its decision to contract. Here, regardless of whether the claimant accepted the defendant's contention that the Property was unsaleable, the fact that the Property had actually been sold was plainly material to the parties' negotiations. It fundamentally altered the factual basis upon which the defendant's claim for diminution in value had been advanced.
44. Moreover, the implied representation that the Property had not to date been sold was plainly material to the settlement negotiations. There was a suggestion in submissions that the claimant may have been aware of the sale before the Settlement Agreement was concluded. That suggestion was speculative and there is no credible evidence that the claimant had such knowledge.
45. On the issue of honesty, I need to assess the factual question of the state of the defendant’s knowledge and belief at the relevant time, taking the defendant’s case at its highest, and then apply the objective standards of ordinary people to her conduct taking into account her state of knowledge and belief.
46. On the first part of the test, Mr Berragan emphasised two key factors in the defendant’s factual case: that she had not been advised disclosure was necessary, even after telling her solicitor that she had accepted an offer; and that she disclosed the sale to him on 6 September 2023.
47. On the first of these, Mr McPhun could not have advised Mrs Imber to disclose a fact of which he was unaware, and, on her case, he was unaware of the sale until after the Settlement Agreement was concluded.
48. The second point relied on by the defendant, that she did disclose the sale to her solicitor on 6 September 2023, does not seem to me to assist her case on honesty. This alleged disclosure was more than a month after the sale. By this date, the settlement agreement had been made. Ms Imber was under a duty to disclose to correct the continuing representation in the pre-contractual period, before the deal was done. The post-contract disclosure does not assist her. Even on that date, she only disclosed the information to her solicitor, and not to Thames Water. This very late and limited disclosure, if made, would not in my view assist the defendant in establishing that she was acting in good faith.
49. However, I do not need to find that the defendant deliberately concealed the sale, or that she realised she ought to disclose it, or that she understood that a failure to disclose it might be regarded as dishonest. The critical point is that, on her own case, she knew that by 3 August 2023 the Property had been sold for £780,000 and that she was moving out of it. That was not some peripheral development in the background to the dispute. It represented a fundamental change in the factual basis upon which she had been advancing her claim, and indeed in her own life. In the mediation statement she had asserted that she was “trapped” in the Property because it was “unsaleable”, and she sought damages for diminution in value on the footing that there was effectively no market for it. By the time settlement negotiations continued in August 2023, she knew that she was no longer trapped in the Property, that the Property had in fact been sold, and that the central factual premise upon which her claim had been presented no longer reflected reality.
50. Nor, in my judgment, does it assist the defendant to say that she had previously disclosed the existence of an accepted offer. An agreement to sell which may or may not proceed is one thing; a completed sale is another. On the defendant’s own account, she informed the mediator only that she had accepted an offer but did not expect the sale to complete; she states that she “ most definitely told the mediator [she] had no expectation that the sale would complete ” (paragraph 49), by which she appears to have been telling the mediator not to attach significance to the offer. By 3 August 2023 she knew that expectation had proved wrong. The distinction between an uncertain future sale and an actual completed sale was obvious and significant. The latter fundamentally altered the factual position between the parties.
51. In my judgment, ordinary decent people would plainly regard it as dishonest to continue to pursue and to settle a legal claim based on the contention that a property was unsaleable after the property had in fact been sold, without informing the opposing party of that fact. They would do so even if they knew that the defendant had previously disclosed an accepted offer, or that she did not appreciate that lawyers would regard her mediation statement as containing continuing representations. Ordinary people would regard the completed sale as destroying the central basis on which the claim for diminution of value had been advanced.
52. I would add that it is difficult to reconcile the defendant's explanation for not telling Mr McPhun of the sale until after the Settlement Agreement with the surrounding circumstances. She contacted him regarding settlement immediately before exchange and shortly after completion, yet did not mention a completed sale of the very Property which formed the subject matter of her claim and caused a very great change in her personal circumstances. That aspect of her account appears inherently improbable. But even if it is true, and even taking into account the caution that I need to exercise before making a summary determination of dishonesty, in my judgment the defendant has no realistic prospect of resisting a finding of dishonesty against her at trial.
53. Accordingly, there is no real prospect of the claimant failing to establish (i) misrepresentation, (ii) reliance and (iii) dishonesty. The defendant therefore has no real prospect of defending the claim. Summary judgment will be entered. The appropriate relief is rescission, and I will therefore rescind the settlement agreement and order that the defendant repay to the claimant the settlement amount. If the claimant wishes to pursue its claim for damages, those damages will need to be assessed. I will give directions for the assessment of damages in the order made consequential to this judgment. 23 October 2026