UK case law
Thrive Living Yorkshire Limited v Ofsted
[2026] UKFTT HESC 1465 · Care Standards · 2026
The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Full judgment
The AppeaL
1. Thrive Living Yorkshire Limited (“ TLYL ”) has brought an appeal against Ofsted’s (“ Ofsted ”) decision dated 11 June 2026 to refuse its application to carry on a supported accommodation undertaking. The STRIKE OUT APPLICATION
2. On 2 September 2026, Ofsted applied to strike out the appeal. Ofsted submits that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and ought to be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(4)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 (“ the HESC Rules ”).
3. The parties were directed to attend a preliminary hearing, which took place on 7 October 2026. Those in attendance were: a. For TLYL: Miss M Nath, Counsel. b. For Ofsted: Mr J Taylor, in-house solicitor. Background and Key Chronology
4. The following factual chronology was not in dispute.
5. On 25 October 2023, TLYL applied to become registered as a supported accommodation provider. Since then, TLYL has proposed a number of different individuals for registration as its service manager. The corresponding applications were submitted on 25 October 2023, 26 November 2024, 22 July 2025 and 3 February 2026. Each application was subsequently withdrawn.
6. On 23 April 2026, Ofsted served a notice of proposal to refuse TLYL’s application for registration.
7. On 2 June 2026, TLYL submitted a further application for the registration of a new service manager, Ms Nicola West. Ofsted returned that application because it contained incomplete, incorrect or missing information. The application was resubmitted but returned again on 9 June 2026. Ofsted’s case is that the application remained incomplete because Ms West was unable to provide a valid Disclosure and Barring Service (“ DBS ”) certificate.
8. On 11 June 2026, Ofsted served its notice of decision (“ the Notice of Decision ”) refusing TLYL’s application for registration.
9. Ms West’s complete application for registration as service manager was subsequently received by Ofsted on 14 July 2026. That application has not been processed by Ofsted. Ofsted relies on its Social Care Enforcement Policy which states that: “After a NOD has been issued the refusal of application takes immediate effect. Ofsted will not accept applications for a new… registered manager (RM)/registered service manager (RSM) under the application that was refused. If providers wish to put forward new people in these roles after the NOD, they will need to submit a fresh application with a new URN and pay the relevant fees.” The Parties’ Positions
10. Both parties’ positions evolved during the hearing in response to the issues raised by the Tribunal. The parties’ positions as set out in their written application documents are summarised below.
11. Ofsted’s position can be summarised as follows: a. The appeal should be dismissed because, at the material time, TLYL did not satisfy the statutory requirements for registration. b. Ofsted relied on section 13 of the Care Standards Act 2000 (“ CSA 2000 ”), which provides that registration may only be granted where Ofsted is satisfied that the requirements of the relevant regulations are being, and will continue to be, complied with. c. The relevant regulations are the Supported Accommodation (England) Regulations 2023 (“ the 2023 Regulations ”). d. Ofsted contends that regulation 14 of the 2023 Regulations requires the appointment of a registered service manager. It submits that the existence of a registered service manager is a mandatory requirement and not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, where no suitable person is appointed to that role, the provider’s application for registration is incapable of being granted. e. Ms West’s complete application was not received until more than four weeks after the Notice of Decision refusing TLYL’s registration had been issued. Consequently, that individual was not part of TLYL’s application that was before Ofsted when the refusal decision was made. f. Ofsted further relies upon its published Social Care Enforcement Policy, as set out above. g. On that basis, Ofsted submits that it has not assessed, and cannot assess within the present proceedings, Ms West’s application to be the proposed registered service manager. It argues that the appeal concerns the correctness of the refusal decision on the facts existing at the time that decision was made, rather than subsequent developments. h. Ofsted submits that the absence of a registered service manager rendered TLYL’s application for registration defective and incapable of approval. It argues that later steps taken by TLYL to remedy that defect cannot retrospectively cure the deficiency in the original application. Accordingly, Ofsted contends that the appeal process cannot convert an application that was defective at the material time into a valid application and that, in those circumstances, the lack of a registered service manager is fatal to TLYL’s appeal and so the appeal serves no practical purpose.
12. TLYL opposes the application and submits that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success on a number of grounds. TLYL’s position can be summarised as follows: a. TLYL's primary submission was that regulation 14 of the 2023 Regulations required only the appointment of a service manager and did not require that person to have been registered by Ofsted at the time of the Notice of Decision. TLYL draws a distinction between the appointment of a service manager and the completion of the registration process for that individual. b. TLYL contends that Ms West had been identified and appointed prior to both the Notice of Proposal dated 23 April 2026 and the Notice of Decision dated 11 June 2026. It is said that she commenced employment on 5 May 2026. c. TLYL further submits that Ofsted was aware of Ms West's appointment before the Notice of Decision was issued. Reliance is placed upon communications with Ofsted on 5 May 2026 and upon wording in the Notice of Decision acknowledging that the provider had recruited a new proposed registered service manager. d. Accordingly, TLYL disputes Ofsted's contention that the appeal amounts to an attempt to remedy a defective application after refusal. Rather, TLYL argues that regulation 14 had already been satisfied because a service manager had been appointed before the refusal decision was made. e. TLYL also submits that delays in progressing Ms West’s application arose from difficulties obtaining a replacement DBS certificate and were administrative in nature. It is submitted that these delays did not alter the fact that Ms West had already been appointed and had commenced employment before the Notice of Decision. f. TLYL submits that Ofsted attached undue weight to the fact that there had been four previous proposed registered service manager applications. g. TLYL also challenges Ofsted's reliance on concerns relating to planning permission and safeguarding concerns. Analysis The Legal Framework
13. The starting point is to identify the correct legal framework against which Ofsted’s application falls to be considered. In my judgment, the analysis set out in Ofsted’s application does not proceed on entirely the correct basis. I raised the issue with the parties and invited submissions. Having considered those submissions, I set out below my conclusions.
14. It was common ground that: a. where an application for registration is made under section 12 of the CSA 2000 , section 13(2) requires Ofsted to grant the application where it is satisfied that the relevant regulatory requirements, including those prescribed in regulations under section 22 and any other relevant enactments, are being and will continue to be complied with. Absent such satisfaction, Ofsted is required to refuse the application; and b. the relevant regulations under section 13 were the 2023 Regulations.
15. Mr Taylor submitted that: “regulation 14 sets out the requirement to appoint an individual to be the Registered Service Manager.”
16. Turning to consider regulation 14, it states: (1) The registered provider must appoint an individual to manage the supported accommodation undertaking if— (a) there is no registered service manager in respect of the undertaking, and (b) the registered provider— (i) is an organisation or a partnership, (ii) does not satisfy regulation 12, or (iii) is not, or does not intend to be, in day-to-day charge of the supported accommodation undertaking. (2) If the registered provider appoints a person to manage the supported accommodation undertaking, the registered provider must, without delay, give the CIECSS notice of— (a) the name of the person so appointed, and (b) the date on which the appointment takes effect.
17. On a straightforward reading of regulation 14, it does not impose a requirement to appoint an individual as a registered service manager. Rather, regulation 14(1) imposes an obligation on a registered provider to appoint an individual to manage the supported accommodation undertaking where there is no registered service manager in respect of the undertaking and the conditions in regulation 14(1)(b) are satisfied.
18. Mr Taylor submitted that the references to a "manager" and a "registered service manager" in regulation 14(1) should be understood as having the same meaning. I am unable to accept that submission. The language of the 2023 Regulations draws a distinction between a person who is appointed to manage a supported accommodation undertaking and a person who is registered as its manager.
19. A person appointed under regulation 14(1) is appointed by the provider to manage the undertaking. On the facts of this case, that person was Ms West, who was appointed by the Appellant on 5 May 2026. By contrast, a registered service manager is a person who has been registered as such by Ofsted pursuant to the statutory scheme established under Part 2 of the CSA 2000 . Had Parliament intended the terms to bear the same meaning, there would have been no need to use different language within the same provision.
20. In my judgment, the correct statutory starting point is section 11 of the CSA 2000 . Section 11(1) makes it a criminal offence for a person to carry on or manage a regulated establishment or agency unless that person is registered in respect of it. Section 11 therefore requires any person managing a supported accommodation undertaking to become registered with Ofsted.
21. Regulation 14 of the 2023 Regulations operates alongside section 11 of the CSA 2000 . Where the provider of the supported accommodation undertaking is a corporate entity, as in this case, it requires that entity to appoint an individual to manage the supported accommodation undertaking and to notify Ofsted of that appointment without delay. Once the manager is appointed under regulation 14(1), section 11 of the CSA 2000 requires them to make an application under section 12 of the CSA 2000 to become registered with Ofsted.
22. Regulation 14 is not therefore irrelevant. Rather, regulation 14 provides the mechanism by which a corporate entity provider ensures that there is an identified individual responsible for the day-to-day management of the undertaking pending registration. Once registered under Part 2 of the 2000 Act , that individual becomes the registered service manager for the purposes of the statutory scheme.
23. I raised this analysis with the parties during the hearing. They did not seek to advance any substantive response to suggest that it was incorrect.
24. Drawing these matters together and applying them to the facts of this case, I decided that: a. Section 13 of the CSA 2000 provides that registration may only be granted where Ofsted is satisfied that the requirements of the 2023 Regulations, together with the requirements of any other enactment which appears to Ofsted to be relevant (including section 11 of the CSA 2000), are being, and will continue to be, complied with. b. Regulation 14 of the 2023 Regulations required TLYL to appoint a manager. c. Section 11 of the CSA 2000 required that manager to be registered with Ofsted. d. Both the appointment of a manager and the registration of that manager with Ofsted were mandatory requirements, not matters of discretion. e. Accordingly, the question arising under section 13(2) of the CSA 2000 was whether Ofsted was satisfied that those requirements were being, and would continue to be, complied with. The Procedural Framework
25. HESC Rule 8(4)(c) provides that the Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings where “the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding”.
26. An application under HESC Rule 8(4)(c) requires a two-stage analysis. First, the Tribunal must determine whether the appeal, or the relevant part of it, has no reasonable prospect of success. Secondly, if that threshold is met, the Tribunal must decide whether it should exercise its discretion to strike out the proceedings. Strike out does not follow automatically. Rule 8(4) provides that the Tribunal may strike out proceedings where one of the grounds in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) is established. The use of the word “may” confers a discretion which must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective.
27. The overriding objective is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes: a. dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; b. avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; c. ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; d. using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and e. avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.
28. In determining whether there is a reasonable prospect of success, I remind myself that TLYL is not required to demonstrate that its case will probably succeed at a final hearing. It is sufficient if the appeal has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 .
29. As explained by the House of Lords in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16 , the distinction is between claims which have a realistic prospect of success and those which are merely fanciful. A claim is fanciful if it lacks any real substance and is not realistically capable of succeeding at a final hearing. Does the appeal have no reasonable prospect of success?
30. Ofsted’s position may be stated shortly. It submits that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success because TLYL did not have a registered service manager at the date of the Notice of Decision and continues not to have one. The requirement for a service manager to be registered with Ofsted is a mandatory statutory requirement. Accordingly, the absence of a registered service manager was fatal to TLYL’s application for registration and is equally fatal to this appeal.
31. Miss Nath submitted that Ofsted’s application must fail because its position advanced on the law in its written application was incorrect.
32. In the alternative, Miss Nath submitted that Ofsted’s analysis was incomplete. She contended that there were wider matters, relevant to the Tribunal’s determination of the application, which were capable of affecting the outcome. Those matters were as follows: a. First, there was a dispute of fact between the parties concerning Ofsted’s rejection of Ms West’s application on 9 June 2026. b. Secondly, she contended that Ofsted’s position derives from its published policy rather than from any requirement imposed by the statutory scheme itself. c. Thirdly, there are wider issues in the appeal that are both substantial and potentially capable of leading to the appeal being allowed, whether in whole or in part.
33. In my judgment, the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. My full reasons are set out below.
34. Given the correct analysis as to the law, Miss Nath submitted that Ofsted’s application must fail. She contended that Ofsted’s case rested on the proposition that TLYL had failed to comply with regulation 14. However, on the proper construction of regulation 14, that proposition is unsustainable. Regulation 14 requires only the appointment of a service manager. Ms West had been appointed to that role and, accordingly, the requirement imposed by regulation 14 was met.
35. Whilst I accept Miss Nath’s construction of regulation 14 (for the reasons set out above), I do not accept that it follows that Ofsted’s application must fail. The fact that Ofsted’s analysis of regulation 14 was incorrect does not, of itself, determine the outcome of the application. The application must be determined by reference to the correct statutory framework, including the substantive requirements which arise under it.
36. I have had regard to the overriding objective in HESC Rule 2. It would be contrary to that objective to permit an appeal that has no reasonable prospect of success to proceed to a three-day final hearing absent a valid and proportionate reason. Such a course would result in unnecessary cost to the parties and an unjustified use of Tribunal resources. I have therefore considered the strike out application against the correct statutory framework.
37. It was not in dispute that the statutory scheme requires TLYL to have a registered service manager in order to become registered. At paragraph 15 of TLYL’s response to Ofsted’s application it states: “The Appellant… does not suggest that the RSM requirement is optional” . To the extent there is any dispute as to that, for the reasons set out above, the existence of that requirement is beyond dispute. The interplay between regulation 14 of the 2023 regulations and section 11 of the CSA 2000 makes that requirement mandatory.
38. It was also not in dispute that as at the date of the Notice of Decision, and still as at the date of the preliminary hearing, TLYL had no registered service manager. In my judgment that is fatal to these proceedings.
39. There is a three-day final hearing of this appeal listed for March 2027. At that hearing the Tribunal must make its decision based on all the evidence available to it as at the date of that hearing. The Tribunal is not restricted to evidence available to Ofsted when the Notice of Decision was issued. The Tribunal is in effect looking at the decision afresh; it is not judicially reviewing Ofsted’s decision-making process.
40. At the final hearing, TLYL must be able to satisfy the Tribunal that the requirements set out in section 13(2) of the CSA 2000 are being and will continue to be complied with (so far as applicable) in relation to TLYL. They are that: a. the requirements of the 2023 Regulations; and b. the requirements of any other enactment which appears to the Tribunal to be relevant.
41. At this stage, I need only be satisfied that there is a reasonable, or realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect that TLYL will be able to satisfy the Tribunal that these requirements are, and will continue to be, complied with. However, the absence of a registered service manager makes that impossible. Compliance with the requirements in section 13(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 necessarily requires the appointment of a registered service manager, and there is not one, nor is there any realistic prospect that there will be one by the time of the final hearing because of Ofsted’s reliance on its Social Care Enforcement Policy. Therefore, there is no realistic basis upon which the Tribunal could conclude that the relevant regulatory requirements are being, and will continue to be, complied with. It follows that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.
42. I accept Ms Nath’s submissions that it would not usually be appropriate to strike out an appeal, if facts relevant to the ultimate outcome of the case are disputed. But I am not persuaded that any dispute of fact concerning Ofsted’s rejection of Ms West’s application on 9 June 2026 is materially relevant. My reasons are: a. When Ms West made her application to become registered as the service manager for TLYL, Ofsted was required to consider her application under section 13 of the CSA 2000 . Ms West was therefore required to comply with: i. the requirements of the 2023 Regulations; and ii. the requirements of any other enactment which appeared to Ofsted to be relevant. b. Regulation 12 of the 2023 Regulations sets out the fitness requirements for a registered service manager. Regulation 12(e) provides that an i n dividual may only be registered as a registered service manager if full and satisfactory information is available in relation to the individual in respect of each of the matters in Schedule 1. c. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 of the 2023 Regulations mandates that anyone seeking to register to manage a supported accommodation undertaking must provide an enhanced criminal record certificate otherwise known as a DBS certificate. d. It was not in dispute that in June 2026, Ms West was unable to provide Ofsted with a copy of her DBS certificate because it had been lost. e. Ms Nath submits that this was no more than an administrative issue because Ms West was registered with the DBS Update Service, enabling Ofsted to verify her DBS status online without awaiting a replacement certificate. f. Ofsted did not accept that Ms West was registered with the DBS Update Service. This does therefore present a dispute of fact. But I am not persuaded this dispute is materially relevant. g. Whether Ms West was registered with the DBS Update Service, and whether Ofsted was justified in returning her application, does not assist TLYL for two reasons: i. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Regulations requires the provision of “ an enhanced criminal record certificate ”. On an ordinary reading of that provision, Ms West was required to provide the certificate itself. Registration with the DBS Update Service is not a substitute for that requirement. ii. In any event, even if TLYL's position were correct on that issue, it would not alter the outcome. Even assuming that Ms West was registered with the DBS Update Service, that such registration satisfied paragraph 2 of Schedule 1, and that Ofsted wrongly returned her application on 9 June 2026, the fundamental difficulty remains unchanged: TLYL had no registered service manager when the Notice of Decision was issued, still has no registered service manager, and there is no realistic prospect that it will have one by the time of the final hearing. h. In Three Rivers No 3 [2001] UKHL 16 at paragraph 95 it was stated: “it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible”. i. In my judgment, the position advanced by Miss Nath is a paradigm example of the situation envisaged in Three Rivers . Even if TLYL were to prove all facts that it offers to prove, it will not be entitled to the relief it seeks.
43. For these reasons, I am not persuaded that any dispute of fact concerning Ofsted’s rejection of Ms West’s application on 9 June 2026 is materially relevant. Any such dispute of fact is not therefore a barrier to the strike out application.
44. The fact that Ofsted places significant reliance upon its Social Care Enforcement Policy is also immaterial for similar reasons.
45. It was not in dispute that: a. on 14 July 2026, Ms West provided a complete application to become TLYL registered service manager; b. Ofsted refused to accept and process that application because it had been received after service of the Notice of Decision; c. Ofsted’s decision was a decision made in accordance with its Social Care Enforcement Policy as opposed to be a decision made in accordance with statute.
46. But none of the above assists TLYL. Neither does Miss Nath’s submission that Ms West’s application on 14 July 2026 was not an application by a new individual because Ms West had already made two unsuccessful attempts at making her application prior to the Notice of Decision being issued. Irrespective of these facts or alleged facts, the same fundamental difficulty remains unchanged: TLYL had no registered service manager when the Notice of Decision was issued, still has no registered service manager, and there is no realistic prospect that it will have one by the time of the final hearing. Therefore, for reasons already stated, the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.
47. Further to the above, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider Ofsted’s reliance on its Social Care Enforcement Policy. The Tribunal is not judicially reviewing Ofsted’s decision. As set out above, the Tribunal considers the issues arising from the statutory provisions afresh, on the evidence available at the time of the hearing. If TLYL wishes to challenge the lawfulness of Ofsted’s decisions or its reliance on the Social Care Enforcement Policy, then the appropriate forum for that challenge is the courts by way of judicial review. This Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine any such challenge.
48. Finally, I am not persuaded that the fact that TLYL raises wider issues in the appeal such as Ofsted’s approach to planning permission, the weight attributed to certain evidence, and the assessment of safeguarding concerns have any bearing on my assessment as to reasonable prospect of success. I reject Miss Nath’s submission that those issues are potentially capable of leading to the appeal being allowed, whether in whole or in part. It is fanciful to suggest that any of these issues could overcome the fundamental deficiencies outlined above. Whatever findings of fact may be made on those wider issues, they will not change the fact that TLYL had no and still have no registered service manager.
49. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. Exercise of discretion and the overriding objective
50. As noted above, the conclusion that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success is not the end of the analysis. I must determine whether, in all the circumstances, the appeal should be struck out. In doing so, I must seek to give effect to the overriding objective in HESC Rule 2.
51. I have considered the importance of the proceedings to TLYL and the fact that the appeal raises the wider issues referred to above. I have also taken account of TLYL’s interest in having those matters determined at a final hearing.
52. Those considerations do not, however, displace the Tribunal’s duty to deal with the case fairly and justly. The wider issues identified by TLYL cannot overcome the absence of a registered service manager and therefore cannot affect the outcome of the appeal. A final hearing would not provide TLYL with a realistic opportunity to obtain the relief it seeks.
53. The appeal is listed for a three-day final hearing. Permitting it to proceed would require both parties to incur further costs in preparing evidence, submissions and attendance at that hearing. It would also require the Tribunal to allocate substantial judicial and administrative resources to determining an appeal which has no realistic prospect of success. That would not be proportionate to the issues that remain capable of determination or represent a fair use of the parties’ or the Tribunal’s resources.
54. I have considered whether a less restrictive case-management measure would be sufficient. I am satisfied that it would not. Further directions, additional evidence or a shorter hearing could not remedy the fundamental difficulty identified above. Nor would postponing the proceedings be justified where there is no identified basis upon which TLYL could satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement within the present appeal.
55. Strike out is a significant step and I have not treated it as an automatic consequence of my conclusion under Rule 8(4)(c). However, fairness does not require an appeal to proceed where, even if the disputed matters were resolved in TLYL’s favour, it could not succeed. Avoiding the unnecessary expenditure of the parties’ resources, the disproportionate use of Tribunal resources and further delay is consistent with, and required by, the overriding objective.
56. Drawing those matters together, I exercise my discretion to strike out the appeal. Conclusion
57. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and that it is fair, just and proportionate to strike it out. The appeal is therefore struck out pursuant to Rule 8(4)(c) of the HESC Rules. It is ordered that:
1. The appeal is struck out under Rule 8.
2. The Telephone Case Management Hearing listed on 10 February 2027 shall be vacated.
3. The Final hearing listed to commence on 02 March 2027 shall be vacated.
4. This is a final decision. The Appellant can apply for the decision to be set aside because of procedural error, or for permission to appeal because of legal error. Any application must be received by the Tribunal within 28 days and should be made on one of the relevant onward appeal forms ( S1 or P1 ) which can be downloaded from the website or obtained from the Tribunal’s administrative centre. Judge O’Neill First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care) Date Issued: 23 October 2026