UK case law

Uttlesford DC v Anthony Mongan & Ors

[2026] EWHC KB 2557 · High Court (King's Bench Division) · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Mr Justice Ritchie :

1. I have before me a hearing which is the return date of a previously granted injunction for alleged breaches of planning control, the injunction having been applied for under Section 187B of the I am grateful to Ms Caroline Bolton and Ms Choudhury for their submissions. Town and Country Planning Act 1990 . Bundles

2. I have, by way of bundles, a digital Claimant’s bundle to which some documents have been added, a bundle from the fourth Defendant (D4), who is called Lorna Derrett, a first Defendant’s authorities bundle, a Claimant’s authorities bundle and some other loose documents which I have put in the main bundle. Chronology and evidence

3. The chronology in this case, factually, is as follows. On 30 April 2026 there was a press inquiry made to the Claimant Council about what they were going to do about occupation of land at Mole Hill Green, Felstead, Dunmow, Essex, which now has registered title AA90723, but at that time was thought to have registered title AA83291.

4. On 1 May 2026 numerous complaints were received by the Claimant Council from local residents. On 3 May 2026, Sarah Marshall, who is employed by the Claimant, did a drive-by of the land and saw hard standing had been laid on what was previously a green field and fencing had been put up. On 5 May, the Claimant issued a temporary stop notice and served it by nailing it to posts on the land. At that time, there were caravans on the land. An application was made on that day for change of use of the land to become a 12 pitch traveller site and by pitch, I mean fenced off areas upon which either semi-permanent accommodation or mobile accommodation could be situated. By 7 May 2026, at least one other caravan had arrived on site.

5. On 7 May 2026, an emergency out-of-hours ex-parte (that means only one party turns up), application was heard by Mr Justice Mould, who granted an injunction prohibiting, without planning consent, the Defendants, including unknown persons, from:

1. bringing onto the land hardcore materials, caravans, motorhomes, port-a-cabins or toilets;

2. stationing on the land, caravans, port-a-cabins or accommodation;

3. residing on the land, (that is any of the Defendants residing on the land);

4. constructing things on the land;

5. installing or connecting services on the land;

6. undertaking further development;

7. parking plant or machinery on the land.

6. The land was shown edged red on a plan attached to that injunction, which encompassed all of the relevant land originally entitled AA83291.

7. The Defendants to that injunction were first, Anthony Mongan, second, persons unknown (PUs), being the owners or occupiers of caravans or other forms of residential occupation situated on or being brought onto the land, or persons undertaking operational development on the land without a lawful planning consent, or changing the use of the land without lawful planning consent. The third Defendant was persons unknown bringing caravans onto the land or attempting to bring caravans onto the land. This was an injunction against one known person and otherwise against the world, but only the persons in the world who were bringing prohibited items and doing prohibited activities on the land.

8. The order also dealt with alternative service of pleadings, evidence and orders, by nailing them to posts at the entrance to the land. It provided for a return date. Undertakings by the Claimant were not given because it is a council. The ex-parte injunction was made upon the basis of a witness statement by Sarah Marshall, which at that time was unsigned but later was signed on 5 May 2026. She is a planning enforcement team officer of nine and a half years’ experience and she set out the numerous complaints that the council had received on 1 May 2026.

9. She did a search of the Land Registry, which showed that the land was owned by UK Real Estate and Land Limited as registered owners. She did her drive-by on 3 May and saw hardstanding and fencing and on 5 May, as I have mentioned, and residents sent photos and videos of the pitches which had been created on the land. She did not exhibit them. On 5 May she instructed bailiffs to put up a temporary stop notice which was served by bailiffs on that day and they took various photos, which I will describe in a minute. As I mentioned, on 5 May, a change of use application was put in through planning agents. The relevant person was called Spencer Copping. That was later either withdrawn, refused or invalid.

10. On 7 May various residents informed the Claimant that another caravan had gone on site. I have looked carefully at the photos taken on 5 May, by the enquiry agents, and at the email which the bailiffs sent to the Claimant. The land looks like a building site. It has trucks and diggers upon it. It has some mobile caravans and one static caravan. It has no front gates and there are photos of at least six men and one woman who have later, during these proceedings, been identified as the first Defendant and members of his broader family. My interpretation of those photographs, which I will give in a little more detail later, taking into account all of the evidence, is that this looks like a rapid action pitch building operation with heavy machinery, a heavy lorry. It was a “let’s do it quick before the council can catch us” sort of operation. There is no evidence in those photographs that the men and women and their children had moved in, were sleeping, living, eating, toileting, playing or going in and out to work on or from that site at that stage.

11. The order of Mr Justice Mould was served by Stephen Dalton on the site on 7 May on posts and the evidence of service was provided in a witness statement. He also exhibited an email from the service agents. It was hearsay. It had come from a lady called Tracy Burrows in the bailiff’s office. She reported that the bailiffs thought that the land looked vacant and/or the word derelict was used, although there were caravans occupied on it but they considered that the land was unoccupied.

12. There was a second witness statement from Sarah Marshall sworn on 12 May 2026. This set out that, on 7 May, Lorna Derrett, as her name was spelled there (although I think her name may only have one T), called her. She called back and she wanted to know why her land was included in the injunction. At that stage, I conclude, the council did not know that the larger parcel of land had been split up into five smaller parcels. In any event, Lorna Derrett asserted that she owned part of the land and Sarah Marshall basically said, they had done a Land Registry search and that is what they had found. Lorna Derrett responded that she had made an application on 30 December 2025 for a self-built cabin with three bedrooms but that had been refused on 24 February 2026.

13. The council became aware, according to Sarah Marshall in this witness statement, that BBC News had reported that parcels of land had been sold off on Facebook. However, as a result, Sarah Marshall visited again on 11 May 2026 and, in her judgment, she could not assess that any further works had been done but she considered from that visit, that the site was unoccupied.

14. In a third witness statement from Sarah Marshall, sworn on 12 May 2026, she described her visit in more detail. She served the claim form, the order and the notices. She noticed fencing was up. She took photos of the various caravans. At that stage, there was no front gate and it did not appear to be occupied at all. I have looked at the photos and they give the impression of building and development works in progress but no impression of residential occupation.

15. Then, on the next day, 13 May 2026, Brilliance Solicitors came on record to be acting for D1, that is Mr Anthony Mongan and D2, that is the persons unknown. I am not sure that any solicitor can act for persons unknown because they cannot receive instructions but we will find out later in this story that that in fact meant the wider members of the first Defendant’s family. An acknowledgement of service was put in on the same day, stating that the claim would be contested. On the same day, a first witness statement was put in from Anthony Mongan and he said that he was a traveller and/or gypsy, he was not literate and this was his new home solution. A witness statement was also put in by Tarsine Choudhury, the first Defendant’s solicitor, dated the same date, saying that the Defendants needed an adjournment and so did she because she had only been instructed recently.

16. An order was made on 13 May 2026 the original return date, by Deputy High Court Judge Claire Padley. The ex-parte injunction was continued and directions were given for the Defendants to file their evidence by 27 May 2026, the Claimants by 10 June, and permission was granted to join Lorna Derrett. The return date was given for today, 18 June 2026, over a month forwards. The bundle was to be delivered three days before, skeletons two days before and alternative service was provided on the posts, but service was also to be by email to the solicitor.

17. Service did take place, through Gary Lynch, on 26 May 2026 and photos were attached to that, showing new posh gates had been added to the land and various concrete and wooden fences appear to me to have been increased on the land. There were caravans on the land, there was a Range Rover, there was a builder’s truck and there appeared to be some underground piping. This gave rise, at least in my mind, to a strongish suspicion, but nothing more, that further work had been done and that there had been a breach of the injunction ordered by Mr Justice Mould, but no breach allegations were raised and no contempt proceedings were pursued by the Claimant.

18. On 27 May 2026, a second witness statement was signed by Anthony Mongan and in that he stated that he had bought two parcels of land which were part of AA83291. The second Defendants, namely the unknown persons who are owners and occupiers on his case, were his extended family. He said he had bought the parcels for £130,000 from UK Real Estate and Land 2 Limited and he had sent an application to the Land Registry to register the transfer but, I do not know whether this was intentionally done or not, there is no date on the application and he did not provide me with the date of transfer or the date of purchase. So that is a rather substantial hole in the evidence provided by Mr Mongan.

19. Mr Mongan informed the Court that 12 plots were occupied by 12 families and that at the time of the drive-by by Sarah Marshall on 1 May, these people were occupying the caravans on site. Interestingly, he produced no adequate photographic evidence either of the families entering the site or occupying the site. I will come to the photos he did provide in a minute. He gave evidence, in a quite legal way in his witness statement, point by point, answering the evidence of Sarah Marshall. He asked why the Claimant had not produced the photos and videos provided to the Claimant by the residents? They had not been exhibited. He said that he had heavy machinery and construction machinery on site, so the children were not allowed out of the caravans. He said of the planning application, that it had not been exhibited by Sarah Marshall.

20. He asserted that the Defendants had occupied before 7 May 2026, so that Sarah Marshall was wrong to say that occupation was imminent thereafter. He said that this was not a conservation area and he referred to a witness statement, unsworn, by Simon McKay, allegedly dated 20 May 2026, who is a chartered town planner, who set out his submissions for why planning is likely to be granted for the application that the first Defendant wanted to make to split up his plots into 12 sites. He set out the Claimant’s Gypsies Accommodation Assessment 2024, stating there was a need for 90 pitches and that 64 should be provided before 2027. He asserted there was no local policy. He asserted the impact would be low. He asserted that plants could be planted around the boundaries. He asserted it was not a nationally important landscape site or a conservation area. There was no surface water issue and there was suitable highway access and he asserted that there was no significant impact on the two nearby listed buildings. Therefore, he asserted there was a reasonable prospect of getting planning.

21. Mr Mongan went on in his witness statement to say that he was developing the land for residences. He had made retrospective planning applications, but he gave absolutely no explanation of why he did not make any prospective planning applications and asked the council in advance before moving in. He just left that completely blank.

22. He then complained that the council had made no welfare assessments of the families whom he asserted were living on the land, whilst not asserting that he had ever asked them to do so. The attitude of Mr Anthony Mongan comes out through that witness statement. He is nitpicking on quasi-legal points; he assumes that he has no responsibility to do what is reasonable and he assumes that all the responsibility for all relevant actions falls onto the Claimant’s shoulders and hence those of the taxpayers. I am not sure that that attitude is conducive to a good interaction between himself, his family and the council.

23. In any event, he made no comment upon the second and third witness statements of Sarah Marshall. He said he had never heard of Spencer Copping (his own planning expert) and he provided photos of a caravan which was occupied with children. Unlike the other photographs which he had provided taken on 3 May, which had dates on them and the iPhone-style date stamp, these photographs had all of that information deleted. So it was impossible for this Court to know upon what date those photographs had been taken, whether it was before 7 May or, and I think this is more likely, after 3 June 2026.

24. On 13 May 2026, the amended claim form was issued, adding Lorna Derrett. In the fourth witness statement of Sarah Marshall, dated 10 June 2026, she set out that she had researched the title and there were new plans. Some land had been removed. It looked as if, on 30 April 2025, some land was removed or perhaps in October 2025. What was clear from a plan which she exhibited was that, what used to be AA83291, in other words a single rectangular plot, had now been split up into five plots. Using North as the top of the plot and South as the bottom, there are two at the top in the North: Northwest and Northeast, which are AA89299 and 88273. Then there is a middle plot, which is AA90723, and then there are two in the South. The South-West is 83291 and the South-East is 88474. Subsequently, it was clarified by both the parties, that it is the middle plot which is the subject of these proceedings, the one which is owned by Anthony Mongan. It apparently has two parts to it, but as is shown on the plan, it appears just to be one.

25. In any event, Sarah Marshall confirmed that Spencer Copping had submitted a planning application on 5 May 2026, but there was then some confusion in her witness statement about to which plot she was referring to. She then said that the first Defendant’s planning application was eventually withdrawn. She accepted that the land is not in the conservation area nor an important landscape area, but it is open countryside. The council then attended on 13 May 2026 to see what work had been done the night before, because residents had complained again, and found the caravans tipped at an angle, suggesting they were not occupied. I do not mean tipped sideways. I mean the towing bracket at the front was on the ground, and hence the front was down and the rear was up, which would certainly make it more difficult to make a cup of tea, sit on the loo and walk inside. It might make it still possible to lie down, because the bed would be on a bit of a slope, and it might make it rather risky for children to live in such caravans, constantly running around on slopes. I think that is probably an important piece of evidence.

26. Residents had not reported that anyone was living on the site, a relevant piece of evidence. Then, residents reported on 3 June 2026 that a generator had been moved onto the site, submitted videos and said it was noisy. Also, photos of washing and clothes and children’s bikes were provided, and Sarah Marshall said that those did not confirm that anyone was living there on or before 7 May. She disputed that anyone was living there before 7 May, but it did raise, at least in my mind, the concern that people had moved in since the order of Mr Justice Mould, as continued by Deputy High Court Judge Clare Padley. In any event, photos were attached, which showed the injunction stapled to the fences and the new front gates and some children’s pushchairs and washing, and that is photos from 3 June 2026.

27. In the fifth witness statement of Sarah Marshall, sworn on 11 June 2026, she stated she attended on 10 June 2026 and served the amended claim form and did so by fixing it to the fence. I am not sure that was particularly helpful to Lorna Derrett. All the Claimant had to do was find out where she lived and serve her at her house, but they did not. Photos from the site showed vans and caravans. A certificate of service by email of the amended claim form was provided by J Walker of Sharp Pritchard. This had been served on Brilliance Solicitors. That does not help in relation to serving on D4, who had not instructed Brilliance Solicitors. So it seems to me that Lorna Derrett was probably not properly served. In any event, she came to hear of it and there is evidence set out in the witness statement of Sarah Marshall.

28. Turning then to Lorna Derrett herself, on 13 June 2026, she explained in a witness statement that she owned a separate parcel of land nearby and she fully supported the Claimant’s efforts to prevent unauthorised occupation of the neighbouring parcel of land owned by Anthony Mongan. She had reported all the problems to her MP. She had submitted her earlier planning application, which had been refused. She had wondered: why am I involved in this injunction? I am not occupying inappropriately! and she was, in my judgment, quite right so to wonder.

29. There is some correspondence that has been provided to me between Brilliance Solicitors and Sharpe Pritchard. The first relevant letter is 3 June 2026, when Brilliance, quite properly set out the names of all of the Defendants who were actually occupying the plots. I will not recite them all here, but they are set out in that letter and they required the Claimant to notify each Defendant before issuing applications. They said they were going to draft a variation application to vary the order to name the Defendants. That was 3 June 2026, it is now 15 days later, and they have not done so. It was asserted in that letter that occupation had been established. The Claimants rejected that assertion in response in correspondence.

30. A third witness statement was filed by Anthony Mongan dated 18 June 2026. It was in breach of the directions given by Clare Padley because it was filed today, served last night, I believe and then finally signed off today. I let it in, in any event, because, in a mature and professional way, Ms Bolton did not object to it. She asked for time and read it and dealt with it. But I take it into account that this witness statement was delivered late, despite the Defendants having instructed solicitors more than four weeks before the hearing and despite the clear directions of a deputy High Court judge about when it should have been submitted. In that, Mr Mongan suggested that, with his wife and four children, he had moved into the plots. There were 12 plots occupied by his broader family, brothers and mother and father and cousins. He said of the temporary stop notice that they had entered before it. He complained there was a lack of authorised sites. It is interesting that he did not set out in his witness statement that he ever asked the Claimant council whether they had any available sites. Interestingly, his solicitor, Ms Choudhury, relied on a document generated by the council setting out that they in fact had 29 sites available for travellers. If you do not ask, you do not get and that rather indicates to me they never intended to ask, because they did not.

31. Mr Mongan said his plan, with his family, was to settle down, not travel, and to register with a GP. He has two very young children. He occupies plot 4, he says and then he set out various dated stamped photographs of him, his brother, Charlie Ward, Edward Ward, Edward Mongan, Angela Mongan, Martin Mongan and his father’s car, on site on 5 May when the bailiffs turned up. I have no doubt they were on site when the bailiffs turned up and, as I shall be finding in a little bit more detail later, that was part of the rush job to build quickly before the council could react plan. That does not mean that they were living there residentially though.

32. In that witness statement, he changed his mind about Spencer Copping, who he re-remembered he had in fact employed through WSA Planning to make his planning application and he was upset that Sarah Marshall had told the court that he and his family were not in occupation. What he did not say in that witness statement was that he ever wrote to the council before he moved in or on the day he moved in to say, “hello, we have moved in”, so I do not see quite why she is so upset that the council say he was not then in occupation, particularly in view of the council’s evidence. He also complained there had been no welfare assessment for his family, but he did not put any evidence in that he had ever asked for a welfare assessment. Submissions

33. Going through the skeleton arguments, the Claimant’s case is that all 12 families are not in occupation and that what the families have done is rush to a fait accompli. The Claimant asserts that the Claimant’s evidence undermines the Defendant’s assertion of residential occupation and the Claimant asserts there was none before the date of the ex-parte injunction. The Claimant asserts that no welfare checks are required because there was no residential occupation before the order. After the order, which was not only a “do not develop” order, it is a “do not start residence” order. It is stressed by Claimant’s counsel this is not an eviction order because nobody was living there or nobody was living there at the time the ex-parte order was granted.

34. Claimant’s counsel took me through the various evidence in support of her case, the law in section 187 and the American Cyanamid test and then relied upon Wolverhampton [2023] UKSC 47 and dicta in The Jockey Club [2024] EWHC 1786, and the criteria set out there.

35. The first Defendant did not file a skeleton on time in accordance with directions but provided it at 11.30 last night and to me this morning. I could have excluded it but chose not to do so because I wished to ensure that the Defendants had every reasonable opportunity to put their arguments forwards. No objection was taken by the Claimant’s lawyers. In the first Defendant’s skeleton it was submitted that the first Defendant owns the land and that gypsies are a recognised ethnic group under the heading Race in the Equality Act 2010 . He challenged the injunction, he set out the chronology. It was asserted by Ms Choudhury, through the counsel she instructed, Mr Alan Masters of One Pump Court, in the written skeleton, that the Defendants were in occupation prior to the ex-parte injunction and seven caravans were on site. The planning application was set out.

36. A complaint was made that the Claimants had failed to apply to join the named Defendants, the first Defendant’s wider family, despite being told of their names on 3 June 2026. I should interject here, counsel has informed me that an undertaking will be given by the Claimant’s solicitors to do so within seven days and I accept that undertaking. The Claimant’s solicitors should have applied to join the named Defendant earlier. It is one of the principles of PU or UP injunctions that as soon as the beneficiary of the injunction gets to know of new named Defendants they need to be joined because they are no longer unknown and so it might be argued technically they are no longer bound by the injunction because if they are not unknown and they are not named, there is a difficult legal argument. However, I am told that that application will be made and I take that undertaking at face value.

37. Mr Masters and Ms Choudhury set out further in their skeleton that the Claimant’s website said that if the authority cannot demonstrate in their five year plan sufficient deliverables, then paragraph 11D of the National Framework applies and the authority should consider how to overcome planning objections under paragraph 11D which creates a presumption in favour of development. That may be so. I am not a planning officer. That is a matter for the Claimant council, who needs to carry out their decisions wholly in good faith and in accordance with the law.

38. Article 8 was then set out and the advocates for the Defendants relied on a case called Bromley v London Gypsies [2020] EWCA Civ. 12 , which they said reaffirmed South Bucks v Porter [2003] 2 AC 588 , and backed up what they say was their occupation argument. They complained again of no welfare enquiries and asserted a continuing duty to make welfare enquiries. Counsel relied on Porter and submitted that an injunction was refused on appeal because there was a failure to make Article 8 enquiries. Counsel relied on best interests of the children in H v The Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 308 and Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74

56.

39. The Defendants’ Counsel asserted there was no evidence of suitable alternative accommodation if the Defendants were evicted and relied on Brentwood v Ball & Ors [2009] EWHC 2433, a decision of Stadler J. In the alternative, if the development was unauthorised, they had applied retrospectively and submitted it was not unlawful to behave in that way because it was allowed by the . Article 8 of the ECHR was set out and the difficulty travellers suffer in getting councils to provide accommodation and then a request was made to adjourn the hearing date in the skeleton. TCPA 1990

40. The Defendants sought to continue the injunction, but varied to allow the Defendants to stay residing on the land. They objected to ordering their occupation to cease. They objected because no ECHR balancing exercise had been carried out. They relied on South Cambridgeshire v Gammel [2005] EWCA Civ. 1429 . They asserted even if the caravans were not occupied they were clearly the Defendants’ homes because the Defendants travel a lot. The Article 8 duty was set out and referred to again.

41. The Defendants asserted there was no history by these Defendants of breaches and the Defendants would undertake: a. firstly, to leave if they lost the planning application, b. secondly to return the land to its previous condition, and c. thirdly, they would not oppose the injunction against further persons residing on the land or further development. Basically, through those undertakings, what the Defendants wanted was to live on the land whilst all of this went on. They sought directions for a Porter hearing, a welfare hearing, on the basis that they had established Article 8 rights. Case law

42. I have carefully read and I have taken into account the case law cited to me and Chapman v UK [2001] Butterworths HRC 48, in which a traveller bought land and was refused planning and it was held that interference with Article 8 rights had taken place, but the injunction was justified to protect the other residents and it was a legitimate aim to injunct the travellers however, proper regard had to be had to Article 8 for making such decisions. That case might help me were I to find that the Defendants’ Article 8 rights were established on the land.

43. Also, in South Bucks v Porter [2003] UKHL 26 , various councils were granted various injunctions under section 187B of the TCPA , to prevent various travellers living in mobile homes. They refused planning. On appeal, the Court found that there had been a failure to consider Article 8 rights and the appeals were allowed. On further appeal the House of Lords dismissed the further appeal. In summary, the House of Lords said that section 187B was a discretionary power and all the circumstances were relevant. The courts generally would not examine planning policies but they had to consider section 6 of the and Human Rights Act 1998 Article 8 of the ECHR if the Defendants were residing in occupation of the land and if so, they would only grant an injunction if it was just and proportionate to do so. So, by example, Mr Berry, who was one of the Defendants in that case, had moved on to his land with his family and four months later the injunction was made to evict him and planning had been refused. Enforcement notices were appealed, the Claimant won and no alternative site was available. In particular, I rely on paragraphs 18, 27 to 29, 31, 34, 36 and 37 of the judgment of Lord Bingham.

44. I was also referred by the Defendants to Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 , which is a case involving constructive trusts and priority, in relation to mortgages. Although it is a House of Lords case I did not find that the facts were of much help. There were some parallel facts, in that the wife in that case was doing DIY in a knackered property her husband had bought using a Swiss trust fund and alleged that that was occupation, but that factual matrix did not lead to anything in the House of Lords judgment that assisted me in determining residential occupation for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR, rather than occupation in relation to overriding interests in trusts.

45. I was also referred to Tandridge v King [2026] EWHC 1256, a decision of Mr Douglas Jones KC, sitting as a deputy, on a return date for an injunction. The Defendants had moved a caravan onto land on 27 February 2026 and on 28 February 2026 the claimants had filed an injunction application which was granted ex-parte. The factual matrix revolved around one single point - whether residential occupation had started the day before. The defendants asserted that residential occupation for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR had started the day before. The claimants disputed that. The defendants’ evidence rather fell apart, in that the defendants initially said the husband and wife, the children and their parents had all moved in, but then the claimants found out the defendants’ parents had secured accommodation on tenancies elsewhere so the defendants flipped their evidence to say: well actually it was not our parents, it was just us that moved in, which was not impressive. The judge went carefully through the relevant criteria: serious issue to be tried, damages adequate, balance of convenience and decided that he could not make any firm finding on occupation because it was not appropriate on a return date and that was a matter for trial. I am not sure I agree with him on the procedural decision but that is not the point. What he found was that he was not convinced there was sufficient evidence on the defendants’ side of occupation for that to tip in the balance within the balance of convenience test. So that case does not help me much, although it is a nicely laid out judgement with the relevant criteria in it.

46. The next case which was put before me by Ms Bolton, who had to do some last minute research, was Surrey Heath Borough Council James, Rob and Others [2020] EWHC 2014, a decision of Mr Justice Freedman. At paragraph 32, the vulnerabilities of gypsies were laid out, but it was said that those are not directly relevant to individual sites. At paragraph 35, the relevant factors for determining residential occupation and the balance of convenience were set out and I take his guidance into account. One is the shortness of the occupation and the other is failing to observe a temporary stop notice. I will come to the factors which I consider are relevant, but I agree with Mr Justice Freedman that those are some relevant factors.

47. The next relevant case which was put before me by Ms Bolton was Surrey Heath v Khosrwo Shir [2019] EWHC 3251, a decision of Her Honour Judge Sarah Richardson sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. In that case, paragraphs 61 to 71 are relevant. One person was on site with children, but in breach of the original ex-parte injunction, and the Court had to balance matters sensitively. An eviction, in effect, by injunction was ordered. Analysis

48. Turning then to the matters that I have to decide. In relation to Lorna Derrett. In my judgment, she should never have been joined, she was not served and I delete her as a Defendant to this cause of action. If I had needed to do so I would have stuck out the cause of action against her because she was never served, she never should have been served, she never did anything wrong and there was no cause of action against her. I would have awarded costs to her but she contacted me earlier in the week and asked not to turn up but to appear by video. My clerk communicated with her to say she should attend, then she communicated with the Claimant council and they agreed to drop the claim against her. She did not ask for costs.

49. The second matter that I need to deal with is the application to join the named Defendants. I grant that application on the undertaking given that a proper application will be issued and the application fee will be paid. The new Defendants should then be added.

50. The third is to look at the unknown persons criteria and to see whether the injunction should be continued against unknown persons. This is slightly easier because no party considers that it would be inappropriate to continue the injunction against unknown persons but for this I intend to go through the criteria set out in Valero Energy v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134, at the same time taking into account the useful criteria set out by Mr Justice Mann in the Jockey Club case.

51. Firstly, substantive requirement A: is there a cause of action? I consider that there is a civil cause of action identified in the claim form and it is a Quia Timet action: “what I fear”. It is also based on the actions that had already been done, namely unlawful development in breach of planning of greenfield sites to turn them into residences.

52. Secondly, has there been full and frank disclosure by the Claimant? I am slightly worried about this because the Claimant has not provided the photos and videos that they should have provided which residents had provided to them, but I do not regard that as lack of frankness. I regard the relevant evidence as having been summarised by Sarah Marshall, which I accept she summarised fairly. If there was anything in there that showed residential occupation and I found out later it had been hidden, I would take a very serious view of it, but I work on the basis that I have been properly informed by a professional.

53. Is there sufficient evidence to prove the claim? In relation to PU’s there is sufficient evidence. In other words, no unknown person should be coming on to Anthony Mongan’s site and doing work or residing there unless they were already there and hence not in breach of Mr Justice Mould’s injunction. Nobody else has the right to be there unless they are invited by him and certainly persons unknown cannot come on to the site and start building or live there. So I consider there is quite sufficient evidence in Sarah Marshall’s written statements to satisfy that criteria.

54. No realistic defence of persons unknown. I consider there is no realistic defence of persons unknown because in this process those that want to occupy the site with the first Defendant have been named and flushed out. No other person is suggested to be invited and therefore it seems to me that unknown persons have no realistic defence because they are not entitled to come on to the site and do either residence or building.

55. As for the balance of convenience and compelling justification under the altered test arising from American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 , I consider that there is a compelling justification to keep unknown persons off this site, either carrying out building works development works or services or residential use because this is not permitted on this site. That is newcomers. I take into account any balancing exercise that I would be required to do for unknown persons under DPP v Ziegler , under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but I do not consider that they are triggered.

56. Next are damages an adequate remedy? I do not consider damages are an adequate remedy for trampling all over the planning restrictions on greenfield sites and whether it is actually possible to return greenfield sites to greenfield condition after hard core has been laid and other matters have been put on them or it is just going to be a right mess, I do not know. I do not consider either that there is evidence that these Defendants or the persons soon to be named as Defendants have the finances or the apparent finances, whether in bank statements or otherwise, to be able to satisfy any damages claims that might arise. Certainly, they had £130,000 to buy the land, but I do not know whether they have any real property or assets. I know there are some caravans. I do not know the value of them. I have seen some black Range Rovers but I do not know the value of them. They could be 20 years old for all I know.

57. Procedural requirements. Are the PUs properly identified? I consider the two categories of PUs are properly determined. The terms of the injunction need to be tight and were I to grant an injunction, then I would restrict it to the relevant new parcel of land with the new land number and the new map, new registered land number and temporarily it would be restricted for a period of years upon which I will hear submissions but in the first instance, I would suggest for two years or until further order. The prohibitions must match the claim. They do. The geographic boundaries, I have already set out. The temporal duration, I have already set out. Service on PUs should be by a page on the website of the council, in my judgment, as well as by nailing to posts and fences and the right to set aside or vary should be set out in the order and the right to review should be set out as well.

58. Therefore, having taken into account the case law history of injunctions against Pus, particularly in the leading cases: Wolverhampton and in Ineos Upstream v PUs [2019] EWCA Civ 515 , particularly the judgment of Longmore LJ paragraphs 18 to 34, I consider that the injunction of Deputy High Court Judge Padley should be continued against persons unknown.

59. The next question, is should the injunction be continued against Anthony Mongan and his close family, in its current form? Firstly, I should say there is no dispute that it should be continued against any further development or any new residents or any for more building works or bringing on any equipment and all the matters that are set out in the original injunction. The only matter that is in dispute is that part of the order which states that nobody can reside on the premises. Just so that is carefully identified and there is no confusion, 1D is the paragraph in dispute. That is the prohibition on residing on the land or any part thereof. It is that that I now turn to consider. On balance I do grant a renewal of the injunction in all its terms.

60. Looking at the relevant factors, I consider that: a. breaches of planning regulations, are relevant; b. overnight, or bank holiday, secret moving into occupation is relevant; c. superfast development, is relevant; d. lack of registration at the Land Registry as the owner of the plot at the time of these activities, is relevant; e. lack of planning permission, and lack of application for planning permission until the superfast bank holiday occupation, is relevant; f. having no services at the site, is relevant; g. the site being in effect uninhabitable, is relevant; h. ignoring a temporary stop notice, is relevant; i. ignoring an injunction by for instance, putting on fancy front gates and moving on a generator, which I think is likely to have happened after the injunction, is relevant; j. living on the site, if that is what the Defendants are saying they have done, after the Mould J injunction, is relevant; k. making no request to the Claimant for a residential site before they occupied, is relevant;

61. What are the actual decisions I have got to take? Firstly, the question is: is there a serious issue to be tried. I consider there is. The first serious issue is: have planning restrictions been breached? The second serious issue is: whether residential occupation occurred before the 7 th May ex-parte order.

62. Secondly, I do not think damages are an adequate remedies but I repeat it for this part. Thirdly, I look at the balance of convenience which does not really mean convenience at all because that is a rather loose general phrase. It is the balance of justice and ensuring a status quo so that one party does not get an advantage over the other before the case goes forward. The status quo ante, in other words what was happening before, is relevant to this. Also sending out the right signal to developers and others who intend to breach planning permission without applying first. I therefore have to look at something called residential occupation.

63. No law has been put before me in any previous case which sets out how this court should define the sort of residential occupation triggering Article 8 rights. So, I am going to start with the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 which states: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There should be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

64. Starting with para. 1, the words describe the right to respect for his/her private and family life and home (if he/she has one). This case is not about the right to family life outside the home because that would be another case. I tie those together and then need to consider what factors should be taken into account when deciding whether a traveller who has rushed on to a site very quickly, over a bank holiday weekend or any weekend, when council offices are shut, built hard-standing and put on caravans with no pre-existing power, no mains water, no services, no sewage and no permission and the asserts residential occupation has built a “home” in which his family life takes place or is established. I consider that the factors are: (1) all of the circumstances. (2) Consideration of whether any occupation is residential occupation and whether it is real, not illusory. (3) Consideration of the reality of residential occupation which generally involves the normal activities of daily living at home: so, sleeping, eating, drinking, toileting, playing, communicating, walking, growing, ties within the community, for instance GP services and others, schooling, joining charities, joining clubs, taking part and perhaps working as well because so many people work from home. (4) The positive factors towards proof of private life in a home are undermined if those claiming the residential Art 8 rights, have homes elsewhere or rights to occupy elsewhere. I note that these Defendants have made absolutely no effort to inform me whether they have a home elsewhere or the right to occupy elsewhere or where they have been for the six years, six months or even three months. They have made no effort to fulfil the evidential need to show this is their home and no other place it. (5) There is a temporal element to family life. It does not just occur at the drop of a hat. It does not occur because there was a running race to get into a caravan recently hauled onto a green field, before the local authority turn up on the next working day. That approach is a childish interpretation of the ability to gain the serious rights granted by the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 . I of course accept that family life, at home, could arise very quickly. I imagine, if somebody has just rented or bought a flat or house and has just moved in. The moment husband, wife and children step over the threshold, they are in, that is their new house. Perhaps they have sold their old house and they have nowhere else to go. That I could see would mean it would be a short temporal element. In this case the first Defendant bought a field, rushed to whack down hardcore, slapped on a caravan and then during major building works asserted “we are occupying it as a family”. It would need, in my judgment, to be a longer temporal time before that could be shown to be a home and other circumstances would be necessary on the list above, for such a finding to be made.

65. Applying those factors here, I find that the first Defendant’s and the soon to be named Defendants’ evidence of residential occupation is full of holes and as leaky as a sieve. If they had more, they could have put in a lot more. They could have put in videos of the families turning up on each of the plots, going into the caravans, eating and drinking there and residing there, but they did not. Instead, at its height, they put in a couple of photos where all the metadata (if that is the right phrase) had been taken off. That is to be compared with the Claimant’s evidence of visits on 3 May, 5 May, 11 May, and the 13 May from Sarah Marshall and Bailiffs which, whilst not perfect, is far more weighty evidence than the Defendants’. The Claimant’s evidence shows me, on balance at this interlocutory stage, that the caravans and the static home on this land was not residentially occupied when Mould J made his order. I take into account the tilting of the caravans and the evidence of the residents. I take into account the other factors which I listed above. I take into account ignoring the temporary stop notice, the uninhabitability of the land, and what appear to me to be potential breaches of the injunction.

66. I have come to the conclusion, temporary though it is for the purposes of this being a renewal date, but with some permanence because there may not be a final hearing or a trial, that there was no one living on stie when the injunction was first granted. In any event, for the purposes of the period between now and the resolution of the planning application, I am not convinced on the balance of probability that there is a sufficiently strong case to be able to say that there was residential occupation before the order of Mr Justice Mould.

67. The result of that is that Article 8 is not relevant to this decision and the result of that is I consider that in relation to Anthony Mongan and all of the other persons who were previously unknown but are now named, (they are the ones in the letter of 3 June) are to be bound by the injunction extended by DHCJ Padley on this renewal, such that residence at the land is prohibited. Para. 1D prohibited from all Defendants from residing on the land or any part of whether in a caravan, mobile home or any other kind of residential accommodation or use the land as a residential gypsy caravan site. I consider that order should be continued on the evidence that has been put before me. END