UK case law

XUY, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Croydon

[2026] EWHC ADMIN 2214 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2026

Get your free legal insight →Email to a colleague
Get your free legal insight on this case →

The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Deputy High Court Judge Halford Introduction

1. Did the Defendant, the London Borough of Croydon (“the Council”), act unlawfully in deciding on 25 July 2025 to make a Child Protection Plan for five of the children of the Claimant (“Mr Y”)? Did the Council thereafter act irrationally or ultra vires in determining the children's access to social media should be within the scope of that plan? Did the plan breach Mr Y's right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), as given effect by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“ the 1998 Act ”), and was that right also breached by Council officers repeatedly seeking entry to the family home and threatening to call the police to help them?

2. The circumstances in which the court is asked to resolve these questions are very sad. Mr Y and his wife, who I shall call Mrs Z, have six children, who I shall call A, B, C, D, E and F in decreasing order of age. A is now an adult. There is a dispute about when the family first came to the attention of the Council’s Social Services Department. The Council says that happened as long ago as 2017, but Mr Y says it was not until the second half of 2023. Nothing turns on this. Not least because no real action was taken in relation to the Council’s initial concerns even though A left home in October 2023 following a self-harm episode that had resulted in hospitalisation. Nor did the Council act in December that year when it formed the view that there was reasonable cause to suspect that at least one of the children was suffering or likely to suffer significant harm as defined in section 47(1) of the Children Act 1989 (“ the 1989 Act ”). It still did not act when similar concerns arose in the course of 2024 and early 2025. However, matters reached a tipping point on 23 May 2025, when Mr Y emailed the Council to say that, following violent and other conflict at home, B had been offered the stark choice of completing his secondary education at boarding school or leaving home once he turned 16 in which case he would need the Council’s assistance. Social workers then initiated a section 47(1) Children and Family Assessment process, but did not complete it to their satisfaction. The Council says this was because Mr Y and Mrs Z were uncooperative. The concerns were then escalated to an Initial Child Protection Conference (“the Initial Conference”) on 24 July 2025 at which Mr Y, Mrs Z and various professionals were present. A report of the discussions was produced the same day. On 25 July 2025, the Child Protection Plan challenged in these proceedings was put in place.

3. The litigation took a straightforward course. Pre-action correspondence was sent by Mr Y on 3 August 2025. The Council responded on 13 August 2025. The claim was issued in a timely way on 19 September 2025. Summary Grounds of Defence were filed, Mr Y replied, and the papers were then referred to a Deputy High Court Judge, Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC. He refused permission on 18 November 2025, but the application for permission was renewed orally and granted on all grounds by HHJ Dunne on 27 January 2026. Detailed Grounds of Defence were then filed. The substantive hearing was on 21 April 2026 hearing. There have since been two developments. First, in response to questions I asked, Mr Parkin, Counsel for the Council, sent me certain local policies used by its officers to assist in decision-making on child protection and welfare matters. Secondly, Mr Y sent me a report of an Independent Social Worker who he and the Council had agreed could visit and interview the family to assist with future decision-making. I will discuss the limited significance of those policies and that report below.

4. At the hearing, Mr Y’s position was that he had asked the Council only for help in accommodating B if he rejected the boarding school offer, which B had. In the context of this claim, Mr Y said that he was not challenging the Council’s initiation of section 47(1) enquiries about the family in 2025, but that did not mean he accepted such enquiries were appropriate. On the contrary, the rest of his family should have been left alone. He strongly disputed that Child Protection Plan was warranted, pointing to the last, December 2023, edition of the statutory guidance on 1989 Act decision-making, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children (“Working Together”). He said that statute and guidance only allowed such a plan to be made where there was evidence of one or more children suffering or likely to suffer significant harm for particular, specified reasons. These evidence and reasons thresholds had not been reached. The plan was being used impermissibly as a means to take forward an assessment process that ought to have been completed before it was made. Further, the contents of the plan were legally objectionable, as were the steps taken by social workers to give effect to it, most significantly presenting themselves at the family home demanding entry to interview the family and threatening police involvement.

5. Mr Parkin disputed all of this on the Council’s behalf. Read realistically, the documents produced at and following the Initial Conference were clear about what future harm the professionals involved were concerned was likely and was seeking to address through the plan, he said. The elements Mr Y objected to were discursive and exploratory, not prescriptive in the way he had suggested. There was nothing legally wrong in social workers presenting themselves at the home of a family whose children were subject to such a plan and asking to speak to those who live there, or in seeking the police’s help. Nothing the Council had done came close to a human rights breach.

6. Besides, Mr Parkin submitted, even were the decision-making flawed in some respect, the claim was one to which section 31 (2A) the Senior Courts Act 1981 as amended (“ the 1981 Act ”) applied: relief should be refused because it should be apparent to the court that it was “highly likely that the outcome for [Mr Y] would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.” Mr Parkin went as far as submitting that the conclusion a Child Protection Plan was needed was “unavoidable”. Mr Y refuted this, arguing the Court could not have any confidence that the same decisions and actions would have occurred had the Council directed itself properly and there was no evidence of that. The very existence of the Child Protection Plan had ongoing damaging effects, particularly on Mrs Z, who wanted to work with children. It ought to be quashed, he said.

7. This judgment is structured as follows. At §§8 to 48 below I will say more about the factual background to the claim because, understandably, Mr Parkin says that the Council’s thinking on 24 and 25 July 2025 needs to be understood in the context of all that had happened up until then. It is not necessary this judgment for me to detail everything in the Council’s records, however, and I have not attempted to do so, only to give a sufficient sense of its concerns and thinking. At §§49 to 74 I will set out the legal framework. It is largely uncontroversial, though there is one important matter on which Mr Y and the Council disagree. I summarise their respective submissions at §§75 to 103. The remainder of my analysis and conclusions is set out at §§104 to 142. Background

8. The key recent events are as follows. In October 2023, A’s then therapist contacted the Council reporting that Mr Y had been in touch to say that therapy was being ended and there should be no contact with third parties about this. The therapist felt it was important that the Council were aware. Enquiries were made over the next few days by social workers. There is an email from Mr Y saying he considered a social services assessment to be inappropriate and was refusing one. Mrs Z is also noted as having refused an assessment. The police are recorded as having attended at the family home towards the end of October and found it in a messy state, in that there were clothes strewn about, but this appears to have been the height of their concerns.

9. A was admitted to hospital early that November, having self-harmed. The Council’s notes record him saying he wanted to go home, and that Mr Y was refusing to allow it. There are references to violent behaviour and threats to burn the house down from A, and to Mr Y asking the Council to take over responsibility for his care and accommodation. A social worker made an unannounced visit at the family home which was not productive. A few days later, the Council decided to provide A with accommodation under section 20 of the 1989 Act . In December the Council’s notes record it considered the “ section 47 ” threshold was met, but section 47(1) enquiries were not progressed because there was “lack of engagement from the parents without which it is difficult to fully address [the] contributory factors”. There is then a note that “[c]oncerns not substantiated”. A never returned to live at the family home, however.

10. The Council’s notes go on record that, in January 2024, concerns were raised that B had been threatened with being ‘kicked out’ and ‘put into care’. An internal review was undertaken but no action followed.

11. Around this time, Mr Y also made a number of complaints about what he considered to be intrusive enquiries from the Council’s social workers. Most were dismissed in a detailed report of June 2024, but the independent investigator concluded there had been some poor communication with the family and that Mr Y and Mrs Z had been more open with the Council’s social workers than had been suggested, including by giving social workers satisfactory assurances about F having seen a local health visitor.

12. Nothing else seems to have occurred for just over a year until March 2025. The police then referred concerns to the Council after B had apparently acted violently at home when a pair of his earrings had been confiscated.

13. Two months later the Council decided to take no further action because Mr Y and Mrs Z remained unwilling to permit the family to be assessed. However, the very next day after this decision was made, the case was reopened because Mr Y had called the Council to report the ultimatum he had given to B of accepting boarding school education or leaving home and approaching the Council and seeking support.

14. Pausing there, I need to say something about Mr Y’s perspective on the events that had led up to that call. In a detailed witness statement, he describes his and Mrs Z’s relationship with B having deteriorated far beyond the boundary-testing every parent of a teenage child will be familiar with into threatened and actual violence from B towards Mrs Z as well as damaging things in the home. Mr Y describes his family having reached breaking point in intolerable circumstances and him and Mrs Z reluctantly reaching the decision that B would need to leave the family home one way or the other when he reached 16, essentially for safety reasons.

15. Returning to the chronology, in June 2025 the Council decided once again to undertake a 1989 Act Child and Family Assessment but, as I have mentioned already, its records say that this ended up being limited due to non-cooperation by Mr Y. The Council’s records mention calls from him in early June stating he would not cooperate at all and then that he would, but only to the extent necessary to assist the Council find accommodation for B if he decided against the offer of boarding school education. He is recorded as describing the assessment process as “pointless”.

16. Nonetheless, in July 2025 the Council redoubled attempts to assess the family. A social worker wrote to Mr Y early that month stating: “I must reiterate that I remain seriously concerned that the children may be at risk of significant harm, particularly in relation to emotional neglect, social isolation, limited access to external support, and the potential for rejection from the family home. These concerns remain unresolved. As part of the ongoing Section 47 enquiries under the Children Act 1989 , I am legally required to see and speak with each child individually to understand their lived experiences. I have made several attempts to do this with your cooperation, which remains the preferred and most constructive approach.”

17. The email concluded by requesting a home visit the next day during which each child would be individually interviewed, adding: “If access is denied, I may need to seek police assistance to fulfil my statutory duties. I sincerely hope this will not be necessary and that we can work together in the best interests of the children.”

18. Mr Y responded by email the same day, stating that he was not intimidated by what he considered to be “threats”, did not believe the 1989 Act empowered social workers with to enter people’s homes, that the police could enter but if there was a proper basis under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 , that the social worker involved would “not be permitted into my home, under any circumstances” and was embarking on a “fishing expedition in breach of my Article 8 ECHR rights”.

19. The social worker decided to convene the Initial Conference on 16 July 2025, it was postponed until 24 July. By this point, she had filled in a Child and Family Assessment form dated 11 July 2025 which I need to describe in some detail.

20. The form begins by explaining that the assessment had been prompted by the violent confrontation reported by the police. It records Mr Y and Mrs Z discussing other similarly challenging incidents in their view that B had needed to be home-schooled directly because he was “attracted to the wrong crowd”, but was now attending college two days a week and it was reporting positively on his educational progress. The form continues by describing the family composition, then setting out a chronology of contact between them, the police and social services (some of which is disputed, as noted above). It adds that the lack of co-operation from Mr Y had been considered at a strategy meeting on 20 June 2025, he had been asked to reconsider on a call five days later but had refused, B had been in touch to say that he did not want to take up the offer of boarding school education, and the attempted home visit had been rebuffed as described above. The assistance of the police had been sought, but they had simply said that they should be called if entry was denied. Others’ views had been canvassed internally within the Council and matters had been escalated upwards to the Initial Conference.

21. Under the headings “Child Pen Picture” several paragraphs of biographical detail are given for each child in the family, but in relation to C, D, E and F it says “[w]e haven’t yet had the chance to meet you yet, so we don’t know much more about you just yet – but we really looking forward to getting to know you better.” In respect of Mr Y and Mrs Z, it adds, again addressing itself to the children, the form says: “it seems that your parents are meeting your basic physical needs. This includes things like making sure you have food and drink, a warm and safe place to live, clean clothes, and help with keeping clean and healthy. We understand that you have access to medical and dental care when needed.”

22. However, the form then states: “Your parents seem to find it difficult to meet your emotional needs in a way that helps you feel truly seen, heard, and cared for. When we've spoken with them, it hasn’t always been clear that they understand how important it is for each of you to feel loved, valued, and emotionally safe. Feeling emotionally safe means having adults around who notice how you're feeling, comfort you when you're upset, praise you when you do something well, and show you kindness and care every day. When we asked your parents about some of the challenges [B] has faced, they focused on things like turning off the Wi-Fi or limiting phone use. But they didn't talk much about how those actions might make him feel inside.”

23. The form goes on to comment somewhat imprecisely that there is “domestic abuse or interpersonal violence and abuse”, and the children the family are affected.

24. Next the form sets out some analysis, starting with the social worker’s view on what is “working well” which focuses on B’s educational achievements and some social activities. Under the subheading “[w]hat are we worried about?” is the comment “children's emotional needs may not be fully met at home”, followed by others to the effect that it appears there is focus on behaviour and discipline rather than understanding feelings, “children have shared that they feel blamed or left out” (which is odd because only one child had been spoken with), that there is a risk of family breakdown one child has left and is being looked after and another, B, has been threatened with being excluded from the home thanks to the ultimatum, there are concerns that some important positive qualities are not being adequately modelled at home, home education and restrictions on social interaction are limiting opportunities to form friendships and so social confidence, and concerns about isolation have been expressed. The next subheading is “[w]hat is the impact on the child(ren)?”, but it only answers that question at a high level of generality based on social work theory rather than discussing the children being assessed. A series of “[g]rey areas” is then listed, acknowledging that several of the children have not been spoken to yet.

25. The concluding sections of the form concern recommendations and planning. They begin, again in language addressed to the children, with “[b]ased on the information gathered, there are significant concerns regarding the emotional wellbeing, safety, and long-term outcomes for all of you in your family”. The unwillingness of Mr Y and Mrs Z to engage in a section 47 assessment is then noted, as is their apparent willingness to litigate. This part of the form adds: “[Mr Y and Mrs Z] do not appear to recognise that the local authority's primary concern is the welfare and protection of you as children who live in their jurisdiction and concerns for your welfare has come to their attention. There is a pattern of avoiding scrutiny and deflecting responsibility, particularly when concerns are raised about their parenting approach.”

26. The form then states that B faced an ultimatum obliging him to leave the family home one way or the other, which was very similar to what happened to A. It adds: “This raises serious concerns about a developing pattern in which you are all at risk of being excluded from the family home at the age of 16, without adequate emotional preparation or support. Your parents do not appear to show insight into this pattern, instead placing blame solely on you, the children, for your emotional and behavioural presentations… there is a real risk that this pattern may repeat”

27. The social worker’s first concluding recommendation is that the case be progressed to an Initial Conference “to bring together professionals and the family to assess whether the children are at continuing risk of significant harm and to consider whether a Child Protection Plan is required.” The importance of seeing and speaking with the remaining children is stressed, as is the need for multi-agency approach.

28. A plan follows. Each child is to have at least one face-to-face meeting with the social worker, consent should be obtained for contact with GP schools and other services. The children should feel supported and report that they no longer feel threatened, they should remain in the home, have regular opportunities for interaction with peers, Mr Y and Mrs Z should attend parenting support sessions and participate in meetings without making complaints or legal threats. A boxed is ticked to indicate the suggested outcome is “continue intervention within Child Protection Pathway”.

29. All this is endorsed by the social worker’s manager in the final section of the form. She says it is worrying that Mr Y and Mrs Z did not appear to want to explore what could help to make it possible for A to return home and that the same thing appears to be happening to B, something she considers to be an “abdication of parental responsibility”. She expresses curiosity over the “distrust” of “public sector workers”. A decision needed to be made at the Initial Conference about the need for a child protection plan. The further report produced shortly before the Initial Conference

30. The Initial Conference was first documented in a Multi-agency Child Protection Conference Report. Almost all of its contents is transposed verbatim from the Children and Family Assessment Report. Under the heading “[w]hat is your recommendation?” It states: “I recommend that the children are supported under a Child Protection Plan to ensure what appears to be significantly harmful levels of emotional neglect by their parents are addressed with expert professional interventions for the whole family.”

31. It is unclear who wrote this report or when. Mr Y says that he was sent it on 14 July 2025 Mr Y’s response

32. Mr Y wrote at length to the chair of the Initial Conference on 22 July 2025 stating that he disagreed with much of the report and questioning what the evidence base was, particularly in relation to the children who had not been interviewed at that point. For instance, he strongly objected to the conclusion that there appeared to be “significantly harmful levels of emotional neglect”. The report writer had offered no evidence for this conclusion, Mr Y said. Adopting the report’s recommendations in the absence of evidence would be unlawful. He observed there were factual errors: the report said the children not have mobile phones, but in fact the older ones did. It mentioned threats of care proceedings made by him to the children, threats which he had never made. There was a lack of reasonable enquiries about the family circumstances which, in his view, had led to a series of ill-informed conclusions. Relevant matters had not been considered. Certain conclusions were contradictory, known facts had not been properly grappled with and vague and incoherent explanations given for social services’ intervention. As for the concern that he and Mrs Z were standing on the legal rights, they were entitled to do so, this was relevant to the issues the Initial Conference needed to grapple with. Mr Y also raised concerns about another attempt by the social worker to access his home on 17 July when he had once again been turned away. He had no right to come in, Mr Y said. The attempts to do so, with or without the threatened police support, were unjustified.

33. I stress that this is only a summary of a very detailed critique. The Initial Conference outcome report

34. Another form, this one headed Child Protection Initial Conference Outcome, reports what was decided at the 24 July 2025 conference. It records that the chair explained that the “purpose of the conference was to share information resulting from any child protection enquiries, relevant assessments, and professional involvement with the family in order to assess any risks or concerns for the child(ren's) safety and welfare.” It adds that she advised: “based on the information shared, the conference will need to give a view regarding whether the child(ren) require a Child Protection or Child in Need Plan in order to effectively address any risks or concerns identified for the child(ren)'s safety and welfare.”

35. Looking forward, it lists certain things that “need to change” ranging from completion of the assessment to understand the children’s lived experiences and hear from them directly, their behaviour needs to be addressed, parental boundaries and routines needed to be understood, particularly around mobile phone usage, and B would need to be supported in relation to accommodation if Mr Y and Mrs Z remained adamant he must leave home. Various actions to achieve these things are listed. Most significantly, under the plan, Mr Y and Mrs Z were to allow the social worker access to the home to complete an assessment given the concerns raised about B’s behaviour at home and the impact on his siblings, to be followed by planning any support that might be helpful. The “[c]ontingency plan” was that “[s]ocial care will seek legal advice should the parents not engage with children social care under the child protection framework.

36. Pausing there, I observe that the essence of the plan was that the needed to be an assessment of the children and support for B if the ultimatum was enforced.

37. Under the heading “[t]hreshold of risk and professional views on the Child(ren)’s Plan” is a summary of the views of seven professionals. The social worker’s opinion was that the “threshold has been met for all the children to be placed under a CP plan under the category of emotional harm. There is a disconnect in the parents’ understanding of the emotional needs of the children and its impact and their resilience to support a better understanding of that”. A representative of CAIT Police observed that the lack of a full assessment meant the reasons for B’s behaviour were not known, but that “[w]e appear to have a situation where a child is being asked to choose between 2 punishments. Can’t have a child who will essentially be homeless in a month’s time…” and as regards the siblings was a “likelihood of emotional harm – I think the siblings have potential to suffer significant harm particularly as they get older if they start to push back on boundaries. We are not at that point yet…”. The Receiving Social Worker’s opinion was “initially I was looking at the older ones to be managed on a CIN plan…. however … I feel all the children need to be subject to a CP plan due to the level of unknowns in this case”. The specialist public health nurse stated “agree for a CP Plan to be initiated for all the children under Emotional harm. Hearing today the children's views and the parents not listening to their views and feelings. It is vital to get the children's views and feelings to provide targeted support.” The Lead for Elective Home Education commented “I feel threshold is met for a CP plan to be initiated for all children under the category of Emotional harm. The assessment has to include the whole family… The risk of emotional harm is huge”. The social work team manager commented similarly “I agree for all the children to be placed on a CP Plan under Emotional harm for all the children.” The chair added “My view is CP plan under Emotional Harm for all the children. We will be seeking a Legal Planning Meeting if there is no engagement under the CP Plan, which is very likely.”

38. The views of A and B, the only two children who had been spoken to, differed. A thought a plan was needed “under emotional harm”, but B said the younger children should not be involved. They would not have the same problems as he had when they got older, he said. He did not want to be subject to a plan himself, but he did want Mr Y to be more flexible. I noted Mr Y was arguing forcefully that the threshold had not been met for it to be put in place. He was happy for social workers to speak with the older children but not the younger ones.

39. The Initial Conference Chair’s summary is then recorded. Concerns about B’s violence are noted along with harm being reported by A and B because of boundary-setting in the home. An understanding of the family circumstances was needed. The plan adds, importantly: “During the meeting [A] and [B] reported that they have been harmed by your parents implementing boundaries around their social media use which impacts negatively on their socialization/ emotional wellbeing. [B] wants this to change and stated that had he not found ways to get around your father he would be significantly harmed. Your social worker needs to obtain a clear understanding of how the mobile phone/access to social media apps impacts negatively on [C] and [B] as it is believed that his mobile phone might be linked to [B] not adhering to your parents and might be contributing to his behaviours to rebel the restrictions that were applied by your parents. It is evident that social media and schools are major ways that teenagers connect with peers, however, when there are limitations or restrictions applied, it can lead to loneliness, emotional harm, social skill delays or feeling left behind. I am aware that you are home schooled and given lots of opportunities to socialise with other peers, but social media and the internet can also help you feel part of the world outside of your home, gaining access to new ideas and being connected to others which is really important and being able to navigate the online world safely is an important modern skill. Given the risk of you being physically or emotionally harmed if you are exposed to arguments or are caught in the middle of a conflict, and because of the concerns raised by [A] and [B] about their social and emotional wellbeing being negatively affected by restrictions your parents have put in place on their social media use. I agree that the threshold for child protection has been met, and you will all now be made subjects of child protection plans. [B] has also been asked to leave the family home on a specific date, which might not be in his best interests. This can damage [B]’s sense of safety, trust and belonging within his family which can also impact negatively on his emotional wellbeing.”

40. A series of tick boxes follow for each child except for A. For each, “Create Child Protection Plan… Category Emotional Abuse” is ticked.

41. The other notable part of this document is entitled ‘minutes’ and contains a series of bullet points noting some of what those at the meeting said. For instance, the social worker is recorded as having expressed “concerns that when [C] turns 16, he might be asked to leave the family home as there appears to be a pattern of the children being asked to leave home by a certain age if they push or do not conform to parents[’] rules and boundaries” and Mr Y explaining that, from his perspective, as A and B had been asked to leave for safety reasons, social services had no right to insist on an assessment visit though he was very willing to answer questions as needed. The minutes repeatedly record him asking for the evidence of harm which is thought to be occurring but not the responses, if there were any, to these requests.

42. What is described as a new plan was produced on 14 October 2025, but it echoed the same basic recommendations as the original one in the Initial Conference paperwork. Reservations are expressed by the social worker’s manager , whose view was that there had been no progress at all and that the “children’s education, social attainment and emotional development was being impacted” as Mr Y and Mrs Z were “not providing them with a good enough childhood” and there was a looming threat of them being “thrown out of the house at the tender age of 16 years old” if they did not “abide by their father’s rules”. There was “neglect”.

43. Pausing again, I note that no reasoning is given for these conclusions, and they are difficult to understand in circumstances where the manager was simultaneously saying that the assessment process continued to be frustrated. All those involved in the review agreed that the plan should remain in place. Further visits to the family home

44. Both the October 2025 notes and material supplied in support of Mr Y’s claim mentions further visits to the family home and attempts to enter, but not how many. At the hearing, Mr Y told me that he estimated that social workers had asked to come in at least six times around this time. On one occasion there had been a repeat of the threat to call the police to gain entry, and that a social worker had shouted aggressively.

45. According to the October notes, police undertook a ‘welfare check’ of their own on 23 September 2025 and there was no cause for concern. However, that note needs to be approached with caution because just two days earlier, B had been taken into ‘police protection’ and referred on to social services because he had been asked to leave the house. The Child Assessment Order application and independent social worker’s report

46. More positively, I was told about the agreement reached that an independent social worker’s report should be commissioned following an application made by the Council for a Child Assessment Order under section 43 of the 1989 Act and the comments made by the judge who heard it on 18 December 2025. He had highlighted to the Council that at the core of this matter was a trust issue and encouraged such a social worker’s involvement as a non-litigious way to settle the dispute.

47. The report of the independent social worker is, by its very nature, ex post facto evidence as far as the decision-making challenged in this judicial review is concerned. Mr Y made no submissions about it, but his covering email indicated it supported his position. For present purposes, I need only note that the social worker undertook what I consider to be thorough enquiries, was not hindered in any way in speaking to all of the family members at home, considered that there had been some problematic parenting issues in the past but that Mr Y and Mrs Z had reflected and were endeavouring to take a different, more flexible approach with the children still living at home. No further social services intervention was recommended. What became of A and B

48. The conflicts of the past have had an enduring impact on this family. A, who is at university, has since spent time in the family home, but B has not returned. Mr Y said that his and Mrs Z’s relationship with them had improved since they moved out, he did not know where B was living. Mr Parkin said that he was in foster care. Legal framework The 1989 Act

49. Part IV of the 1989 Act is concerned with the different ways in which the default arrangements for care of a child by one or both of their parents, or sometimes others with parental responsibility, may prove inadequate necessitating a local authority intervention. Interventions can take various forms. They range from identifying child as being ‘in need’ and offering support at home to them and to those with parental responsibility, right through to seeking an order for a child to be taken away from their parents and put in foster care or otherwise supported.

50. Such outcomes are intended to be a last resort. By section 31 , the court may only make a care or supervision order if it is satisfied: “(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to— (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child's being beyond parental control.” and by subsection (9): “’harm’ means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development[ including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another]7; ‘development’ means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development; ‘health’ means physical or mental health; and ‘ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.”

51. An intervention involving seeking a care or supervision order will be the cumulation of a multi-stage process normally starting with the making of enquiries under section 47 . It provides materially: “47. — Local authority's duty to investigate. (1) Where a local authority— (a) … (b) have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives, or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child's welfare... (3) The enquiries shall, in particular, be directed towards establishing—[ (a) whether the authority should— (i) make any application to court under this Act ; (ii) exercise any of their other powers under this Act ; (iii) exercise any of their powers under section 11 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (child safety orders); or (iv) (where the authority is a local authority in Wales) exercise any of their powers under the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014; with respect to the child… (6) Where, in the course of enquiries made under this section— (a) any officer of the local authority concerned; or (b) any person authorised by the authority to act on their behalf in connection with those enquiries— (i) is refused access to the child concerned; or (ii) is denied information as to his whereabouts, the authority shall apply for an emergency protection order, a child assessment order, a care order or a supervision order with respect to the child unless they are satisfied that his welfare can be satisfactorily safeguarded without their doing so. (7) If, on the conclusion of any enquiries or review made under this section, the authority decide not to apply for an emergency protection order, a child assessment order, a care order or a supervision order they shall— (a) consider whether it would be appropriate to review the case at a later date; and (b) if they decide that it would be, determine the date on which that review is to begin. (8) Where, as a result of complying with this section, a local authority conclude that they should take action to safeguard or promote the child's welfare they shall take that action (so far as it is both within their power and reasonably practicable for them to do so).”

52. Section 43 provides this complementary power: “43. —. Child assessment orders. (1) On the application of a local authority or authorised person for an order to be made under this section with respect to a child, the court may make the order if, but only if, it is satisfied that— (a) the applicant has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; (b) an assessment of the state of the child's health or development, or of the way in which he has been treated, is required to enable the applicant to determine whether or not the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (c) it is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or be satisfactory, in the absence of an order under this section. (2) In this Act “a child assessment order” means an order under this section…” and this linked duty: “(6) Where a child assessment order is in force with respect to a child it shall be the duty of any person who is in a position to produce the child— (a) to produce him to such person as may be named in the order; and (b) to comply with such directions relating to the assessment of the child as the court thinks fit to specify in the order.”

53. Although the primary duty-holders under the 1989 Act are local authorities, other public authorities have welfare responsibilities and powers to act. Section 46 creates this emergency, last resort police power: “(1) Where a constable has reasonable cause to believe that a child would otherwise be likely to suffer significant harm, he may— (a) remove the child to suitable accommodation and keep him there; or (b) take such steps as are reasonable to ensure that the child's removal from any hospital, or other place, in which he is then being accommodated is prevented.”

54. If the police choose to exercise the power, the child is considered as having been taken into ‘police protection’: section 46(2).

55. Relatedly, section 11 of the Children Act 2004 (“ the 2004 Act ”) places a duty on police forces to ensure their functions are carried out with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children Working Together

56. Section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 requires local authorities in their social services functions to act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State. This and a series of other statutory provisions have been used to fashion the Working Together guidance in a form that requires local authority social services departments to follow it unless there are overriding, rational and clearly expressed reasons not to do so. Mr Parkin accepts that in this case there were no such reasons and so Council was fully obliged to comply with Working Together.

57. The broad scope of Working Together as summarised at page 8 as: “Child protection is part of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children and is defined for the purpose of this guidance as activity that is undertaken to protect specific children who are suspected to be suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm. This includes harm that occurs inside or outside the home, including online.”

58. See too pages 14 and 18. The broad nature of harm is discussed at, for instance, pages 58 and 67. It is clear that harm is not confined to abuse, neglect and exploitation, nor harms which parents are responsible for. Thus page 55 refers to various violence outside the home, association and with organised crime groups, being in the youth justice system having a parent in custody, or a sibling in care are all flagged as potentially harmful.

59. At page 55, Working Together defines the function of assessment very broadly, including to “analyse their needs and/or the nature and level of any risk and harm being suffered by the child, including where harm or risk of harm is from outside the home” then “decide whether the child is a child in need (section 17) or is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm ( section 47 ).” At page 89, it explains that “[a] section 47 enquiry is carried out by undertaking or continuing with an assessment in accordance with the guidance set out in this chapter” and “is initiated to decide whether, and what type of action is required to safeguard and promote the welfare of a child who is suspected to be suffering, or is likely to suffer significant harm.” The enquiry must be carried out “in a way that minimises distress for the child and family”. The “child who is the subject of concern” should be seen “to ascertain their wishes and feelings, assess their understanding of their situation, assess their relationships and circumstances more broadly, and understand the child’s experiences and interactions with others…”. Parents and other carers should be interviewed. Pages 91 and 92 draw a distinction between a situation where, as a result of the enquiry, “concerns of significant harm are not substantiated” and those where the concerns “are substantiated, and the child is judged to be suffering or likely to suffer significant harm”. In the latter scenario, lead practitioners - i.e. the social worker with primary responsibility for the case - should rapidly: “convene an initial child protection conference (see next section for details). The timing of this conference should depend on the urgency of the case and respond to the needs of the child and the nature and severity of the harm they may be facing.”

60. Careful thought should be given to who should attend the conference. The lead practitioner should “ensure that the child and their parents understand the purpose and who will attend, parents should be given appropriate information to support their participation in the conference.” Such a conference’s purpose, explained at page 93 is: “To bring together and analyse, in a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary meeting, all relevant information and plan how best to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child and protect them from harm. It is the responsibility of the conference to make recommendations on how organisations and agencies work together to safeguard the child in future.”

61. Tasks include “agreeing an outline child protection plan, with clear actions and timescales, including a clear sense of how much improvement is needed, by when, so that success can be judged clearly.” The purposes of a plan, explained at page 96, include, ensuring the child is safe from harm, preventing them from suffering further harm, promoting their health and development and supporting the parents. Notably. Part of the lead practitioner’s work will be “complet[ing] the child’s and family’s in-depth assessment, securing contributions from core group members and other practitioners as necessary”: see page 97. The core group should “decide what steps need to be taken, and by whom, to complete the in-depth assessment to inform decisions about the child’s safety and welfare” and “further develop the outline child protection plan, based on assessment findings…”: see page 97. These and other matters will be discussed at a child protection review conference.

62. Page 100 adds that “[a] child should no longer be the subject of a child protection plan if… it is judged that the child is no longer continuing to, or is likely to, suffer significant harm and therefore no longer requires safeguarding by means of a child protection plan”. A plan can end for other reasons besides this, such as the family moving to another local authority area. Conversely, the intervention may be escalated. Page 96 reminds local authority social care to “consider the evidence and decide what legal action to take if any, where a child has suffered or is likely to suffer significant harm” following the initial child protection conference. If there is still not sufficient protection of the child by the parents to “pre-proceedings”, that is taking steps that may lead to care proceedings: see page 101.

63. Working Together then sets out a series of very helpful flowcharts to illustrate what is summarised above. Flowchart 4 at page 104 (which forms an appendix to this judgment), shows an Initial Conference can come about in two different ways. Both are preceded by completion of an assessment.

64. In the first scenario, the lead practitioner assesses that the concerns are substantiated but the child is not suffering or is not likely to suffer significant harm. They then decide whether it is necessary to convene a conference. If not, they agree a plan with the family and other practitioners to ensure the child’s future safety and welfare, recording and acting on the decisions made. If a conference is necessary, one is convened.

65. In the second scenario, the lead practitioner assesses that the concerns are substantiated, and the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm. If that is the assessment, an Initial Conference must be convened.

66. The next decision is made at the conference by all the professions participating, ideally by consensus. If they decide that the child is not suffering or likely to suffer significant harm, they agree a plan with the family and other practitioners to ensure the child’s future safety and welfare, recording and acting on the decisions made. However, if they decide the child is suffering or likely to suffer such harm, “[t]he lead practitioner prepares an outline child protection plan (CPP) and a core group is established”. Local procedures

67. The local procedures the Council says it complies with include, materially, a Children’s Social Care - Local Assessment Protocol. It states at page 11: “The purpose of an assessment (whether carried out under s17 child in need or s47 child protection threshold) is to understand what is happening in the child’s life (including unborn), exploring how they are cared for by the adults around them and how their health, education and wellbeing needs are being met. Where there has been, is, or is likely to be unmet need, or the child is suffering harm, the assessment should identify what help and support the child and family require to meet the need and prevent further harm.”

68. Under the heading ‘Analysis’ at page 12, the protocol notes that the assessment will consider matters including: “• The need/harm or potential need/harm to the child. Separating the issues e.g. drug misuse, emotional abuse, mental health difficulties. • The ‘significance’ of any harm experienced, exploring how long the need/harm has been going on for (Duration). How often it is happening/has happened (Frequency). The context in which it happens/has happened. The seriousness of the incident/s or situation. • If the child has been harmed or at risk of harm, what the harm is attributable to (Cause) i.e. (a) the parenting/parent’s behaviour (b) the environment or harm in the community (c) the child is beyond parental control.” adding at page 13: “Once the issues have been weighed up, the social worker, alongside their managers oversight, needs to consider ‘on a balance of probability’ and with a safe level of uncertainty, the likelihood of the concerns continuing or re-emerging in the future and what factors are likely to increase the risk of harm.”

69. G8, a note on Child Protection Plans. It notes “Each child considered to have suffered, or to be likely to suffer Significant Harm must have a Child Protection Plan (CPP), which is recorded in the agreed local format.” The 1998 Act and Article 8 ECHR

70. Section 6(1) of the 1998 Act states “it is unlawful for a public authority” including a local authority “to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right” set out in schedule 1 when exercising their functions unless primary legislation makes it impossible not to act in that way, as explained in subsection (2).

71. The scheduled rights include Article 8. It has two parts. First the right: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” and then the qualification: “2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

72. Article 8 is breached where there is an interference with one or more of the four interests set out in the first part that cannot be justified as a lawful, necessary and proportionate way of achieving one of the legitimate aims set out in the second part. The court must assess the proportionality of an interference for itself. The test to be applied was set out by Lord Reed in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 (“ Bank Mellat ”) at §74: "(1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right; (2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective; (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective; and (4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure's effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter.”

73. The Supreme Court has given further guidance on the proper constitutional role of courts in applying a proportionality test in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19 at §15 per Lord Hoffmann and Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30 (“ Scheidler ”) at §§118 to 122, stressing that it goes beyond merely reviewing the exercise of a function to establish whether the primary decision maker misdirected itself, acted irrationally or unfairly. Instead, there must be “a more searching investigation” and it “remains open the court to conclude that the measure in question fails to strike a fair balance and is disproportionate”: Shvidler at §122. However, the court “may afford a measure of respect to balance of rights and interests struck by the public authority” in assessing whether the Bank Mellat stage (4) test is met. The 1981 Act

74. Section 31 (2A) of the 1981 Act is concerned with granting relief, that is a meaningful remedy, if a judicial review claim established a legal error has occurred. It provides: “(2A) The High Court— (a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review, and (b) may not make an award under subsection (4) on such an application, if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. (2B) The court may disregard the requirements in subsection (2A)(a) and (b) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest.” Submissions Mr Y’s case

75. At the heart of Mr Y’s case is the submission that a local authority like the Council has to reach a series of threshold-based conclusions first to make enquiries about the welfare of a child, then to convene an Initial Conference, then to conclude that a Child Protection Plan is appropriate and then to initiate care or supervision order proceedings. As each of these steps involves ever greater intrusion into the life of the family involved, both the 1989 Act and Working Together demand more of the Council by way of justification and evidence to support its conclusions. Mr Y said the Council did not appreciate this, and it had conflated the justification required for enquiries with that needed for a Child Protection Plan.

76. Developing this submission at the hearing, Mr Y referred to the wording of section 47(1) (b) which is quoted at §51 above. To make “such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote [a] child’s welfare” local authority officers need to have “reasonable cause to suspect” that a child who is living or found in their area is “suffering or likely to suffer significant harm”. Without that reasonable suspicion, which Mr Y pragmatically accepted was a low threshold, there can be no section 47 enquiries at all. This was not a belief-based threshold, as explained to Singh J as he then was by Counsel for the Claimant in R (O) v Peterborough City Council [2016] EWHC 2717 (Admin) (“ Peterborough ”) at §49. Instead, the whole point of section 47(1) enquiries is to enable a decision on taking action to be made on an informed, evidenced basis. That statutory imperative is underscored by section 47(8) . Dexter J had made that clear at §45 of R (ONO FC, SC) (Children by their mother and litigation friend LF) v Bristol City Council [2025] EWHC 3227 (Admin) (“ Bristol ”) where he said “ for a section 47 conclusion about significant harm under Part V, the inquiring local authority must provide a clear snapshot of the harm the child has suffered or is likely to suffer.”

77. A decision to take action once enquiries were complete, including preparing a Child Protection Plan if appropriate, therefore had to be evidence-based, Mr Y submitted. That was why Working Together discussed circumstances “[w]here concerns of significant harm are substantiated, and the child is judged to be suffering or likely to suffer significant harm” being the trigger for lead practitioners convening an Initial Conference. Action would then normally be decided upon at that conference, which is why Working Together also emphasised the need to “consider the evidence and decide what legal action to take, if any”. The “evidence” the drafters of the guidance had in mind would necessarily be that gathered as a result of the section 47 enquiries. Flowchart 5 was clear, he said. There was no route to a child protection plan that did not involve conclusions first being reached by the lead practitioner and then conference participants that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.

78. All this was reinforced by what Working Together envisaged at the Child Protection Plan review stage, Mr Y contended, which was confronting question of whether a child was continuing to suffer was still likely to suffer significant harm. That only made sense if the core group had already reached the conclusion that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm.

79. Mr Y went on to submit that there is an additional threshold for making a Child Protection Plan: the action or inaction of the child’s parents had to be causally connected to the child suffering significant harm or it being likely that they would in future. That was why Working Together states, “once the child protection process has been carried out, it may be deemed by the local authority that there is still not sufficient protection of the child by the parents”, which then prompts care or supervision order proceedings. The guidance adds that “the pre-proceedings process acts as the final opportunity for the parents to avoid care proceedings” which must mean that the parents have to do, or cease doing, something specific to avoid the need for even more intrusive local authority intervention. The guidance is there to explain section 31 of the 1989 Act . The child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm is attributable to the “care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him” or “the child's being beyond parental control”. In short, either the child’s parents had to be at fault or the child had to be out of their control.

80. Mr Y submitted that this further threshold of significant harm or the likelihood of it attributable to the failures or actions of the child’s parents was made clear in Peterborough . In that case, the child was suffering significant harm in that she was refusing to eat, was not toilet trained and needed to mobilise using a buggy. There was no evidence “that what had happened here was neglect on the part of the claimant’s parents” so a plan was inappropriate notwithstanding the child suffering significant harm: §§54 and 57, Singh J had concluded. Mr Y acknowledged ‘a tension’ between this judgment and Bristol, but says Dexter J had been wrong to draw a distinction between the attribution-based threshold for intervention in section 31 and the threshold for a conclusion on harm and action in section 47 . The two sections needed to be read together, consistently with Working Together. There had been no dispute in Bristol that harm was attributable to emotional abuse by the mother involved.

81. Mr Y submitted that if a local authority’s suspicions that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm are substantiated as a result of evidence gathered through section 47 enquiries, and this is the result of abuse, neglect or exploitation attributable to the child’s parents, then and only then can there be a Child Protection Conference. Such a conference would need to concur with the views of the social worker who had convened it and reach its own conclusion on the cause of the significant harm or likelihood of it, and whether it was abuse, neglect or exploitation, on the part of the child’s parents. Without all of this, there was no lawful basis for a Child Protection Plan.

82. The first ground of Mr Y’s claim was that the Council seriously misdirected itself about these thresholds when deciding to make a Child Protection Plan. The Initial Conference could not have been convened until evidence of the children suffering significant harm or being likely to suffer it had been gathered through section 47(1) enquiries. The Council had not progressed beyond the stage of suspicion, which was the enquiries threshold but not the Initial Conference threshold. Paragraph 21 of the Summary Grounds of Defence had acknowledged “there [was] no satisfactory evidence of the degree of harm, or lack thereof likely to be suffered by the children”.

83. This basic error became all the more apparent in what was said by the professional participants at the conference, Mr Y said. All concurred that there needed to be further enquiries and assessment, and that being the conclusion of the plan itself, rather than steps protecting children again specific dangers. This, one of the social workers had tellingly referred to the need for a plan “due to the level of unknowns in this case”. Another participant said that the plan would bring about a “better understanding”, there were multiple references to “understanding” being an objective in the outcome decision and minutes. There was reference to “potential to suffer significant harm”, but at a future point not yet reached and, besides, potential is not same as a likelihood. There is reference to a “need to ensure that [B’s] siblings remained safe not being harmed in any way” which will be “achieved” if “there is no concerns about the children’s safety”. All of this was consistent with uncertainty over whether or not the statutory threshold had been met, Mr Y said. In short, there was no evidence of significant harm or the likelihood of it and so the evidence-based threshold for a Child Protection Plan had simply not been reached. Paragraph 21 of the Summary Grounds of Defence was effectively a concession of this ground, Mr Y submitted.

84. Mr Y also contended that the assessment-focused purpose of the Child Protection Plan here was legally improper, referring to the protective and supportive purposes identified in Working Together: §61 above. A plan was not a tool for investigating whether a child is suffering significant harm or at risk.

85. Further, Mr Y submitted, the second threshold for a plan had certainly not been met in that there was nothing to suggest, less still evidence of, neglect, abuse or exploitation of the children by him or his wife. The plan contained references to emotional neglect and abuse, but those were assertions only. The evidence of such wrongs was striking by its absence. What had happened with A and B was not abuse. When a child reached 16, local authority could take on responsibility for them. How could something that was lawful be abusive, he asked rhetorically?

86. The Council’s complaints about his and his wife’s lack of co-operation somehow justifying a Child Protection Plan went nowhere, Mr Y said. Working Together does not suggest non-cooperation is a reason to bypass the requirement for evidence of significant harm or its likelihood being gathered through section 47(1) enquiries prior to the conference. If those enquiries were being frustrated by parents, Parliament had provided a remedy in the form of a section 43(1) order. To seek one, the Council only needed to be satisfied that the suspicion-based threshold for section 47(1) enquiries was met and that an order is needed to access a child or children to assess them. Once such an order was in place, section 43(6) obliged the child’s or children’s parents to comply. Importantly, however, there was a judicialised safeguard against the abuse of power by the Council. Here the Council had attempted to circumvent that safeguard by making a Child Protection Plan demanding assessment.

87. Last in relation to the substance of this part of claim, Mr Y said that the Council failed to take into account the changes in B’s behaviour in that he had become less violent. The Child Protection Plan referred to the risk of the other children being harmed. To address this, it noted “the social worker is to devise a safety plan with the family members who ensure that the children are not harmed by [B]”, but they never had been harmed by him. Only Mrs Z and Mr Y himself had been the target of violence.

88. As regards the Council’s procedural arguments based on section 31 (2A) of the 1981 Act , Mr Y pointed to the guidance given by Lewis LJ in R (Bradbury) v Awdurdod Parc Cenedlaethol Bannau Brycheiniog (Brecon Beacons National Park Authority) [2025] EWCA Civ 489 at §71, that it was: “not for the court to try and predict what the public authority might have done if it had not made that error. If the court cannot tell how the decision-makers would have approached matters, what decision it would have reached, if it had not made the error in question, the requirements of section 31 (2A) are unlikely to be satisfied” and that section 31 imposed a high threshold for withholding relief were there had been an obvious misdirection of law to a threshold test.

89. Here the Council had misused its power to make a Child Protection Plan without evidence of significant harm or the likelihood of it. All the Council could point to was the basis of its suspicions. It had conceded there was no evidence: §82 above. Section 31 (2A) was concerned with technical breaches only, not fundamental errors of law or use of power for improper purposes.

90. Mr Y added that the Council was in particular difficulty arguing the outcome of the Initial Conference would have been no different but for its errors in circumstances where there was no evidence of what it would have decided had it approached the conference on the right footing.

91. Mr Y’s second and third grounds are linked and have a narrower focus: that the Council was mistaken to say that the children were wholly restricted from social media access and that restrictions could never be warranted and rationalised this with the comment “when there are limitations or restrictions applied, it can lead to loneliness, emotional harm, social skill delays and feeling left behind”. This was an unreasoned, extreme position and thus irrational. This was unacceptable overreach, as were the suggestions that these restrictions needed to be actively explored and ‘addressed’ so that the concerns were dispelled. These were matters squarely within the domain of parental responsibility, not that of the Council’s officers, whether in a Child Protection Plan or otherwise. Section 43(8) expressly prohibited inclusion of steps in the plan that were beyond the Council’s powers.

92. Mr Y’s fourth and fifth grounds concern what are said to be discrete interferences with Article 8. Putting a Child Protection Plan in place was automatically a breach of Article 8 rights if Ground 1 was made out, he said, because it would not have been made in accordance with the law. Besides, less intrusive measures had not been considered, such as simply offering B the accommodation he would need given his unwillingness to take up the offer of boarding school education. Such accommodation could have been arranged far sooner, making the transition easier for everyone. That was far less intrusive. His suspicion was that the Council was simply desperate to avoid the cost.

93. Then there were the attempts to access the family home notwithstanding Council’s officers having been told repeatedly and emphatically they were not welcome. There were attempts made before any child protection plan was in place, then a series of further attempt in July, twice in August and then in September 2025. He estimated there had been 10 attempts in total. Officers had not taken ‘no’ for an answer. Mr Y added that his complaint letters about this have not been heeded, nor had social workers respected what he has told them when they have arrived insisting on entering and speaking to his children. Section 47 allows investigation, but not repeated attendance at a particular address to which entry has been refused. That this interfered with private and family life is not denied, Mr Y said. How then was it justified as proportionate? Any queries the local authority had could have been answered in correspondence, he said. There was also no legal basis whatsoever for threatening to involve the police. This was not a criminal matter. Doing so was deceptive and intended to frighten him into compliance with the social worker’s unlawful demands. The Council’s case

94. Mr Parkin began by painstakingly taking me through the history of the attempts made to assess the children and of the Council’s escalating concerns, which he characterised as a pattern with three particular features. The first was the marked unwillingness of Mr Y and Mrs Z to allow any assessment and indeed any contact with their children by Council officers until they were, in effect, expelled from the home or about to be, as had happened with A and B, which point Mr Y and Mrs Z were only interested in the Council taking over responsibility. That pattern had led to two expulsions, both towards the end of childhood but not yet at the point of adulthood. Mr Y and Mrs Z were effectively abdicating their responsibilities as parents and asking the Council to step in. That was inherently problematic and harmful. There were other children to whom this could happen. The third feature of the pattern was a very restrictive home environment with inflexible rules which led to tension and conflict. This was vital context to the decision to proceed with an Initial Conference and to form a plan included but was not limited to fully understanding the family dynamics.

95. Turning to the actual decision-making that had happened against this backdrop, Mr Parkin accepted that Mr Y was right to draw a distinction between the threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect significant harm or the likelihood of it on the one hand and that based on suspicions being “substantiated” on the other as a basis for action. He stressed that enquiries threshold was “quite low” but agreed that a conclusion had to be reached under section 47(8) before a plan could be made: R (S) v Swindon BC [2001] EWHC Admin 334 (“ Swindon ”) at §36. However, that case also emphasised that the need for intervention was a matter of professional judgement: “the whole structure of the act is quite alien to the mechanism of establishing facts on the balance of probability before action can be taken in cases such as the present”, as Scott Baker J as he then was had emphasised.

96. Here it had not been spelled out in “so many words” by the conference participants that the children were suffering or likely to suffer significant harm but was implicit in the reasoning those involved had given: §37 above. Further, the lead social worker, their manager, the CAIT police representative and the Lead for Elective Home Education had all been very explicit that there was risk of “emotional harm”. This was implicit in the views others had expressed, and was essentially a universal conclusion. The plan itself had then reflected the position by telling C, D, E and F that “based on information gathered, there are significant concerns regarding the emotional well-being, safety and long-term outcomes for all you in your family” especially as none of them had “yet been seen by professionals” and Mr Y and Mrs Z were “avoiding scrutiny and deflecting responsibility, particularly when concerns are raised about their parenting response.” It was also pointed out that B’s current circumstances of being about to be expelled were strikingly similar to what A had experienced.

97. The social worker had recorded in the plan that that it was her “professional view…. that the threshold for significant harm may be met, particularly in relation to emotional abuse and neglect”. That wording was not as clear as it might have been, but reading the documents generated following the Initial Conference as a whole, that the view was that the threshold was, in fact, met.

98. If there was any error, Mr Parkin submitted, it was not one of failing to gather the evidence that would support such conclusion, but only a failure to express that conclusion in sufficiently categorical terms. This was the very kind of technical or semantic error in decision-making that section 31 (2A) of the 1981 Act was concerned with; an error of no real legal substance. It was highly likely that the decision would have been the same absent that kind of error. Mr Parkin added that Mr Y’s email of 23 May 2025 confirming the nature of the ultimatum B had been given vividly illustrated the substantiated nature of the concerns. My Y had said that B would “have to leave the house” by the date the ultimatum expired, 29 August 2025 if he remained unwilling to take up the offer of the boarding school place and ought to contact the Council if he was unable to arrange accommodation for himself. This was extraordinary. Mr Y appeared to believe he had no responsibility whatsoever to ensure his children had a stable environment. It was unavoidable that the Council should reach a conclusion that significant harm was occurring, or likely.

99. Mr Parkin accepted that the “primary goal” of the plan was one of assessment, but the need for support for B in the form of accommodation, should he not be permitted to live at home, and for a safety plan for his siblings, were also objectives. These were all rational steps to take the circumstances. Further, Working Together envisaged an ongoing process of assessment as part of a Child Protection Plan: §61 above. Overall, the plan was to address risks to the children. The obstacle to assessment had been Mr Y and Mrs Z’s uncooperativeness, which had been a running theme in their relationship with the Council. Although here the Council had ultimately resorted to seeking a section 43 order, if that was a precondition to undertaking a section 47 assessment in every case where parents were uncooperative, the system would collapse.

100. Mr Parkin urged me to reject Mr Y’s argument that there was a second threshold for a Child Protection Plan concerned with attributing harm to neglect, abuse or exploitation caused by the failures of child’s parents. Those things might be present, but a plan might also be necessary in many other circumstances. This issue had not been central to Peterborough , he said, but had been squarely confronted at §45 of Bristol : “45 This distinction [between sections 31 and 47(1)] has importance for the rival arguments. Section 31 falls under Part IV, entitled "Care and Supervision". Part IV sets out the tests and procedures for care and supervision orders. Section 47 by contrast falls within Part V, labelled "Protection of Children". Therefore, the focus in Part V is the significant harm the child is suffering or is likely to suffer. It is not concerned with attribution as section 31 is. Part V is a mechanism for the better protection of children. By way of illustration, for an emergency protection order ("EPO") under section 44 of Part V (as mentioned in section 47 ), there is no requirement of attribution of risk to the caregiver. Under an EPO, a child may be removed to different accommodation irrespective of the sources of harm or risk in order to protect the child from the risk. The consequence of all this is that for a section 47 conclusion about significant harm under Part V, the inquiring local authority must provide a clear snapshot of the harm the child has suffered or is likely to suffer. It is not about attributing the harm, let alone pointing the finger of blame. Properly conducted, a section 47 inquiry is an objective harm assessment, a harm profile revealed by the statutory enquiry.”

101. It followed that there was no need for the Council to reach an evidence-based conclusion that Mr Y and Mrs Z were responsible for neglect, abuse or exploitation for there to be a child protection plan. Even if that were wrong, the initial conference had concluded there was, at the very, least the risk of neglect or emotional abuse.

102. There was no conclusion that the children had been banned from social media and that such a ban was impermissible in the plan or other assessment documentation, Mr Parkin submitted. This part of Mr Y’s claim was directed at a non-existent target. Instead, the documents spoke of a need to understand how parental boundaries and routines operated around mobile phone and social media use and what the impact of that was on B and C. Reaching such an understanding was an unobjectionable aim of the assessment process. No firm view had been expressed. On the contrary, it had been noted that social worker would be looking into resources to help the parents understand the social media apps and their usage.

103. Turning to Article 8, Mr Parkin accepted that if the Child Protection Plan had been unlawfully made, it would not be “in accordance with the law” and thus would be a breach. However, he submitted that it was highly unlikely that a decision to initiate a Child Protection Conference would ever be disproportionate or unnecessary in a democratic society, given the overarching welfare and protection purposes. Further, a plan that was primarily concerned with further assessment did not have any coercive element to it. That was why the Council had ultimately needed to apply to court for a section 43 order here. As for the attempted visits to the home, it was hard to understand Mr Y’s objection in circumstances where the social workers had expected his wishes are not entered the family home. As regards the threatened involvement of the police, Mr Parkin’s position in the detailed Grounds of Defence was this was only made in the context of assessment being resisted by force, and so was not unusual for anything other than standard practice. Analysis Context

104. Before I grapple with Mr Y’s and Mr Parkin’s submissions about what must precede any Child Protection Plan, I need to recap on the circumstances the Council was confronted with immediately before the Initial Conference on 24 July 2025 was convened. At that point, three things were clear.

105. First, there had been concerns about the older children in the family for some time, particularly about A and B. The Council had considered making section 47(1) enquiries at various points, but had never completed an assessment until shortly before the conference: §§8 to 13 above. In my view, Mr Parkin’s characterisation of the history as series of ongoing attempts to assess that were rebutted by Mr Y and Mrs Z is an oversimplification. They had not wanted to cooperate historically, but at various points the Council itself had decided not to take matters forward either by assessing notwithstanding their resistance, as ultimately happened, or by applying for a section 43 order to compel cooperation. The Council was hardly powerless. For whatever reason, it must have decided repeatedly that matters were not quite so serious as to necessitate intervention until the ultimatum was given to B. Indeed, it had actively decided to close the case before it learned of that ultimatum: §13 above.

106. It seems to me that there are real difficulties in the Council relying on its historical inaction in the face of Mr Y’s and Mrs Z’s unwillingness for their children to be assessed as a significant reason for there to be an Initial Conference and then a Child Protection Plan. This and other local authorities will encounter uncooperative parents all the time. In general, they will be able to persuade such parents that it is in their children’s and their own interests to cooperate with assessments. If not, then section 43 is available. It is unclear to me why consideration was not given to using that mechanism until the Child Protection Plan was in place. Possibly only then was legal advice sought and given.

107. Secondly, B faced an imminent ultimatum requiring him to leave home either to take up the offered boarding school place, or find accommodation for himself, or seek it via the Council. There was no ambiguity over the ultimatum. The Council had been told about it by Mr Y himself in clear terms and, as its own internal documents recorded, he had remained firm after giving A similar instructions not to return home when A was in hospital recovering from a self-harm incident. Indeed, the police had needed to use their emergency child protection powers to accommodate A. The Council also had significant amounts of information about A and B for the Initial Conference because it had spoken with both of them. It knew A’s opinion that there was “emotional harm” occurring and that B agreed there was a risk to the other children and was unwilling to take up the boarding school offer. The Council also knew B was troubled to the extent that there had been violent confrontations at home and even if these were not attributable to Mr Y and Mrs Z, they were indicative of vulnerability. In these circumstances, the Council could easily come to the conclusion that it was likely B needed its help very soon, either to change Mr Y and Mrs Z’s mind about the ultimatum or to accommodate him if they did not.

108. Thirdly, the Council knew very little about C, D, E and F. They were all being homeschooled at that point and although these arrangements would have had to be approved and there is absolutely no suggestion that the children’s education was in any way inadequate, state contact with them to date was inevitably limited as a result. There are references to C, D, E and F being at risk of violence from B in the Council’s records, but there is no real foundation for suggesting, less still concluding, that there was such a risk because no one had ever said that B been violent towards his siblings and the circumstances in which there had been violent conflict with his parents all involved them asking him to do or refrain from doing certain things in that parental capacity. A had thought a plan was needed because of “emotional harm”, but not because of any physical risk to them from B: §38. In my view, amongst the most significant features of the Child and Family Assessment form are the passages drafted in plain English which are addressed to C, D, E and F in turn stating the social workers hadn’t “yet had the chance to meet you yet, so we don’t know much more about you just yet – but we really looking forward to getting to know you better” and “[w]hen we've spoken with [your parents], it hasn’t always been clear that they understand how important it is for each of you to feel loved, valued, and emotionally safe”: §§22 and 33 above. Nothing had materially changed by the end of the conference. This lack of knowledge and clarity as reflected in some extent in the plan itself in the repeated references to the need to “understand” exactly what was happening in the family: for instance, §§35, 37 and 39 above.

109. There is one other important contextual factor to be borne in mind. Local authority social services officers are obliged both by Working Together and the nature of their work to prepare extensive records of their decision-making at speed, identifying and weighing multiple factors. This work is not easy. Part of it involves experience-based professional judgement both about the tell-tale signs of problems within families that cannot be safely be ignored and then what, if any, the appropriate intervention ought to be and when. Social workers handle multiple cases simultaneously. The stakes are extraordinarily high. This is why Scott-Baker J in Swindon at §55 and Singh J in Peterborough at §53 acknowledges the margin of appreciation in relation to the application of Article 8 in this context is a wide one. See too the comments of Lady Butler-Sloss in R v Hampshire County Council ex parte H [1999] 2 FLR 359 at page 371. It is also why Singh J acknowledged at §52 Peterborough that: “the reasons of a public authority which are set out in the sort of document under consideration in this case… should not be read as if they were a statute or a contract. As has been emphasised in other administrative contexts such as planning, they should not be read as if, for example, a public authority was sitting an examination. They need to be read in a commonsense and fair way and read as a whole.”

110. With these matters in mind, I now turn to the key arguments. Ground 1

111. It makes no sense to deal with the elements of Ground 1 chronologically, starting with Mr Y’s contention and that there could not be an Initial Conference because the section 47 assessment process was not yet complete. In other words, there had yet to be any conclusion, less still a properly reasoned, evidence-based one, on significant harm or the likelihood of such harm being suffered by B, C, D, E or F.

112. On this point, I consider that the Council’s concession is limited and does not take matters much further forward. It simply accepts “there [was] no satisfactory evidence of the degree of harm, or lack thereof likely to be suffered by the children” when the conference was arranged. That is not a concession that there is no harm or no likelihood of harm at all. At best, it might be said that the Council had not assessed harm as ‘significant’ or its likelihood of occurring in future.

113. However, in relation to B, if this was indeed what was being conceded, which Mr Parkin did not accept, the concession would have been wrongly made, in my view. It could not be clearer that, at the time the Initial Conference was convened the Council had formed the view that there was a likelihood of future harm in that B was about to be required to leave home and did not want to. Harm would be the unwelcome removal of a secure place to live, at home with parents and siblings, and the emotional consequences for the child regardless of the behaviour that had preceded that happening. Mr Y’s own communications about the ultimatum were evidence of the likelihood of that future harm. As I have already said, the Council had every reason to believe that Mr Y was likely to maintain the ultimatum, given what had happened with A. Mr Y himself had said that B seemed to be under the impression that he might find accommodation for himself, and was sceptical he could. Further, both A and B had spoken with the Council and neither thought B was being looked after as he should have been. In short, B, a vulnerable child, was about to become homeless. Even though the Council had been alerted to this by Mr Y and asked for its help, it would be completely unrealistic to think that enforcing the ultimatum would not result in significant harm because B did not wish to leave home and there was, as yet, nowhere for him to go.

114. In these circumstances, the conclusion that there needed to be an Initial Conference in relation to B was entirely understandable. In the language of Working Together, the Council was responding to the “urgency of the case” including imminent homelessness and “the needs of the child”, in particular for accommodation, “and the nature and severity of the harm they may be facing”. The position as regards harm associated with boundary-setting, including in relation to social media use, was less straightforward, but the likelihood of harm arising from the ultimatum was clear cut.

115. It is no answer to say that further enquiries needed to be made in relation to B. The Council already had a graphic picture of what was happening, which was similar to what had happened to A who had suddenly become homeless prompting the police to use their section 46(2) emergency protection powers (having presumably had reasonable cause to believe that A would otherwise be likely to suffer significant harm: §§45 and 53 to 54 above). The Council had spoken to B and, by the time of the conference, to Mr Y and Mrs Z. It is far from obvious what further information could be gathered within the relevant timeframe. Even if further enquiries could have been made, they were not necessary in my view for the Council to form a rational view that B faced the likelihood of significant harm.

116. It is not a good answer either to say that the Council needed to be satisfied that the harm B faced was as a result of abuse, neglect or exploitation in the sense those terms are used in section 31 , less still that one or more of them needed to be attributable to Mr Y or Mrs Z. I agree with Dexter J’s analysis in Bristol that, although some of the language is similar, section 47 is concerned with a much broader range of harms that might befall a child than section 31 . It needs to be kept in mind that section 31 focuses on the threshold test that needs to be met for a local authority to step in to an established family and take over the care of one or more of its children or require supervision. In that context, it is unsurprising that what needs to be shown is a failure, whether unintentional or not, on the part of the parents whose ordinary role will be displaced. Yet section 47 is essentially concerned with identifying and putting in place arrangements to protect against any significant harm that is occurring or may be likely. That is why Working Together defines ‘harm’ and its assessment so broadly: §§57 to 59 above.

117. The logic of Mr Y’s position is that the local authority cannot make enquiries and put in place child protection arrangements if a child has no parents who may be made the subject of a care order, as would be the case with an unaccompanied minor asylum seeker, for example. It would also prevent the Council from making enquiries and taking protective steps once the child was already in care, or if their care arrangement at home were entirely satisfactory but, at school, they were being sexually groomed or coerced into an organised crime gang. I do not accept section 47 is constrained in the way Mr Y submits. Peterborough does not suggest otherwise, in my view. There, Singh J accepted a submission by Counsel for the claimant that there was no evidence on which a public authority could reasonably have concluded that the claimant's parents had been guilty of neglect: §54. As a whole basis of that particular Child Protection Plan had been a factual conclusion that the parents were neglectful (see §35), it is unsurprising that Singh J found the plan unlawful. However, Peterborough is not authority for any principle that neglect, abuse or exploitation attributable to parents or not is a necessary precondition for a plan in all cases.

118. It is worth testing the counterfactual. Suppose an evidenced-based conclusion that neglect, abuse or exploitation attributable to parents or not was necessary a precondition to convening a child protection conference to discuss B’s imminent homelessness and needs. If this sort of harm attributable to parents were not established, on Mr Y’s analysis it is very hard to see how the Council would go about doing the very thing that Mr Y was seeking, which was to take over responsibility for B and meet has accommodation needs. No doubt emergency powers of some kind could have been used, but this would circumvent the sophisticated professional-consensus-based decision-making machinery established in Working Together around the child protection conferences. This would make no sense.

119. As regards the decision to convene the Initial Conference in respect of B, Mr Y’s final point was that there was nothing unlawful in a parent expecting their 16-year-old child to present themselves to the local authority seeking support. Parents had no legal duty to house children of that age. In my view, this point is bad. It confuses what is required by way of legal obligation with what is in a particular 16-year-old child’s interests. Sometimes there will be good reason why children’s interests are better served by them leaving home at 16 and some children choose to leave at that age, including to join the services. That does not mean it is desirable for all children by default. The Council’s conclusion that leaving home because of the ultimatum was likely to be significantly harmful to B was open to it, as I have said.

120. In circumstances where the Council could lawfully and rationally reach that conclusion in order to convene the Initial Conference about B, it could equally conclude at that conference that there remained a likelihood of significant harm, as indeed it did. As much is clear from the comments about the imminent risk of homelessness made by the professional participants: §§35 and 37. Nothing recorded as having been said immediately before or at at the conference could have displaced those concerns.

121. For these reasons, making the appropriate allowances identified above at §109 about the wording of the decision-making documents, I conclude that the Council properly directed itself that there was a likelihood of significant harm when making the parts of the Child Protection Plan that related to the ultimatum given to B even though, as Mr Parkin acknowledged, the language used could, in my view, have been clearer.

122. The position as regards C, D, E and F is different in my view, however. It is also different in relation to the parts of the Child Protection Plan which considered the unlikely alternative of B remaining at home. In relation to all of them, Mr Y’s arguments have far more force.

123. The Council’s main difficulty is the chasm between the information it had as a result of the very limited section 47(1) enquiries it had made about C, D, E and F before the conference happened which I have summarised at §108 and any conclusion that they were suffering significant harm or likely to be in future. There were similar difficulties with assessment of boundary-setting in relation to B. It recognised that more information needed to be gathered, looking at the family dynamic holistically even though A and B had said that this was harmful: §39 above,

124. At a number of points, the Council itself came close to facing up to this difficulty, referring to the possibility or potential of harm, and the need to reach a clear understanding, for example: §§37, 59 and 84 above. However, it then went significantly further in that the participating professionals reached a consensus of sorts there was harm, that is “emotional abuse” and/or “emotional neglect”. Despite the length of the various reports, notes and plan it is very hard to discern precisely what this abuse or neglect was, or even whether the Council considered it was occurring at the time of the conference, or that there was some future likelihood of it. Strikingly, the nature of the harm was not explained to C, D, E and F, who were four of the five children who the Council was ostensibly seeking to protect with its plan. Instead they were told that it was not clear Mr Y and Mrs Z understood their emotional needs because Mr Y and Mrs Z had not talked much about that the children themselves had yet to be spoken with: for example, §§22 to 25.

125. Taking the Council’s case at its highest, it was that A and B were suggesting harm of at least one of these kinds was occurring, and that Mr Y and Mrs Z’s own comments when interviewed suggested they operated a very strict regime at home where non-compliance was penalised, that this included limited access to social media, and the pattern of exclusion from the home which A and B had experienced might repeat itself: §26.

126. My view is that this hypothesis begged far more questions than it answers. Conceivably, the home environment could be an oppressive one in which adherence to flexible rules was prioritised to such an extent that necessary emotional support was absent and the children might be given ultimatums in future. That was highly speculative, however, as the Council’s limited concession acknowledges. Putting this another way, the Council could come to a view that there was a risk of significant harm in future, but mere risk is not the test set by section 47 or Working Together. It is hard to conceive of any child who does not place some risk of harm in modern society. As Mr Y and Mr Parkin both acknowledged, the statute and the guidance require a rational conclusion that there is actual or likely significant harm in order for a child protection conference to be convened such as the Initial Conference in this case. Section 47(8) and Working Together also require the conference participants to reach such a conclusion before action can be taken, including making a Child Protection Plan.

127. This case is a good illustration of why those requirements are important precursors to any child protection conference. Participants at the conference will need to prepare and then make difficult, nuanced decisions on an informed basis. There may be an opportunity to gather some information at the conference if parents and affected children are present, but they may not be (as was the case with C, D, E and F here). Fairness will often demand that affected parents have notice of a local authority’s concerns in advance of such a conference in order that they can prepare and respond. That may be required under the common law, given the stakes, or Article 8. After all, in an extreme case, the decision made at the conference might be to proceed directly to care proceedings. More importantly still, if a Child Protection Plan is to be realistically capable of fulfilling the objectives identified at pages 93 to 97 of Working Together (§§60 to 62 above) at a minimum it will need to identify what the significant harm the child is suffering or likely to suffer actually is, and one or more steps necessary to protect the child against that harm, thus safeguarding and promoting their welfare. In my judgment, the lack of a completed assessment and the absence of sufficient information about risks and possibility are not harms in and of themselves.

128. I therefore conclude that Mr Y is right to say that the Initial Conference was prematurely called in relation to C, D, E and F. Had it not been for the likelihood of significant harm arising from the ultimatum, it would also have been premature to establish the conference in respect of B because the Council had not reached a clear conclusion B was suffering or likely to suffer significant harm for other reasons. Conceivably, it might have reached that conclusion based on the information it had gathered from A and B, and from the questions Mr Y and Mrs Z had answered, but such a conclusion is not expressed clearly in the pre-conference materials anywhere, nor in the plan.

129. Similarly, the professional participants in the conference were in no better-informed position when the discussions were over. Some appear to have concluded there was significant harm in the form of “emotional abuse” or “emotional neglect”, as I have said, but only the former of these conclusions appears in the tick box (§40 above), neither is explained in clear terms at all and they appear simply to be labels attached to the unease the participants felt about this family’s circumstances. Tellingly, one of the central objectives of the plan is to dispel their concerns, rather than protecting the children from something tangible that is identified. The lack of clarity and the plan compounded when it was reviewed and the unreasoned conclusions about “children’s education, social attainment and emotional development was being impacted” expressed: §42.

130. It follows that the Child Protection Plan in respect of C, D, E and F was not lawful.

131. I have considered whether parts of the Child Protection Plan which are lawful concerning B can be disaggregated from those which are not, and I have concluded that cannot be done practically. It follows that the whole plan will need to be quashed, though I will make clear in declaratory relief that not all of it is unlawful.

132. I now turn to the remaining arguments advanced under Ground 1. The next is about the lack of evidence for conclusions that there was significant harm or the likelihood of it. On this point, I do not accept Mr Y’s submissions. What is required is a rational conclusion made following sufficient enquiries. That may not generate a body of ‘evidence’ in the sense that word is conventionally used. A social worker may simply reach a properly reasoned conclusion, based on their professional judgment as recognised by Scott Baker J in Swindon : §95. As Singh J succinctly put it in Peterborough at §53, “the end of the day the defendant still has to ask itself the right questions and arrive at conclusions in answering those questions which are not irrational” to which I would add, ‘and give adequate reasons for those conclusions in the decision-making documents’.

133. I also cannot accept Mr Y’s submission about it being an impermissible purpose of a Child Protection Plan to further the assessment of a child or children. Working Together expressly recognises that further assessment may happen pursuant to a plan: §61 above. However, I agree that the parental non-cooperation is not a reason to move from a position where there are incomplete section 47(1) enquiries and so an incomplete assessment to a Child Protection Conference and preparation of a plan. That will simply compound the problem of planning on an uninformed basis. Instead, where social worker cannot agree with parents about an assessment process, a section 43(1) order will need to be sought.

134. Last, as regards this part the case, I agree that insofar as the need for the Initial Conference and a plan is based on some threat of violence by B towards the other children, I agree that was not a rational conclusion the Council could reach based on the evidence it had. There was nothing to suggest that B represented a threat to his siblings less still that it was likely he would cause them significant harm.

135. Turning to the Council’s arguments based on section 31 (2A) of the 1981 Act , I have no difficulty in rejecting them in respect of the errors made in relation to the calling of the Child Protection Conference and the making of the plan in respect of C, D, E and F. It is at least possible that, had the Council completed sufficient enquiries to enable it to assess these children and did so back in July 2025, it would have concluded that there was either significant harm or the likelihood of it in future. I do not read the recent independent social worker’s report as establishing conclusively that the Council’s concerns in that regard were baseless. It is also clear that things have moved on and Mr Y and Mrs Z have reflected on the event of the last few years and, in the eyes the social worker, are better parents for having done so. However, applying the test as summarised by Lewis LJ in Bradbury I cannot tell how the social worker who called for the conference or the other professional participants would have approached matters had they been properly informed thanks to a comprehensive assessment. This is a classic situation in which the court is being invited, here by the Council, to put itself into the shoes of multiple expert decision-makers and reach a view on what they would have done had they had information which they lacked. That is wholly impermissible in judicial review generally and section 31 (2A) does not create an exception. As Mr Y points out, I do not even have the benefit of evidence from those decision-makers about what they would have decided in the counterfactual situation. This is not an appropriate situation in which to withhold relief. Grounds 2 and 3

136. I will deal with Grounds 2 and 3 summarily. In short, having carefully read the material generated by the Initial Conference I accept Mr Parkin’s submission that the Council had not reached concluded view that any social media restrictions being operated within the family home were impermissible. The documents reflect A’s and B’s concerns about boundary setting which included social media use, and an understandable need to explore this as part of the assessment process. That is clear from the outcomes sections of the plan which do not prescribe the lifting of any restrictions whatsoever.

137. As Grounds 2 and 3 challenged decisions that have not been made, they are unsustainable and this part the claim is dismissed. Grounds 4 and 5

138. Mr Parkin accepted that a Child Protection Plan necessarily represented an interference with private and family life interests protected by Article 8 and so, if it were made unlawfully without following proper process, it would not be in accordance with the law and so human rights breach. In other words, as he said at the hearing, Mr Y’s first Article 8 argument stood or fell with Ground 1 of this claim. I agree. The process of making a child protection plan is important and a failure to follow it may be sufficiently significant to amount to an interference. Even though a plan in itself is not coercive it carries conclusions about family circumstances that have consequences, practical and emotional. I will make an appropriate declaration reflecting this. Strictly speaking in these circumstances, I do not need to make a finding on Mr Y’s alternative argument that less intrusive alternatives to making a plan, in particular simply offering B accommodation, were not properly considered. However, in my view this argument had no merit anyway. The Council was right to proceed to make a plan in respect of B because of the likelihood of significant harm. It would be wholly artificial to simply offer him the one thing Mr Y thought necessary rather than to look at and plan for his needs holistically.

139. Last, as regards the Council officers’ attempts to enter the family home, I find that there was no interference with private or family life that required justification. I say this because, at its highest, Mr Y’s case is that the Council’s officers called at the family’s home on 10 occasions asking to be admitted to assess the children and were turned away. The officer’s actions did not disrupt family life in any meaningful way and neither did they intrude upon the privacy of the family’s home. The position would have been different, of course, had they forced their way in unlawfully with or without the assistance of the police. As an example of that kind of interference see McLeod v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 24755/94). It did not cohere because Mr Y was very well aware of his rights and capable of standing on them. Even if repeated attempts to enter a family’s home individually or cumulatively amounted to an interference with Article 8 protected interests, such attempts would not, without more, amount to an unjustifiable interference and so an Article 8 breach in circumstances where the officers involved had an unchallenged suspicion that the children within might be at risk of harm and formed a lawful view that one of them was likely to experience significant harm. I stress such a view would justify overriding Mr Y’s refusal to allow access; that would demand a greater justification and, save in an emergency situation, due process. As Mr Y says, here there was a judicialized process to seek access to the children in the circumstances which the Council went on to use: section 43 . It would have been better had they resorted to it sooner, but not having done so does not represent a human rights breach, in my view.

140. As far as the threat to call the police is concerned, Mr Parkin was quite wrong to characterise this as an appropriate response to forcible resistance of the social workers. Mr Y never said he would resist with force. The social worker simply said that if he persisted in refusing access, she would involve the police. That was no doubt born of frustration, but was inappropriate and may well have escalated tensions. However, in itself, it does not turn what was otherwise not a human rights breach into one, especially as Mr Y immediately identified the threat as hollow. Conclusion and remedies

141. As indicated above, the Child Protection Plan is unlawful and will be quashed. I will make declarations as to the extent of its illegality and the narrow, process-based human rights breach identified above at §138. The remainder of the claim fails.

142. Having considered the parties’ submissions, I consider there should be no order for costs. Mr Y has been partly vindicated in relation to part of the Child Protection Plan concerning B, but much of the Council’s decision-making under challenge was lawful and were a costs order made in his favour, given the way the case was put, there would need to be a set off to reflect that which would quite possibly mean him paying money over to the Council. The costs of assessment to quantify this would be significant in themselves. The efficient, just solution is for each party to bear their own costs. ___________________ Appendix: Working Together Flowchart 5