DRN-6068905

The complaint Mrs R has complained about the way Barclays Bank UK PLC trading as Barclaycard responded to a claim she’d made under section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“the CCA”). What happened The circumstances of the complaint are well known to the parties so I won’t go over everything again in detail. But, to summarise, between March and April 2017 Mrs R paid around £3,000 to a company I’ll call “S” using her Barclaycard to have spray foam insulation installed at a rental property she owned. She said the purchase came with insurance and a manufacturer backed guarantee. Mrs R said in 2023 she decided to sell the property. She accepted an offer towards the end of the year, but the surveyor highlighted the spray foam. Mrs R said she found out the spray foam was incorrectly installed and wasn’t suitable for the property and caused damage. She said she later learned S had made a fraudulent misrepresentation; there was no cooling off period given; no signed contract; no reasonable care taken; and an inducement to buy. She said she spoke a company that advised her to raise a section 75 claim. And I understand there was a substantial cost to have the spray foam removed. Around January 2024 Mrs R put in a section 75 claim with Barclaycard. She said S had sold the product to her with some urgency saying it was a good price for a fixed time only. She said S sold the product on the basis it would secure the roof for the future and that it was risk free. She said she wasn’t told about any negative impacts, like trapping of moisture, or that it could impact a lender’s decision to offer a mortgage on it. She said she wasn’t told it was almost impossible to remove and that it would need a specialist company to do so. Barclaycard ultimately declined the claim because the purchase was made more than six years prior to Mrs R raising the claim, so it thought the claim had been brought out of time. Mrs R complained and referred her complaint to the Financial Ombudsman to consider. One of our investigators looked into things but thought Barclaycard’s ultimate answer on the claim was broadly fair. Mrs R didn’t agree. In summary, she said until 2023 she had no reason to believe there was any problem with the installation. She said the problem only crystallised when the property was surveyed for sale and the lender refused to proceed due to the spray foam. She said at the time she agreed to the installation there was no substantive public information available about the downsides of spray foam and consequences often arise years after installation. She said she’d been diligent as a landlord, and she relied on professional advice in raising her claim. She said she was going through a lot at the time and that she couldn’t understand why her situation wasn’t deemed sufficient to warrant an extension of the relevant time limit. As things weren’t resolved, the complaint has been passed to me to decide.

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What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. My findings on jurisdiction The event complained of here is Barclaycard’s alleged wrongful rejection of Mrs R’s section 75 claim in March 2025. This relates to a regulated activity under our compulsory jurisdiction. I understand Barclaycard hasn’t issued a final response letter for this aspect of the complaint. But Mrs R complained about Barclaycard’s answer to the claim and referred her complaint to the Financial Ombudsman in June 2025. I think her complaint in relation to the overall outcome of the section 75 claim was brought in time for the purposes of our jurisdiction. Mrs R also had a complaint in relation to the time taken by Barclaycard to deal with the claim which it formally answered in November 2024. For the avoidance of doubt, I’m not considering that as part of this decision because the parties have accepted that complaint wasn’t referred to our service in time. Merits I appreciate Mrs R has said several things went wrong at the point of sale. But I think the thrust of this complaint relates to how Barclaycard handled the section 75 claim. Section 75 is a statutory protection that enables Mrs R to make a like claim against Barclaycard for breach of contract or misrepresentation by a supplier paid by credit card in respect of an agreement it had with her for the provision of goods or services. But this doesn’t mean Barclaycard can be held liable for everything that may have gone wrong. It’s important to highlight Barclaycard is not the supplier. Creditors have no means of knowing what section 75 liabilities they might have, nor of investigating such liabilities nor of recovering them from suppliers, unless or until debtors raise section 75 claims against them. If a debtor raises a valid claim, it brings the creditor under a duty to honour its liability. But it would not be fair or reasonable to require a creditor to respond to section 75 claims however long in the past they arose. Our service must decide complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of a case. The Limitation Act 1980 (“the LA”) imposes a six-year limitation period on relevant claims, after which they become time barred. Taking into account this time period, the particular nature of liability under section 75, and the need for the debtor to raise a section 75 claim against their creditor before a cause for complaint to our service can arise, I consider it fair and reasonable for a creditor not to have to look into or honour a section 75 claim that was first raised with it by the debtor after the claim had become time barred under the LA. This is in line with our service’s longstanding approach to complaints under section 75. Barclaycard has said Mrs R’s section 75 claim was brought outside the relevant six-year limitation period under the LA. Mrs R has said S misrepresented the product. It’s difficult for me (and Barclaycard) to know what was discussed between Mrs R and S. There’s understandably a lack of supporting evidence of the discussions that took place. It was a long time ago, and S isn’t around to submit its own account of what was said. A misrepresentation would require a false statement of fact that induced Mrs R into the contract. While I don’t know exactly what was

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discussed between Mrs R and S, I have to bear in mind that it would be hard to conclude S made a false statement in 2017 about something it couldn’t have been aware of was potentially false until much later on. And I don’t think there could have been a fraudulent misrepresentation if S didn’t know the statement was wrong, and if it thought at the time what it was saying was right. In any event, the alleged misrepresentation cause of action arose when the contract was entered into in April 2017. For the alleged breach of contract cause of action, I take it to be S installed spray foam insulation that wasn’t appropriate, or that it did so without reasonable care and skill. As such, the alleged breach of contract occurred also around April 2017. The section 75 claim wasn’t raised with Barclaycard until January 2024, that is more than six years after the causes of action against S for misrepresentation and breach of contract would have accrued for the purposes of the LA around April 2017. I appreciate Mrs R quite understandably may not have known there was a potential problem until more recently. But having considered things carefully, as a starting point, I think Barclaycard had valid concerns the claim was raised out of time. There are some scenarios where the time limit under the LA can be extended. But it’s important to highlight the extension of time limits under the LA is different to the extension of time limits set out in our jurisdiction for considering complaints. Section 14A of the LA sets out a special time limit for negligence actions where facts relevant to the cause of action aren’t known at the date of accrual. But claims against the creditor for breach of contract won’t involve claims for damages for negligence and so I don’t think section 14A would apply for a breach of contract claim under section 75. There is a potential for section 14A to apply to claims based on allegations which could be considered a claim for negligent misstatement. But for similar reasons to what I’ve said above, I don’t think I can safely conclude S made a negligent misstatement if it couldn’t have been aware of a potential issue when it sold Mrs R the service. And even if I could consider there was a negligent misstatement made by S, it’s not totally clear that section 75 would cover causes of action under common law that arise independently of the contract. Section 32 of the LA sets out postponement of the limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake. For the reasons given above, I don’t think a fraudulent misrepresentation was made. It could possibly be argued that Mrs R and S entered into the contract on the basis of a mistake. But section 32(1)(c) that relates to mistakes only applies where the ‘mistake’ is an essential element of the cause of action. In Mrs R’s case, even if there was a mistake made which constituted negligence on the part of S, I think that ‘mistake’ wouldn’t be essential to the claim in negligence. Taking all that into account, while I appreciate it’s not straight-forward, I’ve not seen there’s a scenario that extends the time limit in this case. Where it is unlikely this claim against S could succeed due to the expiry of the likely relevant limitation period of six years, I find it was fair and reasonable for Barclaycard to ultimately decline the section 75 claim. So I don’t uphold the complaint. I should point out that while I’m not upholding this complaint, that’s not to say something hasn’t gone wrong with the installation. I’m sorry to hear Mrs R has been put to a significant cost. I can’t imagine how she must feel. I thank her for taking the time to bring her complaint. But while I may be sympathetic to the situation, I can only uphold the complaint where there are grounds to do so. Having considered everything carefully, I’m not going to direct Barclaycard to take action.

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My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs R to accept or reject my decision before 14 May 2026. Simon Wingfield Ombudsman

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