DRN-6300318

The complaint Mrs J’s complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mr H and Mrs J were already trial members of a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’). But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I’ll call the ‘Signature Collection’ – which they bought on 4 August 2016 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 850 fractional points at a cost of £9,170 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). Signature Collection membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr H and Mrs J more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mrs J paid for their Signature Collection membership by consolidating their trial finance and taking finance of £11,761 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Mrs J – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 26 October 2021 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender dealt with Mrs J’s concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 1 March 2022, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits. Mrs J disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) dated 31 March 2026. In that decision, I said: What I’ve provisionally decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

-- 1 of 10 --

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under Section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier. Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here. It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Signature Collection membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr H and Mrs J were: (1) told by the Supplier that Signature Collection membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true. (2) told by the Supplier that Signature Collection membership was an “investment” when that was not true. However, telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. After all, a share in an allocated property was, by its very nature, an investment. And while, as I understand it, the sale of the Allocated Property could be postponed in certain circumstances according to the Signature Collection Rules, Mr H and Mrs J say little to nothing to persuade me that they were given a guarantee by the Supplier that the Allocated Property would be sold on a specific date when such a promise would have been impossible to stand by given the inevitable uncertainty of selling property some way into the future. And as there’s nothing else on file to support the PR’s allegation, I’m not persuaded that there was a representation by the Supplier on the issue in question that constituted a false statement of fact. So, while I recognise that Mrs J and the PR have concerns about the way in which Signature Collection membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s Breach of Contract I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

-- 2 of 10 --

Mr H and Mrs J say that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement. Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr H and Mrs J states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like they made use of their fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. The PR also says on Mrs J’s behalf that the Supplier breached the Purchase Agreement because it went into liquidation. And if certain parts of the Supplier’s business were put into administration, I can understand why the PR is alleging that there was a breach of the Purchase Agreement as a result. However, neither Mrs J nor the PR have said, suggested or provided evidence to demonstrate that they are no longer: 1. a member of the Signature Collection; 2. able to use their Signature Collection membership to holiday in the same way they could initially; and 3. entitled to a share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property when their Signature Collection membership ends. So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mrs J any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Signature Collection membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next. Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements; 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

-- 3 of 10 --

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender. The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale Mrs J’s complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons. The PR says, for instance that: 1. the right checks weren’t carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs J; and 2. Mr H and Mrs J were pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Signature Collection membership at the Time of Sale. However, as things currently stand, neither of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed. I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren’t carried out by the Lender given this complaint’s circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs J was actually unaffordable, before also concluding that they lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs J. I acknowledge that Mr H and Mrs J may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Signature Collection membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr H and Mrs J made the decision to purchase Signature Collection membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier. Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Mrs J’s credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that’s the suggestion that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr H and Mrs J the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Signature Collection membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Signature

-- 4 of 10 --

Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Signature Collection membership was marketed or sold to Mr H and Mrs J as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Signature Collection membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. And there is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Signature Collection membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Signature Collection as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr H and Mrs J, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. But on the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to Mr H and Mrs J as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs J have been rendered unfair to her had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach (if there was one) had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Signature Collection membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr H Mrs J decided to go ahead with their purchase. This is because it was only after the Investigator issued their view, and after the judgment in R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (‘Shawbrook & BPF v FOS’) was handed down, that Mrs J provided a 2024 dated statement and recalled that the Supplier led

-- 5 of 10 --

them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain. And as experience tells me that, the more time that passes between a complaint and the event complained about, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and/or influenced by discussion with others, I find it difficult to understand why the Financial Ombudsman Service was only given such evidence when it was. Indeed, as there is limited evidence on file to corroborate Mrs J’s very recent evidence about their motivations at the Time of Sale, there seems to me to be a very real risk that her recollections were coloured by the judgment in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS or the outcome she received from Our Investigator. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that I can give their written recollections the weight necessary to finding that the credit relationship in question was unfair for reasons relating to a breach of the relevant prohibition. That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr H and Mrs J themselves don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Signature Collection membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs J’s decision to purchase Signature Collection membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale The PR says that Mr H and Mrs J were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier in order to make an informed choice. It isn’t clear what information the PR thinks the Supplier failed to provide at the Time of Sale. But as I’ve already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. So, while I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr H and Mrs J sufficient information, in good time, in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of ‘key information’), even if that was the case, neither Mrs J nor the PR have persuaded me that they were deprived of information that would have led them to make a different purchasing decision at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings (which I make no formal finding on), I can’t see why they led to an unfair credit relationship as a result. The PR also says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on

-- 6 of 10 --

1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); 3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’). But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs J in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. As the Supreme Court said in paragraph 326 of its judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it’s not possible to simply apply the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61 (‘Plevin’) to this complaint (as the PR does) when it’s concerned with a product and marketplace that were very different to those in Plevin. What’s more, Mrs J was provided with information as to the price of Signature Collection membership and the cost of the Credit Agreement (interest rate, fees, APR and monthly repayments). So, she was at least in a position from which she could understand the cost of the Credit Agreement and compare it with other options that might have been available at the Time of Sale.

-- 7 of 10 --

I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs J, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs J into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don’t currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs J. In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs J entered into wasn’t high. At £107.03, it was only 0.91% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (0.84%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had she known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I’m not currently persuaded that she either wouldn’t have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs J wanted Signature Collection membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for a timeshare she wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs J but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. Overall, therefore, I’m not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs J. Section 140A: Conclusion Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs J and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. And as things currently stand, I don’t think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis. Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

-- 8 of 10 --

While I’ve found that Mrs J’s credit relationship with the Lender wasn’t unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs J’s complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I’ve considered those grounds on that basis here. The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs J (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender’s compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. However, for the reasons I set out above, I’m not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs J a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren’t, in my view, available to her. And while it’s possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don’t think any such failure on the Lender’s part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time. Overall Conclusion In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs J’s Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. My provisional decision For the reasons explained I currently intend to not uphold the complaint. In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs J’s Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it. The PR also responded – they confirmed they had nothing further to add. Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I’m now finalising my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

-- 9 of 10 --

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.2 [G] The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. As the Lender has accepted my PD and the PR has confirmed it has nothing further to add, I can confirm that I see no reason to depart from my provisional findings. So in conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs J’s Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. My final decision For the reasons set out above, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs J to accept or reject my decision before 15 May 2026. Paul Clarke Ombudsman

-- 10 of 10 --